PERSONAL AND PARTY 
GOVERNMENT 



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

ILmttion: FETTER LANE, E.C 

C. F. CLAY, Manager 




OFtjin&urgfc: 100, PRINCES STREET 

aStrlin: A. ASHER AND CO. 

ILnpjig: F. A. BROCKHAUS 

^eto-lork: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

ISombas anU Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. 



Ad rights reserved 



PERSONAL AND PARTY 
GOVERNMENT 



A CHAPTER IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF 

THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REIGN 

OF GEORGE III, 1760— 1766 



BY 

D. A. WINSTANLEY, M.A. 

FELLOW AND LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 



CAMBRIDGE 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
I9IO 



•$>^' 






(JEambrtUge : 

PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 



to 



PREFACE 

TN the following pages an attempt is made to narrate 
-*- the struggle between the crown and the whig party 
from the accession of George III to the downfall of the 
first Kockingham administration. The tale is tangled 
and involved, and it has been necessary, in order to 
preserve the continuity of the story, to omit much of 
vital interest in the history of the time. Thus the highly 
important negotiations with France, and the Peace of 
Paris, are only considered in their bearing upon domestic 
politics; and although this limited treatment might well 
deserve censure in a work professing to be a general 
account of the period, it may possibly be excused in what 
claims to be no more than a study of only one aspect of 
the early years of the reign of George III. 

It would be a mistake, however, to deny or belittle 
the importance of the contest between the king and the 
whig leaders. It was no mere selfish lust for power that 
impelled George III to wage war upon the men who had 
enslaved his grandfather, but a conscientious conviction 
that it was his duty, as a constitutional monarch, to rule 
as well as to reign. Nor were his opponents influenced 
by sordid and ignoble motives. Believing firmly in the 
principles of party government, Newcastle and his followers 
saw in the increase of the power of the crown a menace to 



VI PREFACE 

the safety of the nation and the predominance of parlia- 
ment; and, though worsted in the encounter, and con- 
demned to dwell, save for a brief and unhappy interval, 
in the wilderness of opposition, the ideals, for which they 
endured defeat, were destined ultimately to triumph. 
The defects of the whigs, and they were many, have not 
been spared by historians; but it is to their credit that 
in their struggle with the monarchy they were fighting 
not for places but for principles. 

Their failure is somewhat surprising, seeing how much 
they had in their favour. It might have been anticipated 
that a youthful king, inexperienced in affairs, and too apt 
to disregard public opinion when it conflicted with his 
own will, would find himself no match for men who had 
grown grey in the service of his grandfather, and had 
accumulated a rich store of political experience. The 
success of the crown cannot be attributed to any one 
cause, and due account must be taken of the fact that 
an organised opposition to the administration was an 
irregular and unrecognised feature of the constitutional 
life of the period. But, when all reservations have been 
made, it remains true that Pitt, by refusing to throw 
in his lot with the whigs at the critical moment of their 
fortunes, did not a little to gain for the king the authority 
which he was so grossly to misuse. Great as were his 
achievements, and worthy as he is of the high place 
he holds in English history, Pitt failed as a domestic 
politician; and the early years of the reign of George III 
constitute the record of his failure. 



PREFACE Vll 

Use has been made of the valuable Newcastle, 
Hardwicke, and Bute papers at the British Museum ; 
and no student of the eighteenth century can fail to owe 
much to the many distinguished historians who have 
devoted themselves to that period. I am also deeply 
indebted to Dr Foakes-Jackson of Jesus college, and 
to Mr H. W. V. Temperley of Peterhouse, for much 
kind assistance. By a generous expenditure of time 
and trouble they were able to remove many blemishes, 
and suggest many improvements; and while the author 
is solely responsible for the many defects of his work, 
they have no small share in any merits which it may 
possess. I must also thank Dr A. W. Ward, master 
of Peterhouse, who was good enough to give much needed 
help. 

D. A. W. 

March 2, 1910. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTEB 

I. The Accession op George III 

II. The Fall op Pitt 

III. The Supremacy of Bute . 

IV. The Grenville Ministry 

V. The Fall of George Grenville 

VI. The Eockingham Ministry 



PAGE 

1 
43 

78 
156 
204 
240 



APPENDIX 

I. William Pitt and his latest Biographer 



276 



II. The Election of a High Steward of the Uni- 
versity of Cambridge in the year 1764 . . 284 

III. Placemen and the repeal of the Stamp Act . 305 

Index 308 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. 

The accession of George III to the English throne on 
October 25th, 1760, marks the beginning of an important 
epoch in the constitutional and political history of this 
country. Having but recently attained his majority when 
he inherited the crown, the new prince was to reign for 
sixty years, frequently to the detriment of the nation whose 
welfare, nevertheless, he sincerely had at heart. The 
domestic and personal misfortunes of his later life, and 
the courage he displayed under the burden of adversity, 
gained for him the affection of his subjects, causing them 
to forget his faults as a ruler ; but those who knew him 
in his younger days regarded him with a less friendly 
and more critical eye. Lord Waldegrave, who had acted 
as his governor, formed an unfavourable opinion of his 
character, crediting him with obstinacy, uncharitableness, 
and a lack of frankness 1 ; and, unfortunately, these defects 
were exaggerated rather than diminished by the education 
he had received. For fear that he might be contaminated 
by the lax morality of his age, he had not been permitted 
to mix freely in society; and though this restriction 
doubtless prevented him from contracting many vicious 
1 Waldegrave Memoirs, pp. 8 — 10. 



2 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

habits, it seriously restricted the limits of his mental 
horizon. A tendency to act upon prejudices which he 
mistook for principles, an inability to credit his op- 
ponents with sincerity and good faith, an inveteracy of 
resentment, and a blind adherence to his own opinions, 
however little founded on reason and knowledge, were the 
distinguishing characteristics of George III throughout his 
long reign. Sincerely and unaffectedly pious, genuinely 
anxious for his people's welfare, he possessed many qualities 
admirable and attractive in a private individual; and, 
even as a constitutional monarch, he might have acted a 
useful part in the intelligent discharge of the formal 
duties of his office. But, unfortunately both for himself 
and his country, he elected to play a more ambitious role, 
and one for which he was intellectually unfit. 

The task which he set himself to perform was no less 
than the restoration of the personal power of the monarchy 
which, since the Ee volution of 1688, had suffered a sensible 
declension. The great struggle in the seventeenth century 
between the crown and parliament for supremacy in the 
state, in the course of which one king had lost his life 
upon the scaffold, and another had been obliged to seek 
refuge in France, had ended in a victory for the popular 
assembly; and Greorge III had no wish to go back upon 
a settlement which had been ratified by time and ac- 
quiesced in by the majority of the nation. The preroga- 
tives, claimed and exercised by the Stuart monarchs, had 
perished with them; and, after the Eevolution of 1688, 
it was impossible for an English sovereign to assert a 
supremacy over the law of the land or a right to rule 
independently of the will of parliament. Henceforth he 
was compelled to recognise that very definite limits had 
been placed to his authority; and that, if he was the 
leader of the nation, he was also, in a sense, its servant. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 3 

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that the 
statesmen responsible for placing William of Orange upon 
the English throne intended to deprive him and his suc- 
cessors of all influence upon the government of the state. 
The political principles, which inspired the leaders of the 
Revolution, are embodied in the two great statutes of the 
period, the Bill of Rights and' the Act of Settlement, 
neither of which are directed towards the annihilation 
of the royal authority, aiming rather at the restraint of 
those powers which had rendered the government of the 
Stuarts insupportable. The law of the land was made 
superior to the arbitrary will of the sovereign by the 
abolition of the suspending and dispensing powers, and 
by making the tenure of the judicial office independent of 
the good pleasure of the crown ; whilst annual sessions of 
parliament were rendered indispensable by the necessity 
of passing the Mutiny Act every year, and by the exten- 
sion of the practice of appropriation of supplies. Thus the 
effect of the Revolution was to institute, for the first time 
in English history, a limited monarchy with parliament as 
the supreme power ; but, restricted as the royal authority 
was, it still remained considerable. An immense amount 
of patronage was still vested in the king; his choice of 
ministers was unfettered by legal restrictions; he could 
dismiss parliament at pleasure, and could even refuse to 
sanction a measure approved by both houses. Possessed 
of such extensive powers, it is not surprising that neither 
William III nor Anne were cyphers in the politics of their 
time, and often exercised a decisive influence upon the 
course of national affairs. 

The outcome of the constitutional struggle had been, 
therefore, not to destroy the royal prerogative, but to insure 
that it was used in accordance with the will of parliament. 
That body, as representative of the nation, was made 

1—2 



4 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

responsible for the proper use of the authority of the 
crown; but, unfortunately, nothing was done to equip it 
for the adequate performance of this onerous task. Those, 
who had reformed the monarchy, had omitted to reform 
the parliament. No steps had been taken to extend the 
franchise, to diminish the number of rotten boroughs, or 
to check the practice of bribery at elections. It was still 
possible for seats to be purchased in the open market, for 
two or three freeholders to return a representative, and 
for a member to accept a bribe at the hands of the 
government without being called to account by indignant 
constituents. It is true that parliament could control the 
king, but it is equally true that the king, if he chose 
to do so, could control parliament. In Cornwall, which 
returned more borough members than any other English 
county, and was notorious for electioneering corruption, 
the crown was possessed of considerable influence 1 ; and, 
in other parts of England, it was customary for certain 
constituencies, known as treasury boroughs, always to 
return the nominees of the ministry of the day. More- 
over, the members of a large number of boroughs were 
practically appointed by private individuals or close 
corporations who, regarding the privilege as a species 
of property, were often found willing to sell their rights; 
and it was open to the monarch to compete with his sub- 
jects in the purchase of seats. 

The defects in the electoral system were not the only 
means possessed by the king of influencing the body 

1 According to Coxe, Lord Falmouth, at the General Election of 
1741, " gained over many of the Cornish boroughs which had usually 
returned the members recommended by the crown," and, apparently, in 
1774, a later Lord Falmouth was able to return the members of six 
Cornish boroughs. See Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole (1798), i. 
684; Porritt's The Vnreformed House of Commons, i. 340. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 5 

which had undertaken to defend the national liberty. 
The extensive patronage, which he still retained, enabled 
him to reward richly those who rendered him personal 
service; and members of parliament who dared to 
frustrate the wishes of the crown, did so with the 
knowledge that they were probably cutting themselves 
off from the valuable prizes of public life. A peerage, a 
public office, or a rich sinecure which would confer 
affluence upon the happy recipient, were among the 
usual rewards offered to men who were willing to 
sacrifice their convictions to their advancement. It has 
been related how, in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
" one nobleman had eight thousand a year in sinecures, 
and the colonelcies of three regiments. Another, as 
auditor of the exchequer, inside which he never looked, 
had eight thousand pounds in years of peace and twenty 
thousand in years of war 1 ." The same tale is told by 
Horace Walpole who enumerates with great complacency 
the various patent places conferred upon him by an affec- 
tionate father, and proudly asserts that " he who holds an 
ancient patent place enjoys it as much by law as any 
gentleman holds his estate, and by more ancient tenure 
than most gentlemen hold theirs 2 ." When, moreover, it 
is remembered that the granting of offices of great profit 
and no obligations did not exhaust the resources of the 
crown, that it was still possible for valuable government 
contracts to be assigned as rewards for political services, 
and for the supporters of the ministry to be enriched at 
the public expense, some idea can be formed of the golden 
prospect which revealed itself to those who entered into 

1 Trevelyan's The Early History of Charles James Fox (Silver Library 
edition), pp. 97, 98. 

2 Walpole's Works (1798), n. 363—370. The essay is also printed 
in Cunningham's edition of Walpole's Letters, i. 



6 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

politics, not with the idea of serving their country, but 
with the intention of founding a fortune 1 . 

Thus, by a wise dispensation of his patronage, by in- 
fluencing elections, and corrupting the chosen of the people, 
it was still possible for an English king, even after the 
Revolution settlement, to rule in apparent submission to 
parliament but really in accordance with his own wishes. 
Able to control the guardian placed over him, he could 
still exercise a decisive influence over the course of politics; 
for a subservient house of commons, bribed and cajoled 
into submission, would support the ministers whom the 
king approved, and the royal prerogative, nominally exer- 
cised under parliamentary supervision, would, in effect, 
be uncontrolled. Yet nothing is more certain than that, 
in spite of these many advantages, the English monarchy, 
after the death of Queen Anne, declined in prestige and 
influence, and by the time that G-eorge III ascended the 
throne had reached the nadir of its fortunes. The new 
ruler discovered that his patronage was dispensed by the 
ministers who, as his grandfather had bitterly remarked, 
were indeed "kings in this country," that members of 

1 On his accession, George I was informed by Lord Cowper that 
"the parties are so near an equality and the generality of the world so 
much in love with the advantages a king of Great Britain has to bestow, 
without the least exceeding the bounds of law, that 'tis wholly in your 
Majesty's power by showing your favour in due time (before the elec- 
tions) to one or other of them, to give which of them you please a clear 
majority in all succeeding parliaments," Cowper's An impartial History 
of parties. Thoyras Rapin in his Dissertation sur les Whigs et les Torys 
(1717) also comments upon the influence possessed by the crown: "Le 
premier abus consiste dans la trop grande influence que la cour a dans 
les elections des membres de la Chambre Basse, et par consequent sur 
les deliberations du Parlement. ...On peut juger de l'effet que produisent 
ces intrigues par cette seule consideration. C'est qu'ordinairement le 
Parlement est Whig quand le ministere est Whig, et qu'il est Tory, quand 
les ministres sont Torys " (pp. 156 — 158). 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 7 

parliament looked to the cabinet rather than to the crown 
for guidance, and that what may be termed the political 
machinery had been captured by a few men who utilised 
it to maintain themselves in power and to diminish the 
authority of the crown. 

This unanticipated development had been brought 
about by a strange mixture of chance and design. The 
death of Queen Anne without issue placed in the person 
of George I a foreigner upon the English throne ; and the 
monarchy could not but be affected by the change. Past 
fifty years of age when he inherited the royal dignity, 
unable to speak the language of his new subjects, and 
caring little for the land he had come to rule, George I 
was not likely to be an object of English loyalty; and, 
though the nation might acquiesce in the accession of the 
Hanoverian dynasty as a safeguard against Catholicism 
and the predominance of French influence in Europe, it 
was hardly likely to become enthusiastic at the spectacle 
of a German elector installed upon the throne of the 
Stuarts. The part played by George I in the government 
of the country, and especially in the sphere of foreign 
policy, has doubtless been unduly minimised, but it remains 
true that, unable to count upon the affection of his people, 
and unacquainted with the domestic politics and constitu- 
tional customs of his new dominions, he was obliged to 
entrust what came to be known as the management of 
the house of commons to his ministers who, in order that 
they should adequately accomplish this task, had to be 
allowed to dispose of the royal patronage. Thus what the 
king should have preserved in his own hands, if jealous 
of his prerogative, was delegated to his advisers, with the 
result that it was the ministers and not the crown who 
granted peerages, appointed to bishoprics, and filled up 
those numerous places of which the occupants had nothing 



8 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

to do but draw their pay; and it is hardly surprising that 
the house of commons in time became more intent upon 
pleasing the king's servants than upon pleasing the king 
himself. 

It was a further blow to the royal influence that the 
new dynasty was deprived, by the circumstances attending 
its accession, of the power of choosing its ministers indis- 
criminately from either political party. Unable to confide 
in the tories, whom he suspected of having intrigued in 
the interests of the banished Stuarts, George I was obliged 
to place his trust in the whigs who used the royal favour 
to establish themselves in power and to drive their 
political opponents into the wilderness of opposition. 
His example was followed by his successor; and the 
whig predominance, which continued until the early 
years of the reign of George III, is one of the most 
striking and significant features of the constitutional 
history of the eighteenth century. It now became 
possible for the ministry to be composed of men holding 
the same political opinions, and thus possessed of the 
strength which comes from union; and, when it is re- 
membered that the custom of the sovereign attending 
the meetings of the cabinet ceased after the death of 
Queen Anne, it can be seen how great was the probability 
of a ministry, united in opinion and secure of a majority 
in the house of commons, taking up an independent and 
even hostile attitude towards the court. Thus the banish- 
ment of the tories from political life, and the transference 
of the crown to a foreign house, fostered the growth of an 
oligarchy which was to rule England until the accession 
of George III. A few great nobles, the leaders of the 
whig party, adding to the influence they possessed as 
borough proprietors and great landowners the vast 
resources of the royal patronage, effectively controlled 



THE ACCESSION OF GEOEGE III 9 

parliament; and the king found himself unable to dis- 
pense with their services, not because they were approved 
by the country, but because of their following in the 
house of commons. The great "Revolution families," as 
they came to be called, the Russells, the Cavendishes, 
and the Pelhams, established themselves in power by using 
the influence of the crown against the crown itself ; and 
it was left for George II to discover that, in order to 
protect himself from the Jacobites, he had sold himself 
into slavery to the whigs. At the end of his reign he 
complained with some bitterness that " he had a right to 
choose those who were to serve him, though at present so 
far from an option, he was not even allowed a negative 1 ." 
Parliament, which in former days had resisted the crown 
in the name of the people, now prevailed against the king 
in the interests of the whig aristocracy. 

Victory, however, as well as defeat is apt to be a cause 
of division; and those, who had succeeded in bringing the 
monarchy into subjection, soon fell to quarrelling amongst 
themselves. During the last years of Queen Anne the 
whigs, threatened by the tory supremacy, had presented 
a more or less united front to the enemy ; but no sooner 
had they prevailed over their opponents than divisions 
began to appear in their ranks. Sunderland and Towns- 
hend competed for the royal favour during the early part 
of George I's reign ; and though the schism was temporarily 
healed by Walpole's rise to power, and the deaths of his 
two most formidable rivals, Sunderland and Stanhope, it 
was soon to break out afresh. Walpole was obliged to 
work with colleagues who had no intention of submitting 
to the dictation of a single member of the cabinet, and 
after his resignation in 1742, it became more apparent 
than ever before that the whig party was split up into 
1 Waldegrave Memoirs, p. 133. 



10 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

rival sections, divided from each other by no question of 
principle but by personal predilections. While some 
gathered round the banner raised by the Duke of 
Bedford, others enlisted under the Duke of Newcastle, 
and the importance of a statesman was measured, not by 
the favour he enjoyed at court or his popularity with the 
country, but by the extent of his following in both houses 
of parliament. The importance of these divisions must 
not, however, be exaggerated, for though Newcastle and 
Bedford were in a sense rivals, they were often found 
willing to work together ; and the whig leaders, however 
great their internal dissensions, were apt to unite when 
their authority was threatened by the crown. 

The most typical, and in many ways the most success- 
ful politician of the period, was Thomas Pelham-Holles, 
Duke of Newcastle. Succeeding to the barony of Pelham 
on the death of his father in 1712, he was created Earl of 
Clare in 1714; and, in the year following, received the 
title of Duke of Newcastle upon Tyne, as a reward for 
raising a troop of horse for service against the Pretender. 
Many years later he was given a second dukedom, that 
of Newcastle-under-Lyme, as a consolation for the loss of 
office. Possessed of great wealth, for, in addition to his 
paternal inheritance, he had succeeded early in life to 
the vast estates of his uncle, John Holies, Duke of New- 
castle, he embarked upon a political career, declaring 
for the House of Brunswick and whig principles. Rising 
quickly to official importance, he became secretary of 
state in 1724, and continued to hold that office until the 
death of his brother, Henry Pelham, compelled him to 
exchange it for the first Lordship of the treasury, which 
post he occupied when George III ascended the throne. 
Few eighteenth century statesmen were more bitterly 
attacked by their contemporaries or have been more 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 11 

severely judged by historians. Depicted as a treacherous 
buffoon, and as devoid of any ability save a capacity for 
low intrigue, Newcastle has been caricatured rather than 
portrayed by writers who never grow weary of relating 
his rather foolish mannerisms and his many eccentricities. 
Though inferior to Pitt, both as a man and a statesman, 
Newcastle proved himself a capable politician and an 
industrious administrator. He was by no means so 
habitually deficient in his management of foreign affairs 
as has been often represented ; but it is unlikely that 
he would have risen to the eminence he attained if he had 
not shown himself a thoroughly efficient party manager. 
Throughout a lengthy political career he remained true 
to his belief in the principles of party government, and 
spared no pains to gain a following which would support 
him in parliament. He was not squeamish of the means. 
he practised to obtain his end, and for him the church, 
the civil service, the bench, seats in parliament, honours, 
and titles existed largely to buy and keep adherents. 
But, in thus openly carrying on a crusade of corruption, 
he differed little from most of his contemporaries, save 
that he was rewarded by greater success ; and if he had 
been more scrupulous, it is not improbable that the whig 
predominance would have been seriously endangered, and 
George III anticipated by his grandfather in the design 
of restoring the personal power of the crown. His devotion 
to party intrigue, sometimes, indeed, led him to under- 
estimate the importance of events which fell outside that 
sphere of activity; but, as will be seen, he was by no 
means destitute of real political insight. He may be 
accused of having lowered the standard of public life, 
but it is to his credit that, in an age of greed and cor- 
ruption, he was free from all reproach of desiring to make 
the pursuit of politics lead to the acquisition of wealth j 



12 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

and, when the days of adversity came, and he was obliged 
to retire from office, it was found that he had very 
materially reduced his own fortune in the service of his 
party. 

Newcastle's most intimate friends and political advisers 
were his brother, Henry Pelham, Philip Yorke, first Earl 
of Hardwicke, and William Cavendish, fourth Duke of 
Devonshire. Pelham, a dull and painstaking politician, 
did not survive the reign of Greorge II, but Hardwicke 
was to live to see the overthrow of the once triumphant 
party, and to die in the hour of defeat. The son of a 
small attorney at Dover, he rose by sheer ability and un- 
remitting industry from the ranks of the middle classes 
to be lord chancellor of England; and, although his 
comparatively humble origin was never forgotten by his 
enemies, he was the cherished friend of Newcastle who 
was accustomed to ask his advice in every political crisis. 
In seeking counsel in this quarter Newcastle was guided 
by a true instinct ; for, though a zealous whig and a firm 
believer in the principles of party government, Hardwicke 
was a wise statesman as well as an ardent politician, and 
had other interests at heart besides the triumph of the 
particular faction of which he was a member. In legal 
circles he will always be remembered as one of the 
greatest of equity judges ; and as a minister his fame has 
been unjustly tarnished by the attacks directed against 
him on account of his association with Newcastle. He 
can at least never be accused of being a mere time-server, 
for it should be remembered in his favour that, in the face 
of much temptation, he remained true to the cause he had 
espoused when it had ceased to be profitable to do so. 

The other member of this narrow circle, William 
Cavendish, fourth Duke of Devonshire, was a typical 
representative of a family which has always played an 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 13 

honourable part in English history. Inheriting his 
political principles almost as much as his name and his 
estates, the Duke of Devonshire rose to high office in the 
state ; and, although of mediocre ability, was gifted with 
that equable temperament which is among the inheritances 
of his house. A strictly honourable politician, and possessed 
of a fund of sound common-sense, he was universally re- 
spected and liked, even by those who were opposed to 
him; and was often called upon to settle differences which 
had arisen between men not endowed with his happy 
disposition. 

A rival section of the whig party was led by John, 
Duke of Bedford, who was destined to play a leading and 
not always glorious part in the early years of George Ill's 
reign. With an ancestry as distinguished as the Caven- 
dishes, Bedford's political importance was inevitable ; but, 
though always asserting his adherence to whig principles, 
he refused to submit to the Pelham predominance, and 
formed a faction of his own, which came to be known as 
the "Bloomsbury gang." A proud and passionate man, 
prone to take offence, and jealous of his own importance, 
Bedford was not easy to work with ; but he was by no 
means without political acumen ; and though he supported 
the unpopular side in the negotiations which concluded 
the Seven Years' war, he was able to give a consistent 
defence of the policy he advocated. In an age carried 
away by Pitt's imperial ideals, Bedford was what would 
now be called a "little Englander"; and his reputation 
has suffered in consequence. Unfortunately, too, for his 
good fame, though himself a man of strict honour, his 
followers were some of the most abandoned politicians of 
the day, preferring places to principles and their own 
advancement to the country's welfare. During the reign 
of George II, Grower, Sandwich, and Rigby were the 



14 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

leading members of this discredited faction ; and before 
any negotiation with Bedford could be brought to a suc- 
cessful issue, it was generally found necessary to satisfy 
the rapacious appetites of his followers. Lord Grower was 
perhaps the most respectable member of the party, with 
the exception of its leader ; but of Rigby nothing good is 
related save that he drank fair 1 . An unblushing and 
unscrupulous placeman, he had no thought or care save 
for his own profit; and under an appearance of jollity and 
good-nature, concealed a heartless and cynical tempera- 
ment. By callous self-seeking, and an effrontery which 
nothing could abash, he became of some political im- 
portance, and will always be remembered as the " brazen 
boatswain of the Bedford crew." 

If Bigby was the most grasping, Lord Sandwich was 
certainly the most dissolute member of this faction. With 
some pretensions as a patron of art, capable of industry, 
and not without administrative ability, he would have 
I>een quite fitted for high political office, were it not that 
he shocked an easy-going age in the matter of morality 
by the extent and variety of his excesses. A leading 
member of one of the most famous Hell-Fire clubs of the 
period, Sandwich lived and died in defiance of public 
decency ; and when George III appointed him to be 
secretary of state, men, forgetting that politicians cannot 
be pickers and choosers, wondered how so pious a king 
could select so infamous a servant. 

Out of the circle of these whig politicians it was 
Newcastle who rose to pre-eminence in the period after the 
fall of Walpole. He forced G eorge II to dismiss Carteret, 
the minister favoured at court, and succeeded in driving 
Bedford from the cabinet ; and the struggle was perhaps 
not so ignoble as it is usually represented. Reprehensible 
1 Trevelyan's The Early History of Charles James Fox, p. 71. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 15 

as were the means adopted by Newcastle to gain followers, 
he at least prevailed by aid of a parliamentary majority, 
thus testifying to the real strength of a minister under 
a constitutional monarchy. For ten years he governed 
England in alliance with his brother and Hardwicke ; but 
the death of Henry Pelham in 1754 struck a mortal blow 
at his power. Pelham, as first Lord of the treasury and 
leader of the lower house, had undertaken the manage- 
ment of the house of commons. It was he that had 
dispensed Newcastle's bribes and promises, keeping the 
party together and winning over waverers at critical 
moments ; and, now that he was gone, it was difficult to 
find another to take his place. Newcastle, confined to the 
house of lords, was unable unaided to execute properly 
this most necessary part of his work ; and there was a real 
danger that whoever was allowed to bribe and corrupt 
the members of the lower house would gain sufficient 
power to enable him to strike for independence. It was 
not until 1755 that Newcastle, driven to despair by the 
rising tide of opposition, entrusted the task to Henry Fox 
who, at the same time, was given the seals of secretary of 
state. Fox was not long in discovering that he had 
embarked upon a forlorn hope. There was every sign 
that the country would shortly be involved in another 
great continental struggle ; and, though war had not yet 
been declared with France, hostilities between the two 
countries had already begun in America where an English 
force had been almost completely annihilated. The nation, 
which had always regarded Newcastle with indifference, 
now began to look upon him with disgust. The capture 
of Minorca by the French, which followed immediately 
upon the formal declaration of war, fanned the fury of the 
people against an administration apparently betraying 
every symptom of incompetence. The system of patronage, 



16 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

so effective in the past, now broke down in the face of 
what threatened to be a great national catastrophe; for 
it was impossible that members of parliament should 
remain unaffected by so vigorous an outcry on the part 
of the country. Abandoned by Fox, who perceived the 
danger of being engulfed in the rising storm, Newcastle 
resigned office in the autumn of 1756, and was succeeded 
by an administration in which the Duke of Devonshire 
was first Lord of the treasury, and William Pitt secre- 
tary of state. 

The elder Pitt was perhaps the only politician of the 
period who was really popular with the nation at large. 
The grandson of a governor of Madras who acquired 
notoriety by the purchase of a famous diamond, he entered 
parliament in 1735, quickly distinguishing himself by the 
perfection of his oratory and the fierceness of his onslaughts 
upon Walpole's administration. A member of that little 
band nicknamed " the Patriots," he continued to oppose, 
even after Walpole's fall, pouring the vials of his rhetorical 
wrath upon Carteret whom he denounced, in the rather 
florid style that he affected, as having "drunk of the 
potion described in poetic fictions, which made men forget 
their country." Much of his criticism was grossly and 
absurdly unfair; and in the bitterness of his language 
and the ferocity of his attack, he has been equalled by 
many a soured politician. He was, however, no needy 
placeman offering himself for sale, and was honourably 
distinguished by the pure and disinterested motives which 
inspired his conduct. He did not seek for office because 
of any emolument it might bring, nor to satisfy a craving 
for self -aggrandisement ; but because he was convinced 
that he, alone, was capable of saving the country. He 
had many faults, and was often bombastic and overbearing; 
but he was possessed of all the self-assurance of true 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 17 

greatness, and, in an age of few moral ideals, cherished 
a passionate devotion to England. All else, profit, places, 
even the principles of party government, seemed to him 
naught when weighed against the national glory; and 
though doubtless his excessive patriotism sometimes led 
him to disregard the common bonds uniting different 
states, and to sacrifice domestic to imperial politics, his 
errors were those of the intellect and not of the heart. 
He was sometimes mistaken, but he was never mean 1 . 

There hardly seemed room for such a man in the 
narrow field of eighteenth century politics; and it is 
significant that Pitt was more than twenty years in 
parliament before he rose to anything higher than a 
subordinate post in the administration. But during this 
period of probation he was laying the foundations of his 
popularity with the nation which greeted with enthusiasm 
a politician so different from the ordinary type. When in 
1746 he accepted the office of paymaster of the forces, he 
astonished his contemporaries by refusing to take advan- 
tage of the valuable perquisites belonging to that post; 
and though a theatrical element was not absent from 
this act of self-denial, it was also inspired by a delicacy of 
feeling not often found in the political life of the time. 
The spectacle of a comparatively poor man declining to 
enrich himself at the public expense was not one to which 
that age was accustomed; and it is not surprising that 
the people began to believe that Pitt differed not only, in 
degree but in kind from the men who surrounded him, 
and to regard him with a feeling akin to personal devotion. 
The support of the nation, however, profited little in a 
parliament in which the Pelhams were predominant : and 
though by his marriage with Lord Temple's sister Pitt 

1 For an examination of Dr von Euville's estimate of Pitt's character, 
see Appendix i. 

W. y<^ 2 



18 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

secured a certain measure of political influence, it was 
as nothing compared with that enjoyed by Newcastle. 
Disliked by George II who had neither forgotten nor 
forgiven his many disparaging references to Hanover, 
comparatively powerless in parliament, and feared by the 
statesmen of the period as much as he was trusted by the 
people, it seemed as though he was condemned to illus- 
trate how imperfectly the house of commons represented 
the country. 

His opportunity came when the disastrous opening of 
the Seven Years' war produced something approaching 
to a national panic, and forced Newcastle into resignation. 
In the administration which was formed in December, 1756, 
Pitt was the real leader, though Devonshire the nominal 
premier. After a five months term of power, however, 
the new ministers found that they had embarked upon a 
hopeless undertaking, and that it was impossible to prevail, 
unsupported by the crown, in a parliament still dominated 
by Newcastle. Popular opinion had been successful in 
forcing Pitt into the cabinet, but it was not able to, keep 
him there; and he was dismissed by the king in the 
spring of 1757. A ministerial interregnum of eleven 
weeks followed. The nation expressed its approval of the 
fallen minister by voting him gold boxes ; and, unable to 
construct a cabinet in which the popular statesman was 
not included, George II was compelled to swallow his 
pride and sanction the formation of an administration in 
which Newcastle was first lord of the treasury, and Pitt 
secretary of state. 

This was the famous coalition ministry which raised 
the country to a pinnacle of glory not attained by it 
since the days when the victories of Marlborough forced 
Louis XIV to sue for peace. The Seven Years' war, 
which had opened so disastrously, was converted into 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 19 

a series of triumphs astonishing to those who had come 
to believe that the sun of England's greatness had set. 
Canada was conquered, the French power in India over- 
thrown, English naval supremacy asserted, and the country- 
embarked upon a flood of success which showed no signs 
of abating. Pitt had succeeded in evoking a spirit of 
daring and enterprise which had too long lain dormant ; 
and though some of the details of his policy may be ad- 
versely criticised, it remains true that he had taught the 
country the secret of its greatness. And those who had 
been taught were grateful for the lesson, lavishing upon 
Pitt a wealth of confidence denied to all his colleagues. 
Secure of a parliamentary majority, and overwhelmingly 
popular with the country, the coalition ministry has every 
claim to be considered one of the most powerful adminis- 
trations ever formed. 

Such was the political situation when George III came 
to the throne, determined to free the crown from its 
subjection to the whig party. The death of his father in 
1751 had secured the predominance of the influence of 
his mother, the Princess Dowager, and her friend and 
counsellor, Lord Bute, who trained the young prince for 
the work they intended him to accomplish. It has been 
said that it was from Lord Bute that George III received 
his first lessons in English constitutional history^ and it 
is not likely that the teacher minimised the prerogatives 
of an English king. The boy was not slow to learn the 
lesson. Knowing little of the world, surrounded by those 
who flattered his pride, and sincerely anxious to fulfil the 
duties of his responsible station, it is not improbable that, 
early in life, he came to regard himself as destined to 
overthrow those who had humiliated his grandfather. His 

1 History of England from the accession to the decease of George III, 
by John Adolphus (1840), i. 12. 

2—2 



20 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

inclinations did not long remain unknown, and, when 
George II died, it was reported that his successor, though 
prepared to continue the same ministers in power, was 
likely to retain more authority in his own hands 1 . 

Those responsible for the education of the young 
prince had taken as their gospel Bolingbroke's famous 
pamphlet, The Idea of a Patriot King. The leader of the 
tories at the close of Queen Anne's reign, Bolingbroke had 
seen all his hopes dashed to the ground by the establish- 
ment of the Hanoverian dynasty. Knowing that he would 
receive but little mercy at the hands of his triumphant 
opponents, he had fled to France, and placed himself at 
the disposal of the Pretender, only to find that the Stuarts 
in exile had lost none of their old incapacity. Abandoning 
the jacobite cause as hopeless, Bolingbroke obtained the 
royal pardon, and was permitted to return to England, 
though not allowed to take his seat in the house of lords. 
Denied his full rights as an English peer, and cherishing 
a deep-rooted animosity against Walpole, he waged un- 
ceasing war against the ministry with his pen. A most 
accomplished writer, he was possessed of all the skill of 
an experienced politician in seizing hold of the weak 
points of a strong case; and, though unable to express his 
opinions in parliament, was one of the most formidable 
antagonists of the administration, doing not a little to fan 
the popular dislike of Walpole. It is customary to sneer 
at Bolingbroke's political philosophy and to regard him as 
the champion of despotic ideals of government; but this is 
to do him a serious injustice. It is to his credit that he 
perceived the fatal flaws in the system of party govern- 
ment as it was conceived in the eighteenth century, and 
it was in the best known of all his works, The Idea of 

1 Horace Walpole's Letters (edited by Mrs Paget Toynbee), iv. 
444—448. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 21 

a Patriot King, that lie ruthlessly exposed the weak 
spots in the whig armour. Written in 1738, though not 
published till a few years later 1 , few political tracts have 
been so bitterly attacked or so grossly misrepresented : 
and the version of its teaching which has obtained popular 
currency is more of a parody than a reproduction. With 
a grace of style rarely equalled and perhaps never sur- 
passed, the author depicts with telling effect the condition 
to which the country had been brought by the rule of 
bribery and corruption. The old national spirit had been 
killed, and men now regarded political life either with 
indifference or as a happy hunting ground for competent 
adventurers. Sunk in a senseless apathy, the nation 
watched with dull eyes its representatives fight and 
squabble for places and emoluments ; and while each man 
sought his own advantage, no one gave a care to the 
state. If ruin was to be averted, political life must be 
regenerated; and, according to Bolingbroke, the monarchy 
alone could raise England from the slough into which it 
had fallen. The king who undertook this task would not 
be compelled to ride rough-shod over the constitution, 
purging the evils of the body politic with the draughts of 
despotism. Content to restrain his authority within legal 
limits, he would seek to govern, not at the dictation of a 
faction, but in accordance with the popular will. Choosing 
as his ministers those whom the people approved, making 
war upon the parties which rent the nation with their 
factious strife, the patriot king would look to the country 
for guidance, finding his greatest happiness, not in the 
enjoyment of the pomp of royalty, but in the execution 
of the wishes of his subjects. Neither a whig nor 
a tory, with no interest but the country's welfare, he 

1 Bolingbroke entrusted the manuscript of the pamphlet to Pope who 
secretly printed fifteen hundred copies of it. 



22 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

would be, in the truest sense of the word, a national 
monarch 1 . 

It is vain to deny the attractive character of the argu- 
ment, and those responsible for George Ill's education 
may be excused for thinking that, in basing their instruc- 
tion upon such a foundation, they were preparing their 
young charge to fulfil his highest duties as a constitutional 
king. Unfortunately, however, Bolingbroke did not 
explain the method to be employed by his ideal ruler to 
ascertain the national will; and frankly admitted that 
a patriot king was " the most uncommon of all phenomena, 
in the physical or moral world." At the present time 
parliamentary elections form a rough but reliable index 
of public opinion ; but this has only been brought about by 
the reform and extension of the franchise and the almost 
total abolition of electioneering bribery. In the eighteenth 
century neither the debates in the house of commons nor 
the results of elections were at all indicative of the trend 
of thought in the country; and it was not easy for the 
king, save on questions which stirred the nation to its 
depths, to hear the voice of his people. The monarch,, 
therefore, who undertook the part allotted to him by 
Bolingbroke, would be beset with difficulties, many of 
which might prove insuperable. Unless gifted with a rare 
political insight, he might easily misread the signs of the 
times, and, instead of being the servant of his subjects, 
become the slave to his own prejudices. Not until parlia- 
ment had been reformed and corruption abolished could 
Bolingbroke's ideal monarchy come into being; and his 
teaching has suffered in reputation by imperfect execution 
at the hands of one, not inclined to submission, and too apt 
to refuse advice not in accordance with his own opinions. 

1 For an interesting discussion of this pamphlet, see Bolingbroke and 
his Times: The Sequel, by Walter Sichel (1902), pp. 365—372. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 23 

G-eorge III had imbibed but part of Bolingbroke's 
political philosophy. He had been taught to dislike the 
party system, to distrust the whigs, and to despise his 
predecessor for the humiliation he had endured at the 
hands of his ministers ; but it is very doubtful whether he 
had learned to submit himself to the dictates of his subjects. 
He intended to inaugurate a new epoch in the relations 
between the crown and the cabinet, to wrest from his 
ministers the power which they had stolen from the 
monarchy, and, without transcending the limits of his 
prerogative, to exercise a decisive influence over the 
national destinies. It was no easy task that he had set 
himself to perform. If Newcastle had stood alone, the 
cry of oligarchical usurpation might have been raised, and 
an appeal made to the country against an unrepresen- 
tative house of commons. If Pitt had stood alone, he 
might have been attacked in parliament, and advantage 
taken of the fact that he had but a scanty personal 
following, and looked to the nation rather than its repre- 
sentatives for his strength. But the union of parlia- 
mentary influence with popular support boded ill for the 
designs of the crown; and the coalition ministry seemed 
destined to withstand all the assaults which might be 
levied against it. 

Yet the enterprise was not so hopeless as it seemed at 
the first glance. Newcastle and Pitt were men of such 
different and opposite characteristics that it was not easy 
for them to work in harmony. Their alliance had been of 
the nature of a marriage of convenience, and, like many 
such an union, had been productive of friction. To those 
thrown into close contact with him, Pitt's faults were some- 
times more obvious than his many virtues. He was often 
bombastic and unreasonable, and never hesitated to show 
his contempt for men whom he thought deserved it. He 



24 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

always preferred to dictate rather than explain; and 
many of his schemes appeared wild and visionary to more 
prosaic minds. Newcastle, who was of a jealous tempera- 
ment, and had grown accustomed to predominance in the 
ministry, fretted under the pre-eminence of his great 
colleague, and on certain questions, moreover, funda- 
mentally disagreed with him. Whereas Pitt desired to 
continue the war until France agreed to terms which 
ensured the supremacy of England, Newcastle sighed for 
a speedy peace. Pitt was anxious for, and Newcastle was 
opposed to the meditated attack upon Belleisle; and they 
were not in agreement over the Militia Bill, Newcastle's 
resistance to that measure being strengthened by the 
support of Greorge II who, only a few days before his 
death, had reproached him when he confessed his inability 
to secure its rejection 1 . Thus the ground was prepared 
for the attack. To accentuate the strained relations 
between the two leading members of the administration, 
to foment their jealousies, and, after driving them apart, 
to crush them separately, was the obvious course for 
George III to follow. It is impossible to prove that he 
deliberately pursued this policy 2 ; but it is certain that 
during the first year of the new reign there was a marked 
increase in the lack of harmony between Pitt and New- 
castle, and that the latter was willing to lean upon the court 
for protection against a colleague who seemed prepared to 
take all power into his own hands. 

It would not be enough, however, to drive the two 
leaders of the coalition further apart : steps must also be 

i Add. MS. 32913, f. 45, f. 183, f. 226. 

2 According to the second Lord Hardwicke, the King " principally 
availed himself with great wit and finesse of the dissensions between 
the Duke of Newcastle and Mr Pitt; that he played off one against the 
other occasionally, till he got rid of the popular minister" (Memoirs of 
the Marquis of Rockingham, by Lord Albemarle, 1852, i. 6). 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 25 

taken to undermine the parliamentary power of the whig 
party. Newcastle's hold over the house of commons 
was the fruit of bribery and corruption. He had traf- 
ficked in boroughs like a huckster 1 , and had dispensed 
the patronage of the crown to reward his followers and 
purchase new adherents. Preferments in church and 
state had been bestowed with a lavish hand upon those 
who had earned recognition by faithful service to the 
ministry. Seats in parliament had been bought and sold, 
and by devoting himself to the work of corruption with 
an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause, Newcastle had 
built up a party which might be hated but could not 
be despised. Pitt, in spite of his popularity with the 
country, had not been able to maintain himself in power, 
save by an alliance with the man who had captured the 
political machinery ; and the great whig chieftain, secure 
of a following in the house of commons, might well prove 
a match for a youthful and inexperienced king. 

Two courses were open to George III if he wished to 
strike at the root of Newcastle's predominance. Playing 
the part allotted to him by Bolingbroke, he might appeal 
to the nation against a corrupt house of commons. He 
might raise the standard of purity of election and initiate 
a movement for parliamentary reform. If bribery were 
discountenanced and rotten boroughs destroyed, New- 
castle's power would crumble away, for if the nation were 
allowed to speak, it would not be in his favour. But 
though Newcastle might be overthrown, it was not likely 
that the king would profit by his fall. An appeal to the 
country would almost certainly result in an accession of 

1 Mr Basil Williams' article, entitled " The Duke of Newcastle and 
the Election of 1734," published in the English Historical Revieiv, xn., 
throws an interesting and valuable light upon Newcastle's electioneer- 
ing methods. 



26 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

strength to Pitt; and the king might discover that he 
had only substituted one master for another. Moreover, 
those who wear crowns are seldom revolutionaries, and a 
reformation of a franchise would mean a veritable revo- 
lution of the constitution. An easier, if less honourable, 
path lay before George III. He could fight Newcastle 
with his own weapons. The latter had built up his power 
partly by the use of the patronage of the crown, and it 
was open to the new king to deprive him of that source 
of strength. If G-eorge III took into his own hands the 
dispensation of the royal patronage, it would be easy for 
him to win supporters in the house of commons, and 
undermine Newcastle's power. Owners of boroughs and 
members of parliament would quickly learn that obedience 
to the court rather than to the minister was the sure road 
to promotion; and few would hesitate to serve one who 
could reward them so richly for their devotion. If he 
had adopted the more difficult course, George III might 
have earned a different reputation in history, and acquired 
the glory given to those who fail in a noble cause ; but he 
was not the man to tread a path bestrewn with obstacles 
and leading to an unknown destination. He preferred to 
use the simpler means which lay ready to his hand, and 
follow the well established precedents of bribery and 
corruption. The whigs could scarcely complain if the 
king was prepared to use their weapons against them- 
selves, though they might be mortified at finding how 
aptly the young sovereign had learned their methods of 
government \ 

1 It should be noted, however, that George III never conceived him- 
self as destroying or deflecting the course of the constitution. He 
sincerely believed that tbe king governed as well as reigned, and was 
"entitled to use the prerogative granted to the crown by law. He 
never allowed that he was obliged to choose his ministers at the dictation 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 27 

Behind the parliament lay the nation, and the crown 
could not afford to neglect altogether the force of public 
opinion. The voice of the people was sometimes heard 
and occasionally exercised an influence over the actions 
of ministers. Walpole had withdrawn the Excise Bill on 
account of the popular feeling against it, and this is not 
the only instance of the power of the people. The same 
minister had declared war on Spain in response to popular 
pressure, and the directors of the South Sea company 
were sacrificed to appease the indignation of the country. 
Only a few years before the accession of George III, an 
enlightened measure of toleration, the Jew Naturaliza- 
tion Act, had been repealed because of the outcry raised 
against it. It was said, with some plausibility, that Pitt 
had climbed into office on the shoulders of the people; 
and there was no doubt that it would be a material 
advantage to the king in his contest with Newcastle and 
his followers if he could count upon the approval of the 
majority of his subjects. If George III provoked an 
angry feeling of resentment in the country, those whose 
supremacy he designed to overthrow might become en- 
deared to the people; and it therefore behoved him to 
walk warily. It is true that much might be forgiven him 
if he were personally popular, and it has often been 
assumed that in the early days of his reign he possessed 
the affection of his subjects. This, however, seems to be 
open to doubt. It is certain that he had many advantages 
denied to his grandfather. His youth, his domestic 
virtues, and his simplicity of character were all in his 

of parliament or the nation. On March 22nd, 1778, he wrote to Lord 
North "I wrote on that day unto you; I again repeat it — strengthen 
this administration by an accession from any quarter, but I will never 
consent to removing the members of the present cabinet from my 
service." Correspondence of King George III with Lord North, 1867, 
ii. 159. 



28 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

favour; and, as the first of his line who was thoroughly- 
English in his tastes and habits, he was likely to become 
a favourite with a race which has always been charac- 
terised by an aversion to foreigners. Many of those who 
went to court to pay their respects to the new king were 
gratified by his gracious conduct and unaffected manners 1 , . 
and compared him favourably with his predecessor who 
had always preferred Hanover to England, and had been 
too honest or too indifferent to conceal his preference. 
Yet the gratification expressed by a few courtiers must 
not be taken as representative of the feeling of the 
nation ; and the outburst of loyalty, which usually greets 
the accession of a new king, is of small political signifi- 
cance. Lord Holland, who was a shrewd judge of men 
and affairs, was of the opinion that George III was never 
popular 2 : and this judgment appears less surprising 
when it is remembered that the two persons most closely 
associated with the young king were his mother, the 
Princess Dowager, and her adviser, Lord Bute. The 
former was generally supposed to have become Bute's 
mistress, and though the scandal may have been a ma- 
licious lie, it was very generally believed, and wrought 
much harm 3 . The moral failings of great personages are 
apt to be condoned, but those who credited the rumour, 
though they might have forgiven the princess for her 
want of restraint, found it hard to pardon her for her 
lack of taste. Her offence was that she had chosen a 
Scotchman for her paramour. The natives of North 
Britain are not, and never have been popular in England ; 

1 Walpole's Letters (edited by Mrs Paget Toynbee), iv. 454 — 457. 

2 The Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox (1902), i. 76. 

3 It is interesting to note tbat Lord Waldegrave apparently believed 
that a closer tie than friendship united the Princess of Wales with Lord 
Bute (Waldegrave's Memoirs, pp. 38, 39). 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 29 

and in the eighteenth century they were heartily and 
generally detested and despised. Johnson and Wilkes, 
though they had little else in common, agreed in hating 
the Scotch ; and it was unfortunate for the king that his 
mother's friend and his own counsellor belonged to that 
much abused nation. It was believed that Bute would 
lavish the royal bounty upon his fellow-countrymen, and 
that Scotchmen would flock to the court of St James to 
fill their pockets at the expense of Englishmen. Bute 
from the very beginning was unpopular ; and it is by no 
means improbable that his master was included in the 
same condemnation. 

It would seem likely, therefore, that Lord Holland was 
substantially correct in his opinion, and the king, though 
he might attain popularity, could not count upon it as 
an initial advantage. He would be obliged to enter upon 
his design of regaining the authority which his predecessor 
had lost, without the support of the people ; and he would 
be wise to avoid a contest on questions which might affect 
the interests or arouse the passions of the nation. Un- 
fortunately, this was impossible. Before he could hope 
to attain success, it was necessary that England should 
withdraw from the contest in which she was engaged. 
As long as the country was involved in war, Pitt seemed 
indispensable. The success which had attended the 
English arms was almost exclusively attributed to him, 
and great would be the outcry if he retired from the 
cabinet before peace was made 1 . The king, however, did 
not wish to have a servant who could not be dismissed 
with impunity; and, therefore, both he and Bute were 

1 In August, 1761, Bussy informed Choiseul that Pitt was "L'idole du 
peuple, qui le regarde comme le seul auteur de ses succes et qui n'a pas 
la meme confiance dans les autres membres du Conseil." See Le Due 
de Choiseul et VAngleterre, Revue Historique, lxxi. 



30 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

anxious for the conclusion of peace, in order that they 
might gain greater freedom of action. They were con- 
fronted by a problem which called for delicate handling, 
and which could not be treated without arousing the 
interest of the nation. To conclude the war without 
gaining substantial advantages would cast opprobrium on 
those who thwarted the designs of a great statesman, 
and neglected to profit by what had been so laboriously 
achieved. To refuse to make peace, except on terms 
which the people would regard as satisfactory, might 
indefinitely prolong the struggle, and defer the time when 
Pitt's services ceased to be necessary. The riddle was by 
no means easy, and the attempt that was made to solve it 
will be dealt with in a later chapter. It is well, however, 
to bear in mind that, from the outset, George III was 
forced to enter upon a struggle with his ministry on a 
question not of parliamentary but of national interest : 
before Pitt and Newcastle could be taught that they no 
longer held office independently of the goodwill of the crown, 
it was necessary that peace should be made with France. 
Some time, however, must be allowed to elapse before 
even this preliminary step was taken. The death of 
George II rendered necessary the dissolution of parlia- 
ment, and negotiations for peace could not be begun until 
after the general election. Moreover, so much turned upon 
the success of these negotiations which would be conducted 
by the cabinet, that it was advisable to make changes in 
the administration, and introduce those who would be 
likely to work in the King's interests. Thus the first six 
months of the new reign were largely occupied by the 
general election and the ministerial changes. The latter 
were by no means unimportant. Henley, the lord 
keeper, was promoted to be lord chancellor early in 
1761, and Bute declared that Henley owed his elevation 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 31 

to him 1 . The new chancellor was likely to prove ready 
to comply with the wishes of the king. Educated at 
Oxford, he did not, to use the phrase of one of his bio- 
graphers, "altogether neglect classical learning"; but he 
chiefly occupied himself in cultivating a taste for port, 
and laying the foundations of a collection of tales more 
amusing than edifying. He was rewarded for these 
accomplishments by being elected a fellow of All Souls' 2 . 
In politics he had attached himself to the Leicester House 
party ; and his promotion to the chancellorship was not, 
therefore, without significance. He was to prove himself 
a subservient instrument of the court, untrammelled by 
political principles, and ready to betray and desert his 
colleagues at the bidding of the king. 

George Grrenville, who held the post of treasurer of 
the navy, was given the rank of cabinet councillor; and 
though this was a position rather of dignity than of 
power, and did not carry with it the right of attending 
the meetings of the smaller or inner cabinet 3 , it was 
specially arranged that Grrenville should be informed of 
all important business by Bute's secretary, Jenkinson 4 . 
G-renville, though connected by marriage with Pitt, was 
not in entire sympathy with him, and had openly opposed 
him in parliament in December, 1760 5 ; and it is possible 
that his promotion was not entirely unconnected with 
this incident. Legge, the chancellor of the exchequer, 
whom the king disliked and treated with marked cold- 

1 Dodington's Diary (1784), p. 428. 

2 Campbell's Lives of the Lord Chancellors, v. 177. It is reported 
that when George III said to Henley " Your friends tell me, my lord, 
that you like a glass of wine," the latter replied, "They have mis- 
informed your majesty: they should have said a bottle." 

3 English Historical Review, xvn. 680. 

4 Grenville Papers (1852), i. 360, 361. 

5 Add. MS. 35352, f. 157. 



32 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

ness 1 , was dismissed from his office in spite of Newcastle's 
plea that he might be retained 2 . His place was taken by 
Lord Barrington, a politician of slender abilities and a 
sincere believer in the doctrine that support should always 
be given to the ministers approved by the king, irrespec- 
tive of the party to which they belonged 3 . To become 
chancellor of the exchequer, Barrington resigned his 
office of secretary at war in favour of Charles Townshend, 
a brilliant and erratic politician who was known to be 
ambitious, and was suspected of an inclination to oppose 
Newcastle 4 . 

It would be easy to lay too great a stress upon the 
changes thus made. Legge fell, not because he was 
politically dangerous, but because in the past he had 
offended the king and Bute in the matter of an election. 
The promotion of Henley might have been expected and 
could hardly be criticised; and if Barrington was preju- 
diced in favour of the royal prerogative, he was also 
closely connected with Newcastle. What had been done 
was rather indicative of the new influences at work than 
productive of great results, and pales in importance before 
the introduction of Bute into the cabinet. The king's 
favourite did not belong to that ring of noblemen amongst 
whom the prizes of political life were usually shared. 
During the reign of George II he had confined him- 
self to the politics of Leicester House, and was little 
known outside that narrow circle. He had never dis- 
played any great political ability, and was generally 

1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 7. 

2 Add. MS. 32919, f. 402. 

3 Lecky's History of England in the eighteenth century (Cabinet 
Edition), m. 188. 

4 " That gentleman is a person of great wit and understanding, but 
very pushing, and has often thwarted the Duke of Newcastle in his 
measures." P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 10th, 1761. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 33 

considered to be more suited for an office of ceremony than 
of business. Nervously sensitive as to his own dignity, 
chilly in manner, and excessively haughty, he was not 
likely to win adherents, and only too likely to make 
enemies. His talents did not lie in the direction of public 
life, and, realising his own limitations, he preferred to be 
the prompter in the wings rather than the actor on the 
stage. Bute was not of the order of royal favourites who 
exploit the crown to promote their own advancement. 
On the contrary, it seems that not selfish ambition but 
genuine affection for the king's person led him to take 
his place in the political arena; and, though he may 
have been unwise, he was not base. He displayed an 
unfeigned reluctance to assume the cares of administra- 
tion, but he had to struggle against a will stronger than 
his own. His pupil and master had determined that he 
should have high office in the ministry, and that men 
should learn that there were other avenues to greatness 
than the favour of the whig party. On the day that he 
succeeded to the throne, the king pressed Bute to become 
secretary of state 1 . The offer was wisely refused, but 
two days later Bute took his seat at the privy council, 
and before a month had elapsed had joined the cabinet 
as groom of the stole 2 . 

In normal circumstances a groom of the stole 
would have little weight in the cabinet council. Only 
summoned to meetings of the larger cabinet, which 
were for the most part formal in their character, he 
could not claim to attend those smaller meetings, some- 
times called conciliabula, at which the most important 

1 Add. MS. 32919, f. 481. 

2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, I. 12, 13. Hunt's History 
of England, 1760 — 1801 (Vol. x. of Political History of England, 12 
volumes), p. 8: E.H.R. xvn. 681. 

w. 3 



34 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

business was discussed. Yet it is likely that Bute, 
transcending the limits of his office, was a member of 
the inner cabinet. He was known to be in the most 
intimate confidence of the king, and it was hardly 
possible that he should be kept in ignorance of the most 
urgent affairs of state 1 . Lord Holland states that Bute 
was present at a meeting of the smaller cabinet in 
November, 1760 2 . " I suppose/' said Bute himself to Lord 
Temple, " your Lordship does not mean to look upon me 
as a bare groom of the stole. The king will have it other- 
wise 3 ." It would seem, therefore, that, from the very 
outset, Bute commanded an exceptional position, and, 
though holding an office of little political importance, 
ranked with those who were entrusted with the most 
intimate secrets of government. He was the king's 
minister in the narrowest sense of that term, and those 
who denied him their confidence did so at their peril. He 
possessed the substance without the form of power. 

It may well cause surprise that Bute consented to leave 
a post of so -much advantage to undertake the work of 
a secretary of state. The more important office would 
bring with it increased responsibilities and more arduous 
duties. As secretary of state he would be far more open 
to parliamentary and popular criticism. The circle of his 
enemies would be widened by his advancement to so 
eminent a position, and his authority would not be ex- 
tended in proportion. In after years he always affirmed 
that it was against his own will, and in obedience to the 
wishes of the king, that he took the higher office; and 

1 Bute's exceptional position may be estimated from the fact that it 
was he who, early in the reign, offered the presidency of the council to 
Lord Hardwicke (Add. MS. 35428, f. 1). 

2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 12, 13. 

3 Add. MS. 32919, f. 285. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 35 

there is no reason to doubt the truth of this statement. 
Unused to business, and aware of his own unpopularity, 
he might well hesitate to become a colleague of Pitt 1 . 
The burdens of office would weigh doubly heavy on 
one unaccustomed to the transaction of affairs; and yet 
there can be little doubt that the king was right in 
pressing his favourite to undertake the duties from which 
he shrank 2 . If the royal designs were to be executed 
successfully, it was necessary that Bute should hold high 
office in the administration. Those in the cabinet might 
understand the position of a groom of the stole enjoying 
the intimate confidence of the crown ; but if the ministry 
continued much as it had been at the close of the late 
reign, members of parliament and proprietors of boroughs 
would still regard Pitt and Newcastle as the leaders in 
the political world, and act accordingly. The promotion 
of Bute was to be the outward and visible sign of the 
restoration of the royal authority ; and, in order that men 
might understand the change that had taken place, the 
form and substance of power must be united. 

Yet, necessary as it might be, it was a step of no little 
daring. Pitt would certainly be offended, and if the 
ministers had united in opposition to the intruder, the 
king might have received a mortifying defeat. But 
what might have failed, if attempted to be brought about 
hy the undisguised exercise of the royal authority, could 

1 On the day that George II died, Pitt informed Bute that it was not 
for the good of the country that he should be given high political office 
(Rockingham Memoirs, i. 149, 150). 

2 On March 24th, 1761, Bute wrote to the King " I take the office 
that of all others my mind has the most repugnance to, and I am torn 
from one that I have reason to dote on... Each fond wish of my heart 
crys out against this important change, but duty and gratitude con- 
demns one to the trial. I make it then, but not without violent emotions 
and unpleasant forebodings." Add. MS. 36797, f. 47. 

3—2 



36 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

be effected by intrigue. Newcastle and Pitt had not 
drawn nearer together in face of the common danger, 
and the former might be willing to receive an ally against 
his dictatorial colleague. He was selected to play the 
part of a traitor within the camp, and fell into the trap 
which had been so carefully laid for him. It was early 
in 1761 that the intrigue began which resulted in Bute 
becoming secretary of state. The Comte de Viry, the 
Sardinian ambassador, acted as intermediary between 
Bute and Newcastle; and the latter was won over to 
give his consent to the proposed change. Devonshire and 
Hardwicke, Newcastle's staunch political allies, were taken 
into the secret, and agreed to accede to the king's wishes. 
As it was known that Pitt would object, he was not told 
until his opposition would have been useless. The plot 
was crowned with success, and within six months of his 
accession the king had scored a notable triumph, and laid 
a firm foundation for future aggressions 1 . 

More than a year later Newcastle was repenting of 
his duplicity. To his partner in crime, the Duke of 
Devonshire, he wrote: "I own, I did, in council with 
your Grace and my friends, prefer my Lord Bute to him 
(Pitt), and was an insignificant instrument to bring my 
Lord Bute into the secretary's office 2 ." Yet, shortsighted 
and foolish as his conduct may have been, it is not in- 
capable of explanation. He had suffered much at the 
hands of Pitt who had often treated his colleagues as 
subordinates, and refused to listen to their advice. He 
suspected that Pitt would rather prolong the war than 
conclude a treaty which he considered unfavourable; and, 
anxious for peace, Newcastle was willing to lean for 

1 For a detailed account of this intrigue, see E. H. R., xvn. 683 — 
685. 

a Add. MS. 32941, f. 36. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 37 

assistance upon the king's favourite. He believed, 
though wrongly, that he had strengthened his position 
in the administration, and gratified the crown. "Lord 
Bute's system/' he wrote about this time, "is certainly 
founded upon the firmest confidence in us 1 " ; and he was 
assured by Viry that Bute was anxious to bring about 
peace 2 . By adroit diplomacy the king had accomplished 
what might have seemed impossible. He had secured a 
party in the administration for the favourite, and had suc- 
ceeded in hoodwinking Newcastle whose present fears 
made him blind to future possibilities. 

Thus, by the end of March, 1761, the ministry had 
suffered an important transformation. Bute had been 
given a commanding position in the official world, and 
the breach between Newcastle and Pitt had been widened. 
Moreover, during the same period, parliament had been 
dissolved, and a general election held. The election of a 
new parliament was of great importance at this particular 
juncture. In previous elections Newcastle had been per- 
mitted to traffic in boroughs and to use the influence of 
the crown to purchase adherents for himself. If he were 
still allowed a free hand in this nefarious business, the 
results would be the same as they had been in the past. 
A majority of those returned would be inclined to sup- 
port the ministers against the king ; and the latter might 
find that his advisers were able to appeal to parliament 
against the crown. It was necessary, therefore, that 
Newcastle should learn that the old order had passed 
away with the old king. In December, 1760, instructions 
went forth from the court that no money was to be given for 
the purchase of seats 3 ; and Lord Anson was commanded 
by the king to inform the workmen in the royal dock- 

1 Add. MS. 32920, f. 61. 2 Ibid. f. 158. 

3 Add. MS. 32915, f. 332. 



38 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

yards that they might vote for whom they pleased, even 
though the chancellor of the exchequer was a candidate. 
The grant of such exceptional freedom was probably 
dictated by a desire to prevent the election of Legge, 
and cannot be taken as indicative of the general policy 
followed. On the contrary, Bute declared that while the 
king intended to nominate the members for the royal 
boroughs, Newcastle must be allowed to use the crown 
influence arising from the customs and the excise 1 . But 
such influence would only be available in certain places : 
elsewhere, Newcastle, unable to depend upon financial 
assistance from the crown, would be fighting at a dis- 
advantage. It has been said that Bute privately used 
the king's money to influence elections 2 ; but whether he 
was guilty of this breach of faith or not, Newcastle would 
be handicapped in the purchase of seats. Previous elec- 
tions had constituted a serious drain upon his own financial 
resources, and he now found himself engaged in a struggle 
with opponents more wealthy than himself. He would 
have to encounter the rivalry of men, enriched with the 
plunder of the Bast, anxious to get into parliament, and 
careless of the means they adopted to attain their end. 
Borough proprietors reaped a golden harvest, and, though 
the court had pretended to discountenance bribery, the 
general election was frankly and openly corrupt. In an 
access of cynicism the borough of Sudbury advertised 
itself for sale, and the keenness of the competition can be 
estimated from the fact that at Andover there were no 
less than nine candidates 3 . 

1 Dodington's Diary, p. 433. 

2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 : Walpole's Memoirs 
of the reign of George the Third (edited by G. F. Russell Barker, 1894), 
i. 31. 

3 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 31. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 39 

Nor was it lack of funds alone that stood in Newcastle's 
way. In previous elections men who placed their boroughs 
at his disposal might hope to obtain some reward at the 
hands of the crown ; but this was no longer the case, and 
Newcastle was unable to guarantee that those who 
served him would be rewarded by the king for their 
fidelity. Times had changed, and those who controlled 
elections might prefer to exercise their influence in favour 
of the king rather than of his ministers. Politicians, like 
other men, are apt to turn from the setting to the rising 
sun, and Newcastle was to learn that the support of the 
court in the past had been of greater value than he, per- 
haps, realised. When he appealed to Bubb Dodington 
for his interest in the Weymouth election, the answer was 
returned that Dodington had promised to use his influence 
in favour of those who would certainly be approved by 
Newcastle because they were agreeable to the king 1 . 
Formerly the order had been reversed, and men had been 
approved by the king because they were supported by 
the minister. 

Yet, in spite of the disabilities against which he 
struggled, Newcastle believed that he had succeeded. He 
reckoned upon two hundred and ninety-two supporters 
and one hundred and eight opponents in the new parlia- 
ment, and professed himself uncertain as to the conduct 
of one hundred and thirteen members 2 . Thus, if even all 
those whom he doubted joined the ranks of the opposition, 
Newcastle would have a clear majority; and if his estimate 

1 Dodington' s Diary, pp. 415, 416. 

2 Add. MS. 32999, f. 323. This document is undated, but its refer- 
ence to the parliament of 1761 is proved by the inclusion of the Marquis 
of Tavistock amongst the members of the house of commons. The 
parliament of 1761 was the first and only one in which he sat. It is 
interesting to note that Newcastle included William Pitt amongst those 
members whose conduct he regarded as uncertain. 



40 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

had been correct, he could have afforded to disregard the 
hostility of the court. Events were to prove him guilty 
of a gross error of judgment. The parliament, which he 
had thus classified, was to see him fall from office un- 
moved, was to approve the Peace of Paris which he 
condemned, and was to defend George Grenville against 
the attacks of the whig opposition. It was to degenerate 
into a tool of the court, and to be used to thwart those 
who dared to oppose the wishes of the king. Newcastle, 
in believing that if he had not gained a triumph he had 
at least averted a defeat in the general election, mis- 
understood the political situation; and it is necessary to 
understand how he came to be guilty of so faulty a 
forecast. 

It was noticed by contemporaries that the new parlia- 
ment contained an unusual number of members who had 
never sat before 1 . Many of these novices probably 
belonged to that class which had enriched itself in 
India, and was anxious to play a part in political life 
in England. Unattached to any political party, possibly 
devoid of any political principles save those which they 
had picked up during their sojourn in the East, they 
would be willing to tread the path which led to honours 
if not to honour. Removed beyond the need of money, 
they would be more likely to be influenced by the smiles 
of a king than the guineas of a minister. Covetous of 
the prizes which the crown could confer, they would not 
be inclined to support Newcastle against the court, and 
the king could count upon their aid when he wished to 
overthrow his ministers. Moreover, Newcastle was to dis- 
cover that those who had served him loyally in the past, 
when he had been the dispenser of patronage,^ were ready 

1 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 10th, 1761 ; Horace 
Walpole's Letters, v. 28, 30. 



THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 41 

to desert him when he could no longer reward them for 
their devotion. The greedy crew of placemen, uninfluenced 
by sentimental attachment or considerations of loyalty, 
abandoned their old leader when he was unable to 
satisfy their appetites. They rallied to the banner of 
the court; and Newcastle, deprived of the great part of 
the patronage which he had formerly dispensed, found his 
own weapon turned against himself. By the general 
election of 1761 the king had gained a parliament 
which could be bought. 

Other signs that a new order of things had arisen had 
not been wanting. The king's speech at the first privy 
council meeting of the reign was probably composed 
by Lord Bute, and was in any case not the work of 
his ministers 1 . In its original form it contained a re- 
flection upon the war, describing it as "bloody and 
expensive " ; but before it was printed the objectionable 
words were deleted. The speech from the throne at the 
opening of parliament was drafted by Lord Hardwicke, 
and submitted to Bute who returned it with an addition 
in the king's own hand, emphasising the English birth 
and education of the new sovereign 2 . Newcastle also 
received a disagreeable if salutary lesson in the disposal 
of patronage. On his own initiative the king added five 
tory lords and commoners to the lords and grooms of 
the bedchamber, leaving Newcastle to discover what had 
been done as best he might 3 . Nor was this the only 

1 FitzMaurice's Life of Shelburne (1878), i. 43. Walpole's Memoirs, 
i. 7, 8. Rockingham Memoirs, i. 8 — 11. Life and Letters of Lady Sarah 
Lennox, i. 5, 6. 

2 Add. MS. 32914, f. 345. 

3 Add. MS. 32915, f, 332: "a most extraordinary phaenomenon," 
wrote Newcastle, "appeared yesterday, of which I had the first notice 
by an accidental information from Ned Finch at my Lady Yarmouth's." 
Ibid. 



42 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

rebuff that the old duke suffered. He had often cause to 
complain of the chilly treatment he received at court; 
and, to one so chagrined, it was scanty comfort to be 
told that " the king would have everything go on for the 
present as it was in his grandfathers time, and 'til the 
several officers are appointed after the expiration of the 
six months; but when the new appointments are made, 
the king will then declare whom he will call to his 
cabinet council 1 ." It is little wonder that the old states- 
man felt the ground slipping from under his feet. He 
lived in fear that Pitt, whom he did not trust, might ally 
himself with Bute 2 , and his suspicions, baseless though 
they were, influenced him to welcome with alacrity the 
advances of the king's favourite. 

The time had now come to begin the negotiations for 
peace. Not until England had withdrawn from the 
European conflict could the king exercise a free choice 
as to those who were to serve him. It was not so much 
that he desired to rid himself of Pitt, but that he wished 
to have liberty to do so if he chose. No servant of the 
crown must claim to be indispensable, and peace was 
necessary in order that Pitt should learn that he held 
office by the goodwill of the court. 

1 Add. MS. 32914, f. 171. 

2 When it was announced that no money were to be given by the 
crown for the purchase of seats, Newcastle believed that he detected a 
consequence of an alliance between Bute and Pitt. Add. MS. 32915, 
f. 332. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE FALL OF PITT. 

The unsuccessful negotiations for peace with France, 
begun in March and broken off in the following September, 
exercised a decisive influence upon English politics by- 
bringing about the fall of Pitt. The fact that they proved in 
the end abortive must not lead to the supposition that they 
were necessarily ill-judged or premature. Public opinion 
was certainly in favour of a pacification on terms justified 
by the recent glorious successes of the English arms, as 
the strain of the lengthy and exhausting contest was 
beginning to show itself in the fall in British securities, 
and the general disinclination on the part of capitalists 
to invest their money 1 . The Bavarian minister at the 
English court believed that the desire for peace was very- 
general throughout the country 2 , and the instant rise of 
the funds at the first rumours of negotiations with France 3 
is evidence that the commercial community, which had 
suffered severely at the hands of French privateers 4 , was 
desirous of pursuing its avocations unmolested. 

Yet, though the majority of Englishmen may have 
wished for a peace, there were few who did not desire it 
to be such as would secure the unchallenged supremacy 
of England. Many lives had been lost and much ex- 

1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 ; P. R. 0., Foreign 
State Papers Miscell., Jan. 9th, 1761. 

2 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., Jan. 9th, 1761. 

3 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 17th, 1761. 

4 Hunt's Political History of England, 1760—1801, p. 2. 



44 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

penditure incurred in the pursuit of victory. The national 
enemy had been overthrown in the New World and 
humiliated in India; and it was felt that substantial 
advantages must be gained in return for so extravagant 
an outlay and so distinguished a success. France appeared 
to have reached the nadir of her fortunes ; and, though an 
insignificant minority may have considered any peace, 
however unfavourable to England, preferable to the pro- 
longation of the war, public opinion generally desired that 
terms should be exacted which should make the con- 
clusion of the contest, not only advantageous to England, 
but disastrous to France. 

Whether the war, however, was brought to an end 
depended far more on the king and his ministers than on 
the wishes of the nation at large, and the ministry was not 
agreed as to terms. Some like Bedford were willing to 
make any concessions in favour of peace. Newcastle, 
Hardwicke, and Devonshire were against the continuance 
of the war, and feared that Pitt would insist on such 
onerous terms that France, exhausted as she was, would 
prefer to continue an apparently hopeless struggle rather 
than conclude a peace fraught with ruin and dishonour. 
Their alarm, to a certain degree, was unfounded. Pitt was 
no Attila, intent upon rapine and slaughter. He had no 
wish needlessly to prolong the war ; but, though ready to 
make peace, intended it to be of such a character as would 
cause it to rank amongst the most glorious in English 
history. He made no secret of the terms which he would 
expect France to accept 1 . Canada, with its islands, its 
harbours, and its fisheries, must be surrendered to England, 
and the fishing privileges off the island of Newfound- 
land, which had been allowed to the French by the treaty 
of Utrecht, must be given up. Favourable as the war 
1 Add. MS. 32921, f. 340, f. 381. 



THE FALL OF PITT 45 

had been to England, it cannot be said that these demands 
erred on the side of moderation. If fulfilled, the French 
fisheries in the New World would be entirely destroyed, 
and a valuable training ground for the French navy lost. 
The English would be left supreme in North America, and 
it was only too likely that the hostility of other countries, 
and especially Spain, would be aroused by the spectacle 
of so unrivalled a predominance 1 . 

If Pitt was not unreasonable, he may at least be said 
to have been exacting. He was anxious that France 
should pay the uttermost farthing; but it was by no 
means certain that that country was in so reduced a 
condition as to agree to any terms that might be de- 
manded. There was a danger that the negotiations might 
be abruptly broken off. It was not probable that Newcastle 
and his friends would be able to prevail against a states- 
man of the type of Pitt. Animated by the confidence 
born of success, realising to the full that his services were 
indispensable, they felt that he would, if thwarted, resign 
the helm, and leave his colleagues the task of carrying 
on the war which he, alone, was capable of conducting. 
Newcastle understood the need of some potent ally to aid 
in overthrowing the supremacy of one accustomed to 
dominate the ministry and to exact submission to his 
will ; and his hopes, and those of his followers, naturally 
rested upon the king and Lord Bute. The latter had 
promised to assist Newcastle in the question of peace, and, 
with Bute as an ally, the old duke might hope to stand 
his ground against his overbearing colleague. Promises, 

1 Add. MS. 32921, f. 381: "But at the end he raised the point of 
the fishery,... on which he had much set his heart. I spoke to him 
very fairly on that subject, that I wished it as much as he ; but Spain 
and all the rest of Europe would be against our engrossing such a 
monopoly." Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 6th, 1761. Ibid. f. 340. 



46 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

however, are easy to make and difficult to fulfil; and 
Bute was not so chivalrous as to ruin himself for the sake 
of a pledge he had given. His position, and that of the 
king, was one of no little difficulty. He was anxious 
that war should cease, in order that his master might 
reap all the benefits of the popularity of having inaugurated 
his reign by conferring the blessings of peace upon a 
nation wearied by a long struggle; and also might be 
able, whenever he felt it necessary, to dispense with the 
services of Pitt. For these reasons Bute naturally inclined 
to lend his support to Newcastle ; but there was another 
side to the picture. Pitt was the popular hero, the states- 
man trusted by the people. He was known to have no 
attachment, save to the country to which he had devoted 
himself. In his hatred and dread of France he was 
supported by the majority of his fellow-countrymen who 
approved of his attempt to extract the most favourable 
terms from the enemy of England. If Bute lent his name 
and assistance to those endeavouring to thwart the popular 
minister in so beneficent a design, he would become more 
detestable to the people than ever; and the king, his 
master, might have to share in the unpopularity of his 
servant. The new secretary of state found himself at 
the beginning of his official career between the horns of 
a dilemma. The part he had to play was mapped out for 
him by circumstances. He must hold the balance between 
the two factions in the administration. He could not 
afford to throw in his lot unreservedly with the party 
■opposed to a continuance of the war, nor could he purchase 
popularity by a whole-hearted alliance with Pitt. He 
was obliged to steer a middle course, and to aim at 
bringing about a peace which would satisfy the national 
ambition and yet be acceptable to France. It was no 
easy role that Bute was forced to adopt, calling for 



THE FALL OF PITT 47 

greater insight and political ability than he probably- 
possessed 1 . 

Before it is possible to estimate the probability of a 
settlement being concluded between England and France, 
some account must be taken of the forces at work in 
the latter country. There is reason to believe that 
Choiseul, the French minister, was sincerely desirous of 
bringing the war to an end. His country had suffered 
much in the conflict with England; and was not in a 
condition indefinitely to prolong hostilities. In striving, 
however, to attain this goal, Choiseul would have to face, 
not only the opposition of his ally, Austria, but also a 
powerful faction in France itself, pledged to the support 
of Austrian interests, and anxious to continue the war 2 . 
The existence of this party could not but exercise an 
influence on Choiseul's policy. However anxious he might 
be to free his country from the strain of a long and 
unsuccessful contest, he was obliged to face the fact that 
there were those who were ready to accuse him of a too 
ready compliance with the demands of England. The 
cry that France was being sacrificed to the implacable 
hatred of her ancient enemy would be easily raised and 
with difficulty refuted; and it would seem that there 
"was a very definite limit of concessions beyond which 
Choiseul could not afford to go. Peace would only be 
attained if this limit coincided with what the English 
ministers were willing to accept. 

Spain, which had certain rights in dispute with England, 
and had found in Pitt a minister whom it was impossible 
to cajole or intimidate, had an immediate interest in the 
negotiations pending with France. The unbending atti- 
tude adopted by the English minister would tend to be 

1 Von Ruville's Graf von Chatham, n. 425. 

2 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers MiscelL, Jan. 13th, 1761. 



48 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

intensified rather than diminished if he succeeded in 
making peace on his own terms; and Spain might be 
» called upon, either to forego what she thought to be 
legitimately" her due, or embark single-handed upon a 
struggle with a country which had astonished the world 
by its victories. It was therefore to her interest to secure 
an alliance with France. It was probable that her 
grievances would be listened to with more attention by 
the English ministers if they knew that France was ready 
to take up arms on her behalf. But the hope of such an 
alliance would be dashed to the ground by the conclusion 
of peace. Having come to terms with her rival, France 
would certainly not be willing to risk another quarrel; 
and Spain would be left to fight her own battles unassisted. 
If France was to be won to espouse the Spanish cause, it 
must be before peace was concluded with England 1 . If 
he found the English administration unbending and 
exacting in its demands, Choiseul might be inclined to 
listen to the overtures of the Spanish government ; and, in 
return for championing a quarrel which was not his own, 
win an ally for a war which he could not conclude 2 . 

1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 95, 96. 

2 A passage in the instructions given to Bussy supports this view : 
" Le sieur de Bussy doit aussi marquer de la confiance a M. le comte 
de Fuentes, ambassadeur d'Espagne. La cour de Madrid a propose a 
Sa majeste" de conclure un traite" offensif et defensif. Le projet de ce 
traits tel qu'il a £te communique" par le marquis de Grimaldi, serait 
sujet a. de grands inconve"nients dans les circonstances presentes. Le 
Roi a juge a propos de diviser en deux parties le projet espagnol et de 
proposer a Sa Majesty Catholique un traite" d'amitie, de garantie, pure- 
ment defensif, lequel serait une espece de pacte de famille. II est a 
pr^sumer que la negociation de ce traite qui est si analogue a l'interet 
et aux sentiments des deux souverains, aura le succes que l'on en doit 
attendre. De plus, le Roi qui a communique a Sa Majeste" Catholique 
sa position actuelle politique, vis-a-vis de FAngleterre, proposera a ce 
prince de difterer les engagements offensifs contre la Grande-Bretagne 



THE FALL OF PITT 49 

Thus, for different reasons, both Spain and Austria 
desired to delay the conclusion of peace, and had cause 
to fear the pacific tendencies of Choiseul. The latter 
would shun an alliance with Spain as long as he retained 
hope of peace with England. But he was not a free 
agent, and would be willing to throw himself into the 
arms of Spain if he found that he could only make peace 
with England upon terms to which he could not afford to 
agree. The situation was intricate, and difficult to unravel ; 
but it is at least certain that the longer the negotiations 
continued the greater would be the chance of failure; 
for time would be given to the Austrian and Spanish 
factions to bring pressure to bear upon Choiseul, and 
drive him to continue the war. 

It was on the last day of March, 1761, that the Russian 
ambassador in England, Prince Galitzin, communicated to 
Pitt the terms of peace proposed by the French govern- 
ment 1 . They appeared to be of a liberal and conciliatory 
character. England and her allies were invited to take 
part in a peace congress which was to meet at Augsburg 2 ; 
but, as the delays of an European congress are proverbial, 
Choiseul suggested that the attainment of peace might be 

jusqu'a ce qu'il soit instruit du degre" de volonte' que le Eoi et le ministre 
britanniques ont pour la paix en g£n6ral, et les conditions definitives 
que, relativement a la France, ils voudront mettre au r^tablissement de 
la paix entre les deux royaumes. Si les Anglais se pretaient a une 
paix raisonnable, il serait contraire a l'objet du Eoi, de signer un traite' 
offensif contre PAngleterre, lequel traite ranimerait certainement le feu 
de la guerre. Si, au contraire, le ministere britannique porte ses pre- 
tentions a un degre 1 insoutenable, nous taeherons de conserver, en ce 
cas, la bonne volont6 de l'Espagne, pour qu'elle se joigne a nous dans le 
seul parti qui restera de se faire rendre justice par les armes." Quoted 
in Waddington's La Guerre de Sept Ans, iv. 514, 515. 

1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 ; P. K. 0., Foreign 
State Papers Miscell., April 3rd, 1761. 

2 This congress never met. 

w. 4 



50 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

facilitated if the particular interests of England and 
France were considered separately. As a basis of dis- 
cussion, he suggested that the two countries should remain 
in possession of the territory they occupied in various 
parts of the world at certain fixed dates. In Europe, 
May 1st, 1761, was the date named as determining posses- 
sion; in the West Indies and Africa, July 1st, 1761; and 
in the East Indies, September 1st, 1761. These epochs, 
however, were not to be taken as final or beyond discussion. 
They, as well as the question of the compensation to be 
given for the surrender of the conquests of each country, 
were to be subjects of negotiation 1 . 

Such terms were by no means disadvantageous to 
England ; and Newcastle was overjoyed to find the enemy 
so liberally inclined 2 . Pitt was not so enthusiastic, and 
thought that he espied a dangerous ambiguity in the 
proposals 3 . He suspected that Choiseul intended to con- 
sider those portions of the territories of the elector of 
Hanover and the landgrave of Hesse, England's allies, 
which had been occupied by the French, as conquests 
wrested from Britain; and if his suspicions were correct, 
the terms were not so favourable as Newcastle imagined. 
It would be impossible for England to allow her allies 
to suffer for the part they had taken in the war; and, 
therefore, if Choiseul's offer was accepted, part of the 
English conquests might have to be sacrificed in order to 
win back for the German princes what they had lost. 

It was not necessary, however, to reject the French 
terms because of an ambiguity ; nor in the English answer 
was the doubtful point touched upon 4 . The English ministers 
agreed to send representatives to the congress at Augsburg, 

1 Parliamentary History, xv. 1023 — 1025. 

2 Add. MS. 32921, f. 272. 3 Ibid. 

4 This reticence was due to Pitt. Add. MS. 32921, f. 340. 



THE FALL OF PITT 51 

and to conduct separate negotiations with France. Assent 
was given to the principle of uti 'possidetis as laid down 
by Choiseul; but the actual dates named in the French 
proposals were not agreed to, that point being left over 
for further discussion. Choiseul returned a far from con- 
ciliatory answer. Retreating from the position he had 
formerly taken up, he declared that the dates, as fixed by 
France in her first proposals, could not be changed; and that 
the continental war could not be brought to a conclusion 
unless, at the same time, France and England had arrived 
at a pacific settlement 1 . The demand that the epochs 
must be taken as fixed was rejected by the cabinet at 
a meeting on April 27th ; and it has been reported that 
Pitt was largely responsible for the firm line adopted 2 . 
His attitude was quite intelligible, even to those who 
disapproved of it. He hoped soon to hear of the capture 
of Belleisle, against which an English expedition had 
been despatched ; and as France would probably be willing 
to redeem that island at a great cost, it was important 
that the dates should be so arranged as to leave England 
in possession of it. The final determination of the epochs 
must therefore be left until Belleisle had been taken. 

The preliminary moves having been made, it was 
necessary for the two courts to exchange representatives. 
It was arranged that Bussy should come to England and 
Stanley go to France. The instructions to be given to the 
English representative were thoroughly discussed at a 
cabinet meeting on May 13th 3 . It was agreed that Stanley 
must inform Choiseul that England desired a separate 
peace with France, to be concluded before and indepen- 
dently of the general European pacification; but a far 

1 Pari. Hist., xv. 1028—1030; Add. MS. 32922, f. 61. 

2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 43. 

3 Add. MS. 32923, f. 63. 

4—2 



52 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

more knotty question was whether the losses of the German 
allies of England should be counted as conquests made 
upon the English crown. From the outset of the negotia- 
tions, Pitt had realised the importance of this question ; 
and at the cabinet meeting demanded that Stanley should 
receive definite instructions regarding it. He refused, 
however, to express any opinion himself ; and this unusual 
reticence aroused the distrust of his colleagues who sus- 
pected that he was encouraging them to do what he feared 
to do himself. It would be dangerous to declare that the 
German allies of the English crown should be left for relief 
to the congress of Augsburg, for the king, in his capacity of 
elector of Hanover, might well be offended by such treat- 
ment ; but if, on the other hand, the conquests of England 
were sacrificed in order to buy back the territories of 
petty German princes, popular disapproval might be 
evoked, and the cry raised that once more England was 
being sacrificed to Germany. Safety lay in the path of 
inaction ; and Pitt's colleagues refused to be driven where 
he himself was disinclined to go. No decision was arrived 
at, nor was Stanley given instructions on this point, but he 
received orders not to sign any act with France, without 
the authority of one of the secretaries of state; and, 
though the negotiations were to be considered as sepa- 
rate from those to be conducted at Augsburg, he was 
instructed to inform the French minister that England 
would not desert her ally, the king of Prussia 1 . 

With the despatch of Bussy and Stanley to their 
respective destinations, the negotiations may be said to 
have begun in earnest. In conversation with Pitt, Bussy 
did not show himself pacifically inclined, though to New- 
castle and Hardwicke he was conciliatory throughout 2 . 

1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 506—509. 

2 Add. MS. 32923, f. 367; Ibid. 32926, f. 205. 



THE FALL OF PITT 53 

He was reported by Stanley to be in the interests of a 
family opposed to Choiseul l ; and it is not unlikely that 
he utilised his official position to work as an ally of the 
party in France opposed to peace. If this were so, it 
would explain the difference of his attitude towards Pitt 
and Newcastle. Time must be given to allow of an alliance 
being concluded between France and Spain, and, there- 
fore, the peace party in the English cabinet must be 
encouraged to continue the negotiations. But to guard 
against the contingency of terms being offered by England 
which Choiseul could accept with perfect safety to his 
reputation, Pitt must be induced to believe that the 
French government was not sincerely desirous of peace ; 
and a haughty and unbending attitude on the part of the 
French emissary would go far towards conveying this 
impression. 

If Pitt was disappointed by his conversations with 
Bussy, Stanley formed a very favourable opinion of 
Choiseul. The latter showed himself conciliatory and 
ready to meet the English representative half-way. Re- 
turning to his original proposition, he consented to allow 
the epochs to be made a subject of negotiation; but 
argued that the German allies of the English crown must 
be included in the treaty between the two countries. This 
demand, though it might cause unpleasant consequences, 
was only reasonable ; and after the fall of Belleisle, which 
capitulated on June 7th, the English ministers were ready 
to offer terms of peace. These were decided upon at a 
cabinet meeting on June 16th 2 . The epochs were so 
arranged as to include Belleisle amongst the English 
possessions; and it was expressly stipulated that the 
terms agreed upon between the two courts must be 

1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, u. 524. 

2 Grenville Papers, i. 365, 367. 



54 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

considered as final irrespective of what happened at 
Augsburg, and that the treaty must be signed by- 
August 1st. 

Though the English ministers were reported to have 
agreed unanimously to these proposals 1 , it is not likely 
that they would have escaped criticism in France. As 
a matter of fact, they were never considered, for Choiseul,, 
before he had seen the English despatch, had confided to 
Stanley terms of peace to be communicated to the English 
government. The greatest stress was laid upon the 
necessity of secrecy; and the offer was only to be com- 
municated to those ministers whom it was absolutely 
necessary to trust. By these new proposals Choiseul 
abandoned the principle of uti possidetis which he had 
been the first to enunciate, and sketched out a definite 
settlement. Minorca was to be restored to England, in 
return for which, Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, and G-oree 
were to be given back to France. Canada, with new 
boundaries, was to remain in the possession of England ; 
but the island of Cape Breton, lying to the north-east of 
Nova Scotia, was to be restored to France on the condition 
that it should not be fortified. The French were still to 
enjoy the fishing privileges off the coast of Newfoundland 
granted to them by the treaty of Utrecht; but they 
undertook to surrender their conquests from the German 
allies of England 2 . 

There is no reason to believe that Choiseul was acting 
insincerely in offering these terms. They were dictated 
by a desire for peace and a fear of the faction who schemed 
to continue the war. If they had been accepted, England 
would have regained possession of Minorca and acquired 
the province of Canada in the New World ; and it might 

1 Grenville Papers, i. 365, 367. 

2 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 539. 



THE FALL OF PITT 55 

be argued that this would afford ample compensation for 
the five years of warfare. France, on the other hand, 
would not have surrendered everything of any value. 
Canada would no longer be hers, and Minorca would once 
more be in the possession of England; but the fishing 
rights off Newfoundland would not have been forfeited, 
and the possession of Cape Breton implied the enjoyment 
of the fisheries in the gulf of St Lawrence 1 . Choiseul, 
indeed, had defined his policy far more than he had ever 
done before. To win England over to the side of peace, 
he had offered to surrender a large and important pro- 
vince : to placate his fellow-countrymen, he had preserved 
the French fishing rights in the American seas. It was 
a daring bid for peace, an attempt to over-ride the oppo- 
sition of the Austrian faction, and to free his country from 
its most formidable antagonist 2 . 

A critical point in the negotiations had been reached ; 
and whether peace was concluded depended very largely 
upon the events of the next few weeks. Newcastle, 
delighted with the French terms, flattered himself that 
the end of the war was in sight; but Bute displayed 
greater acuteness, and was far less enthusiastic 3 . The 
cabinet met on June 24th to consider the French proposals 4 . 
All the ministers agreed in refusing to allow the boundaries 
of Canada to be defined anew, and in repudiating the 
demand that Cape Breton should be restored to France. 
Over the question of the Newfoundland fisheries they 
disagreed. Pitt's views on this point were well known; 

1 It is unlikely that Choiseul would have wished to retain Cape 
Breton except he proposed that France should preserve her right of 
fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence. 

2 It is difficult to understand Choiseul's desire for secrecy except 
that he feared that the terms might be misunderstood in France, and 
afford a handle for his opponents. 

3 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. * Ibid. 



56 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

and it could have caused no surprise to his colleagues 
when he argued against this concession. Supported by 
his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, he was opposed by 
Granville, Hardwicke, Bedford, Halifax, and Newcastle. 
They did not deny the value to England of such a 
monopoly if it could be acquired, but dwelt upon the 
jealousy it would provoke among the maritime powers of 
Europe. With legal acuteness, Hardwicke pointed out 
that if France was denied the rights granted her by the 
treaty of Utrecht, she could hardly be expected to fulfil 
the stipulations of the same treaty regarding the fortifica- 
tions of Dunkirk. Between the two parties Bute steered 
a middle course. He was anxious that an attempt should 
be made to expel the French from the Newfoundland 
fisheries, but was content to abandon the demand if 
refused by Ohoiseul. The question was left undecided, 
until the cabinet met again; but, in the interval, Bute 
was careful to inform Newcastle that the king approved 
of the policy which his favourite had advocated l . 

The attitude of those who opposed Pitt on this point is 
certainly not without justification. An acquisition may 
be of great value, but this does not constitute a cogent 
reason for demanding it as a necessary condition of peace. 
To drive the enemy to despair by exacting too onerous 
terms is faulty diplomacy. A treaty must of necessity 
be of the nature of a compromise; and few wars would 
have been concluded, save by the complete exhaustion of 
the combatants, if the victorious country had always 
enforced an unconditional surrender upon its defeated 
opponent. Moreover, particular circumstances might 
render it inexpedient to press France closely on this point. 
She had enjoyed the right of fishing off Newfoundland for 
many years; and to be called upon to surrender it at 
1 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. 



THE FALL OF PITT 57 

a time when she was to be compelled to abandon the gulf 
of St Lawrence, might well seem too exacting. There can 
be little doubt that Newcastle and his friends were right 
in their opposition to Pitt; but they did not know how 
right they were. They were unaware of the perils which 
beset Choiseul, and how fatal it would be for him to 
conclude a peace which could be construed as unduly 
favourable to England. 

Bute, more influenced by considerations of domestic 
than of foreign policy, played a deeper and more subtle 
game. Convinced that neither he nor his master was in 
a position to give hostages to fortune, he desired above all 
things to avoid anything which might reflect unpopularity 
upon the king ; and, anxious as he was for peace, he was 
cautious as to the means of obtaining it. It would seriously 
hinder the cause he had so much at heart if he could be 
taunted with having prevented Pitt from gaining a valu- 
able acquisition for England. He could not afford to 
throw in his lot with Newcastle and his followers; but 
neither did he dare to take his stand by the side of Pitt, 
and imperil the chance of peace. He chose the path of 
compromise and safety; and utilised the two opposing 
parties for his own ends. 

The cabinet met again on Friday, June 26th ; and Pitt 
placed before the assembled ministers the draft of his 
answer to the French proposals 1 . He explained that he 
had framed his reply in accordance with what he had 
understood to be the wishes of the majority of the 
council, leaving the point of the Newfoundland fisheries 
undetermined ; and then went on to say that he considered 
the policy advocated by Bute puerile and illusory. This 
provoked the latter to defend his opinion with no little 
asperity. To calm him, he was assured that the form in 
1 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. 



58 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

which the letter had been cast ensured that an attempt 
would be made to expel the French from the Newfound- 
land fisheries; and, to place the matter beyond doubt, a 
sentence was added stating that the French could not 
be permitted to continue to enjoy the rights granted by 
the treaty of Utrecht without substantial compensation. 
Stanley was also instructed to inform Choiseul that 
England would only consent to restore Guadeloupe and 
Mariegalante in return for the immediate evacuation of 
the territory of her German allies ; and that peace could 
not be made unless France consented to surrender Canada 
in its entirety, together with the rights of fishing, to cede 
Senegal and Goree to England, to reduce Dunkirk to the 
condition stipulated for by the treaty of Utrecht, and to 
restore all that she had conquered in Germany 1 . 

Choiseul was disappointed by the English answer. He 
had striven for peace but had failed to soften the hearts 
of the British ministers. He might well feel that they 
had accepted all his concessions and retained all their 
own prejudices. It was the question of the fisheries which 
weighed most heavily upon him. He affected to care 
little for the French fishing rights off Newfoundland; 
but pleaded for a defenceless port in Cape Breton, which 
might serve as a shelter for the French fishing boats. 
" Donnez-nous," he remarked to Stanley, " de la peche et 
sauvez nous le point d'honneur pour Dunkerque, car ce 
n'est que cela la paix est faite 2 ." The parting of the ways 
had come. Choiseul had followed one line of policy, and 
it had ended in failure. He had discovered that peace 
with England could only be bought by the surrender of 
the fisheries; and the price was more than he could afford 
to pay. By his side stood Grimaldi, the Spanish am- 

1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 543. 

2 Ibid. ii. 532. 



THE FALL OF PITT 59 

bassador in France, tempting him with the bribe of an 
alliance with Spain; and as the hope of peace with 
England faded, the value of the Spanish alliance in- 
creased. With a new ally it might still be possible to 
continue the war. France was not yet at the end of her 
resources, and England was feeling the burden of the 
contest. The negotiations were continued, but hence- 
forth Choiseul showed a greater compliance towards 
Spain, and prepared for a contingency which did not seem 
unlikely to come to pass. 

It is well to remember that Pitt was not solely re- 
sponsible for the English demands which induced Choiseul 
to waver in his inclination towards peace and to draw 
nearer to Spain. Bute was equally convinced that the 
limits of concession had been reached; and censured 
Bedford for being too ready to make sacrifices in the 
cause of peace 1 . There was a danger of a deadlock. 
Both countries seemed determined not to make any 
further concessions; and Choiseul, having failed to con- 
ciliate his opponents, endeavoured to intimidate them. 
The French terms which arrived in England on July 20th 
breathed no spirit of compromise, and if the English 
ministers had found fault with the former proposals, they 
were not likely to be content with these. Choiseul again 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 29 — 34. M. Waddington, however, 
is of a different opinion: "A notre avis, c'est bien a Pitt qu'incombe la 
responsabilite de l'echec. Com me conditions de paix, il e^ait bien deter- 
mine a n'accorder que celles qui imposent au vaincu la loi du vainqueur. 
Humilier la France, ruiner son commerce, lni enlever ses colonies, et 
detruire sa marine, il n'eut pas d'autre but et ne le cacha pas. II fit 
ajourner les concessions qui, accordees des le d^but, eussent assur^ la signa- 
ture des pr^liminaires, les combattit avec energie, et quand elles lui furenfc 
arracMes par ses collegues moins intraitables, il les transmit avec des 
expressions, des commentaires et des restrictions qui en att^nuerent 
beaucoup la ported." La Guerre de Sept Am, iv. 600, 601. 



60 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

demanded a share in the Newfoundland fisheries and the 
cession of Cape Breton; and though France agreed to 
surrender its conquests from the German allies of England, 
an exception was made of the territories of the king of 
Prussia. It was argued that as these had been conquered 
and governed in the name of Austria, they could not be 
restored without the consent of that power. With the3e 
terms were despatched two private memorials from the 
French court to Bussy, calling upon England to terminate 
her dispute with Spain, and declaring that Austria could 
only consent to a separate peace between England and 
France if she were allowed to retain possession of the 
Prussian territory conquered by the French 1 . 

Choiseul had thrown down the glove. He had ex- 
changed the olive branch for the sword, and sought to 
frighten England by vaunting the intimacy between 
France and Spain. It is difficult to believe that he ex- 
pected his new offer to be accepted unmodified ; it is far 
more probable that he intended it to serve another purpose. 
French pride would be gratified by the firm stand taken 
upon the fishery question ; the gratitude of Austria might 
be expected for the loyalty of her ally. Spain could not 
be unmindful that France had championed her interests, 
and risked the hope of peace with England in conse- 

1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 547, 552, 553. The two private 
memorials were presented to Pitt by Bussy on July 23rd. Some time 
later, Choiseul informed Stanley that Bussy had been instructed to 
produce or suppress the Spanish memorial as he thought best; and 
that he had been persuaded to produce it by the Spanish ambassador 
in England, Fuentes. It seems clear that both Choiseul and Bussy were 
not in favour of immediately producing the Spanish memorial; and 
that this momentous step was taken in accordance with the wishes of 
Louis XV, Grimaldi, and Fuentes. Waddington's La Guerre de Sept 
Ans, iv. 560 — 563 ; Le Due de Choiseul et VAngleterre ; Revue Historique, 
Tome Soixante-onzieme ; Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 570; Add. MS. 
32925, f. 312 ; Ibid. 32926, f. 47. 



THE FALL OF PITT 61 

quence. It was a diplomatic move of no little adroitness. 
France no longer stood detached from Austria and at 
the mercy of England. Choiseul had sown the seed which 
was to produce the Family Compact; and intimated to the 
English ministers that he had reached the limit of his 
concessions, and was preparing to conclude new alliances. 
England must decide either to forego her demands or 
incur the risk of driving Spain into the arms of France. 
Choiseul had thrown in his lot with the Austrian and 
Spanish factions, using them as pawns in the game against 
England. 

The political situation in England was not favourable 
to a policy of surrender. The tide of victory showed no 
sign of turning, and news had just arrived of the capture 
of Pondicherry and Dominica 1 . These fresh triumphs 
would strengthen the position of those who were in favour 
of continuing the war rather than yielding further to the 
demands of France. Bute, who was more in sympathy 
with Pitt than his opponents, had been endeavouring to 
"spirit up the Dukes of Newcastle, Devonshire, and 
Bedford, to something vigorous 2 ." When, therefore, the 
cabinet met on July 21st, all the ministers were unanimous 
in regarding the French terms as unsatisfactory; and 
Bute is reported to have taken an active part in the dis- 
cussion 3 . At a further meeting on July 24th, an answer 
to the French proposals was decided upon, and delivered 
by Stanley to Choiseul five days later. Unanimity again 
prevailed 4 ; and though Newcastle complained of the 
manner in which Pitt had executed the instructions of the 
cabinet, he received little sympathy from either the king 

1 Add. MS. 32925, f. 202 ; Grenville Papers, i. 376. 

2 Grenville Papers, i. 376. 

3 Add. MS. 32925, ff. 251, 329 ; Ibid. 35352, f. 176. 

4 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 554 ; Grenville Papers, i. 378, 379. 



62 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

or Bute 1 . The English, answer was certainly not con- 
ciliatory. Many of the French demands were unhesitat- 
ingly rejected. The right of fishing in the gulf of 
St Lawrence and the possession of Cape Breton were 
again refused, and the two private memorials declared 
to be inadmissible. The French were not to continue 
to enjoy their privileges in the Newfoundland fisheries, 
unless prepared to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk; 
and the distinction drawn between the king of Prussia 
and the other German allies of England was definitely 
repudiated 2 . 

If Choiseul had hoped to intimidate the English 
government, he must be counted to have failed. No sign 
of surrender in any material point could be detected in 
the answer to his proposals. He had met with a serious 
rebuff, and the continuance of the war appeared certain, 
unless he was willing to forego some of his demands. 
The policy adopted by the English administration was 
agreeable to the wishes of Pitt, and warmly approved 
by Bute 3 . Left to themselves, Newcastle and his friends 
would probably have been more conciliatory; but they 
could not hope to prevail against the alliance of the two 
secretaries of state, and meekly followed their lead 4 . This 
union, temporary in its nature, and soon to be broken, 
exercised a decisive influence upon the course of the 
negotiations. It may be held to be responsible for their 
failure. Choiseul can hardly be blamed for thinking that 
the English ministers had taken up a position from which 
they would not retreat. Peace seemed out of the question 

i Add. MS. 32926, f. 187. 

2 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 557. 

3 Grenville Papers, i. 378, 379. 

4 For some curious gossip about the alliance of Pitt and Bute at this 
time, see the Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. pp. 51, 52. 



THE FALL OF PITT 63 

unless he was willing to surrender the French fishing 
rights in the gulf of St Lawrence ; and that concession 
he could not afford to make. Nothing was left but war, 
and after he received the English answer, he informed 
Havrincour, the representative of France in Sweden, that 
the king had definitely made up his mind to continue 
the war, but wished to conceal his intentions for the 
present, and to prolong the negotiations with England 1 . 
It is not difficult to discover the reason which impelled 
Choiseul to adopt this policy of duplicity. If the war 
was still to go on, France must win Spain as an ally ; and 
it was necessary to gain time to bind the two countries 
together by a treaty of alliance. The positions of the 
two Bourbon powers were reversed. Up to this point it 
had been Spain that needed the assistance of France : it 
was now France that needed the assistance of Spain 2 . 
Choiseul was about to take decisive action, to throw him- 
self upon the side of Spain, and drag that power into the 
war, because he believed that peace with England had 
passed out of the sphere of practical politics. In this he 
was wrong. The firm attitude adopted by the English 
ministry depended solely upon the union of Pitt and 
Bute. The latter, thinking that France might respond to 
pressure, and anxious to avoid the reproach that he had 
been instrumental in preventing the country from re- 
ceiving an adequate reward for her many triumphs, united 
with Pitt to withstand Choiseul's demands. But he was 



i Add. MS. 32926, f. 67. 

2 Six months later, Hardwicke wrote to Newcastle, "I am now con- 
vinced that the intercepted letter in the summer from Choiseul to 
Havrincour in cypher wherein mention was made of training on the 
negotiations between England and France till the latter end of September 
— deserved more weight to be laid upon it than we were willing to allow 
it at that time " (Add. MS. 32932, f. 366). 



64 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

not inclined to sacrifice the hope of peace to this alliance. 
If Choiseul adhered firmly to his terms, if it appeared 
necessary to purchase peace by allowing the French to 
fish in the gulf of St Lawrence, Bute would be willing to 
make the surrender demanded. The time was shortly to 
come when he would be in alliance with Newcastle, and 
urging that concessions should be made to France. 
When, however, that time came, he had waited too long. 
When England was willing to make concessions, France 
was too deeply committed to Spain to be able to accept 
them. 

The negotiations continued, but Choiseul was no longer 
acting sincerely. He wished not for peace but for time 
to allow him to conclude an alliance with Spain : not till 
that had been accomplished could he afford to defy 
England. He was obliged to pursue an intricate and 
double-faced policy demanding no little care and skill. 
His plans would be seriously affected if the English 
ministers, convinced of the impossibility of attaining 
peace, broke off the negotiations before he had concluded 
an alliance with Spain ; and, to guard against this danger, 
he was compelled to frame terms, sufficiently exacting to 
prevent them being accepted without hesitation, and yet 
sufficiently conciliatory to afford an excuse for the con- 
tinuance of the negotiations. The French ultimatum, 
which arrived in England early in August, was inspired by 
these principles 1 . Not intended to be accepted, it was 
meant to afford discussion by which the negotiations 
might be prolonged 2 . Choiseul agreed to surrender Groree 
on certain conditions, but on the other points in dispute no 
material concessions were made. Yet to Newcastle, Bussy 

1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 566. 

2 For evidence that the ultimatum was not intended to be accepted, 
see von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, ir. 458. 



THE FALL OF PITT 65 

talked smoothly of peace, with the intention of buoying 
him up in the hope that all was not yet desperate 1 . 

The interest now centres round the divisions in the 
English cabinet. The success of Choiseul's tortuous 
policy depended on the peace party in the cabinet per- 
sisting in the negotiations despite the opposition of Pitt. 
Though Newcastle was shocked by the French ultimatum, 
he refused to believe that peace was out of the question 2 . 
Anxious that the English demands should be as low as 
possible, he hesitated between surrender on the fishery 
question and the risk of continuing the war against the 
combined powers of France and Spain 3 . But against 
Newcastle and his friends stood Pitt who seemed to enjoy 
a greater predominance than ever. Stormy meetings of 
the cabinet were held on August 13th and the day 
following. At the first of these, it was agreed that a 
meeting between Pitt and Bussy must take place, and that 
a letter should be written to the latter informing him of 
this decision. Pitt presented the draft of this note to the 
ministers when they met on August 14th. It was not 
couched in conciliatory language. Formal regrets were 
expressed that " the happy moment to put an end to so 
many miseries is not yet come." The document did not 
escape criticism, but Pitt refused to alter what he had 
written ; and the letter was finally approved by a narrow 
majority 4 . 

Not only the policy of Choiseul, but the designs of the 
king were threatened by the power wielded by Pitt at 

i Add. MS. 32926, f. 205. 

2 Ibid. 32926, f. 269, f. 281. 

3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 25, 26; Bedford Correspondence, in. 35 — 36. 

4 Add. MS. 35870, f. 297 (E.H.R., April 1906); Chatham Corre- 
spondence, ii. 136 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 26 — 28 ; Thackeray's Life 
of Pitt, ii. 589. For an account of the interview between Pitt and Bussy, 
see Waddington's La Guerre de Sept Ans, n. 579, 580. 

W. 5 



66 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

this moment. Bute had thrown in his lot with the popular 
minister, and had actively supported his policy against 
the opposition of Newcastle ; but it was not the intention 
of either the king or his favourite to place supreme 
authority in the hands of a man who had climbed to 
power on the shoulders of the people, and looked for his 
strength, neither to the court nor to the parliament, but 
to the nation. Yet there was a danger that the outcome 
of Bute's policy would be the unchallenged supremacy 
of Pitt. The warmest advocate of peace, the Duke of 
Bedford, had already declared his intention of ceasing 
to attend cabinet meetings, and it was probable that his 
example would be followed, in the near future, by the 
Duke of Devonshire 1 . Newcastle was threatening to 
retire 2 , and, though he was prone to talk of retirement 
and remain in office, it was not likely that he would con- 
tinue in the service of the crown, if abandoned by his 
friends. The utter collapse of the peace-party and the 
consequent triumph of Pitt did not appear improbable; 
and, if this catastrophe were to be averted, it was time 
that the king stretched out a saving hand to those in 
favour of concessions. 

The first signs of a change of front on the part of Bute 
and his master can be discerned shortly after the cabinet 
meeting on August 14th. No answer had yet been given 
to the French ultimatum, and the character of the reply 
would largely depend upon the course of action pursued 
by Bute. If the latter continued in alliance with Pitt, 
the answer would be haughty and unyielding; only by 
winning Bute over to the side of peace could Newcastle 
hope to effect a modification of the English demands. 
And Bute was not unwilling to be won. He had gone far 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 36 — 39 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 30. 

2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 30—31 ; Add. MS. 32927, f. 68. 



THE FALL OF PITT 67 

enough in support of Pitt. He could never be reproached 
with having failed, through inertia or cowardice, to gain 
important acquisitions for England, and it would not be 
the action of a wise statesman to imperil peace by per- 
sisting in demands which the enemy refused to grant. 
The time had come for retreat from a position which could 
be no longer occupied with advantage. 

Thus, at the moment that Newcastle was striving to 
gain the assistance of Bute, the latter was willing to come 
to an arrangement with him. The Duke of Devon- 
shire played the part of mediator, and discovered that 
he had undertaken an unexpectedly easy task. On 
August 16th he had an interview with the king who told 
him that he was in favour of allowing the French to fish 
in the gulf of St Lawrence, and of granting a port of 
shelter for their ships 1 ; and it is not without significance 
that he expressed himself most warmly in favour of the 
Duke of Bedford continuing to attend the meetings of 
the cabinet, i Two days later, Devonshire had an inter- 
view with Bute, and was satisfied that the latter would 
support the peace party in the administration. At a 
second meeting, a few days later, the compact was sealed 
and signed. Bute readily agreed to the necessity of a 
good understanding with Newcastle, declared his readi- 
ness to work with him, and denied that he was connected 
with anybody else 2 . 

A cabinet revolution had occurred. Bute had united 
with the minister whom he had formerly neglected, and 
the balance of power in the administration had shifted. 
Newcastle and his friends were now in a stronger position 
than they had occupied since the beginning of the nego- 
tiations. They had secured an important ally, and 



1 Bedford Correspondence, m. 36 — 39. 

2 Add. MS. 32927, f. 154. 



S— 2 



68 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

pursued a policy approved by the king. The change in 
the political situation was not long in making itself felt. 
An answer to the French ultimatum had to be framed; and 
the cabinet met on August 19th, August 20th, and August 
24th, to settle the terms to be offered. At these meetings, 
the party in favour of concession and conciliation carried 
the day. Though Pitt and Temple neither modified nor 
concealed their opinions, they acquiesced in the decision of 
the majority, for the sake of preserving unanimity 1 . The 
right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence, except on 
the coasts belonging to England, was granted to France ; 
and the island of St Pierre was offered as a shelter for 
the French fishing vessels. The privileges of the French 
in the Newfoundland fisheries were to continue if the 
stipulations of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in regard 
to the fortifications of Dunkirk were executed. The 
ministers, however, still adhered to their demand that the 
French should restore that part of the territory of the 
king of Prussia which they had conquered 2 . 

Pitt had suffered a serious rebuff. He had been out- 
voted in the cabinet, and compelled to consent to a policy 
which he did not approve. France had been allowed 
more than he had ever been willing to grant. The 
material point of the fisheries had been decided in her 
favour ; and in place of the stipulations of the treaty of 
Utrecht in regard to the fortifications of Dunkirk, the 
more moderate provisions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
had been substituted. Had such terms been offered a few 
weeks earlier, peace might have been made. It was now 

1 Rockingham Memoirs, I. 33—34; Add. MS. 35870, f. 301, f. 303 
(E.H.R., April 1906). 

2 In the Parliamentary History, and by Thackeray in his Life of 
Pitt, the English ultimatum is dated August 16th. It was not despatched, 
however, until later, as can be seen by the covering letter to Stanley, 
dated August 27th. Add. MS. 32927, f. 220. 



THE FALL OF PITT 69 

too late. Choiseul had despaired prematurely, and reaped 
the fruits of his precipitancy. He had sold his freedom in 
order to insure his safety; and when England offered 
terms which, if a free agent, he would have gladly 
welcomed, he was too deeply committed to Spain to be 
able to accept them. The Family Compact between the 
two countries had been signed on August 15th, and France 
was pledged to the support of Spanish interests. To 
the English ultimatum Choiseul was obliged to return an 
answer which shattered the last remaining hopes of peace; 
and, after a meeting of the cabinet on September 15th, 
Stanley was ordered to return home. 

Thus failure and disappointment stared in the face 
those who had so laboriously striven to make peace 
between two countries labouring under the burden of a 
world- waged conflict. The war was to continue ; and one 
result of the attempt of the English ministers to come to 
terms with France had been to draw that country nearer 
to Spain. That was the new element in the situation; 
and whereas for France the situation had improved since 
the beginning of the negotiations, for England it had 
changed for the worse. The danger of a war with Spain 
had been discussed at the cabinet meeting which decided 
upon the recall of Stanley 1 : it was a question which 
could not be neglected with safety. It was destined to 
precipitate a political crisis, to drive Pitt and Temple 
from power ; and to sow the seeds of dissension between 
those who should have united to withstand the aggressive 
policy of the crown. With the exception of Pitt and 
Temple, the ministers have been severely censured for 
their policy at this juncture; but, before it is possible 
to form a fair judgment, it is necessary to form a clear 
idea of the information at their disposal. Not until 
1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 187, f. 193. 



70 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

we know how much they knew of the relations between 
the two Bourbon powers, can we decide the degree of their 
guilt in refusing to follow the advice of Pitt and declare 
war upon Spain. 

All were agreed that the intimacy between France 
and Spain had become much closer since the beginning of 
the peace negotiations. In addition to the information 
given in Stanley's despatches, there was the Spanish 
memorial to prove the friendly nature of the relations; 
between the two countries. Intimacy, however, varies in 
degree, and, as existing between two countries, can hardly 
prove a dangerous factor in international politics unless 
ratified and cemented by a formal treaty of alliance. 
The Family Compact had been signed on August 15th, 
and Spain had pledged herself to take up arms on 
behalf of France, if called upon to do so. The English 
ministers were aware of the existence of this treaty 
through an intercepted letter written by Grrimaldi; and, 
from the same source, they acquired the information that 
France had pledged herself to continue the war until 
the Spanish grievances against England were removed ! „ 
From Stanley they had learnt that France had under- 
taken to support Spanish interests in the negotiations, 
with England 2 . What they did not know, and it was an 
important lacuna in their information, was that, by an 
article of the Family Compact, Spain had pledged herself 
to go to war on behalf of France. 

Such was the information at the disposal of those who 
had to decide upon the proper policy to be pursued. 
Reduced to the simplest terms, the question was whether 
England should declare war on Spain because she sus- 
pected that country of an alliance with France directed 

1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 139 — 141. 

2 Ibid., n. 140, Note 2. 



THE FALL OF PITT 71 

against her interests. Much could be urged in favour of 
a bellicose policy. It was in the highest degree unlikely 
that France would have committed herself so deeply to 
the interests of Spain, and imperilled the hope of a pacific 
settlement with England in consequence, except she could 
count upon receiving some material advantage in return. 
The nature of the advantage was not known; but it could 
be safely surmised. Everything pointed to the fact that 
Spain was ready, on behalf of her ally, to take up arms 
against England : that was the price she would be called 
upon to pay in return for French assistance. This was 
the conclusion at which Pitt arrived, and he, therefore, 
favoured a declaration of war against Spain. The in- 
formation he possessed was not such as could be published 
to the world as a justification of his conduct. But he was 
willing to incur odium, ready to suffer the accusation of 
needlessly provoking hostilities, knowing that time would 
justify him. He saw that war between England and 
Spain was certain. England, standing as she did to Spain, 
could not disregard or view with indifference a rapproche- 
ment between that country and France. Inquiries as to 
the exact nature of the Family Compact could not be 
avoided; and if, as seemed highly probable, that treaty 
contained clauses hostile to England, the inquiries would 
end in war. Therefore, if Pitt was correct in his surmise 
as to the character of the treaty, war between the two 
countries was inevitable, sooner or later ; and it was to 
the interest of England that it should be sooner. Specula- 
tion, and the weighing of evidence, led to a conclusion 
which could not be proved, but yet was invested with the 
strongest degree of probability. It is the mark of a 
great statesman to be willing to act upon the most prob- 
able hypothesis: he who waits for certainty denies his 
own powers of insight, and gives the advantage to the 



72 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

enemy. It was no craving to extend the area of warfare, 
no desire for a fresh foe to be overthrown by the victorious 
arms of England, that drove Pitt to adopt a warlike 
attitude : he saw that a conflict with Spain was inevitable, 
but that it still remained within the power of England to 
shatter the designs of that country by driving her into 
war before she was ready to undertake it. 

Save for Lord Temple, Pitt stood alone in his opinion. 
To Newcastle his policy seemed that of a visionary, flown 
with conquest and intoxicated by success. The resources 
of England were not unlimited, and Newcastle had Lord 
Anson's authority for believing them insufficient to support 
a war with Spain 1 . He fixed his gaze on the present 
rather than on the future; and preferred to postpone 
the evil day, hoping that time would bring a solution 
of the difficulty. It was a policy of misplaced caution, 
of waiting upon events rather than attempting to 
control their course. Bute was also anxious to avoid 
an immediate declaration of war. The enlargement 
of the area of hostilities would render a pacification 
more difficult, and as long as England continued at war, 
the services of Pitt seemed indispensable. War with 
Spain would therefore tend to delay the execution of the 
design to restore the personal power of the crown; and 
therefore resort must be had to diplomacy to avert the 
threatened evil. Neither Newcastle nor Bute desired to 
neglect the question of the relations existing between 
France and Spain ; but they deprecated hasty action, and 
sought to unravel the Grordian knot by means of diplomacy, 
rather than to cut it by an immediate declaration of war. 

The cleavage of opinion on this question between Pitt 
and the majority of the ministers became clear at the 
cabinet meeting on September 18th. Pitt advised that 
1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 187, f. 193. 



TIIE FALL OF PITT 73 

Lord Bristol, the English, ambassador at the court of 
Spain, should be instructed to inform the Spanish govern- 
ment that it was the intention of the English king "to 
take forthwith such necessary and timely measures as 
Grod has put into his hands for the defence of the realm." 
In order to avoid ambiguity and misconception, he had 
committed his speech to writing, and this is the document 
generally known as the " advice in writing." So daring 
and high-handed a policy found no supporter in the 
cabinet except Temple. The other ministers were adverse 
to what was nothing short of a declaration of war. They 
advised that Bristol should be instructed to ask a full and 
clear explanation from the Spanish government of its 
conduct ; and should support the demand by the intimation 
that, if no satisfactory answer was returned, a breach of 
diplomatic relations would probably follow 1 . When the 
council was over, Bute drew Pitt apart, and pressed him 
to withdraw the paper he had read, or at least to refrain 
from giving it to the king, as he had threatened to do. 
Pitt, however, was obdurate, and stubbornly refused to 
listen to the arguments of those who disagreed with 
him 2 . 

He staked his reputation upon the correctness of his 
opinion, and time was to prove him right. He saw that 
those who favoured a resort to diplomacy were but taking 
a longer road to the same end ; and that delay would be 
more profitable to Spain than to England. He might well 
think it possible for him to bend his colleagues to his will 
by a threat of resignation. The war with France still 
continued ; and the ministers might naturally hesitate to 
drive from power the man who had raised England to a 
pinnacle of glory she had not attained for many years. 

1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 225, f. 227, f. 233, f. 259. 

2 Add. MS. 32928, f. 259. 



74 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

The cry would be raised that the great war minister had 
been sacrificed by his colleagues, blind to the grandeur of 
his schemes ; and Bute regarded the resignation of Pitt as 
an evil to be averted 1 . Yet there was the other side to 
the picture. If Pitt was indispensable because there was 
war with France, a war with Spain would render him 
even more so. His power would be more firmly established 
than ever, and he would enjoy the position of a dictator of 
the destinies of England. 

A crisis had suddenly arisen for which Bute was not 
prepared ; and his policy betrays signs of confusion. He 
aimed at maintaining peaceful relations with Spain, and 
retaining Pitt in office : it was an attempt to reconcile 
irreconcilables. Pitt had refused to listen to the argu- 
ments of Bute ; but there was still a hope that he would 
give way, as he had done on a former occasion, to the 
united opinion of his colleagues. It was probably for 
this purpose that Newcastle, Devonshire, Mansfield, and 
Bate met at Devonshire House on September 19th 2 . But 
Pitt had taken up a position from which he did not intend 
to retreat; and, when the cabinet met on September 21st, 
he was found to be as resolute as ever 3 . Bute discovered 
that a middle course was not practicable, and, forced to 
select one of two unpleasant alternatives, chose to drive 
Pitt from power rather than embark upon a war with 
Spain 4 . The die had been cast, and Pitt's fate was sealed. 
Thwarted by his colleagues, he could not look for support 

i Add. MS. 32928, f. 259. 

2 Add. MS. 32928, f. 259 ; Lord Hardwicke was unable to be present 
on account of the death of his wife. 

3 Add. MS. 32928, f. 303 : Rockingham Memoirs, i. 37—40. 

4 It is possible that Bute may have been influenced by a letter from 
Stanley, which arrived on September 21st, and spoke more hopefully of 
the prospect of peace with France. See Hunt's Political History of 
England, 1760—1801, p. 29. 



THE FALL OF PITT 75 

to the court. The king shewed himself actively hostile 
to the minister whom he had formerly supported against 
Newcastle. He declined to accept the "advice in writing 1 ," 
and refused to abandon all hope of peace with France 2 . 
A few days later, it was reported that the king was more 
offended than ever with Pitt, and wished to be rid of 
him 3 . 

The toils were closing round the man who had once 
domineered alike over the cabinet and the court. He 
attempted to convince his colleagues, but found them as 
obstinately rooted in their opinions as he was in his. It 
was in vain that he laid stress upon an intercepted letter 
from Grimaldi, which stated that Choiseul had been 
willing to make the settlement of the Spanish grievances 
against England a necessary preliminary to the conclusion 
of peace between the latter country and France 4 . This 
additional piece of evidence of the close connection 
between the two countries was disregarded by those who 
had made up their minds that war with Spain should be 
the last resource of baffled diplomacy 5 . Matters were 
brought to a crisis by the return of Stanley, who arrived 
in England on the last day of September. He brought no 
news, and definite action could no longer be postponed. 
It was necessary that instructions should be sent to Lord 
Bristol, and the question decided whether England should 
be involved in a struggle with a new antagonist or be 
deprived of the services of her greatest statesman. 

The cabinet met on Friday, October 2nd 6 . Ten 
ministers were present, and the proceedings opened by 

1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 303 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 37—40. 

2 Rockingham. Memoirs, i. 40 — 42. 3 Ibid., i. 43 — 44. 

4 Chatham Correspondence, n. 141 — 4. 

5 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 43 — 44. 

6 Add. MS. 32929, f. 18 (E. H. R., Jan. 1906) ; Add. MS. 35870, 
f. 310 {E. H. R., April 1906). 



76 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

Pitt explaining the business which had called them 
together. He declared himself to be of the same opinion 
as before, and referred to the recently intercepted letter 
from Grimaldi as supporting the resolution he had formed 
from the first 1 . All the ministers joined in the discussion ; 
but, except by Lord Temple, not one word was spoken in 
favour of Pitt. By some, a war with Spain was declared 
to be impracticable : by others, it was denounced as un- 
justifiable. Bute argued that an intolerable strain would 
be placed upon the resources of England, prevented as she 
was from abandoning any part of the existing contest, and 
Lord Anson roundly declared that the English navy was 
not in a fit condition to meet the fleets of Spain. Pitt and 
Temple stood alone. The latter, stating his opinion once 
again, left the council chamber. Pitt made a farewell 
speech. He declared that he would be responsible for 
nothing that he did not direct, and intimated his inten- 
tion of resigning office. No resolution was come to upon 
the instructions to be given to Lord Bristol : all that was 
determined was that reinforcements should be sent to 
admiral Saunders, in case the Spaniards began hostilities. 
After the meeting, there could be no doubt that Pitt 
would shortly tender his resignation. A blind belief in 
the possibility of maintaining peace with Spain, a dread 
of enlarging the area of hostilities, and jealousy of his 
pre-eminence, had all contributed to drive him from 
power. He did not fall a victim to a court intrigue, nor 
was his overthrow a triumph for the crown. Events had 
shaped themselves in a way which had not been foreseen j 
and the expulsion of Pitt from office, before peace had 

1 In the account given by Newcastle (Add. MS. 32929, f. 18), the 
date of Grimaldi's letter is given as August 13th : this is obviously 
a slip for September 13th. In Hardwicke's version (Add MS. 35870, 
f. 310) the date is stated correctly. 



THE FALL OF PITT 77 

been concluded with France, was not part of the original 
programme of the court. Bute had been driven into' 
a course of action which he did not approve, in order to 
avoid a greater evil 1 . He was able with perfect sincerity 
to regret the loss of his great colleague, as the administra- 
tion, bereft of the one member implicitly trusted by the 
nation, was sure to be jealously scrutinised; and he himself 
would be held responsible for the dismissal of Pitt, and for 
any misfortunes which might follow. Bute was embarking 
upon an unknown sea, and might well shrink from the 
prospect. He had failed to attain the end for which he had 
striven, and had been obliged to do what he could rather 
than what he would. Unpopular with the people of 
England, he was left to conduct a war and conclude a 
peace ; and, in the discharge of these duties, it would be 
only too easy to add fuel to the flames of popular hatred, 
and enable Pitt to pose as the champion of the people 
against the mismanagement of the king and his Scotch 
favourite. 

But, if the resignation of Pitt was unfortunate for the 
success of the designs which Bute had most at heart,, 
Newcastle, though he did not know it, was the real 
victim. Since the accession of George III, Newcastle had 
pursued a policy for which he was to suffer in after years. 
Fretting under what he thought the tyranny of Pitt, he 
had gladly allied with the court against him. Bute had 
used the old statesman as a pawn in the game : and now 
that Pitt had gone, Newcastle was useless. He was left 
at the disposal of the king to do with him as he pleased. 
Politically, he had signed his own death warrant, and 
was quickly to reap the reward of his treachery and lack 
of foresight. 

1 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, p. 572. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE. 

The position of the administration after the cabinet 
meeting on October 2nd was far from secure. It was not 
a moment of triumph for Lord Bute. He had seen his 
plans miscarry; and if he had gained a victory, it was 
one which might prove more disastrous than a defeat. 
Entangled in the net of his own diplomacy, he had been 
obliged to force Pitt into resignation, before he had suc- 
ceeded in making peace with France, and in the midst 
of negotiations with Spain only too likely to precipitate a 
quarrel with that power. He found himself supreme in the 
administration under conditions which he had not and 
would not have chosen. He had gone too far, and yet not 
far enough, on the path which the king had commanded 
him to tread, to seek for safety in retreat. The mark of 
popular hatred, he must seize the reins of power which 
had fallen from the hands of Pitt, and guide the destinies 
of a nation which neither liked nor trusted him. Few 
men have occupied a more unenviable position. Judged 
and condemned before he had been tried, he was embarked 
upon an enterprise which seemed fated to end in failure. 
If he pursued a conciliatory foreign policy, and succeeded 
in concluding peace with France and placating Spain, the 
cry would be raised that the honour and glory of England 
were betrayed by a Scotch favourite who, conscious of 
his own incapacity, was willing to make any sacrifice in 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 79 

order to rid himself of a burden which he could not 
sustain. If, in order to win the approval of the people, he 
engaged in warlike undertakings, it would at once be said 
that the greatest war minister, ever known in the annals of 
English history, was without a seat in the administration 
at a time when his advice was most needed. When the 
many and overwhelming difficulties under which Bute 
was obliged to work are remembered, his failure is not 
so surprising as his partial success. When he resigned 
office in the spring of 1763, he had incurred the hatred of 
the people to a greater degree than any minister since 
Strafford. No crime was too great to attribute to him; 
and the dislike of the nation pursued him even in his 
retirement. Yet he had succeeded in bringing the long 
war to a conclusion ; and had thus attained one end for 
which he had endured the distasteful burden of official 
life. If he failed in his great project of winning the 
national support for the crown, his want of success was 
due far more to the position he occupied as the king's 
favourite than to the policy he pursued. He struggled 
against circumstances too strong to be overcome except 
by consummate genius ; and that he did not possess. 

The first task to be performed, after the stormy meeting 
on October 2nd, was the selection of Pitt's successor; and 
the choice was not easy to make. If a nonentity in 
politics or a creature of the court was appointed to fill the 
vacant place, the prestige of the ministry, which would 
inevitably be affected by the loss of its greatest member, 
would be still further diminished. Yet if merit and ability 
were sought for and acquired, Bute might discover that 
he had endangered his own predominance in the cabinet, 
and created a Frankenstein to his own destruction. Each 
extreme had its own peculiar dangers, and the problem 
was rendered more difficult of solution by the jealousy 



80 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

with which Newcastle regarded Bute's growing power. 
Though Newcastle and Bute had allied together to thwart 
the aggressive designs of Pitt, neither friendship nor 
confidence existed between them. Their very success 
made further union impossible. Now that Pitt could no 
longer force his will upon his colleagues, Newcastle was 
free to indulge his jealousy of Bute, and the latter could 
give rein to the contempt he felt for the veteran statesman 
who had allowed himself to be used as a pawn in a game 
which he did not understand 1 . This very real though still 
decently draped hostility between the two ministers accen- 
tuated the difficulty of choosing a new secretary of state. 
If a friend of Newcastle was chosen, Bute would find it 
difficult to control the decisions of the cabinet; and if 
the new minister was an ally and follower of Lord Bute, 
Newcastle might discover that he had lost more than he 
had gained by the retirement of Pitt. 

It was necessary, however, to decide upon a new secre- 
tary of state without undue loss of time ; and the ministers 
did not wait for Pitt to resign to discuss the candidates 
for the succession. Amongst those mentioned was Henry 
Fox. As far as ability went, Fox had every claim to 
consideration. He had once been Pitt's friendly rival, 
and had shown himself worthy of his great antagonist. 
He was known to be of a daring and defiant disposition, 
ready in debate, and undismayed in the face of adversity. 
But, lacking the moral qualities, and that lofty disregard 
of wealth which adorned his rival, Fox, at the critical 
moment of his career, had abandoned the path of glory 
and toil, and " sold his reputation for a song." He received 
the punishment that he deserved. He earned the reputa- 
tion of an unscrupulous and treacherous politician; and 

1 For Bute's opinion of Newcastle, see Grenville Papers, i. 395 — 
397. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 81 

few men in public life were so distrusted and disliked. 
His many admirable qualities, his devotion as a husband, 
his affection as a father, were forgotten or ignored by 
those who knew and feared him as a politician. New- 
castle, who had felt the lash of his tongue, stood in awe of 
him ; and had no wish to have him as a colleague. Bute 
was prepared to favour his claims to office, but not 
inclined to press the point in face of Newcastle's opposition 1 . 
He recognised the danger of such an appointment. The 
contrast between Pitt with his contempt of personal profit, 
and Fox with his passion for the accumulation of wealth, 
could not fail to strike the most sluggish intellect. Bute 
neither wished nor could afford so scornfully to disregard 
public opinion. To replace the most popular by the most 
unpopular statesman in England, in order to secure Fox's 
valuable assistance, was an experiment too daring to be 
safe 2 . He might be equally useful, and far less dangerous, 
in a more secret and subordinate capacity. 

If it was not possible to give Fox the seals because of 
the evil reputation he had earned, the same objection 
could not be urged against the Duke of Bedford. The 
leader of a party, the members of which were regarded as 
among the most rapacious politicians of their time, he was 
free from the faults which disfigured his followers ; and, if 
not a distinguished, was at least an honourable politician. 
He had held high office during the reign of the late king, 
and could not be charged with lack of political experience. 

1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 

2 Ibid. Andrew Stone, the friend of the Duke of Newcastle, re- 
marked "that tho' he wished Mr Fox very well, he seldom saw him, and 
had a friendship for him, yet he would declare his opinion very clearly 
that the going from the most popular man (Mr Pitt) to the most un- 
popular man in England (Mr Fox) would give such an advantage to 
Mr Pitt as to put it out of Mr Fox's power ' to be of any service on this 
occasion.' " Add. MS. 32928, f. 362. 

w. 6 



82 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

At the moment, he was far more in sympathy with New- 
castle than Bute. Passionately in favour of peace, he 
had, in company with Newcastle, pressed for concessions 
to be made to France, only to find himself overruled by 
Pitt and Bute. If he was created secretary of state, 
Newcastle's position in the cabinet would be materially 
strengthened, and Bute might be saddled with a trouble- 
some colleague. Bedford would be certain to oppose the 
adoption of an aggressive attitude towards Spain: and 
though Bute declared himself willing to waive any objec- 
tions he might have, it is unlikely that he would have 
consented to an appointment which would have furnished 
Newcastle with an ally, and endangered his own supremacy 1 . 
Fox being ineligible on account of his unpopularity, 
and Bedford on account of his opinions, it seemed prob- 
able that the vacant post would fall by default to George 
Grenville. Few objections could be raised to such an 
appointment. He had already attained a prominent 
position in political life; and, though connected by 
marriage with Pitt, had gained a mild notoriety by daring 
to oppose his powerful kinsman 2 . On the accession of 
George III, he had thrown in his lot with Lord Bute, 
though curiously enough it was not Bute but Newcastle 
who wished him to be given the seals 3 . Bute would 
have preferred to have Grenville as chancellor of the 
exchequer 4 , but Newcastle, who had no wish to have a 
friend of Bute as a colleague on the treasury board, 
strongly objected, and the project was abandoned. Gren- 
ville was asked to accept the secretaryship of state, and 
refused the offer. He had set his heart, not on high 
administrative office, but on becoming speaker of the 

i Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 

2 Add. MS. 35352, f. 157. 

3 Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 4 Ibid. 






THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 83 

house of commons. His legal turn of mind, his grasp of 
detail, and his intimate acquaintance with parliamentary 
law and practice, admirably qualified him for the post 
which he coveted ; and it was in an evil moment for his 
reputation that he agreed to forswear his ambition. But, 
though he consented to abandon the hope of becoming 
speaker, he steadily refused to accept the office of 
secretary of state. He professed to feel a delicacy in 
succeeding his brother-in-law, and remained deaf to all 
the arguments used to persuade him to avail himself of an 
opportunity which might not come again. But, though 
unwilling to take upon himself the task which Pitt had 
abandoned, he was not unready to come to the assistance 
of the ministers. It was agreed that, retaining his office 
of treasurer of the navy, he should be summoned to all 
the meetings of the cabinet, and be entrusted with the 
management of the house of commons. 

The ministers had failed to find a suitable successor to 
Pitt; and were obliged to resort for a candidate to the 
second rank of politicians. The seals, which Grrenville 
had refused, were accepted by Lord Egremont. The new 
secretary of state had never played a prominent part in 
public life; and his appointment was not likely to increase 
the prestige of the administration. Possessed of little 
capacity, he acts but a shadowy part in the history of his 
time, impressing his contemporaries as little as he has 
interested posterity. The brother-in-law of George Gren- 
ville, he would be likely to follow the latter's lead, and 
support Bute rather than Newcastle. Thus, by chance 
or by design, Bute had contrived, through the reconsti- 
tution of the administration, materially to strengthen his 
position in the cabinet 1 . He might count upon the 

1 Newcastle believed that Bute never intended Grenville to be secre- 
tary of state, and that the appointment of Lord Egremont had been 

6—2 



84 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

assistance of Egremont and of Grrenville who, as manager 
of the house of commons, would wield no inconsiderable 
power. Indeed the danger was that he might become too 
powerful. It would come within his province to use the 
means of bribery and corruption, which lay so ready to 
the hands of a minister in the eighteenth century, to gain 
and keep a majority for the administration in the lower 
house; and politicians, like dogs, were apt to become most 
closely attached to those who supplied their wants. If 
allowed to enjoy the usual degree of power allotted to 
the manager of the house of commons, Grrenville might 
easily acquire an authority which would threaten that of 
Bute and the king ; and it was to safeguard against this 
danger that his duties were limited and defined. In the 
words of Newcastle, Grrenville was " to have the conduct 
of the house of commons in the manner my brother had, 
when he was paymaster general, and Mr Sandys chan- 
cellor of the exchequer 1 ." Towards the end of 1762, 
Grrenville complained of the difficulty he experienced in 
conducting the business of the house of commons with 
such restricted powers 2 ; and there can be little doubt that 
the limitations imposed on his' authority were designed to 
retain the dispensation of patronage in the hands of the 
king. Men were not to be allowed to forget, as they had 
forgotten in the past, that the court was the source of all 
promotion. 

decided upon at a meeting at Lord Granville's house on the evening of 
October 2nd. Until further evidence is forthcoming, it is impossible to 
attach much weight to Newcastle's suspicions on this point ; but it is 
worth while to note that it was Lord Granville who advised Egremont to 
accept the offer of the secretaryship of state (Add. MS. 32929, f. 56: 
Hist. MSS. Comm., 6th Report, Appendix, p. 316). 

1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 152. This refers to the administration formed 
after the fall of Walpole from power. 

2 Grenville Papers, i. 482—485. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 85 

Lord Temple accompanied Pitt into retirement, but a 
new lord privy seal was not appointed till two months 
had elapsed. The office was of minor importance, and 
the delay, though possibly a cause of inconvenience, did 
not seriously hamper the transaction of official business. 
Newcastle fretted at Bute's procrastination, and pressed 
the claims of Lord Hardwicke. The latter was offered 
but refused the vacant office 1 which was finally given to 
the Duke of Bedford. It has been suggested by a writer, 
whose opinion has every claim to consideration, that the 
offer to Lord Hardwicke was a mere act of formal polite- 
ness, not meant to be taken seriously; and that, though 
it had always been intended that Bedford should be 
Temple's successor, his appointment was delayed until the 
diplomatic relations between England and Spain had 
become so strained as to render war inevitable, and thus 
the danger averted of Newcastle and Bedford uniting to 
prevent a conflict between the two countries 2 . It cannot 
be said that any inherent improbability attaches to this 
view; but it would seem that further evidence is necessary 
before it can rank higher than a plausible and possible 
theory. Lord Hardwicke, though he held no office, had 
the right of attending the cabinet council and would not 
increase his influence by becoming lord privy seal. 
The Duke of Bedford, also without office, had also been in 
the habit of attending the cabinet meetings ; and the office 
of lord privy seal, though of great dignity, was of little 
political importance; and did not apparently confer the 
right of being summoned to that inner cabinet at which 
the most important affairs were discussed 3 . But to what- 
ever cause the delay in the appointment of Bedford may 

1 Harris' Life of Hardwicke, in. 269. 

2 von Euville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 23. 

3 Walpole's Memoirs of the reign of George III, n. 255, note 3. 



86 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

be due, whether to accident or design, it is at least 
certain that Bute had conferred office upon one ready 
to assist him in bringing the war with France to a con- 
clusion. 

The administration was thus reconstructed far more 
in the interest of Bute than of Newcastle. The former 
would not apparently have to fear the opposition of his new 
colleagues ; but, if secure in that respect, he did not enjoy 
immunity from other dangers. Pitt, though he had been 
driven into resignation, still threatened the safety of his 
former associates. Great was the popular outcry at the 
news of his fall. Bute was forced to confess that the 
storm ran high in the city, always distinguished by its 
loyalty to the "great commoner 1 "; and certain of the 
directors of the Bank of England had not minced their 
words in speaking of those who had outvoted but not out- 
argued the greatest member of the administration 2 . If 
Pitt had chosen to go into opposition, he could have 
played the part of a demagogue with terrible effect. It 
was within his power to lead and organise the ever rising 
opposition in the nation to the Scotch favourite who stood 
between the king and his people; and there must have 
been many who thought that the man, who had gained a 
reputation in early life by reckless opposition to Sir 
Robert Walpole, would not decline the opportunity thus 
offered him. The prospect was sufficiently serious to 
alarm the most experienced and cool-headed politician. 
Embittered by the frustration of his plans, and supported 
by the people, Pitt might prove far more formidable in 
opposition than he had ever been in power. Realising the 
danger, Bute attempted to avert it by depriving Pitt of 
popular support. The nation might think less of the hero 
who, though he had preferred to abandon office rather 

1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 74. 2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 113. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 87 

than continue in an administration which he could not 
guide, was willing to partake of the bounty of the crown; 
and Pitt fell into the trap prepared for him. He refused 
the governorship of Canada, for which residence was not 
to be necessary ; but accepted a peerage for his wife and 
a pension for himself; and the news was quickly published 
in the gazette, with the express purpose of diminishing 
his popularity 1 . 

The trick had an overwhelming, if temporary, success. 
The new peeress was quickly nicknamed Lady Cheat'em ; 
and it was rumoured that the city was preparing to burn 
its former idol in effigy. Men, who took little or no 
interest in politics, were overwhelmed with distress on 
hearing the news. The poet Gray refused at first to 
believe that Pitt had sunk so low, and afterwards attri- 
buted his incredulity to an insufficient acquaintance with 
the writings of St Thomas a Kempis, "who knew mankind 
so much better than I 2 ." The Duke of Devonshire con- 
cluded that Pitt had sold himself to the court 3 ; and those, 
who had believed that amongst the politicians of the time 
there was at least one righteous man, acknowledged them- 
selves mistaken, and confessed that Pitt was as willing to 
be bought as his contemporaries, and only differed from 
them in demanding a higher price. Such an outcry may 
well seem irrational at the present day; but it was not 
altogether devoid of justification. Amply as Pitt had 
deserved all that the king could offer, his conduct was 
open to misconstruction. Men had not yet learned to 
discriminate between the king and his ministers, and to 
oppose the administration was to oppose the court 4 . This 
belief, fostered by the previous two reigns in which 
opposition to the government might be interpreted as 

1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 143. 2 Gray's Works (Mitford), in. 265. 

3 Add. MS. 32929, f. 326. * Ibid. 



88 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

support of the exiled Stuarts, was still alive ; and nothing 
in the new reign had yet happened to encourage the idea 
that it was possible to oppose the ministry of the day 
and yet remain a faithful supporter of the crown. If, 
therefore, most men thought that Pitt had sold his free- 
dom of action and liberty of speech in return for material 
comfort, they can be forgiven for their mistake. But it 
is not necessary to pardon Pitt for an act which involved 
no guilt. He accepted what the crown had to give, not 
as a bribe for what he was to do, but as a reward for 
what he had actually done; and did so with an easy 
conscience because he had determined to work in the 
future, as in the past, to promote the best interests of the 
nation, and, consequently, to render loyal service to the 
king. 

The very success of Bute's stratagem was to be the 
cause of its failure. The tide of public opinion was 
running so strongly against Pitt that it was necessary for 
him to stem it. He wrote, and permitted the publication 
of, a letter in which he declared that the royal favours 
bestowed upon him had been infamously traduced as 
"a bargain for my forsaking the public 1 ." His unsup- 
ported word was sufficient to dispel the storm which had 
so suddenly gathered, and to regain for him his place in 
the affections of the people. It was now known that he 
had not sold himself for a "handful of silver"; and that 
one man still existed who would not barter his convictions 
for a peerage and a pension. Bute had struck in the dark, 
and the blow recoiled upon the striker. He had failed to 
deprive Pitt of the national support which constituted his 
strength, and had only succeeded in increasing his own 
unpopularity. 

Pitt, however, was not the danger to the administration 
1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 158 — 159. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 89 

that Bute imagined. He is not to be numbered amongst 
those politicians "resolved to ruin or to rule the state"; 
and was far too patriotic to sacrifice the welfare of the 
country to his own aggrandisement. Time had curbed 
the faults of his youth, and he shrank from needlessly 
thwarting the government engaged upon a difficult task 1 . 
He had no intention of throwing himself into factious 
and headlong opposition. But, if he was ready to support 
the ministers when he approved their measures, no man 
was less prepared to make a servile submission. He chose 
the part of the independent critic, awarding praise and 
blame where he thought they were deserved, and to Bute 
the prospect could not fail to be unpleasant. Careful as 
he might be, he knew that, if he was to carry his designs 
to a successful conclusion, he must do much that would 
cause offence to Pitt ; and the latter would not be behind- 
hand in denunciation. If the danger was less than Bute 
imagined, it was yet by no means inconsiderable. Pitt 
might stand alone or at the head of a party; but, in either 
case, he would prove himself a formidable antagonist, and 
play the part of Abudah's hag to the administration. 
There was no minister fit to defend himself and his 
colleagues against the thunder of the great orator. 
G-renville, the leader in the house of commons, would be 
of little use in such an emergency. A tedious and 
pedantic debater, he would only serve to point the con- 
trast between himself and the most inspiring speaker of 

1 He informed Hardwicke that " he did not know how much he should 
attend parliament. The supplies he would support to the utmost, both 
publickly and privately, as well of men and ships as of money. He 
did not intend to give any disturbance to administration, but if the 
causes of his quitting should be misrepresented or should be fallen upon, 
he should be obliged to set them in a true light and justify himself." 
Add. MS. 32929, f. 227. 



90 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the day. There was only one man fit to be put up in 
parliamentary combat with Pitt, and that was Henry Fox. 
He was ready to place himself at Bute's disposal. As 
paymaster general he had found it easy to amass the 
wealth that he coveted, and now wished to gain the 
honours which the crown could confer. He desired a 
peerage for his wife ; and, though the request was refused, 
he pledged himself to support the administration, to speak 
or keep silent in the house of commons as he thought 
best, and, binding himself to Bute, undertook to enter 
into no engagements with anyone else 1 . 

In securing the support of Fox, Bute had reckoned 
without George Grenville. The latter, who had refused 
to have any business transactions with Fox, was deeply 
chagrined when he heard of the arrangement into which 
Bute had entered 2 . His predominance in the house of 
commons would be seriously endangered by the new 
recruit, and he began to meditate abandoning the task 
which he had undertaken. Bute could not afford to drive 
Grenville to despair. He needed him as the representative 
of the ministry in the house of commons, and as an ally 
in the struggle which was certain to take place, sooner or 
later, with Newcastle. However valuable the assistance 
that Fox could render, the loss of Grenville would be too 
high a price to pay for it ; and, to placate the latter, Fox 
was instructed to refrain from taking part in debate 3 . Bute 
may have regretted that he was unable to make full use 
of the very great abilities which Fox possessed; but it 

i Add. MS. 32929, f. 227, f. 279 ; Add. MS. 32930, f. 104 ; Fitz- 
maurice's Life of Shelburne, i. 112 — 117. 

2 Add. MS. 32930, f. 104 ; Grenville Papers, i. 414—415. 

3 Add. MS. 32930, f. 176, f. 220. This prohibition must not be 
taken too literally: it could only mean that Fox was not to play too 
prominent a part in debate. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 91 

was at least a gain that they could not be used against 
him. He had succeeded in securing the support of one 
of the foremost politicians of the day, and avoided the 
odium which he would have incurred by f giving Fox a 
ministerial office. 

Stress has been laid upon the various ministerial 
changes effected at this time because they were to exercise 
a decided influence upon the subsequent course of events. 
Bute was now in a stronger position than he had occupied 
before the fall of Pitt, and was ready to deal with those 
questions of foreign policy which called for settlement. 
Amongst these, the relations between England and Spain 
were, perhaps, of the most pressing importance. Instruc- 
tions had to be sent to Lord Bristol who could hardly be 
allowed to remain ignorant any longer of the opinion of 
the cabinet. The administration, however, was not unani- 
mous on this question; and Bute and Newcastle found 
themselves in opposite camps. The former had been 
opposed to an instant declaration of war as advised by 
Pitt, but he fully realised the danger of a close union 
between the two Bourbon powers, and desired that the 
Spanish government should be called upon to explain the 
nature of the treaty it had concluded with France. He 
was not unmindful that such a demand might provoke a 
war, and was willing to run that risk, rather than continue 
any longer in a state of uncertainty. He was anxious 
that no colour should be given to the charge that vigour 
and efficiency had left the administration with Pitt. It 
was better that England should be called upon to face a 
new enemy than the impression given that the ministers 
were sacrificing the honour of the country to a craven 
desire for peace. It was necessary, unless Bute wished to 
drive Pitt headlong into opposition, to pursue a bold and 
energetic policy; and teach Englishmen at home and 



92 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

foreigners abroad that the national greatness did not 
depend upon a single man 1 . 

Newcastle, who perhaps did not see as far, was in 
favour of the adoption of a more conciliatory policy. He 
was adverse to any step being taken likely to provoke 
Spain into taking up arms. He wished instructions to be 
sent to Lord Bristol, but desired them to be of a character 
least likely to arouse the animosity of Spain 2 . He feared 
a war with Spain, not only because he was pacifically 
inclined, but also for a reason which does not appear on 
the surface. He had cause to suspect that Bute was in 
favour of abandoning the war in Grermany, of withdraw- 
ing the English troops from that country, and devoting the 
energies of the nation to the struggle with France on the 
sea and in the new world 3 . To such a policy Newcastle 
was strongly opposed ; and he was not destitute of argu- 
ments in support of his case. The withdrawal of the 
English troops from Grermany could hardly be justified, 
except on the plea of necessity. If it could be shown 
that the resources of England were no longer equal to 
the demands made upon her, the abandonment of the 
continental war might be excused ; and this plea could be 
urged, with greater effect and less danger of refutation, if 
England was compelled to embark upon a war with Spain, 
and thus impose upon herself an additional financial 
burden. It would probably be unjust to believe, as New- 
castle did, that Bute was anxious for war with Spain in 
order to abandon hostilities on the continent with a better 
grace. He was impelled by other reasons to adopt a 
defiant attitude towards Spain. Yet it is true to say that 

1 Bute to Lord Melcombe, Oct. 8th, 1761 (Adolphus' History of 
England, i., Appendix, p. 572). 

2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 115. 

3 Add. MS. 32929, f. 262. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 93 

he regarded the continental war with little favour, and 
would be willing to abandon it if a favourable opportunity 
arose. During the reign of George II, the opposition 
had often denounced the sacrifice of English to German 
interests, and argued that, if a German elector was not 
king of England, English troops would not be seen 
fighting on the continent, and English money would not 
be spent in subsidising petty German princes. A few 
months after the accession of George III, a clever pam- 
phlet had appeared, reiterating these views, and pointing 
out that, whereas the struggle with France on the sea, in 
America, and in India, served English interests, the con- 
tinental war constituted a drain upon her resources, and 
gave no compensating advantage 1 . These opinions were 
shared by Bute who had made no secret of his dislike of 
the sacrifice of English to German interests. If an 
abandonment of the continental struggle was likely to 
be popular in England, Bute would be ready to carry 
it out; but, if it would probably provoke the hostility 
of Pitt and the nation, he might prefer to sink his own 
opinions, and continue a policy of which he did not 
approve. 

The German war remained, however, at present in the 
background, and men's minds were occupied with the 
Spanish question. In opposing Bute on that point, New- 
castle was at a disadvantage; for the former was supported 
in his opinion by Grenville and Egremont. The arrival 
of a reassuring despatch from Lord Bristol on October 
20th wrought no change in the design which Bute had 
formed. Newcastle learnt that, without his advice being 
sought, Egremont had been instructed by the king to 
order Lord Bristol to inform Wall, the Spanish minister, 
that England was willing to settle amicably her dispute 
1 Mauduit's Considerations on the Gennan War, 1760. 



94 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

with Spain, provided that the latter country "made it 
appear to the king that there was nothing offensive con- 
tained in the last treaty with Paris." This was to ask 
more than Wall could perform, and would oblige him, 
either to refuse the request, and thus confirm the worst 
suspicions of the English ministers, or reveal the truth 
that the family compact was expressly framed against 
the interests of England, and thus justify an immediate 
declaration of war. Bitterly as Newcastle might object 
to a policy which he regarded as unnecessarily provocative, 
he was powerless to prevent it. The instructions were 
discussed at a ministerial meeting on October 23rd, at 
which only Bute, Hardwicke, Newcastle, Egremont and 
Grenville were present 1 . With no supporter but Hard- 
wicke, Newcastle found himself outvoted 2 . Three weeks 
before, Pitt, in a similar position, had preserved his 
dignity by resignation: Newcastle, to whom official life 
had become a second nature, clung to office. He pro- 
tested against the administration pursuing a line of conduct 
which could only end in war ; and, in answer to his pro- 
tests, another meeting of ministers was summoned, which 
Lord Mansfield was asked to attend 3 . Bute was suf- 
ficiently powerful to be able to afford to indulge Newcastle. 
The second meeting was a useless formality, though it 
was perhaps then that Lord Hardwicke succeeded in 
obtaining a slight modification of the instructions 4 . As 
they were finally sent, Lord Bristol was instructed to 
press for a communication of the family compact; but, 
if the demand was refused, he was to be permitted to 
accept the Spanish king's solemn assurance as to the 

1 Add. MS. 32929, f- 421. 

2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 470, f. 472. Add. MS. 32930, f. 8. 

3 Add. MS. 32930, f. 220. 

4 Ibid. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 95 

innocent nature of the treaty, provided that the assurance 
was given in writing 1 . 

The die had been cast, and war between the two 
countries was now inevitable. The Spanish government 
might seek to gain time by delay ; but, sooner or later, it 
would be compelled to throw off the mask, and avow its 
hostility to England. No fault can be found with Bute's 
policy, save that, by resorting to diplomacy, he gave to 
the enemy time in which to strengthen themselves for the 
coming struggle. He had prevailed against the opposition 
of Newcastle; and was ready to face parliament which 
had been summoned to meet early in November. 

The parliamentary session passed off quietly. There 
was no organised opposition to the administration ; and if 
the attitude adopted by Pitt was independent, it was at 
least not hostile. Even if he had chosen to lead an attack 
upon his former colleagues, his task would not have been 
easy. There was a lull in domestic politics. At the present 
day, no ministry could pass through a parliamentary 
session without bringing forward several contentious 
measures which would allow the opposition ample oppor- 
tunity for criticism and condemnation. In the early years 
of the reign of Greorge III, the servants of the crown 
were occupied more with administration than legislation, 
and were not supposed to have fallen short of their duty 
if they had failed to make important additions to the 
statute book. Conscious of his own unpopularity, Bute 
was not inclined to add to his burdens the weight of law- 
making, and if his administration lay open to attack, it 
was only in regard to the foreign policy which it pursued. 
Those who wished to oppose the government, and to dis- 
credit it in order to glorify Pitt, were prepared to ask for 
the documents, relating to the negotiations between 
1 Parliamentary History, xv. 1152 — 1157. 



96 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

England and Spain, to be laid before the house of com- 
mons. The motives which inspired such a request were 
obvious. If it was complied with, the house would be 
given the opportunity of criticising the ministers for 
their opposition to Pitt who would be likely to seize the 
occasion to explain his conduct to a larger audience than 
a cabinet council. The danger was doubtless great, but 
the strength of the government, and the weakness of its 
opponents, lay in the extravagant nature of the demand ; 
for Spain might justly be deeply offended if the confi- 
dential documents of an incomplete negotiation were 
published to the world. Though much might be urged in 
favour of the publication of the papers, though it might 
be said that, in refusing to reveal the information on which 
they had formed their opinions, the ministers admitted 
the weakness of their case, it cannot be said that they 
acted rashly in declining to accede to the request 1 . 
The proposal for the Spanish papers to be submitted to 
the house of commons was moved on December 11th, 
and rejected without a division. Grenville spoke against 
the motion, "arguing that it was of the most dangerous 
consequence, whilst a negotiation might be depending, to 
call for papers, as it would tend to loosen all confidence 
from foreign powers." Pitt took part in the debate, 
speaking against the ministers who, however, carried 
the day 2 . 

The Spanish question was not the only danger which 
had threatened the administration : there was also the 

1 Grenville had at first been in favour of laying some of the papers 
before the house of commons, but this was strongly opposed by Bute. 
At a cabinet council on November 10th, the ministers were divided on 
the question ; and it was arranged that Grenville should take the opinion 
of the principal men in the house of commons (Add. MS. 32930, f. 374, 
f. 423, f. 427, f. 431, f. 433 ; Grenville Papers, i. 416). 

2 Add. MS. 32932, f. 141 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 88, ff. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 97 

question of the war in Germany. The foreign estimates 
had to be submitted to the house of commons ; and New- 
castle feared that they would be found not to include the 
necessary supplies for the continental war. He knew that 
Grenville was in favour of retrenchment, and suspected 
Bute of being of the same opinion. But he underrated 
Bute's wisdom and caution. However much the latter 
might sympathise with Grenville, he was not prepared to 
call up the world in arms against him. War with Spain 
had not yet been declared, and no sufficient excuse existed 
for abandoning the continent. To propose the withdrawal 
of the English troops from Germany would be to play 
into Pitt's hands, and give him a legitimate grievance 
against the government. Bute was willing to wait until 
he saw his way clearer ; and Newcastle rejoiced to find 
that the war in Germany was still to continue 1 . Yet the 
debate in the house of commons on the foreign estimates 
gave him food for reflection. If it was of little import- 
ance that Bigby and Delaval argued against the German 
war, it was of great moment that George Grenville dis- 
played almost equal hostility. Though he deprecated the 
abandonment of the continent as involving the desertion 
of those we had promised to support, he argued against the 
utility of the war to England. " Did the war in Germany," 
he asked, " beat the French fleet ? No, Sir Edward Hawke. 
Did the war in Germany take and preserve and recover 
Quebec ? No, but fleets and armies." Proceeding in this 
vein, Grenville contrived, simultaneously, to support the 
administration and to justify the opposition 2 . 

This was bad enough, but worse was to come. When 

1 Add. MS. 32930, f. 374 ; Add. MS. 32931, f. 59, f. 147, f. 195, 
f. 197. 

2 Add. MS. 32932, f. 78 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 71—79 ; Walpole's 
Memoirs, i. 79—83. 

w. 7 



98 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the debate was resumed on the following day, a new 
opponent of the German war arose. This was Colonel 
Barre, until then unknown in politics. The new speaker, 
however, displayed none of that timidity which is supposed 
to sit well upon a parliamentary novice. With incredible 
bad taste, smacking more of the camp than the town, he 
abused the late king for the favour he had shown to his 
German dominions; and described Pitt as an abandoned 
and profligate minister, ready to trim his sails to any 
favouring breeze. He roundly denounced the German 
war, though he was willing to allow it to continue for 
a year longer, not for any useful purpose that it served, 
but as an evil to be endured, a legacy from those who had 
betrayed the country in the past 1 . His hearers were 
astounded by the audacity of the attack upon the popular 
hero ; and Barre rose to parliamentary fame in one bound. 
Nor did he prevail by the power of mere vulgar abuse 
alone: his utterance was distinguished by genuine elo- 
quence; and he showed himself endowed with gifts, 
destined to cause him to shine in debate. But his speech 
had an importance greater than can be attached to any 
display of mere oratory. He had been brought into 
parliament by Lord Shelburne 2 who was known to be in 
the confidence of Bute, and opposed to the Grerman war 3 . 
Those who knew these facts might well invest Barre's 
speech with a significance which it did not appear on the 
surface to possess. It seemed not improbable that he had 
but voiced the opinions which Bute held and did not dare 
to avow; and, though the estimates were voted, and 
the Grerman war continued, Newcastle lamented the 

1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 78, see also f. 109 ; Walpole's Memoirs, 
i. 85—88. 

2 Chatham Correspondence, n. 170 (extract from the Mitchell MSS.). 
s Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 99 

attitude adopted by what he termed "the favourite 
part of the administration 1 ." 

When parliament rose for the Christmas holidays, Bute 
could feel that he had tided over a difficult time success- 
fully. He had refrained from giving Pitt an excuse for 
going into violent opposition, but, at the same time, he 
had encouraged the belief that England's interests were 
served, not by the struggle on the continent, but by the 
contest on the sea. He had averted the danger of the 
house of commons being constituted the judge between 
himself and Pitt on the Spanish question ; and it is only 
fair to admit that it was largely by his skill and caution 
that a quiet session had been secured. But while parlia- 
ment had been sitting, news had come from Lord Bristol 
which boded ill for the maintenance of peace between 
Spain and England. On November 14th, the ministers 
learnt that Wall had refused to answer the English 
inquiries. Lord Bristol was again instructed to press for 
an answer, but there could have been little hope that the 
Spanish government would retreat from the position it 
had taken up, and even Newcastle began to talk of pre- 
paring for a war which seemed inevitable 2 . All hope 
vanished on Christmas Eve, when a further despatch from 
Bristol arrived in England. Wall had again refused 
either to communicate the treaty with France, or to give 
an assurance of its pacific character ; and had informed the 
English ambassador that he could leave the country as 
soon as he liked. A few days before the arrival of 
Bristol's despatch, Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in 
England, had presented a memorial, consisting, for the 
most part, of abuse of Pitt. 

The attitude of Wall rendered anything but war 

1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 149 ; Walpole's Letters, v. 151—153. 

2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. 

7—2 



100 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

between the two countries impossible. He had thrown 
down the glove, and it was for the English ministers to 
pick it up. With the exception of Newcastle and Hard- 
wicke, they were ready enough to accept the challenge 
thus thrown out. The cabinet was summoned to meet on 
December 26th 1 . A draft of an answer to Fuentes' 
memorial, and of a declaration of war, were laid before the 
assembled ministers ; and Newcastle, not allowing for the 
brevity of the interval between the arrival of Bristol's 
despatch and the meeting of the cabinet, was aggrieved 
because these documents had not been previously sub- 
mitted to him. Even Pitt, he sorrowfully declared, had 
been wont to do as much 2 . He suspected that everything 
had been arranged between the two secretaries of state 
and Grenville before the meeting 3 ; and it is possible that 
his suspicions were well founded. But he was powerless 
to do anything but complain; and, by remaining in the 
administration, gave a tacit consent to a policy which he 
did not approve. On January 2nd, the cabinet decided to 
declare war, and, at another meeting a few days later, it 
was agreed to attack Havannah 4 . 

The declaration of war with Spain is not an unimport- 
ant incident in the history of the administration which 
Bute controlled 5 . He had not been driven into hostilities 
against his will : conscious of the risk he ran, he had 
entered upon a course of diplomacy which had resulted in 
a breach between the two countries 6 . He had solved the 

1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 347. 

2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 102. 

3 Add. MS. 32932, f. 362, f. 419. 

4 Add. MS. 32933, f. 36 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 87. 

5 Though Bute did not become first lord of the treasury until 
Newcastle left office in May 1762, he was the leading figure in the 
administration from the time of Pitt's resignation. 

6 von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 33 — 36. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 101 

Spanish question by war, and was now free to turn his 
attention to the struggle on the continent. The contest 
with Spain threatened to prove expensive, for it was likely 
that Portugal would be invaded; and Bute had encour- 
aged the idea that England would come to the assistance 
of her ancient ally 1 . The resources of the country might 
not be equal to the additional strain imposed upon it, 
unless some relief was given; and the way of obtaining 
that relief had already been shown. Bute told Newcastle 
that the German war must be abandoned 2 , and supported 
his opinion by arguments at a cabinet council on January 
6th 3 . Yet he did not desire to act with precipitation, 
and, though he might confide his opinion to his colleagues, 
he did not want to publish it to the world; and it was 
against his wishes that the Duke of Bedford introduced 
a motion against the German war in the house of lords 4 . 

Indeed, the question was far more complicated than 
Bedford, perhaps, realised. England might justify the 
withdrawal of her troops from Germany by the plea of 
necessity, but her ally, Frederick the Great, of Prussia, 
left to bear the full brunt of the French attack, might 
regard such caution as perilously akin to treachery. 
Since the outbreak of the war, Frederick had been 
struggling against a coalition which threatened to over- 
whelm him. The limited resources of the Prussian state 
had been strained to breaking point, and the withdrawal 
of the English troops might well render it hopeless for 
him to continue to contend against difficulties which 
would have proved insuperable to most of his contem- 
poraries. These considerations would have been sufficient 

1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 362, f. 419 ; Add. MS. 32933, f. 33. 

2 Add. MS. 32933, f. 33. s Add. MS. 32933, f. 179. 

4 Bedford Correspondence, in. 72 ; Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, 
i. 127. 



102 PERSONAL .AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

to make Bute pause; but the question was further com- 
plicated by the fact that Frederick the Great was in 
receipt of a subsidy from England. The treaty, under 
which the subsidy had been paid, had recently expired ; 
and negotiations had already been begun for its renewal. 
It would be quite possible for England to withdraw her 
troops from Germany, and yet continue to render financial 
assistance to Prussia 1 ; and, after many conferences between 
Bute and the Prussian ministers in England, it had been 
arranged that, though the treaty should not be renewed 
between the two countries, Frederick should receive, at 
the hands of the English parliament, the same pecuniary 
assistance as had been granted to him in former years 2 . 
It is clear, therefore, that Bute was pursuing a policy 
of extreme caution. Anxious as he might be to give 
England peace, willing as he was to withdraw from the 
continental struggle, he consented to continue the subsidy 
to Prussia, and seemed in favour of delaying, for a time at 
least, the abandonment of the German war. Frederick 
had every reason to be grateful to Pitt. 

The situation was fundamentally changed, and Bute's 
policy with it, by the death of the czarina of Russia, 
Elizabeth, in January 1762, and the accession of Peter III. 
The new czar, though he was to reign but a few months, 
exercised a potent influence upon the politics of Europe, 
and the course of events in England. He was known to 
be an enthusiastic and fanatical admirer of Frederick the 
Great, and his accession rendered it highly probable that 
Prussia might find in her most dangerous antagonist her 
warmest and most valuable ally. When every prospect 
looked dark, and hope had nearly vanished, the un- 

1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 262. 

2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 165 ; Add. MS. 32932, f. 278 ; Add. MS. 32933, 
f. 106. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 103 

expected happened, and rewarded the man who had 
struggled against adversity. The brightness of the dawn 
was in proportion to the darkness of the night. An 
alliance between Russia and Prussia might quickly be 
brought about ; and Frederick, who, but a few days before, 
had been in the depths of despair, could anticipate a 
triumphant issue to the severest struggle which his country 
had ever been called upon to undergo. 

The death of the czarina could not be without 
influence upon the relations between England and Prussia. 
A state, which had been dependent upon English support 
for its very existence, was about to conclude a most 
valuable alliance; and Bute can hardly be blamed for 
thinking that the situation was sufficiently changed to 
justify a revision of the subsidy question. He had 
promised the subsidy at a time when Prussia was 
threatened by destruction. It was to be given, not to 
enable Prussia to pursue a policy of aggression and con- 
quest, but to save her from extinction. The czarina's 
death had wrought a fundamental change, and whereas, 
before that event, Frederick had no choice, unless he was 
willing to confess himself defeated, but to continue the 
struggle against almost impossible odds, he had now the 
option of either prolonging the war with Russian assist- 
ance, or utilising his accession of strength to make peace 
with his enemies at the first favourable opportunity. It is 
not surprising that Bute favoured the adoption by Frede- 
rick of the latter alternative. If Prussia withdrew from 
the war, England would be relieved of a burden which 
she had borne for many years. The war had been fought 
for the possession of Silesia, and if Austria, intimidated 
by the change in Russian policy, was willing to allow 
Frederick to retain his ill-gotten conquest, the king of 
Prussia could lay down his arms, conscious that he had 



104 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

preserved the integrity of his dominions, and proved his 
genius as a general. Such arguments, though they might 
appeal strongly to Bute and certain of his colleagues, 
carried little conviction to the mind of Frederick the Great. 
He had tasted the bitterness of defeat, and had known 
the agony of despair. He had seen his country laid waste, 
and his capital in the possession of the enemy. He had 
not provoked the contest which had come near to com- 
passing his destruction; and, if he had been the first to 
take up arms, it had only been in self-defence against 
those who had conspired to overthrow him. Salvation 
had come at the moment when it was least expected, and 
he would have been more or less than human, and some- 
thing very different from what he actually was, if he had 
not wished to revenge himself upon his foes, robbed of 
their hour of triumph. Allied with Kussia, he might 
inflict upon the hated Austrian power a measure of the 
suffering his country had had to endure ; and, in addition 
to regaining all that he had lost, acquire further 
conquests. 

Bute found himself placed in an awkward position. 
He had no wish to furnish Frederick with the means of 
indefinitely prolonging the war; and yet, if the promised 
subsidy was withheld, he would lay himself open to the 
charge of a breach of faith. It was obvious that English 
interests would not be served by the annihilation of the 
Austrian power; and it would appear that the altered 
circumstances, if they did not permit of the withholding 
of the subsidy, at least justified the imposition of con- 
ditions for its payment. Bute was determined that if 
Frederick received money from England, it should not be 
used to prolong war, but to facilitate the conclusion of 
peace. He instructed Mitchell, the English ambassador 
at Berlin, to inform the Prussian king that the English 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 105 

government regarded the death of the czarina as favouring 
a general pacification, and did not intend to utilise it to 
continue the war 1 . This was a hint which Frederick 
did not wish to take. He was not ready to sacrifice the 
opportunity which chance had given him, and turned 
a deaf ear to the blandishments of Bute. In a letter to 
George III, which reached its destination towards the end 
of February, he talked of prolonging the war, never so 
much as hinted at peace, and declared that Prussia and 
England had now an opportunity, which might never 
occur again, of crushing the enemies who had threatened 
their safety. In a private letter which, unfortunately for 
the writer, was intercepted and seen by those for whom it 
was not intended, he spoke disparagingly of the English 
ministers, and suggested Bedlam as a suitable refuge for 
them 2 . 

The most charitable and generous of men are not apt 
to be prejudiced in favour of those who think meanly of 
their intelligence ; and the unlucky reference to Bedlam 
would not plead in Frederick's favour with Bute. Nor 
would the conduct of the Prussian ministers in England. 
As if demanding the payment of a debt, rather than 
asking for a gift, they told Bute "that, as their master 
was willing to take the subsidy, £670,000, in the way 
which it had been offered to him, they hoped and 
expected that it would be immediately voted. They must 
have an oui or a non 3 ." They received their answer a 
few days later, being told by Bute that the subsidy would 
be paid directly their master informed the English govern- 
ment of the action he proposed to take in regard to a 
general pacification. "Le roi," wrote the secretary of 
state, " souhaiteroit que le secours, qu'il voudroit prefer 

1 Add. MS. 32934, f. 195. 2 Add. MS. 32935, f. 9. 

3 Add. MS. 32935, f. 9. 



106 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

a ce prince, dut plutot aider a la conclusion de la paix qu'a 
la continuation de la guerre 1 ." 

The minatory attitude of the Prussian ministers must 
have strengthened Bute in his resolution not to pay the 
subsidy unless Frederick showed greater compliance with 
the wishes of the English administration. Even New- 
castle began to waver in his support of Prussia, and might 
have consented to refuse the subsidy, if it had not been 
for the influence of Lord Hardwicke 2 . Ugly rumours 
began to circulate that Russia and Prussia were about to 
begin a war upon Denmark 3 , and news arrived from St 
Petersburg that the new czar was fanatically in favour 
of Frederick the Great. The hopes of those who had 
believed in the possibility of winning Russia to the 
side of England vanished in the light of this intelligence 4 . 
Frederick himself fanned the flame by declaring, in a 
letter to Greorge III, that the war would not end until the 
empress had begun to fear for the safety of her hereditary 
dominions 5 . The English answer could no longer be 
delayed, and Bute determined to strike. On April 12th, 
he informed Newcastle that he had made up his mind to 
refuse the subsidy 6 ; and the question was finally settled 
at a cabinet meeting on April 30th. Only Newcastle, 
Hardwicke, and Devonshire spoke in favour of continuing 

1 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, pp. 577 — 578. 

2 On February 25, 1762, in a letter to Hardwicke, Newcastle remarks, 
"If we could, with honor and safety, save £670,000, it would be a great 
thing for us, and perhaps prevent great difficulties at the end of the 
year." In his reply Hardwicke points out that he does not think that 
"this subsidy can finally be refused, consistently with the king's honour" ; 
and Newcastle confesses himself convinced. Add. MS. 32935, f. 74, 
f. 76, f. 89. See also f. 9. 

3 Add. MS. 32936, f. 443, f. 453. 

4 Grenville Papers, i. 420 — 422. 

5 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, pp. 578 — 579. 
« Add. MS. 32937, f. 85. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 107 

the payment ; Bute, Egremont, Grenville, the lord chan- 
cellor, and Lord Ligonier all argued for refusing it, and 
they carried the day. Mansfield, with characteristic 
caution, remained silent. Newcastle and his followers 
found themselves outvoted; and it was decided to with- 
hold financial assistance from Prussia 1 . 

For his conduct in regard to this question, Bute has 
often been charged with bad faith. He stands accused of 
having broken a pledge which he had given, of having 
encouraged the king of Prussia to believe that he would 
receive the subsidy, and then withholding it. The accusa- 
tion is true, but it is not just. The subsidy had been 
promised at a time when Frederick seemed at the end of 
his resources. Surrounded by enemies, he could not hope 
for peace unless he was willing to sacrifice his legitimate 
ambition, and allow Prussia to be hurled from the height 
to which he and his ancestors had raised it. If Bute and 
his colleagues had refused to pay the subsidy unless 
Frederick, when hard pressed on all sides, had consented 
to make peace, they would stand guilty of having 
attempted to force an ally to submit to terms humiliating 
to himself and destructive to his country. But this they 
did not do. It was only after the change in the policy of 
the Russian government had rescued Frederick from the 
slough of despond, and enabled him, either to continue the 
war with every hope of success, or conclude an honourable 
peace with his enemies, that Bute refused to pay the 
subsidy unless Frederick showed himself willing to bring 
the war to a conclusion. This is the degree of his iniquity. 
Misunderstanding and false suspicion existed on both 
sides ; but the English minister can hardly be blamed for 
seizing what he thought to be a favourable opportunity of 

1 Add. MS. 32937, f. 450 ; Add. MS. 32938, f. 26, f. 50, f. 239; Bedford 
Correspondence, in. 75 — 77. 



108 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

refusing to assist Frederick to prolong the contest in 
order to satisfy the ambition of Prussia. The subsidy, it 
is true, had been pledged, but the circumstances had 
changed; and to demand the fulfilment of a promise, 
when the circumstances, in which it had been made, had 
totally altered, was rather to adhere to the letter of the 
bond than to fulfil the spirit. 

The settlement of the subsidy question left Bute free 
to deal with affairs in Germany. Since the outbreak of 
war with Spain, he had made no secret of his opinion on 
that question, and, early in April, had told Newcastle that 
he was determined to withdraw the English troops from 
the continent 1 . But to put such a policy into practice 
would be to court a danger which might imperil the safety 
of the administration. Pitt, who would be certain to dis- 
approve of the refusal of the Prussian subsidy, might be 
driven into violent hostility to the government if the 
continental war was abandoned by England. If the Eng- 
lish troops were withdrawn at the same time that the 
subsidy was withheld, the impression might be given that 
Bute was actuated, not by a desire to promote the interests 
of England, but by animosity against the king of Prussia. 
Nor could the measure be now justified on the plea of 
financial necessity ; for, against the additional expenditure 
due to the war with Spain, must be set the economy 
effected by the refusal of the subsidy. Bute hesitated to 
adopt a policy which would evoke the opposition of Pitt, 
and for which excuse was lacking. He sought safety in 
compromise. If it was too dangerous to abandon the 
German war altogether, it was possible to reduce the 
expenditure upon it. Such a policy would be far less 
open to criticism, for it might be defended as an attempt 
to secure both efficiency and economy; and Bute, who 
1 Add. MS. 32937, f. 85. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 109 

realised the insecurity of his own position, and always 
preferred the path of safety, determined to adopt it. 
When, therefore, Newcastle asked that the house of 
commons should be requested to vote two million pounds, 
one half of which was to be allotted to the assistance 
of Portugal, and the remainder devoted to the war in 
Germany, he was informed that a vote of one million 
would be sufficient for both purposes 1 . The king had 
declared his approval of this policy of economy 2 ; and 
Newcastle discovered the majority of his colleagues 
ranged against him. It was in vain that Lord Barrington, 
the chancellor of the exchequer, endeavoured to con- 
vince Grenville that a vote of one million would not be 
sufficient 3 . It was in vain that Lord Mansfield, who 
on this point agreed with Newcastle, argued with Bute 4 . 
The decree had gone forth, and there was to be no 
drawing back. 

The time had come for Newcastle to retire from the 
administration. His influence had been waning ever since 
the accession of George III. No longer able to dispense 
patronage as had been his wont, he had seen his powers 

1 Dr von Ruville states that Newcastle included the Prussian subsidy 
in the sum of two million pounds which he demanded (William Pitt y 
Graf von Chatham, in. 64). It appears, however, that Newcastle had 
made up his mind to the refusal of the Prussian subsidy, and wished to 
utilise the saving thus effected by devoting more money to the German 
war. On May 2nd, in a letter to Lord Mansfield, he says, " I have desired 
my Lord Barrington to attend you, and he will explain the whole, the 
necessity of having another million, that is one million for Portugal and 
Spain (the new war) and the usual million vote of credit; for though 
there will be a saving by their refusal of the Prussian subsidy, that does 
not give the treasury any money, and if some method is not found 
to raise a sum a little exceeding that subsidy, for our new additional 
expence from our war with Spain, and the defence of Portugal, we can't 
go on." Add. MS. 32938, f. 18. 

2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 108 — 109. 

3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 12. 4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 47. 



110 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

restricted and curtailed, and authority passing to those 
who enjoyed the support of the court. He had submitted 
to the declaration of war upon Spain, and to the refusal of 
the Prussian subsidy; but the breaking point had now 
been reached. He had always been jealous of any inter- 
ference in the treasury which he had come to regard as 
his own preserve; and, fearing that a breach had been 
made in the very citadel of his power, he determined upon 
resignation. On May 7th he informed Bute that he did 
not intend to remain in office, thwarting the measures 
adopted by the majority of his colleagues, and therefore 
proposed to direct Barrington to move the vote for one 
million and no more 1 . Five days later the vote was carried 
in the house of commons' 2 ; and Newcastle's fate was 
sealed. On May 14th he visited the king, who received 
him with scant courtesy 3 ; and on May 24th formally 
resigned his office. Thus fell one of the most typical 
whigs of the eighteenth century. If he was not a great 
statesman, he had at least been a fairly successful one ; 
and, though revelling in petty details and the sordid side 
of politics, was not the absolutely worthless creature he 
has been represented. A few days before he resigned, he 
informed Lord Rockingham of the step he was about to 
take, and then added, characteristically enough, "If you or 
the marchioness have any jobs which I can do, before I 
go out, let me know them immediately 4 ." His exit was not 
destitute of a certain dignity. He refused the pension 
which the king pressed upon him; and since he had 
considerably reduced his own fortune in the service of 
the state, he might well have availed himself of the royal 
bounty. Grown grey in public life, and defeated by his 

i Add. MS. 32938, f. 105. 

2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 185 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 127—132. 

3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262. 4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 260. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 111 

youthful sovereign, Newcastle might have taken the op- 
portunity of withdrawing from the parliamentary struggle, 
and enjoying his well earned leisure; and it is to his credit 
that, when there was little to hope for, he continued to fight 
for the principles which he had professed when in power. 
There can be little doubt that Bute was willing to rid 
himself of Newcastle, and intended to drive him into 
resignation. He had always despised the old duke ; and, 
now that the latter had served his turn, was prepared to 
throw him over. The ground of attack had been skilfully 
chosen. If Newcastle had resigned rather than sanction 
the withdrawal of the troops from Germany, he might 
have posed as a patriot, and been welcomed as an ally by 
Pitt 1 ; but Bute had avoided this danger by allowing the 
war to continue while reducing the expenditure. Yet 
he could not have been unmindful of the possibility of an 
alliance between Pitt and Newcastle. To Mansfield and 
Devonshire he might deride the prospect of Newcastle 
proving a danger to the administration, and, with a cynical 
appreciation of the motive force in eighteenth century 
politics, talk of " the loaves and fishes," and declare that 
"a young king would find friends 2 "; but this did not 
prevent both him and his master attempting to gain a 
pledge from Newcastle that he would continue to support 
the government 3 . The duke was not to be snared, and 
refused to limit his freedom of action by giving a promise 
of support, though he declared that, whether he was in or 
out of office, he would always endeavour to facilitate the 
conclusion of peace 4 . 

1 Newcastle believed that Bute suspected him of championing the 
■war in Germany for the purpose of winning Pitt's support. Add. MS. 
32937, f. 85. 

2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262. 

3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262, f . 381 : Rockingham Memoirs, i. 114—115. 

4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 105. 



112 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

The fall of Newcastle necessitated a reorganisation of 
the administration. It was a foregone conclusion that 
Bute would succeed to the office of first lord of the 
treasury, and Grenville become secretary of state. The 
latter could claim the promotion which he had refused a 
few months earlier ; but, though the king and Bute were 
willing to have Grenville as secretary of state, it was 
only on the condition that his brother-in-law, Lord Egre- 
mont, should vacate the office he then held. They foresaw 
that two secretaries of state, closely connected by 
marriage, might combine to thwart the will of the first 
minister ; and, as Grenville andEgremont in the negotiation 
with France, which had already begun, displayed an 
inclination to adopt a different line of action from that 
favoured by Bute 1 , the suspicion was not devoid of 
foundation. 

Bute was probably right in thinking that progress. 

would be facilitated, and the chance of friction diminished, 

if Lord Egremont could be removed from the inner 

cabinet; and it was suggested that he should resign the 

secretaryship of state, and take the office of lord 

lieutenant of Ireland. It is possible that Lord Halifax 

was intended to take his place in the cabinet 2 ; but the 

scheme was frustrated by the opposition of Grenville. 

The man who had refused promotion, rather than succeed 

one brother-in-law, was not likely to allow another to be 

sacrificed ; and the king and Bute had to abandon their 

plan. When, however, Lord Anson, the first lord of the 

admiralty, died in the following June, his office, which 

carried with it a seat in the inner cabinet 3 , was given to 

Lord Halifax. The latter had little to recommend him, 

but Sir Francis Dashwood, who succeeded Barrington as 

1 Add. MS. 32935, f. 149. 2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 381. 

3 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 255, note 3. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 113 

chancellor of the exchequer, had certainly less. In a 
by no means puritanical age, he was notorious for his 
profligacy ; and it was reserved for a king, who honourably 
distinguished himself from his predecessors by the purity 
of his private life, to choose a chancellor of the exchequer 
from among the members of a hell-fire club. But it 
was not Dashwood's immorality so much as his ignorance 
of finance that unfitted him for the office for which he 
had been selected. Probably that ignorance has been 
exaggerated by his enemies ; but it stands on record that 
the cyder tax, imposed in 1763, owed its origin to the fact 
that the chancellor of the exchequer was incapable of 
understanding the details of a linen tax sufficiently to 
explain them to the house of commons 1 . 

The reconstruction of the administration may be said 
to mark the triumph of the crown. In less than two 
years, Newcastle, in spite of his political influence, and 
Pitt, in spite of his popularity, had been driven from 
office ; and Bute had risen from groom of the stole to be 
first lord of the treasury. He had gathered new men 
around him, and rid the king of those who had tyrannised 
over his grandfather, and had hoped to tyrannise over 
him. Newcastle, Hard wi eke 2 and Legge were no longer 
the advisers of the crown ; and it had been made abund- 
antly clear that promotion came from the court, and was 
not to be won by service, however faithful, to the whig 
party. Yet, though the oligarchy had been overthrown, 
the battle was not yet over ; and, if much had been gained, 
much had been also lost. In the struggle with the 
whigs, the ground had been prepared for the growth of 
an opposition party which might endanger the success of 

1 Add. MS. 32948, f. 92 ; Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, i. 186. 

2 Hardwicke ceased to attend cabinet councils when Newcastle re- 
signed. 

w. 8 



114 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the king's designs. The nation, which had not loved 
Newcastle, had learnt to hate Bute ; and the minister's un- 
popularity was reflected upon the king. The greatest and 
most difficult task of all had still to be accomplished — the 
conclusion of peace with France. It had been with the 
object of bringing the war to a conclusion that Bute had 
taken upon himself so many burdens ; and the work lay 
still unfinished. In the face of a hostile nation always 
ready to judge him at his worst, with colleagues who 
showed themselves more ready to criticise than to obey, he 
embarked upon the undertaking before which all his other 
work seems trivial and merely preparatory. 

It will be remembered that Stanley was recalled from 
France in September 1761 ; and the attempt to bring the 
war to an end abandoned for the moment. But the 
ministers were not prepared to relinquish all hope of 
peace; and were ready to renew the negotiations at the 
first favourable opportunity 1 . In December, 1761, a 
kinsman of Choiseul chanced to be in England, and had 
interviews with the secretaries of state and also with 
Newcastle, who remarked that his visitor " must be duller 
than generally Frenchmen are, if he don't understand 
us 2 ." The ground for future action thus prepared, de 
Brielle, the Sardinian ambassador at Paris, was com- 
missioned, apparently soon after the above conversation, 
to inform Choiseul that the English ministers were willing 
to discuss terms of peace with France 3 . Choiseul received 
this communication with caution, and his answer dis- 
appointed those who had built their hopes on his pacific 

1 Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. Corbett's England in the Seven Years' 
War, ii. 285. See the same work for a valuable and interesting account 
of the negotiations with France. 

2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 388. 

3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 97 — 99. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 115 

inclinations 1 . He complained that the English overtures 
were too vague ; and stated that France could not move 
in the matter without Spain. He suggested that the 
English ministers should send a secret envoy to France, 
who should carry on, simultaneously, negotiations with 
both France and Spain ; or that they should provide the 
Count de Viry with a memoir of the terms of peace they 
were willing to grant, and receive in return the French 
proposals 2 . 

To despatch a secret envoy to negotiate with Choiseul 
might doubtless have been the most effective means of 
bringing about a good understanding between the two 
countries, but circumstances rendered it impossible 3 ; and 
the other alternative stated by Choiseul was adopted. 
Bute sketched out to Viry the terms he would be willing 
to offer 4 . They were generous enough, and lay open to 
attack for yielding too much. Bute, however, had spoken 
as a private man: it was Egremont who was entrusted 
with the task of communicating in writing to the Count 
de Yiry the terms approved by the English ministers. 
His letter was submitted to those of his colleagues 
acquainted with the secret 5 . It was agreed to allow the 
French the right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence 
and off Newfoundland, and they were to be permitted to 
hold the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. G-oree was 

1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 99—100 ; Add. MS. 32935, f. 169, f. 172. 

2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 97—99 ; Add. MS. 32934, f. 121. 

3 Choiseul had stipulated that, if an envoy was sent to France, he 
must he prepared to deal with Spain through the French government ; 
and Viry had informed Bute that Choiseul was not likely to give way on 
that point. Bute himself was in favour of a separate negotiation with 
Spain ; but even had he been willing to make this concession to France, 
he would probably have been obliged to face the opposition of Egremont 
and Grenville. Add. MS. 32935, f. 249. 

4 Add. MS. 32935, f. 249. 5 Add. MS. 32936, f. 9. 

8—2 



116 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

also to be surrendered to France; and it was stipulated 
that in Germany neither power was to continue to aid 
her allies after the conclusion of peace, except by granting 
financial assistance 1 . 

Up to this point the negotiation with France had been 
kept a profound secret. Only a few ministers knew what 
was going on, and the question had never been discussed 
at a full cabinet council 2 . Newcastle and Hardwicke, as 
earnest advocates of peace, had been allowed to know all, 
and had played an active part in the secret councils which 
met to debate the question ; but the Duke of Bedford had 
been kept in the dark 3 , and Lord Mansfield and the Duke of 
Cumberland were only told a part of the truth 4 . The time 
had now come to throw off the mask. The cabinet council 
met on March 29th, 1762, and, as though no previous 
steps had been taken, agreed to renew the negotiation 
with France 5 . The secretary of state was instructed to 
write to the Due de Choiseul suggesting that the two 
countries should exchange ministers, and that the last 
memorial of each country, in the negotiations which had 
been broken off in the previous September, should be 
taken as the base of the discussion. At a later meeting 
a clause was added expressing the desire of the English 
government to make a similar communication to Spain 6 . 
Choiseul returned a favourable reply 7 . Though he again 
stated that France could not make peace without Spain, he 

1 Add. MS. 32936, f. 1. 2 Add. MS. 32935, f. 330. 

s Add. MS. 32936, f. 9. 

^ Add. MS. 32935, f. 390; Add. MS. 32936, f. 186. 

5 Hist. MSS. Coram. Weston Underwood M8S., p. 449. 

6 The idea had been to make a separate offer to Spain, but Egremont, 
who had originally been in favour of this proposal, changed his mind 
and the project was abandoned. Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston Underwood 
MSS., p. 449 ; Add. MS. 32936, f. 234, f. 418, f. 420. 

7 Add. MS. 32937, f. 111. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 117 

seemed hopeful that the latter country would be willing 
to come to terms. In addition to what England had 
agreed to surrender by her last memorial in the previous 
negotiation, Choiseul demanded the cession of Martinique 
which had only recently been conquered. The loss of 
that island had been a serious blow to the French power 
in the West Indies and a corresponding gain to England ; 
and, if Choiseul was unwilling to submit to such a serious 
loss, the English ministers might legitimately refuse to 
surrender so important a conquest. 

The cabinet met on April 23rd to frame a reply to 
Choiseul's letter. The discussion, as might be expected, 
centred round the demand for the cession of Martinique. 
If the ministers consented to surrender the island, they 
might lay themselves open to the charge of pusillanimity, 
and encourage the French government to press for 
further concessions; and it was agreed that Martinique 
could only be given back to the French if England was 
allowed to retain either Guadeloupe or Louisiana 1 . This 
decision was arrived at against the will of Newcastle 2 
who feared that Choiseul might regard the price demanded 
for Martinique as excessive. His mortification, however, 
was of short duration, for, when the cabinet met again to 
come to a final decision, Bute had changed his mind, and 
was in sympathy with him. Bute argued that to ask for 
Guadeloupe or Louisiana in return for Martinique was to 
ask too much, that France would never agree to such 
terms; and he proposed that the administration should 
agree to surrender Martinique in return for the cession of 
the neutral islands 3 and Grenada 4 . In making this pro- 
posal, Bute could feel sure of the support of Newcastle, 

i Add. MS. 32937, f. 341. 2 Add< Mg- 32937, f, 324, f. 349. 

3 Tobago, St Lucia, Dominica, and St Vincent. 

4 Bedford Correspondence, ill. 75 — 77. 



118 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

Hardwicke, and Devonshire, and of the opposition of 
Grrenville and Egremont. Even Bedford, the fanatical 
lover of peace, thought that the offer erred on the side of 
generosity \ But Bute was able to prevail by the assistance 
of those who, in their anxiety for peace, feared to take 
any step which might provoke Choiseul to break off the 
negotiation ; and his proposal was agreed to by the cabinet 
when it met on April 20th 2 , and embodied in a despatch 
dated the day following 3 . 

This was the last communication to France which 
Newcastle was to assist in framing. A few days after he 
had lent his support to Bute against Grrenville, the blow 
fell which compelled him to abandon office. He had been 
the champion of peace as long as he had remained a 
member of the ministry; and, before many months had 
passed, he was to suffer for the part he had played. His. 
withdrawal from the administration left Bute far more 
dependent upon the support of Grenville and Egremont \ 
and accentuated the difficulties of his task. Not until 
he had concluded peace with France could he lay 
down the burden of office, of which he would fain be 
rid ; and, though nearing the goal of his ambition, could 
not yet count with confidence upon success. Much might 
happen to check and hinder him in his course. Choiseul 
might prove himself unconciliatory ; and Bute's attempts to 
placate him by concessions might be thwarted by the oppo- 
sition of the two secretaries of state. The outlook was dark 
and stormy; and the inexperienced minister might well 
be alarmed at the magnitude of the work he had undertaken. 

Choiseul's answer to the English terms arrived early 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 77, 78. 

2 Bedford Correspondence, in. 75 — 77. It is probable that Grenville 
was absent from this cabinet meeting. Grenville Papers, i. 450. 

3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 3. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 119 

in June; but the cabinet did not meet until June 21st 1 . 
Accepting all that had been conceded, Choiseul refused 
to surrender St Lucia, one of the neutral islands 2 . This 
new demand on the part of the French government might 
easily endanger the success of the negotiations. The 
compensation for the surrender of Martinique had only 
been fixed after some hesitation, and had been due to 
Bute supported by Newcastle and his friends. The 
ministers might well hesitate to reduce the compensation, 
for what guarantee was there that Choiseul would not 
proceed to demand still further concessions. Amongst 
those summoned to the cabinet meeting on June 21st were 
Lord Melcombe and Lord Mansfield 3 . The French pro- 
posals were not favourably received by the assembled 
ministers. The Duke of Bedford, true to the policy which 
he had always pursued, advocated the surrender of St 
Lucia, but found himself unsupported by his colleagues. 
Lord Egremont declared the answer of the French court 
to be unreasonable and captious; and his opinion was 
echoed by Lord Mansfield. No record survives of an 
expression of opinion by Grrenville on this occasion; but 
it is certain that he was in favour of retaining St Lucia 4 . 
Lord Melcombe, remarking with some spirit that "he 
might be beaten into a peace but would not be kicked 
into it," argued that the limit of concession had been 
reached when it had been agreed to surrender Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante to France. Bute de- 
livered himself with caution and reserve. He agreed 
that a firm but polite answer should be given, but argued 
"that if there was any one demand, when France had 
reduced it to that point, then it would be fit to determine 

1 Add. MS. 32939, f. 264 ; Add. MS. 32940, f. 6. 

2 Add. MS. 32939, f. 264. 3 Add. MS. 32940, f. 24. 
4 Grenville Papers, i. 450. 



120 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

whether the council would advise his Majesty to continue 
the war for that one object, and then, and not till then, 
he would state the powers and faculty of this country for 
the consideration of that question 1 ." The meeting ad- 
journed to re-assemble three days later 2 ; but, from the 
surviving records, it is abundantly clear that the general 
opinion of the ministers was against any further con- 
cessions to France 3 . 

The outlook was not hopeful. For some weeks the 
English government refused to give way on the point in 
dispute, but failed to persuade Choiseul to withdraw his 
demand 4 . Nor was the situation bettered by the attitude 
taken up by Spain. Acting on Choiseul's advice, the 
administration had made direct overtures for peace to 
that country 5 , and an answer arrived early in July 6 . It 
gave little satisfaction. The reply of the Spanish govern- 
ment was considered to be insolent and overbearing ; and 
thus from both France and Spain there seemed little to 
expect in the way of concession or compromise. The 
situation was critical in the extreme. Spain had returned 
an answer which might justly be considered as insolent; 
and Choiseul insisted upon a demand which the English 
ministers were not inclined to fulfil. Bute began to see 
the hope of peace vanishing before his eyes; and deter- 
mined that the time had come to give way. Peace with 
France and Spain could only be bought at a price, and 
St Lucia was the price that would: have to be paid 7 . 

i Add. MS. 34713, f. 106. 2 Add. MS. 32940, f. 112. 

3 In conversation with Lord Mansfield, Newcastle learnt " that there 
was not at present the least probability of peace ; that the answers from 
France were all verbiage, full of chichane, and even departed or 
chichaned upon points which had been before agreed to." Ibid. 

* Add. MS. 32941, f. 18. 

5 Add. MS. 32938, f. 304. 6 Grenville Papers, i. 462, 463. 

7 Bedford Correspondence, in. 88 — 91. 



, THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 121 

When a courier arrived on July 24th, bringing letters 
from Ohoiseul, Bute is reported to have declared that 
peace was made 1 . The French terms were reported to 
be most favourable 2 , and the cabinet was summoned to 
meet on July 26th. 

It might be thought, judging by the favourable 
estimate Bute had formed of Choiseul's offer, that the 
latter had receded from his position, and agreed to the 
English demands. This was not the case. While asking 
that the two courts should exchange representatives, he 
still insisted upon the surrender of St Lucia. But, and 
this was the secret of Bute's satisfaction, he had changed 
his attitude towards Spain. Up to this time Choiseul had 
always asserted that France could never make peace 
without Spain ; but now, according to Bute, he appeared 
less solicitous of the interests of the ally of France ; and 
had declared that, if Spain refused to make peace, she 
must submit to coercion at the hands of England 3 . Bute 
seemed to see light where all before had been darkness ; 
and, when he met the ministers in council on July 26th, 
he must have thought himself a bearer of good tidings. 
The time had come when it was possible to separate the 
two Bourbon countries ; and the opportunity must not be 
lost. Peace with France could be won by the cession of 
St Lucia ; and then Spain, deprived of its powerful ally, 
would lie at the mercy of England. He therefore pressed 
his colleagues to neglect the question of Spain for the 
moment, and, taking the advantage which fate had given 
them, accept the French proposals. His arguments de- 
servedly encountered opposition. Their validity depended 
upon the supposition that Choiseul, whatever he might 

1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 69. 

2 Ibid. ; Add. MS. 32941, f. 48. 

3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 84. 



122 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

have said, would be willing, or even able, to leave Spain to 
be crushed by the power of England. There was little 
evidence for this belief. The family compact had but 
recently been made, and it was extremely unlikely that 
France would cynically break her faith so solemnly pledged. 
Spain had taken up arms, confident of the support of 
France ; and, if now deserted by her ally, and left alone 
to face the attack of England, her doom was sealed. 
When Bute unfolded his plan to the cabinet, he found not 
a single supporter. More lonely than Pitt on a former 
occasion, he stood absolutely alone. He was fiercely 
assaulted on all sides; and the old lord president, Granville, 
with some of the fire of his youth, bitterly accused him of 
being the dupe of France ; and declared that he himself 
would never agree to a peace in which Spain was not 
included 1 . 

No decision was come to, and a further meeting was 
held two days later. Bute had the wisdom to see that he 
could never carry his original proposal; and, when the 
ministers assembled on July 28th, he proposed that the 
royal consent should be given to the French propositions, 

1 Bute's disappointment can be gauged from a letter which he wrote 
to Egremont after the cabinet council on July 26th: "I am not 
ashamed," he wrote, " to own that I write tbis letter with a heavy heart, 
convinced in my own mind of two important truths — the one that peace 
was in our power, the other that we are about to lose an opportunity we 
shall scarce recover again. I am satisfied the French are as sick of the 
war as we could be, and that by management everything we desired 
relative to Spain would have come about, whereas now we expect in vain, 
that France should thus openly abandon her ally, a different thing from 
doing it in a course of negotiation. Possessing these ideas, you will not 
be surprised, my dear Lord, if the situation I have just been in, single 
and alone, alarms me ; I feel most sensibly that I am, from the 
king's known goodness to me, to stand at mark for the long train of 
calamities that the continuation of this war brings in my view." Add. 
MS. 36797, f. 6. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 123 

that the Duke of Bedford should be sent to France, and 
that the latter country should endeavour to persuade 
Spain to be a party to the treaty ; but, if her efforts failed 
to be successful, she should pledge herself not to assist 
Spain in the war with England 1 . This was agreed to by 
all the ministers present. The administration had thus 
consented to restore St Lucia, and this marks the triumph 
of Bute over Greorge Grenville. On the other hand, Bute 
had tasted the bitterness of defeat. He had stood alone 
in the cabinet, opposed by those who, if it had not been 
for him, would have never been in a position to thwart 
him. He had been obliged to modify his policy in regard 
to Spain, and to assent to a demand being made of 
France which could not be fulfilled without a violation of 
the family compact. At this point in the negotiation 
the deciding word lay with Spain : it rested with her 
either to prolong or conclude the war. If she maintained 
a truculent and defiant attitude, Choiseul would be placed 
between the horns of a dilemma, compelled either to 
continue a disastrous war, or break faith with an ally. 
It was to Choiseul's interest, having secured possession of 
St Lucia, to win over the Spanish government to the side 
of peace. Whether the defiant attitude of Spain had 
been adopted with that end in view or not, it had at least 
served the purpose of rendering England more ready to 
comply with the demands of France. It was known in 
London by the middle of August that Choiseul had agreed 
to the English terms, and was about to send a messenger 
to Spain to exhort that country to peace 2 . The exhorta- 
tions of Choiseul were not without effect ; before the end 
of the month a favourable answer had come from Spain, 

1 For these two cabinet meetings, see Add. MS. 33000, f. 95 ; Add. 
MS. 32941, f. 68, f. 185, f. 203 ; Add. MS. 34713, f. 110. 

2 Add. MS. 32941, f. 249. 



124 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

and it had been arranged that Grimaldi should be given 
full powers to treat with the Duke of Bedford 1 . 

A difficult crisis had been tided over; and nothing 
more remained to be done but despatch the representa- 
tives of the respective countries. The Duke of Bedford 
left for France early in September; and, on the twelfth 
day of the same month, the Due de Mvernois, the 
accredited agent of the French government, arrived in 
England 2 . The appointment of the Duke of Bedford was 
open to adverse criticism. One so biassed in favour of 
peace might easily concede too much to the enemy. Nor 
was he by disposition or temperament suited for the 
delicate work of diplomacy. Hardwicke, who knew him 
well, and who had sat with him at many cabinet councils, 
thought that, despite his passion for peace, no man was 
more likely to take offence on some immaterial point, and 
break off the negotiation in a moment of passion. "In 
another light," wrote Hardwicke, " no man is more likely 
to take a disgust at instructions that may be sent to him ; 
or at the ministers differing in opinion from him ; or not 
agreeing to everything his Grace shall propose. I am 
sure I should not wish to be the secretary of state to 
have the correspondence with him. In that case, instead 
of attaching the Duke of Bedford to Lord Bute, the very 
reverse may happen ; and it may make an eternal breach 
between them 3 ." It is difficult to realise that these words 
were written a month before Bedford left England; for 
few prophecies have been so literally fulfilled. 

It is probable that Bute was responsible for the 
appointment of Bedford. Neither of the secretaries 
of state had any confidence in him ; and it was re- 



1 Add. MS. 32942, f. 86, f. 91, f. 122, f. 142, f. 145. 

2 Add. MS. 32942, f. 240. 3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 122. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 125 

ported that Egremont hated him 1 . They were not 
long in giving a practical illustration of their hostility. 
Shortly after Bedford had left England, his independent 
authority was limited by the ministers who decided that 
the preliminaries of peace must be approved by the king 
before being signed 2 . The Duke, naturally enough, 
resented this restriction of his authority; nor was he 
pacified by being told that the action of the ministers had 
been inspired by a desire to lighten the weight of his 
responsibility 3 . He suspected Egremont and Grrenville 
as the authors of the unfriendly act, and thought that 
they had either prevailed against Bute, or won him over 
to their way of thinking 4 . It was not a happy beginning, 
and the Duke of Bedford was to learn how many are the 
difficulties which beset the path of a diplomatist. However 
anxious Choiseul might be for peace, he was not prepared 
for an unconditional surrender; and even Bedford, the 
most yielding of diplomatists, was dissatisfied with the 
terms offered by the French court 5 . Choiseul afterwards 
consented to abandon the demands to which Bedford took 
objection 6 ; and the ultimatum was despatched to England. 
The terms, thus offered, were in many points identical with 
the preliminaries of peace approved by parliament. The 
territory of the Prussian king was to be evacuated by the 
French who were to have the right of fishing in the gulf 
of St Lawrence and off Newfoundland, and to be given 
the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. But in two 
particulars there was a fundamental difference between 
these terms and the preliminaries. There was no guarantee 
that the French fishing boats would keep at a certain 
distance from the English coasts; and there was no 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 128. 

2 Ibid., p. 116. :i Ibid., p. 117. 4 Ibid., p. 127. 

5 Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston Underwood MSS., p. 344. 

6 Ibid., p. 222. 



126 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

compensation offered for the surrender of the important 
possession of Havannah recently conquered from Spain 1 . 

Bute professed himself satisfied with the terms offered 
by Choiseul; and found himself, in consequence, in direct 
conflict with his two secretaries of state. G-renville 
declared that he would never sign a peace which did not 
allow of compensation being given for the surrender of 
Havannah ; and Lord Egremont was of the same opinion 2 . 
The standard of revolt was raised within the administra- 
tion; and Grrenville talked of summoning Newcastle, 
Devonshire, and Hardwicke to attend the cabinet council 3 . 
The situation was threatening in the extreme. As first 
minister, Bute could hardly submit to the dictation of his 
colleagues. He had already once suffered defeat at the 
hands of his subordinates ; and, if he was to allow himself 
to be outvoted again, he might lose all influence in the 
administration. Yet his opponents were stronger than 
he was. In asking compensation for the restoration of 
Havannah, they were certain of popular support which, 
apart from everything else, would be readily given to the 
men who dared to stand up against the hated favourite. 
Detested by the nation and opposed by his colleagues, 
Bute seemed about to lose the fruits of all his labours: 
the olive branch extended by Choiseul threatened to 
prove a sword of division and destruction. 

At this crisis of his fortunes, he displayed a capacity 
for decisive action, with which he is not often credited. 
A meeting of the cabinet had been fixed for October 4th ; 

1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. The French ultimatum arrived in England 
on September 28th : the fall of Havannah was known the day following. 
See Add. MS. 32943, f. 28, note by Newcastle ; Bedford Correspondence, 
in. 130, 131. 

2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128—132 ; Bedford Correspondence, in. 
125—131. 

3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128 — 132. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 127 

and, before that day, the two secretaries of state had to 
be schooled into submission. The royal authority was to 
be used to overawe the two unruly ministers. "The 
king," said Bute to Rigby, " would be obeyed, and would 
talk to his two secretaries upon their obedience 1 ." But, 
though harangued by their sovereign, neither Grrenville 
nor Egremont would abandon their convictions 2 . They 
persisted in their demand that compensation should be 
exacted for the surrender of Havannah; and would not 
be likely to give way, strengthened by the knowledge 
that not a single councillor was willing to support Bute 3 . 
The king had failed to bend his secretaries to his will; 
and Bute had no other means of coercion. He was quite 
prepared to demand compensation for Havannah 4 ; but 
shrank from doing so at the dictation of his colleagues. 
If he was to make a concession, he must, at the same time, 
give a forcible illustration of his predominance; for, as 
Fox truly remarked, " it was impossible for Lord Bute to 
hold it, when he could not govern his own people 5 ." Time 
was necessary for him in which to execute such a project; 
and it was essential to avoid affording G-renville and 
Egremont an opportunity of voicing their opinions and 
leading the attack upon the first minister. This was 
easily done : the cabinet council, which had been summoned 
for October 4th, never met 6 . 

The rock of offence was George Grenville. Since the 
fall of Newcastle, he had led the opposition in the cabinet 7 . 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 128. 

2 Ibid., pp. 131—133. s Ibid. 

4 Ibid. On September 30th the king told Cumberland that he was 
for some equivalent for Havannah. Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. 

5 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. 

6 On October 10th Lord Halifax informed Newcastle that there had 
not been a council for three weeks. Add. MS. 32943, f. 140. 

7 On July 26th, 1762, Bute wrote, " I scorn to dwell on, nor will I 



128 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

Far abler than his brother-in-law, Egremont, he was, in 
consequence, the more dangerous; and it was supposed 
to be due to his influence that Egremont had adopted a 
hostile attitude towards the Duke of Bedford 1 . By his 
action in the Havannah question, Grrenville had filled up 
the cup of his iniquity ; and Bute determined to deprive 
him of the secretaryship of state and of the management 
of the house of commons. Grrenville's successor was to 
be Henry Fox. By this arrangement, Bute hoped to 
strengthen his position in the cabinet, and facilitate the 
conclusion of peace. Fox was not chosen at random. 
That daring politician was known not to be burdened 
with either scruples or convictions, and he had already 
enlisted under the banner of the court. He was aware of 
the dissensions in the ministry 2 , and if he was told, as he 
said, that " Mr Grrenville would no longer continue in the 
station he was in 3 ," it is incredible that he believed it. 
He refused, however, to become secretary of state, and 
contented himself with a seat in the cabinet and the 
management of the house of commons. The seals, which 
Fox refused, were given to Lord Halifax, whose place at 
the admiralty was taken by Grenville who thus retained 
his seat in the inner cabinet. 

It would seem that Bute had been driven to this 
reorganisation of the administration by Grenville himself. 
In Fox he had gained an ally who would be of assistance, 
not only in the cabinet, but also in parliament. The 
first lord of the treasury had asserted his supremacy in 
no indecisive manner: at the moment that his power 

think on Mr Grenville's dissenting from me in word, look, and manner 
through the whole examination of the preliminaries." Add. MS. 
36797, f. 6. 

1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 140 — 142. 

2 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28 ; Rockingham Memoirs, I. 128—132. 

3 Hist. MSS. Comm., 12th Report, Appendix v. p. 360. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 129 

was threatened, he had initiated and carried through a 
ministerial revolution of no small magnitude. He was 
now the master of his administration, and, if Grenville still 
remained to oppose, there was now Fox to defend. The 
element of mystery is that Grenville should have consented 
to remain in the cabinet. He had been treated with 
small courtesy. If Fox had been willing to become 
secretary of state, Grenville might have been obliged, 
if he wished to retain a place in the administration, to 
take his old post of treasurer of the navy. It is clear 
that he was profoundly dissatisfied with the treatment he 
had suffered 1 ; and yet he consented to continue the 
colleague of the man who had inflicted the insult. There 
is no mystery in the fact that Bute was willing for him to 
remain, for he would not be anxious to add Grenville to 
the opponents of the administration; but that the latter 
should consent to serve the man who had wronged him is 
far more inexplicable. The motives of men's actions, 
hidden as they often are from contemporaries, are seldom 
revealed to posterity ; and our knowledge of the characters 
of actors in the past is frequently too scanty to enable us 
to sit in judgment upon them. In consenting to remain 
in office, Grenville may have been influenced by a desire 
to continue to act as a check upon Bute's pacific ten- 
dencies; but it is also possible that, knowing as he did 
that Bute would not be likely to continue long in power, 
he had an eye upon the succession, and thought to 
purchase promotion by enduring humiliation 2 . 

There is no doubt that the admission of Fox into the 
cabinet, and the relative degradation of George Grenville, 
facilitated the conclusion of peace. From this point 
events progressed smoothly. The Duke of Bedford was 

1 Grenville Papers, i. 451, 482—485. 

2 Grenville Papers, i. 482 — 485. 



130 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

informed that compensation would be demanded for the 
surrender of Havannah l , and on October 22nd the cabinet 
met to consider the final terms of peace 2 . Three days 
later, another meeting was held 3 , after which Bigby and 
a messenger left for France, carrying with them the 
English answer, and a despatch authorising the Duke of 
Bedford to give his formal consent to terms of peace 4 . 
On November 3rd the preliminaries of peace between 
France, Spain, and England were signed. 

Thus Bute had triumphed in the face of difficulties 
which might have proved insuperable to many a man 
with a greater name in the political world. He had 
struggled and prevailed against the divisions in his 
cabinet and the opposition of his colleagues. With no 
support, except that which the king gave him, he had 
successfully asserted his own supremacy ; and, by timely 
concessions, averted the disruption of his administration. 
But the danger was not yet over. The preliminaries of 
peace had been signed, but they were to be submitted to 
parliament for approval; and no one could tell what 
might then happen. Bute was hated by the people, and 
Fox was certainly far from popular. The cry might be 
raised that England was undone by a Scotch favourite 
and a profligate politician; and the treaty subjected to a 
searching and hostile criticism. A party might arise, 
strong in the support of the nation, and bitterly an- 
tagonistic to the ministry. Triumphant as Bute had been, 
his very success had swelled the number of his foes, and 
sown the seeds of a parliamentary opposition. Pitt would 

1 Grenville Papers, i. 480 — 481. 

2 Add. MS. 32943, f. 386 ; Add. MS. 32944, f. 1. 

3 Add. MS. 32944, f. 16. This meeting was summoned to consider 
despatches from Bedford which arrived on October 23rd. Add. MS. 32944, 
f.79. 

* Add. MS. 32944, f. 93, f. 206. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 131 

not be likely to be silent when the preliminaries of peace, 
which conceded far more than he had ever been willing 
to grant, were discussed, and none could tell the effect of 
his utterance, or measure the popular excitement it would 
arouse. Newcastle, if an opportunity arose, would not be 
inclined to spare the man who had expelled him from the 
cabinet. Though he had fallen from his high estate, and 
was no longer the political power he had once been, he 
still reckoned upon finding supporters. He counted upon 
the assistance of those whom he had enriched in former 
days with pensions, bribes, and sinecure places ; and, if he 
allowed for some of his friends deserting to the banner 
of the court, he thought to find a sufficient number of 
faithful followers to form a party which could not be 
despised 1 . He had preserved his liberty by refusing to 
pledge himself to support the administration 2 ; and, in 
whatever course of action he chose to adopt, he would 
be assisted by his friends, Hardwicke and Devonshire, 
who had retired from the cabinet with him, though the 
Duke of Devonshire still retained his office of lord 
chamberlain 3 . 

Bute had accomplished one part of his work, and he 
had now to prepare to meet parliament. The ministers 
were certain to be attacked; and it was necessary to 
strengthen the cabinet. It was more easily said than 
done. When Charles Townshend was offered the secretary- 
ship of the plantations, he refused it on the grounds that 

1 During the autumn of 1762, Newcastle compiled several estimates 
of his probable parliamentary strength. They show that he had formed 
an exaggerated conception of the number of his supporters in both 
houses. Add. MS. 33000, f. 113, f. 118, f. 153. 

2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262, f. 381 ; Add. MS. 32939, f. 264 ; Rockingham 
Memoirs, i. 114 — 115. 

3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 239 ; Add. MS. 32939, f. 383, f. 407 ; Fitz- 
maurice's Life of Lord Shelburne, i. 136, 137. 

9—2 



132 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

he did not wish to be connected with a cabinet in which 
Fox had a place 1 . Lord Waldegrave was approached, but 
declined to take office because he was not prepared to 
separate himself from the Duke of Cumberland 2 . But 
the greatest danger of all lay in the possibility that Pitt 
and Newcastle would unite in a joint attack upon the 
ministry. There were, doubtless, obstacles in the way of 
such an alliance, for Pitt might find it hard to forgive 
what he had suffered at the hands of the man who had 
once been his colleague. He was reported to have said 
that he would never unite with Newcastle 3 , and the Duke 
of Devonshire, who possessed great influence amongst the 
whigs, was opposed to such an union, at least for the 
present 4 . But Bute, who realised the danger, was anxious 
to do too much rather than too little ; and was willing to 
take Newcastle back into the administration, and so widen 
the breach between him and Pitt 5 . During the summer, 
the Sardinian ambassador, Viry, had informed Newcastle 
that Bute was anxious to bestow a mark of his regard 
upon him, and, not long afterwards, Bute told Hardwicke 
that he was ready to give Newcastle office 6 . In August 
Lord Lyttelton was employed to tempt Newcastle and 
Hardwicke to return to the administration 7 . Some weeks 
later, Henry Fox wrote to the Duke of Devonshire, 
inviting him, with Newcastle and Hardwicke, to return 
to their "places at court and council, and restore peace 

1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 181 — 183. Charles Townshend still 
retained his office of secretary at war. 

2 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 155, 156. 

3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 18, f. 36. * Add. MS. 32940, f. 227. 

5 It is possible that Bute was also mindful of the fact that Newcastle 
was a steady supporter of peace, and would therefore be of assistance in 
resisting George Grenville. 

6 Add. MS. 32941, f. 18 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 118. 

7 Add. MS. 32941, f. 370. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 133 

and tranquillity to a people that are at present mad 1 ." 
A personal appeal was made to Newcastle by Halifax 
who pressed him to return to the council "in or out of 
employment 2 ." Newcastle politely refused the offer, but 
Devonshire took the opportunity of upbraiding Fox, 
whose alliance with Bute, he declared, would tend rather 
to increase than diminish the vigour of the opposition 3 . 

The whig leaders have been so often charged with an 
indecent hunger of office, and there is so much justification 
for the accusation, that it is refreshing to find them 
displaying such fortitude under a torrent of temptations. 
But their very virtues were to recoil upon their own 
heads. Bute had failed to win them to his side : they had 
rejected with contumely the olive branch which he had 
extended. They could not be left to gather a party 
of supporters, and embark upon a career of opposition 
which might bring them into office and overthrow the 
ministry. They had refused peace, and, therefore, must 
be given war. It was not for nothing that the ministry 
was represented by Fox in the house of commons. Un- 
likely to be affected by scruples or considerations of 
honour, he was ready to buy success if it could not be 
earned. Stories, only too likely to be true, are told of 
vast sums expended in the purchase of votes, and a party 
was bought to support the preliminaries of peace when 
they should be submitted to parliament. Nor was resort 
had to bribery alone : the king expressed, in no hesitating 
manner, his dislike of the whig leaders. On October 28th 
the Duke of Devonshire went to court, in order to resign 
his office of lord chamberlain. The king refused to see 
him, and when Devonshire inquired with whom he should 
leave his staff, the message was sent back that he would 

1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 

3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 260, f. 274. 3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 



134 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

receive his orders. Not waiting for these instructions, 
the duke at once went to Lord Egremont, and left with 
him the insignia of his office 1 . 

It was necessary to justify such insulting conduct : 
and the royal displeasure was said to be due to Devonshire's 
refusal to attend the cabinet council when summoned to 
do so. The Duke had ceased to be present at cabinet 
meetings when Newcastle retired; and his absence was 
sanctioned by the king 2 . He was, therefore, greatly 
surprised when, on October 3rd, he received a summons 
to attend a cabinet council shortly to be held to consider 
the final terms of peace 3 . He begged to be excused from 
obeying the command, on the ground that his long absence 
from such meetings precluded him from giving an opinion 
on a matter of such importance 4 ; and it would seem that 
his plea was valid. Nor does it appear to have given 
offence. It is more than likely that Devonshire had been 
summoned, not in order to place him in an awkward 
position and compel him to refuse to comply with a royal 
demand, but with a view of placating Grenville. In reply 
to the latter's threat to summon Newcastle, Hardwicke 
and Devonshire, Bute had answered that the first two 
were not eligible and the last would not come 5 , and it is, 
therefore, probable that Devonshire was summoned in the 
confident belief that he would not attend 6 . If by refusing 
he had incurred the anger of the king, it is difficult to 
understand the subsequent offer made to him of a place 



1 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 21, 22 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 135, 
136; Add. MS. 32944, f. 110. 

2 Hist. MSS. Comm., 12th Report, Appendix, v, p. 275 ; Add. MS. 
32944, f. 266. 

3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 48. 4 Ibid. 

5 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128 — 132. 

6 This at least was Newcastle's view. Add. MS. 32943, f. 90. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 135 

iii the cabinet 1 j and therefore, though his refusal to obey 
the summons might serve as an excuse for the king's 
behaviour, the cause must be looked for elsewhere. The 
rock of offence was probably the letter which Devonshire 
had written to Fox, denouncing him for his alliance with 
Bute, and declaring such an union more likely to fan 
than quench the flames of opposition 2 . Such a declaration 
was indiscreet, to say the least ; and it was not till he had 
received this ultimatum that Fox informed the Duke of 
Cumberland that the king was offended and Bute alarmed 
at Devonshire's refusal to attend the council 3 . It would 
seem, therefore, that the king and his confidential minister, 
dismayed at the rising tide of opposition, determined 
to take the first step, and declare war upon their 
opponents. 

And as a declaration of war it was taken. One of the 
whig leaders had been grossly insulted by his sovereign ; 
and his friends and followers were forced to choose be- 
tween him and the king. If most of the peerage kissed 
the rod 4 , there were some, at least, who preferred their 
principles to their places. Lord John Cavendish followed 
his brother into exile, and Lord Bessborough promptly 
resigned the office of postmaster. A few days later, 
their example was followed by the youthful Marquis of 
Rockingham. Unintimidated by these expressions of dis- 
approval, and mistaking blind obstinacy for heroic 
resolution, the king took a step which Bute had not 
advised and Fox did not approve 5 . On November 3rd he 
struck out the Duke of Devonshire's name from the list 
of members of the privy council 6 . 

Attacked so openly by the court, it behoved the 

1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 2 Ibid. 

3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 303. 4 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 160. 

5 Shelburne's Life, i. 176—179. 6 Add. MS. 32944, f. 266. 



136 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

whigs to look to their arms. Parliament, which was 
shortly to meet, would see the struggle begin in earnest. 
Fox was busy, dispensing bribes and purchasing a majority; 
and the whigs were committed to what might appear to 
be a lost cause. In going into opposition they laid 
themselves open to the charge of being disappointed 
placemen ; and their past career would give colour to the 
accusation. They could not hope to prevail against the 
purchased majority of the court; and their only chance 
of success lay in acting as the champions of a public 
opinion which was not represented in parliament. Yet, 
much as the nation might dislike Bute and his hirelings, 
it was not prepared to give its confidence to the whigs. 
The support of the people was given to Pitt. His services 
in the past had not been forgotten, and men looked to 
him for the future. It was he, and not the whigs, who 
could voice the national opposition to the policy pursued 
by Bute ; and only by uniting with him could Newcastle 
and his followers hope to be triumphant. Bute had 
foreseen the danger of such a coalition, and had striven to 
avert it. He had failed to win back Newcastle into the 
service of the crown ; and it remained for Pitt to decide 
whether he should lend the lustre of his name to those 
who had once been his colleagues, and were now ready to 
be his followers. 

As early as September, 1762, Newcastle and Hard- 
wicke perceived how materially the opposition would be 
strengthened by the accession of Pitt 1 ; but the obstacles 
in the way were many. The great commoner had much 
to forgive before he could enter upon an alliance with 
Newcastle who had betrayed him in the past, and might, 
therefore, betray him in the future ; nor could Newcastle, 
who had played the traitor to Pitt, feel that he had yet 
1 Harris' Life of Hardioicke, in. 311 — 314. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 137 

been pardoned by the victim of his treachery 1 . Moreover, 
Pitt had already declared against embarking upon a 
regular course of opposition 2 , and might well refuse to 
alter his conduct in order to assist Newcastle. But behind 
the merely personal dislike and distrust of Newcastle, 
there lay a greater obstacle. If an opposition was 
formed, it would be bound to attack the preliminaries of 
peace when submitted to parliament; and Pitt would 
not be behindhand in the assault. All that Bute had 
allowed to France, in excess of what had been granted in 
the negotiations in 1761, would be adversely criticised by 
him. He would spare no concession which he regarded 
as unnecessary ; and would not be likely to extend much 
toleration to those who were unwilling or unable to go as 
far as he did. The hands of Newcastle and Hardwicke 
were far more tied. Unless they were prepared to endure 
the charge of the grossest inconsistency, they would be 
compelled to restrict their criticism to those concessions 
which had been granted since they left the cabinet. 
Decency forbade them to attack that which they had 
formerly advised; and thus, on a question, second to none 
in importance, they found themselves separated by a deep 
gulf from an indispensable ally. 

Great as these obstacles were, Newcastle did not 
abandon hope of persuading Pitt to join the opposition. 
From fear that the latter might refuse any offer made by 
Newcastle personally, the Duke of Cumberland was chosen 
to play the part of mediator. The choice was wise. 
Cumberland was in the intimate confidence of the whig 
party 3 ; and Pitt was reported to have spoken warmly in 

1 "If he has any resentment to anybody, I am still persuaded it is 
primarily to me," wrote Newcastle in October, 1762. Add. MS. 32943, 
f. 332. 2 See p. 89. 

3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 124 — 127. 



138 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

his favour 1 . A royal duke, however, could hardly begin 
negotiations with a prominent politician; and it was 
arranged that Pitt should be informed that Cumberland 
was willing to give him his opinions on the political 
situation, should he desire to hear them 2 . This plan was 
executed through the agency of Thomas Walpole and 
JSTuthall; and, in conversation with these two men and 
with Cumberland, Pitt declared himself 3 . He left no 
doubt of his hostility towards Bute. Again and again he 
repeated his objections to what he called the favourite's 
"transcendency of power." He referred to the early 
days of the reign when he had protested against the 
proposal that Bute should be given high office; and 
declared that nothing that had happened since had caused 
him to alter his opinion. The preliminaries of peace he 
violently condemned, and referred with no little bitterness 
to the treatment which the Duke of Devonshire had 
suffered. Yet, though he held these opinions, and was 
thus in partial sympathy with the whigs, he refused to 
contemplate an alliance with them. He described himself 
as a whig and a believer in the principles of the revolution; 
but confessed himself under obligations to the tories who 
had supported him in the past, and refused to concur 
in any measures of proscription. He elected to stand 
alone, and though he disclaimed any animosity towards 
Newcastle, he admitted that he did not wish to see him 
again at the head of an administration. 

Thus Pitt rejected the offer made him; and, in so 
doing, helped to establish Bute in power. If he had 
been willing to overcome his prejudices, and modify his 

1 Add. MS. 32944, f. 206. 

2 Ibid. ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 148, 149. 

3 Add. MS. 32944, f. 277 ; Add. MS. 32945, f. 83 ; Rockingham 
Memoirs, i. 149 — 151. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 139 

attack upon the preliminaries of peace, an alliance might 
have been formed, which would have proved decisive for 
the future history of the country. Memories of the 
coalition of 1757 would have been evoked by such an 
union, and the court would have been faced by a party 
which depended for its strength, not upon parliament, but 
upon the nation. A divided opposition would never be 
able to effect anything against an administration which, 
whatever were its faults, at least presented an united 
front to its enemies. Pitt chose to stand isolated from 
those who were ready to enlist under his banner. He 
would attack the peace, and would gain the applause of 
the people, incensed by the idea that France had been 
treated too mercifully 1 ; and the whigs, fighting in the 
same battle, and on the same side, would stand outnumbered 
in parliament and unconsidered by the nation. 

It is beyond doubt that by the peace, which was so 
bitterly attacked, many valuable gains had been acquired 
for this country. Canada with its dependencies, Senegal, 
Grenada, Dominica, St Vincent, and Tobago were now 
English possessions; and Minorca, which had been cap- 
tured by the French, was restored. The English allies 
in Germany, with the exception of the king of Prussia, 
were to receive back those parts of their dominions in the 
possession of the French; and Spain agreed to abandon 
her claim to fish off the coasts of Newfoundland, and 
undertook to cede Florida to England in return for the 
restoration of Havannah. Yet, substantial as these 
acquisitions were, it was argued that they had been 
purchased at too high a price. The French had been 

1 Walpole's Letters, v. 271 — 274 ; Bedford Correspondence, in. 152. 
Charles Townshend was not in sympathy with the outcry against the 
ministers. He called the peace "a damned good one." Add. MS. 32945, 
f. 83. 



140 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

granted the right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence as 
well as off Newfoundland ; and the islands of St Pierre 
and Miquelon had been ceded to them as shelters for their 
fishing vessels. England restored her important conquests 
of Guadeloupe, St Lucia, and Belleisle; and though 
Florida had been ceded by Spain, this was declared to be 
insufficient compensation for the surrender of such a 
valuable conquest as Havannah. More serious than any 
charge of failing to secure the maximum advantage for 
England, the ministers were accused of treacherously- 
deserting the cause of the king of Prussia. The pre- 
liminaries had drawn a distinction between that prince 
and the other German allies of England, for whereas the 
French were called upon to restore the lands they had 
conquered from the latter, they were only asked to 
evacuate the Prussian territory they occupied, thus leaving 
it open whether the lands in question were to fall to the 
Austrians or the Prussians. As a matter of fact, Prussia 
and Austria concluded peace a few days after the Peace 
of Paris had been signed, and Frederick regained the 
territory that the French had conquered ; but this cannot 
be held to clear the framers of the preliminaries from 
the taint of treachery 1 . 

Whether Bute was justified or not in concluding peace 
upon such terms 2 , he and his colleagues were certain to 
be attacked in parliament for their action. If everybody 
else remained silent, Pitt would stand forward in de- 
nunciation. But he would not stand alone, for the whigs 

1 It would appear that some offer was made to restore the conquered 
territory, to the king of Prussia ; but it is possible that this was not 
done until peace between Austria and Prussia was certain. Hist. MSS. 
Comm., 13th Report, Appendix, vn, p. 132. 

2 It is worth noting that even Pitt only committed himself to the 
statement that the war could have been continued for one year longer. 
Add. MS. 32945, f. 83. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 141 

were bound to follow in his wake, even against the 
inclinations of their leaders. Both Hardwicke and New- 
castle doubted the wisdom of attacking the preliminaries 1 , 
but they were left with no other alternative. To pursue 
a policy of inaction would not only widen the breach 
between themselves and Pitt, but serve to discourage 
their own followers who would tend to desert to the 
administration unless they were led into battle. To stand 
on the defensive is as harassing to politicians as to soldiers; 
and it might be better to fight a losing battle than not 
fight at all. The principal members of the whig party 
met at Newcastle House on December 3rd to decide upon 
a plan of campaign 2 . Amongst those present was Charles 
Yorke, a son of Lord Hardwicke, and attorney-general. 
They met in no spirit of triumph. The failure to conclude 
an alliance with Pitt had dashed their spirits ; and, which- 
ever way they turned, failure confronted them. They 
stood on the eve of the battle, dispirited and disunited. 
Newcastle, who had by this time made up his mind and 
determined to take the plunge, pressed for the opposition 
to attack those parts of the peace most open to criticism, 
and then move to adjourn. Though warmly supported 
by Devonshire and Rockingham, his proposal was not 
sympathetically received by the others present. Hard- 
wicke only grudgingly assented to the plan, saying that, 
if Newcastle insisted upon it, he would support it as well 
as he could. 

This was not a happy omen for the future; and the 
whigs looked forward to certain defeat. The parliamentary 
battle over the preliminaries of peace was fought on 
December 9th and the day following. In the upper house, 
Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Grafton spoke in condemnation 

1 Add. MS. 32945, f. 166, f. 176, f. 196. 

2 Add. MS. 33000, f. 200. 



142 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

of the preliminaries, which, were approved, however, 
without a division. In the house of commons, Pitt made 
a speech which lasted more than three hours. He was 
vehement in denunciation, and, if words could have 
destroyed, the ministers would not have survived his 
condemnation of their action. But he held out no helping 
hand to the whig party. He took his stand as an 
independent critic, unconnected with any faction; and 
went out of his way to declare himself a single man 1 . 
Nor did he refrain from censuring those parts of the 
peace which had been agreed upon before Newcastle left 
the cabinet 2 . Applauded by the mob as he left the house, 
he departed having done nothing to assist those who 
were struggling in the same cause as himself. While he 
had displayed his hostility to Bute and his colleagues, he 
had avoided any demonstration of friendship with New- 
castle. Nor was Pitt's speech the only unfortunate event. 
The attorney-general, though he had been present at the 
meeting of the whig leaders, left the house on the first 
day without either voting or speaking; and his elder 
brother, Lord Royston, voted with the government. On 
the day following, Charles Yorke ventured a mild criticism 
of the preliminaries, but neutralised any effect his utter- 
ance might have had by saying that, though he could not 
vote for the address, he did not intend to vote against it 3 . 
Newcastle believed that the conduct of the attorney- 
general and his brother was responsible for the loss of 
many votes to the opposition 4 . 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 21, 22. 

2 He condemned the surrender of Miquelon, Martinique, and St Lucia. 
The latter island had not been surrendered to France when Newcastle 
resigned his ministerial office. 

3 Add. MS. 32945, f. 266, f. 312 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS., 
p. 245. 

4 Add. MS. 32945, f. 312. For an account of the debates on 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 143 

The administration had won a substantial victory, and 
could afford to congratulate themselves upon the overthrow 
of their opponents. On the first day, only sixty-five votes 
had been given in the house of commons against the 
peace, and the minority fell to sixty-three when the 
address was voted on the following day. It was Bute's 
hour of triumph. The work, which he had set out to do, 
was almost accomplished. By the aid of Fox, he had 
carried the peace through parliament ; and the opposition 
had been routed in the first pitched battle. Unfortunately, 
Bute permitted himself to abuse the victory he had gained, 
by allowing a systematic persecution of his opponents to 
be set on foot, without being able even to plead necessity 
as his excuse. After what had happened, it was impossible 
to regard the whigs as formidable opponents, and to make 
them suffer was, merely, to satisfy a lust for revenge, such 
as prompts the slaughter of prisoners when the battle is 
over. 

It was apparently Fox who suggested that punishment 
should be meted out to those who had dared to oppose 
the peace 1 . But retribution was to fall, not only on the 
leaders, but also on their dependents. Men who held 
offices under the crown, given to them by Newcastle or 
his friends, were now to be turned out, not for what they 
themselves had done, but for the sins of their patrons. 
Fox's suggestion was acted upon without delay; and a 
political persecution set on foot, which spared neither 
great nor small. Newcastle, Grafton and Rockingham 
were dismissed from their lord lieutenancies, dragging 
with them in their fall many who had done nothing to 
deserve so hard a fate. Old servants and dependents, 

December 9th and 10th, see Parliamentary History, xv. ; Grafton's 
Autobiography, pp. 23, 24; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 176, seq. 
1 Shelburne's Life, i. 179, 180. 



144 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

who had retired and been preferred to very small places, 
were rigorously hunted out and deprived of their live- 
lihood 1 . Newcastle pathetically confessed that his heart 
was almost broken by the cruelties inflicted upon "poor 
innocent men, in order to be revenged on me 2 ." Impartial 
observers were shocked by the systematic rigour and 
comprehensive character of the persecution ; and, though 
excuses were made, as excuses will always be made for 
every act of iniquity 3 , no arguments could blind men to 
the fact that innocent men had been called upon to suffer 
for no sufficient reason. 

Great as was the crime, the blunder was greater still. 
Left to itself, the opposition might have died in its birth, 
as indeed it was rumoured that it had 4 ; but, like many 
a religious sect, it gained fresh life from suffering. It 
was not the time for those who stood in the same con- 
demnation to waste their energy in bickering; and 
the mutual recriminations, which so often follow failure, 
were hushed in face of the common peril. The breach 
between Newcastle and Hardwicke, caused by the be- 
haviour of the latter's sons when the preliminaries 
were before parliament 5 , was quickly healed; and the 
ex-chancellor declared that the constitution itself was 
in danger 6 . Nor was Pitt indifferent to passing events, 
for, on Christmas Day, the important news reached 
Newcastle that the great commoner was deeply offended 
by what had happened, and, though still unwilling to 
unite with Newcastle, was ready, in the words of the 
latter, " to act in the house of commons with us upon all 

1 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 184 — 185. 

2 Add. MS. 32945, f. 312. 

3 Bedford Correspondence, in. 185 — 188. 

* Walpole's Letters, v. 287—288. 

* Add. MS. 32945, f. 312, f. 323. 6 Add. MS. 32945, f. 335. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 145 

great occasions 1 ." Thus, by his folly, Bute had succeeded 
in drawing Pitt and Newcastle nearer together. 

Severe as the defeat had been, the whig party had not 
been destroyed. A serious rebuff had been suffered and 
a great humiliation endured, but the future was not 
without hope 2 . And out of evil had come good; for, 
shocked by the ruthlessness of Bute, Pitt was more in- 
clined to be friendly with those who had been so severely 
punished. Eumours were afloat of divisions and dissensions 
in the ministry. It was said that Bute had grown jealous 
of the power and predominance acquired by Fox, that 
George Grrenville intended to resign, and that his example 
would be quickly followed by Egremont 3 . It was also 
reported that difficulties had arisen over converting the 
preliminaries into a final treaty of peace, that Egremont 
and Grenville were again opposing Bute, and that 
Lord Egmont, though only joint-postmaster, had been 
summoned to a cabinet meeting, in order that he might 
support the first minister against his opponents 4 . What- 
ever truth there might be in these reports, the negotiations 
with France had gone too far to be seriously endangered ; 
and, by the beginning of February, 1763, Bute knew that 
the final treaty between England, France, and Spain 
would soon be signed, and that peace would shortly be 
concluded between Prussia and Austria 5 . On February 10th 
the Peace of Paris was signed, and Bute had accomplished 
his task. 

While the ministers had been thus engaged, the whigs 
had been quiescent but not idle. Withdrawn into their 

1 Add. MS. 32945, f. 362. 

2 Add. MS. 32945, f. 289, f. 335 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 152, 153. 

3 Add. MS. 32945, f. 335, f. 435, f. 460. 

* Add. MS. 32933, f. 73. This letter is misdated by a year. Add. 
MS. 32946, f. 141, f. 153, f. 159. 

5 Hist. MSS. Comm. 13th Report, Appendix, vn, p. 132. 
W. 10 



146 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

camp, they were preparing for the next sally, and 
endeavouring to win Pitt over to their side. His more 
friendly attitude had spurred Newcastle to renewed efforts. 
He asked both Devonshire and Rockingham to visit Pitt, 
without whom, he confessed, nothing could be done 1 . 
Thinking that he might stand in the way of a reconcilia- 
tion, Newcastle was willing to promise that he would not 
again take office under the crown 2 ; and this act of 
renunciation may be taken as a proof of his sincerity. 
But Pitt remained obdurate, and refused to be won. 
Though ready to attend parliament "upon any national 
or constitutional points/' he steadily refused to enter into 
direct opposition. He declared that he desired to have 
nothing to do with Lord Bute, but deprecated any 
proscription of the tories 3 . Newcastle and Devonshire 
thought that Pitt feared to go into opposition lest he 
should risk the loss of his pension 4 ; but it is possible to 
explain his conduct on less ignoble grounds. Newcastle 
represented the principles of party government. The 
opposition, which he directed, was to fight as a party, and 
to prevail as a party. It must present an united front to 
the enemy; and differences of opinion within its ranks 
must not be tolerated, or, at least, must be concealed. 
Pitt was not prepared to bow his head to the yoke. He 
distrusted Newcastle, and preferred to deal with questions, 
as they arose, on their merits; and was not willing to 
pledge himself to oppose every measure introduced by a 
tory statesman. He desired, as fervently as Newcastle, to 
drive Bute from power, not because he was a tory, but 
because he was inefficient. 

1 Add. MS. 32946, f. 249, f. 259. 

2 Add. MS. 32946, f. 266, f. 317. 

3 Add. MS. 32946, f. 317, f. 329 ; Add. MS. 32947, f. 21. 

4 Add. MS. 32946, f. 317, f. 329. 






THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 147 

Pitt was soon to give an illustration of his independent 
position and his freedom from party restrictions. Now 
that the war had come to an end, it was necessary to 
place the army upon a peace footing; and this question 
came before parliament early in March. Newcastle and 
his followers considered the ministerial proposals ob- 
jectionable in every way 1 ; but it was known that Pitt 
held an opposite opinion, and intended to support the 
ministers in parliament 2 . Caution was necessary. If 
Newcastle carried out his original idea, and put up Legge 
to attack the ministry, offence might be given to Pitt; 
and, in order to avoid this, Legge was instructed to " state 
his own private thoughts, but, out of deference to Mr Pitt, 
give them up to him 3 ." We do not know whether this 
plan was executed or not, but we have Newcastle's word 
that, though Pitt declared himself vehemently in favour 
of the ministerial measure, the opposition avoided giving 
him any cause for offence 4 . 

The debate on the army had taken place on March 4th. 
Three days later, Pitt delivered a violent attack 
upon the cyder bill, and, in the course of his speech, 
insulted George G-renville 5 . On the following day, he 
dined at Devonshire House, in the company of Newcastle, 
Rockingham, and Hardwicke 6 . Over that meeting hangs 
a cloud of mystery which will probably never be dispelled. 
It was understood by contemporaries to have a political 
significance 7 , and, on March 9th, Lord Temple informed 
Newcastle " that what he had been about unsuccessfully 
for six months, viz. the bringing Mr Pitt and us together, 

1 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 193 seq. 2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 163. 
3 Ibid. 4 Add. MS. 32947, f. 182. 

5 Parliamentary History, xv. 1307 — 1309 ; Bedford Correspondence, 
in. 218—220 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 198. 

6 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 335. 

7 Bedford Correspondence, in. 218 — 220. 

10—2 



148 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

is now come about as it were of itself : that nothing 
could be better 1 ." Rigby noted the cheerful faces of the 
whigs "since they put themselves under Pitt's manage- 
ment 2 "; and, two months after the dinner at Devonshire 
House, Newcastle said " all of us, Mr Pitt and my Lord 
Temple included, will act a firm part, be inseparable from 
each other j and never give in to any administration 
which is not founded and has its basis upon the whigs 
and the true friends of the protestant succession 3 ." 

It would, therefore, seem that Pitt had drawn nearer 
to the whigs, and had agreed to conclude some sort of 
an alliance with them. We know nothing of the terms of 
the compact, and it is probable that Newcastle believed 
Pitt to have committed himself more deeply to the oppo- 
sition than he actually had. Nor is it easy to know what 
decided Pitt to throw in his lot with the whigs at this 
particular juncture. It is possible that the conclusion 
of the Peace of Paris, by removing a question from the 
sphere of politics on which Newcastle and Pitt were not in 
agreement, facilitated the union ; and Newcastle's declara- 
tion, that he would not again take an important ministerial 
office, may also have contributed to the same end 4 . The 
nature of the alliance remains unknown. It is clear that 
Newcastle and his friends imagined that they had secured 
the support of Pitt, and believed that he was willing to 
embark upon a career of opposition, and storm the royal 
closet at the point of the sword ; but it is more than likely 
that they had formed exaggerated hopes. Ready as 

1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 216. 2 Bedford Correspondence, m. 219. 

s Add. MS. 32948, f. 291. 

4 In October, 1763, Newcastle wrote to Cumberland : " You know, sir, 
better than anybody, the pains which I have taken to unite us with 
Mr Pitt. I made a public declaration at first that no consideration 
should ever make me come into the treasury again." Add. MS. 32952, 
f. 119. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 149 

he might be to unite with the whigs in opposing the 
cyder tax, it is unlikely that he would deny the principles 
which he had so recently laid down, and enter upon a 
formal opposition to the government. It not infrequently 
happens that one party in a contract imagines himself to 
have gained more than he actually has; and it is not 
improbable that, whilst Newcastle believed that Pitt had 
become completely identified with the opposition, Pitt 
regarded himself rather as an independent ally. 

But, when all allowances have been made, it remains 
certain that Pitt was on more friendly and intimate terms 
with the whigs than he had been for many months past ; 
and it is, therefore, not surprising to find the opposition 
displaying renewed energy and spirit. The cyder bill 
offered a convenient point for attack. This measure had 
provoked popular discontent, especially in the cyder 
counties; and its passage through the lower house was 
contested by the opposition, if not with success, at least 
with credit and vigour. On the first reading in the 
house of commons on March 17th, the minority numbered 
eighty-eight to the hundred and eighty-four of the govern- 
ment ' ; but, when the bill was in committee, an amendment, 
proposing that the tax should fall on the buyers and not 
on the makers of cyder, was only lost by sixty-nine votes 2 . 

When the bill had been passed by the commons, it 
was doubtful whether it should be opposed in the house 
of lords. It is very unusual for the upper house to divide 
upon a money bill; but the occasion might be held to 
justify a resort to extraordinary expedients. Those, who 
were known as the cyder lords, declared their intention of 
continuing the opposition 3 . Newcastle and Cumberland 

1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 236. 2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 265. 

3 These cyder lords were Lord Foley, Lord Ward, Lord Oxford, Lord 
Lyttelton, Lord Suffolk, and Lord Fortescue (Add. MS. 32947, f. 313). 



150 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

thought that the bill should be allowed to pass through the 
upper house unopposed 1 ; but the former was influenced by 
his friends 2 , and by Pitt, to sanction a course of conduct 
which he did not approve. Pitt was anxious for the 
attack to continue, and for a protest to be signed by the 
peers who dissented from the measure 3 ; but the Duke of 
Cumberland was of an exactly opposite opinion. Newcastle 
could not afford to offend either Cumberland or Pitt ; but 
it was difficult to see how he could please them both. He 
attempted to find safety in a middle course. The cyder 
bill was opposed in the upper house, and the leaders of 
the opposition took part in the debate; but to the two 
protests, which were drawn up, only three signatures were 
appended 4 . Both Temple and Pitt were aggrieved that 
the protests had not been more widely signed 5 ; and the 
abstention of the whig leaders had not been accidental. 
To please Pitt, Newcastle and his supporters had attacked 
the bill in the upper house : to please Cumberland, they 
had refrained from signing the protests. No ill conse- 
quences apparently resulted from this policy of compromise. 
Cumberland explained his principles of objection to Pitt, 
and Grafton contrived to pacify Lord Temple; so that 
Newcastle could say with truth that he was very happy 
"at the manner in which we have finished our conduct 
this session 6 ." Indeed, he had cause for self-congratulation ; 
for the end had been better than the beginning. The 
ministry had not been overthrown, but the opposition had 
succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Pitt, and 
could look forward with hope to the future. 

1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 319, f. 327. 

2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 319. 3 Add. MS. 32947, f. 317. 

4 The first protest was signed by Foley, Oxford and Willoughby de 
Broke ; the second by Temple, Bolton and Fortescue. 

5 Add. MS. 32947, f. 359. 

« Add. MS. 32947, f. 361 ; Add. MS. 32948, f. 3. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 151 

In the meantime the political situation had been 
changed by an incident which few could have foreseen 
— Bute had decided to abandon office. As early as 
March 11th, Fox was aware of his leader's determination 1 ; 
and, when the news was published to the world a few weeks 
later, many explanations were given of conduct so inex- 
plicable. It was said that Bute had been driven to resign by 
the popular outcry against the cyder bill ; but it is difficult 
to believe this, seeing that he must have determined upon 
resignation either shortly before, or directly after, the in- 
troduction of that measure. Moreover, the man, who had 
braved the people's indignation against the Peace of Paris, 
might be expected to stand his ground over the cyder bilL 
It has also been suggested that his position was rendered 
untenable by the alliance between Pitt and Newcastle; 
but it is equally difficult to accept this view, seeing that 
only three days elapsed between the earliest date, at 
which that alliance could have been concluded, and the 
day on which Fox learnt Bute's intention. It is far more 
likely that Bute spoke the truth when he said that he had 
taken office in order to bring the war to a conclusion, and 
had always intended to retire when that task was accom- 
plished. He had accepted office unwillingly; and his 
experience had not been so fortunate as to cause him to 
forget his earlier prejudices. He had been thwarted, 
contradicted, and outvoted in his own cabinet 2 . He had 

1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 186. 

2 "What treatment," wrote Bute on April 8th, "have I not met 
with. I allude not to the mere vulgar clamor against me; no, I speak 
of the interior of government. As a minister of this country, I have 
seen myself single in a cabinet formed by my own hand. I have very 
lately been left alone unsupported by any one man in government, tho' 
opposed to the most violent attacks of the enemy ; and that in parliament, 
defending the measure of the year ; and only assisted by two of my own 
faithful friends." Add. MS. 36797, f. 42. 



152 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

fallen foul of Grenville, and was probably jealous of the 
influence and power acquired by Fox. His haughty and 
pedantic manners had stood in the way of his making 
friends. He had earned the hatred of the people, and 
was the target of every pamphleteer and scribbler who 
wished to attack the government. As long as he remained 
in power, the king, his master, could never hope to gain 
the affection of his people; and therefore, now that he 
had done his work, it was time for him to go 1 . Pitt was 
probably right when he remarked, on hearing the news, 
" I think it rather sudden than surprising : Lord Bute's 
undertaking seeming to me the matter of astonishment, 
not his lordship's departing from it 2 ." 

But, though Bute had determined to resign the burden 
of office, he did not intend to make way for those who 
had opposed him. The system of government, which he 
had erected, must continue unchanged; and he would 
have preferred to have remained at the head of the 
administration, rather than allow the king to fall back 
into the slavery from which he had rescued him. There 
must be no interregnum, and, when the world heard that 
Bute had resigned, it must also learn who was his 
successor. A place in the administration was offered to 
Pitt, and refused 3 ; and Henry Fox was tempted with the 
offer of the post of first lord of the treasury. Fox was 
willing enough to take up the burden which Bute was 
preparing to lay down; but his wife pressed him to 

1 Von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 117, 118. 
"A bad constitution and a want of resolution make him inadequate to 
a first situation which he gave up after he had fought the battle, and 
obtained the victory." Add. MS. 22358, f. 22. See also Duten's Memoirs 
of a Traveller (1806), n. 34. 

2 Add. MS. 32948, f. 84. 

3 Add. MS. 32949, f. 191 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 169. Pitt believed 
that, if he had accepted the offer, Bute would not have resigned. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 153 

decline, and conjugal affection triumphed over political 
ambition 1 . Fox's refusal necessitated the prize being 
given to G-eorge G-renville. It was only with great 
reluctance that Fox agreed to this arrangement 2 , nor is 
it likely that the choice was entirely approved by Bute. 
Grrenville had shown himself obstinate and pertinacious; 
and had cause to remember the treatment he had suffered 
at Bute's hands 3 . But there was no one else to fill the 
vacant place. Fox and Pitt had declined, for different 
reasons, to fill the breach, and Grenville prevailed through 
the lack of eligible rivals. His claims were too great to 
be neglected. When called upon by the king, he had 
foregone his ambition of becoming speaker, to take upon 
himself the burden of managing the house of commons, 
and, though he had done much to cause offence, Bute had 
no option but to appoint him his successor. If he had 
been passed over, it is not improbable that the opposition 
would have received a new recruit. 

Yet, if Grenville was to become first minister, and he 
was willing enough to take the post, substantial alterations 
must be made in the administration. His past had not 
been so blameless as to render it safe to give him 
unrestricted power; and, therefore, Fox suggested that 
Shelburne, who was attached to Bute, should be made 
secretary of state in place of Lord Egremont who should 
be given the office of lord president of the council, then 
vacant by Lord Granville's death. In order to win the 
support of the Duke of Bedford for the reconstructed 
administration, Lord Gower, a member of the party 
known as the " Bloomsbury gang," was to be given the 

1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 194 — 196. 

2 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 196 — 199. 

3 Newcastle thought him unsuitable both "as to his ability, and as 
to his submissive temper." Add. MS. 32948, f. 48. 



154 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

admiralty 1 . To these proposals objection was taken by 
Grenville. He probably resented not being allowed to 
form the administration which he was to lead 2 ; and 
protested against the substitution of Shelburne for Egre- 
mont as secretary of state 3 . Bute, chagrined at Grenville's 
conduct, hinted that, if he could not accept the stipulated 
conditions, the treasury might be bestowed elsewhere 4 ; 
but this was an empty threat, and Egremont was allowed 
to retain his office. Shelburne was willing to be omitted 
from the administration altogether, but this Bute would 
not sanction 5 ; and he was given the office of first 
commissioner of trade. The admiralty, which Charles 
Townshend might have had but for his folly, was given 
to Lord Sandwich 6 . The Duke of Bedford was offered 
the post of lord president of the council, but declined to 
become a member of an administration formed on so 
narrow a basis. Either not understanding the designs of 
the king, or understanding them only too well, he advised 
that the whig leaders should be asked to take office 7 ; 
but war had been declared against the opposition, and 
Bute stated that the king intended "never upon any 
account to suffer those ministers of the late reign, who 
have attempted to fetter and enslave him, ever to come 
into his service while he lives to hold the sceptre 8 ." 

The resignation of Bute, and the reconstruction of the 
ministry under the leadership of Grenville, opens a new 
epoch in the reign of George III. Looking back upon 
the course of events since the day that he had succeeded 

1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 196 — 199. 

2 Grenville Papers, n. 38—40. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., n. 32, 33. 
5 Ibid. ii. 40, 41. 6 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 209, 210. 

7 Bedford Correspondence, m. 227 — 230. It was reported that 
Egremont and Halifax also believed that the administration should be 
widened. Add. MS. 32948, f. 54. 

8 Bedford Correspondence, in. 224. 



THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 155 

his grandfather, the king could contemplate with pleasure 
and gratification the work he had accomplished. The 
war had been brought to an end, and the whigs had been 
driven from office. Bute had triumphed over the enemies 
of the new system, and those, who had dared to oppose 
the king's favourite, had met with condign punishment. 
The royal authority had once more become a political force 
of no mean importance, and the men, who had tyrannised 
over George II, found themselves subjected to the tyranny 
of his grandson. The relative ease, with which this had 
been accomplished, was doubtless due, in a large measure, 
to the intimate relations existing between Bute and the 
king. Genuinely attached to his master, Bute had no 
ambition save to serve what he thought to be the interests 
of the crown ; and, as long as he remained at the head 
of the administration, the king was able effectively to 
influence and control the decisions of his ministers. Yet, 
great as the success had been, there was one fatal flaw. 
Bute had succeeded in much that he had undertaken, but 
he had completely failed to win the favour of the people. 
Disliked and distrusted from the beginning, the popular 
detestation of him had steadily increased in volume, and, 
as long as he remained in the service of the crown, the 
king would find the nation arrayed against him. Bute 
must now retire, in order that the stigma of unpopu- 
larity, attaching to the court, might be removed, and it, 
therefore, became necessary to make a new arrangement 
which would present difficulties of its own. It had been 
comparatively easy for the king to exercise a controlling 
influence over the cabinet as long as Bute remained the 
guiding spirit of that body, but, if his place was taken by 
one who regarded the king as a master and not as a 
friend, George III might discover how much he owed his 
earlier success to the peculiar relations existing between 
himself and his favourite. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE GRENVILLE MINISTEY. 

When George III consented to appoint Grenville to be 
Bute's successor, it was not with the intention of sur- 
rendering himself into the hands of his new prime minister. 
The latter had not been allowed an unfettered choice in 
the selection of his colleagues ; nor could he natter himself 
that he possessed the confidence of the crown in the 
measure that it had been given to his predecessor. Bute, 
though he had retired from office, continued to be the 
king's trusted adviser, and intended to rule England from 
the royal closet. He had abandoned the political arena, 
but had not divested himself of his power, and was to play 
the part of a maker and unmaker of ministers 1 . Though 
he left London shortly after his resignation, he soon 
returned ; and, early in June, Lord Rockingham was 
approached by a friend who told him that the favourite 
had taken a dislike to the ministers, and was anxious to 
know whether Pitt and the whigs would come into office 2 / 
It is true that, a little earlier, Lord Egremont declared that 

1 "Wishing one moment to return to office but the next afraid to 
take it, he considers every minister as his rival, and the moment he 
suspects him of standing fair for the favour of his master, it becomes 
immediately his object to remove him." Dated September, 1765. Add. 
MS. 22358, f. 22. 

2 Add MS. 32949, f. 52, f. 70. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 157 

lie had discovered no trace of Bute's influence, and was 
prepared to take strong measures upon so doing 1 ; but 
Newcastle was probably nearer the truth in his surmise 
that the ministers only held their power on sufferance, 
and that the late prime minister was the master of the 
situation 2 . This was the new experiment rendered 
necessary by Bute's retirement. Compelled to employ 
those whom he did not trust, the king gave his confidence 
to the man without a place in the administration. 
Grrenville and his colleagues were reduced to the in- 
significant position of stop-gaps. They were to be allowed 
to remain in office as long as they continued to obey the 
king, and until more suitable successors could be found. 
The shadow of Bute still rested upon them ; and, if they 
struck for independence, it was more than likely that they 
would find themselves driven from power. 

In any circumstances, succeeding as he did a prime 
minister who had been the friend as well as the adviser 
of the king, Grrenville would have had a difficult part to 
play; and neither by training nor by temperament was 
he adapted for a delicate situation. Stiff and arrogant in 
demeanour, touchy of his dignity, and fond of the exercise 
of power, he was not equipped by nature to act a diplo- 
matic role. Unduly conscious of his own integrity, he 
could neither be conciliatory nor ingratiating; and he 
was the last man who would submit to possess the form 
without the substance of power. Yet, anxious as he might 
be to gain ascendency over the king and Bute, his chance 
of doing so seemed remote. He could not turn for strength 
to the support of the people. Pitt was still regarded as 
the only man capable of guiding the destinies of the 
country, and Grenville's administration was generally 

1 Harris' Life of Hardwicke, in. 350 — 353.; 

2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 338. 



158 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

considered to be doomed to a speedy destruction 1 . Nor 
could he count upon the loyalty of all his colleagues. 
Sherburne, who held the office of first commissioner of 
trade, would be likely to sympathise with Bute rather 
than with Grenville ; and, doubtless because his prejudices 
in favour of the favourite were well known, he found 
himself treated with neglect by his fellow ministers, and 
meditated resignation 2 . Thus, unsupported alike by the 
crown and by the people, the ministry presented many 
points of attack, and might be expected to succumb to 
the first assault, from whatever quarter it was delivered. 
It is one of the many instances of the fallaciousness of 
political prophecy that Grrenville, whose destruction seemed 
so imminent, was to continue in power for more than two 
years. 

Parliament had risen on April 19th, and was not to 
meet again until the following autumn. Till then, the 
ministry could count upon immunity from attack by the 
opposition ; but, in the early years of the reign of George 
III, administrations were more often destroyed by court 
intrigues than parliamentary defeats, and, unless Grenville 
could secure the good- will of the king, it was not unlikely 
that, when the autumn came, another than he would be 
found sitting on the treasury bench. It is possible that it 
was in the hope of pleasing the king that the ministers 
waged war upon John Wilkes, for it was known that 
George III was deeply offended by Wilkes' attack upon 
the king's speech at the close of the last session of 
parliament. If they could have foreseen the consequences 
of a step, seemingly so trivial, they might well have 
hesitated before beginning a contest which was to exercise 
a disturbing influence upon English politics for many 

1 Walpole's Letters, v. 312—315 ; Add. MS. 32948, f. 291. 

2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 5, f. 338 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 275—277. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 159 

years to come, and enable a profligate adventurer to pose 
as a champion of freedom. Yet, severely as their subse- 
quent conduct may be censured, they can hardly be 
blamed for failing to discern that the suppression of a 
scurrilous opposition writer would produce a ferment of 
popular excitement, and constitute the principal question 
of debate during one session of parliament. 

Of Wilkes' private character, probably the less said 
the better. The companion of Sandwich and Dashwood 
in their leisure hours, and a distinguished member of that 
brotherhood, which had its headquarters at Medenham 
Abbey, and indulged in orgies both obscene and profane, 
he moved in a society which cultivated vice as an art. 
But he was not merely a debauched man of fashion, nor 
did indulgence in his vicious propensities entirely destroy 
his nobler qualities. He was both brave and generous; 
and his social tact and charm of manner were sufficient to 
overcome the stubborn prejudice of Dr Johnson, and to 
win the approval of Gibbon. Possessed of a brilliant if not 
always decorous wit, he was the author of one of the most 
amusing and least delicate repartees in the English 
language 1 . In politics he was in sympathy with the whig 
opposition, and had been active in the attack upon Lord 
Bute and the Scotch. Though possessed of a seat in 
parliament, he had taken little part in debate ; and it was 
in his paper, The North Briton, that he delivered his most 
savage blows against the court and the favourite. It was 
in this journal that the attack upon the royal speech, at 
the close of the parliamentary session, had appeared. The 
king had described the Peace of Paris as " honourable to 
my crown, and beneficial to my people," and had laid stress 

1 The repartee in question has also been credited to Mirabeau and 
Foote, the actor. See Lord Brougham's Statesmen of the time of George III 
(1855), i. 431 ; Duten's Memoirs of a Traveller (1806), v. 26. 



160 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

upon the "happy effects which the several allies of my 
crown have derived from this salutary measure." Wilkes 
seized the opportunity thus given him. Carefully stating 
the constitutional doctrine that the king's speech must be 
considered as the composition of his ministers, he de- 
scribed it as ". the most abandoned instance of ministerial 
effrontery, not to be paralleled in the annals of this 
country." He expressed regret that the king had given 
the sanction of his name to such mendacious statements, 
and asserted that Prussia had not been assisted but 
betrayed by the peace between England and France. 
The Judas was Bute. " In vain will such a minister," 
wrote Wilkes, " or the foul dregs of his power, the tools 
of corruption and despotism, preach up in the speech 
that spirit of concord, and that obedience to the laws, 
which is essential to good order. They have sent the 
spirit of discord through the land, and I will prophesy 
that it will never be extinguished but by the extinction 
of their power." 

These were bold words, and, according to the custom 
of the time, the ministers were justified in proceeding 
against the man who had uttered them. They could 
support their action by many precedents, and to leave an 
attack of such virulence unpunished might easily be 
construed as weakness. Moreover, if, by the prosecution 
of an infamous and scurrilous pamphleteer, the good-will 
of the king could be acquired, a double end might be 
attained — a troublesome opposition writer would be 
suppressed, and the ministers' tenure of office rendered 
more secure. Therefore, three days after the offending 
number of the North Briton had been published, a general 
warrant was issued by Lord Halifax, authorising the arrest 
of the authors, printers and publishers of the journal, and 
the seizure of their papers. A large number of persons 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 161 

were arrested under this warrant, and amongst them 
Wilkes. He was taken before the secretaries of state, 
and committed a close prisoner to the Tower. In this 
matter, the ministers had not acted blindly or in ignorance. 
They were well aware that the arrest of Wilkes would 
raise the question of the parliamentary privilege of free- 
dom from arrest ; and, before apprehending him, they had 
consulted the attorney and solicitor general who gave the 
opinion that parliamentary privilege did not cover seditious 
libel. The attorney general, Charles Yorke, before giving 
his written opinion to the ministers, had submitted it to his 
father, by whom it was approved 1 ; and that Lord Hard- 
wicke, with no interest to serve, and certainly with no 
inclination to smooth the way for the ministers, sanctioned 
the step that they were about to take, may serve to 
show that expert legal opinion was not all on one side. 
But, though it is possible to defend the ministers for 
arresting Wilkes, it is impossible to excuse many of their 
subsequent actions. Wilkes was closely imprisoned in the 
Tower, and the Duke of Grafton and Lord Temple were 
refused admission to him. The latter moved for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the court of common pleas, over which 
Pratt presided ; and it is worthy of note that, in so doing, 
he pursued an unusual course. " Such a writ," John 
Yorke informed his brother, " has not been moved in that 
court since the reign of Charles II 2 ." Temple had not 
acted without reason. Pratt was his friend, and intimate 

1 "The privilege," wrote Lord Hardwicke to his son, "has been 
variously laid down, sometimes with an exception of treason, felony, 
and breach of the peace ; and sometimes of treason, felony, and 
sureties of the peace. But your report is agreeable to the report made 
by Sir Thomas Lee in Mr Onslow's case, which you will find entered in 
the Journal, 20 May, 1675 : Printed Journals, ix. 342." Add. MS. 35353, 
f. 316 ; see also Add. MS. 35428, f. 1. 

2 Add. MS. 35374, f. 200. 

w. 11 



162 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

with Pitt ; and the supporters of Wilkes preferred that he 
should be tried by Pratt in the common pleas, rather than 
by Mansfield in the king's bench. Thus, from the outset, 
politics were mingled with law to the detriment of both. 

On account of something very like chicanery and sharp 
practice on the part of the ministers, it was found necessary 
to issue a second writ of habeas corpus to secure the 
appearance of Wilkes. On May 3rd he was brought to 
the court of common pleas to stand his trial. He was the 
hero of the hour, and the popular excitement, in the 
opinion of one who was present, was comparable to that 
displayed at the trial of the seven bishops 1 . The city had 
enthusiastically espoused his cause, and the court was 
thronged with his supporters 2 . Pratt deferred judgment 
till May 6th, when he discharged the prisoner on the ground 
that parliamentary privilege covered every offence save 
treason, felony, and a breach of the peace ; and a seditious 
libel, though it might cause the peace to be broken, was 
not in itself an actual violation of it. The decision was 
greeted with loud applause. The ministry had suffered a 
serious and humiliating rebuff, and Wilkes was now 
doubly dangerous. The discomfort he had endured was a 
small price to pay for the popularity he had gained. He 
was now able to pose as the victim of oppression and 
the champion of freedom; and his native insolence and 
audacity were stimulated by the knowledge that he had 
the support of the people. The ministers would have 
acted wisely in neglecting him ; but, as they had already 
deeply committed themselves, they resolved to take further 
measures. Against the advice of Charles Yorke 3 , a 
prosecution was begun against Wilkes in the court of 
king's bench; but the latter, standing upon his parlia- 

1 Add. MS. 35353, f. 325. 2 Ibid. 35374, f. 200. 

3 Add. MS. 35430, f. 214 ; Ibid. 35353, f. 327 ; Ibid. 32949, f. 5. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 163 

mentary privilege refused to appear. This attempt to 
overrule Pratt's judgment served no useful purpose, and 
only contributed to show the vindictiveness of the ministers 
against the man whom they could have most effectively 
injured by treating him with indifference. Nor was 
Wilkes allowed to suffer alone: Lord Temple, who had 
stood forward as his friend and patron, was summarily 
dismissed from the lord lieutenancy of Buckingham- 
shire 1 . 

Wilkes and his fellow victims had been arrested under 
a general warrant, an expedient of doubtful legality, 
which, in the opinion of Hardwicke, was justified at least 
by precedent 2 . Those, who had been arrested, began 
actions against the messengers who had apprehended 
them ; and Pratt, in his judicial capacity, declared general 
warrants to be illegal. These two questions — the extent 
of parliamentary privilege and the use of general 
warrants — were to be warmly debated when parliament 
met in the autumn ; and it might appear, at first sight, 
that Wilkes had provided the opposition with formidable 
weapons of attack. The ministers stood convicted of a 
violation of the law of the land and a breach of one of 
the most cherished privileges of parliament. The victim 
of their animosity had risen to the dignity of a popular 
hero ; and it would seem that the folly of the administra- 
tion had turned to the advantage of the opposition. This, 
however, is only partly true. Wilkes was to prove a 
source of discord amongst those who ought to have stood 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 55. 

2 "I return your grace enclosed the copy of the first warrant, which, 
whatever objections there may be to it, I believe is the form, which has 
often been made use of in the office ; perhaps in your grace's own time. 
My lord chief justice Pratt might probably not be acquainted with it, 
for I do not remember there was any prosecution for a libell (sic), whilst 
he was attorney general." Add. MS. 32948, f. 199. 

11—2 



164 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

united against the government; and the evil that he 
wrought was not confined to the circle of his enemies. The 
innocent were to suffer as well as the guilty, and it would 
have been better for the whigs if he had never endured 
martyrdom in the cause of freedom. 

Newcastle and his followers had based their hopes of 
success upon the support and co-operation of Pitt. They 
had learnt that without him they could achieve nothing 
of any consequence; and, at the very moment when he 
seemed to stand most aloof, he had established friendly 
relations with the whig party. What Newcastle had 
schemed and striven for seemed accomplished, and the 
opposition now numbered the popular hero in its ranks. 
Pitt, embracing those whom he had formerly shunned, 
declared that "he had the honour to be united with 
several great whig lords who, incidentally, passed under 
the description of the Duke of Newcastle's friends, and 
were the main pillars of the whig party. That he was a 
whig, and meant to act upon whig principles 1 ." Such a 
declaration might well cause joy in the opposition camp, 
but it was easy to build too much upon it. Though willing 
to work with the whigs, and boasting of his union with 
them, Pitt was not prepared to sacrifice his right to an 
independent opinion, or inclined to compromise, merely 
for the sake of preserving political union. Though he 
thought that it was essential for the stability of the 
government that the king should give office to those who 
had served his grandfather, and stood by the Hanoverian 
succession, he did not wish to assist in a party triumph, 
or lend a hand in the proscription of all tories. He had 
joined the opposition, but it was on his own terms; and, 
between him and Newcastle, lay a difference of political 

1 Harris' Hardwiche, in. 361 ; see also Add. MS. 32948, f. 341 ; Ibid. 
32949, f. 1, f. 338 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 169. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 165 

opinion which would render harmonious co-operation no 
slight difficulty. 

Newcastle knew that he had not yet fulfilled his task. 
Having secured Pitt, it was necessary to keep him; but 
that would not be easy to do. It would be well, as New- 
castle saw, that the opposition should agree upon a policy 
which Pitt approved 1 , but such a policy had still to be 
discovered. The prosecution of Wilkes, which might 
have afforded an opportunity of a general attack upon 
the ministry, promoted discord rather than union in the 
opposition. Pitt, who asserted that the privileges of 
parliament had been violated by the arrest of Wilkes, was 
aggrieved by the support that Hardwicke had given to the 
attorney general; and declared that " he would never ally 
himself with so-called whigs who were willing to surrender 
the liberty of the subject and the freedom of the press 2 ." 
Against Charles Yorke he was particularly prejudiced. 
Yorke had offended by supporting and approving the 
prosecution of Wilkes ; but the cause of Pitt's dislike lay 
deeper than that. As a distinguished lawyer, and the son 
of a famous chancellor, it was not unnaturally Charles 
Yorke's ambition to occupy the seat which his father had 
adorned, and Lord Hardwicke, a fond and affectionate 
parent, was equally anxious to see his son gain the 
greatest prize of the legal profession. Newcastle was, 
undoubtedly, willing enough to satisfy the ambition of the 
son of his old friend ; but Pitt had made up his mind that 
Pratt should be chancellor before Yorke 3 , and was not 

1 Add. MS. 32948, f. 99. 

2 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. 

3 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. " Mr Pitt then entered further into his 
own grievance, and his apprehension of playing a solo with my Lord 
Temple.... He said to me, if I am so necessary as you all tell me I am, 
why should there be any difficulty in giving me proper support in the 
formation of the ministry and council. If I am in this desperate situa- 



166 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

likely to give way to the arguments of Newcastle or 
Hardwicke. 

Such were the difficulties which had to be overcome 
before the alliance between Pitt and the Newcastle party 
was firmly cemented ; but, even if an understanding had 
been reached on these points, all would not be accomplished. 
The sacrifice of Yorke's ambitions and of Hardwicke's 
reputation as a lawyer would be unavailing if Pitt refused 
to sanction or arrange any definite plan of opposition. 
Newcastle, with the insight of an old parliamentary 
warrior, saw that without a programme the opposition 
would quickly be wrecked : a banner must be raised, 
round which men could rally. "Talking at large," he 
shrewdly remarked, "will no longer do": Pitt must 
be brought to the point, and forced to declare what 
measures he would support, and what measures he would 
oppose 1 . 

It was never easy to bring Pitt to the point, and 
Newcastle was unable to do it. He had two conferences 
with Pitt in the early part of August, and confessed him- 
self disappointed in the result 2 . Pitt was friendly enough, 
and showed no wish to sever his connection with the whig 
party ; but he talked in a tone of despair, and lamented the 
impossibility of achieving anything against the opposition 
of the crown. He raised objections to the idea of Charles 
Yorke becoming chancellor, asserted his difference of 
opinion with Lord Hardwicke, and hinted at a dislike of 
the influence exercised by the Duke of Cumberland over 

tion to answer for everything, is it unnatural in me to desire that the 
great seal may he put into the hands of a friend of mine, especially 
when that friend was attorney general, and is now lord chief justice of 
the common pleas, which gives him the rank over everybody ? " New- 
castle to Devonshire, August 11th, 1763. Ibid. 

1 Add. MS. 32949, f. 386. 

2 Ibid. 32950, f. 65. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 167 

the whig party 1 . He seemed to fear that he and Temple 
might enter npon a course of opposition, only to be 
deserted by their allies at the critical moment. Newcastle 
learnt nothing of the line of action that Pitt would take, 
and failed to gain the programme of opposition that he 
wanted. 

Thus matters stood in the month of August 1763. The 
situation was dangerous, but it was certainly far from 
hopeless. Newcastle never wavered in his conviction that 
the co-operation of Pitt was essential to the success of the 
opposition 2 ; and, if the latter's objections to Hardwicke 
and Yorke could be overcome, and his prejudice against 
an organised opposition removed, all might yet go 
smoothly. Neither the king nor the ministers were un- 
mindful of the dangers that confronted them. The ad- 
ministration was narrow and confined, and the popularity, 
which might have been acquired by the retirement of 
Bute, had been forfeited by the prosecution of Wilkes. 
The court and cabinet might easily succumb to an united 
attack of the opposition led by Pitt, and the king obliged 
to submit to terms dictated by his victorious enemies. 
Real as the danger was, it appeared possible to escape 
it. It was within the power of the crown to use the arts 
of political seduction, and break up the opposition by con- 
ferring office upon its leading members. It was an age 
when party ties sat lightly upon men; and it is to the 
credit of Pitt and the whigs that the king failed. It shows 
that their union, as far as it went, was real, that, however 
divided they might be in opinion, they were ready to 

1 He complained that Cumberland favoured an alliance with Austria 
in preference to an alliance with Prussia. Newcastle assured him that 
Cumberland was in favour of England being connected with both 
countries. 

2 Add. MS. 32950, f. 162. 



168 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

stand by one another when it came to treating with the 
crown. 

The first member of the opposition to receive an offer 
from the court was Lord Hardwicke. Approving as he 
did of the arrest of Wilkes, and having a son a member of 
the administration, it might be thought that he would not 
be unwilling to accept office. He was visited on May 13th 
by Lord Egremont who hinted at a ministerial office, but 
made it perfectly clear that the offer was to Hardwicke 
alone. Pitt and Temple had offended the king too deeply 
to be easily forgiven, and Newcastle was almost equally 
objectionable 1 . Though Hardwicke refused to desert his 
friends, he was again visited by Egremont a month later ; 
but on this occasion the latter was far more vague in his 
conversation, and, apparently, far less anxious for success. 
The difference in the tone adopted by the secretary of 
state may have been due to the fact that he regarded the 
enterprise as hopeless, but it is also possible that, in sound- 
ing Hardwicke, he was not acting in accordance with 
his own wishes or those of his colleagues, but executing 
the orders of the king. Bute was probably anxious to 
strengthen the administration, and diminish the influence 
of Grrenville and Egremont 2 ; and it is at least certain that 
when the latter visited Hardwicke for the third time on 
August 1st, to offer him the presidency of the council, it 
was against his own will, and in obedience to the royal 
commands 3 . This third attempt met with no greater 
success than its predecessors. Though the promise was 
made that Newcastle should be given one of the great court 
offices, nothing was said about Pitt, and the intention was 
clearly to exclude him. Hardwicke was too experienced 
a politician to fall into the trap prepared for him; and, 

1 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 350—353, 369. 

2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 70. 3 Grenville Papers, n. 191. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 169 

though he did not mention Pitt's name, he made it 
perfectly plain that neither Newcastle nor he would take 
office without him 1 . 

Trifling and futile as these negotiations may appear, 
their importance is not inconsiderable. They show that 
the king was dissatisfied with his administration as it 
was; and, though his endeavours to win the support of 
Hardwicke had ended in failure, they had not been 
uninstructive. George III had acquired information which 
would influence his future actions. He now knew that it 
was impossible to gain either Newcastle or Hardwicke 
without Pitt, but he did not yet know that it was im- 
possible to gain Pitt without Newcastle. He was deter- 
mined to effect some alteration in the administration. He 
had grown weary of the ministers who had mistaken the 
conditions upon which they had come into power. Their 
claim to be independent of Bute, who had allotted to them 
the posts which they occupied, was not to be tolerated. 
Moreover, as the ministry was unpopular in the country, 
and threatened by what might prove to be a formidable 
opposition, it is not surprising that the king thought of 
transforming it. But his search for recruits had not been 
successful, and if he was to drive out his present ministers, 
leaving himself at the mercy of the whig party, his last 
state might be worse than the first. If he fretted under 
the rule of George Grenville, he was not likely to enjoy 
greater freedom under a coalition ministry of Pitt and 
Newcastle. He seemed driven into a course from which 
escape was impossible, and spent the month of August in 
trying, with Bute's assistance, to find a way out of a 
difficulty which was largely of his own making. 

The king and his favourite could not expect any 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 191 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 369 — 372 ; Add. 
MS. 32950, f. 1, f. 16, f. 43. 



170 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

assistance in this task from the ministers. Grenville and 
his colleagues left them to follow their own devices, in the 
hope that, failing to form an administration in accordance 
with their wishes, and fearing to entrust the crown to the 
opposition party, they would return to them humble and 
contrite 1 . There was one traitor in the cabinet, and that 
was Shelburne. True to the role for which he had been 
cast, he' was willing to serve the court against his col- 
leagues, and it was to him that the king turned for help. 
Newcastle and Hardwicke had excluded themselves by 
their own act from the royal consideration ; and negotia- 
tions were begun with Bedford and Pitt. This was either 
a desperate venture or a leap in the dark. Bedford was 
prepared to join the administration, and ready to serve 
with Pitt; but he was violently hostile to Bute, and 
refused to take office unless the latter was banished from 
the court and political life. In proscribing Bute, Bedford 
proscribed himself. It was Grenville's great offence that 
he objected to the political influence exercised by the 
favourite, and the Duke of Bedford, by showing that he 
was in sympathy with Grrenville on this point, rendered 
himself ineligible for office. But if Bedford objected to 
Bute, Pitt objected to Bedford. The latter had been 
closely connected with the Peace of Paris, and Pitt refused 
to sit at council with the man who had signed so nefarious 
a treaty 2 . Nor was Bedford alone condemned: Lord 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 83—88. 

2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 288. Bedford 
was not informed at the time that Pitt had objected to him, the latter's 
refusal being attributed to his connection with the whig party, though 
apparently this was not mentioned. (Bedford Correspondence, in. 236, 
237 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 287.) For a general account of the 
negotiations, see Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 283 — 288 ; Grenville Papers, 
n. 90—92, 204, 205; Bedford Correspondence, in. 236—240; Add. MS. 
32950, f. 65 ; Ibid. 32951, f. 192. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 171 

Grower and Lord Sandwich, who would be certain to be 
given office in an administration influenced by Bedford, 
were equally proscribed. 

Failure had again attended the efforts of the king, 
but he had acquired additional information which he 
could put to an useful purpose. The Duke of Bedford was 
now out of the question, and thus the obstacle, which had 
stood in the way of Pitt's acceptance, was removed. He 
might now be willing to give a more favourable hearing 
to an offer from the king, but it still remained uncertain 
what conditions he would impose. There was a danger 
that he would demand, as the sine qua non of his 
acceptance, that the leading members of the opposition 
should be given places in the cabinet and ministry. The 
king must have been aware by this time of the intimate 
relations between Pitt and the whigs; but the silence, 
which Pitt had maintained on this point, may have given 
birth to the hope that it was possible to separate him 
from his allies. The king found himself in a position 
from which advance or retreat was almost equally 
dangerous. To abandon the intention of changing the 
administration would be a confession of failure, and only 
serve to establish the authority of Grenville over the 
crown. To appeal once more to Pitt would be venture- 
some and dangerous, and might result in the return of 
the latter to power at the head of an united party, pledged 
to diminish the royal authority, and to undo the work 
which had been achieved since the beginning of the 
reign. Against the certain evil of continuing to endure 
George Grenville, the king had to weigh the dangers 
involved in an appeal to Pitt. Called upon to make a 
decision, which could not fail to have important results, he 
had every excuse for hesitation; and when on August 21st 
he told Grenville that he did not wish to change his 



172 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

ministry but rather to strengthen it, he may have been 
speaking in absolute sincerity 1 . 

But on that very day Lord Egremont died, and, by 
his death, precipitated a political crisis, thus accomplishing 
more than he had ever performed in his lifetime. It was 
impossible for the cabinet to continue to exist in a maimed 
and crippled condition, without a president of the council 2 , 
and with only one secretary of state. It was imperative 
that new ministers should be appointed, but, if Grrenville 
was allowed to nominate them, his hold upon the govern- 
ment would be materially strengthened, and the royal 
authority sensibly restricted. It was better to run many 
•risks than to submit to the tyranny of Grrenville ; and, 
unable to look for help elsewhere, the king, at this crisis 
of his fortunes, turned for assistance to Pitt. 

The great commoner seemed to command the situation, 
but no one could say how he would use the advantage 
he possessed. He stood in alliance with Newcastle and 
Hardwicke who had been faithful to him when they had 
been approached by the king; and he was not likely to 
be so callously indifferent to party ties as to be unmindful 
of his whig friends. But how far that loyalty would 
carry him, whether it would compel him to demand the 
construction of a purely whig administration which would 
place the monarchy once more in leading strings, could 
not be known until he had declared himself. The happiest 
solution would be a compromise, by which Pitt satisfied 
the most pressing claims of his political allies, and the 
king escaped the danger of being handed over a prisoner 
to the whig oligarchy, flushed with triumph and burning 
for revenge. It was in the hope that some such arrange- 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 193. 

2 Lord Granville, the president of the council, had died in the previous 
January. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 173 

merit would be found possible, that the king took up the 
negotiation 1 . On the evening of August 25th Bute and 
Pitt spent three hours in conversation together; but of 
what passed we know nothing 2 . Pitt, however, must have 
made a favourable impression, for the king summoned 
him to an audience on August 27th. 

The conversation between the king and Pitt on 
August 27th was followed by another, two days later. 
The accounts of these meetings, which have survived, were 
all compiled after the second interview ; and, therefore, 
it is not improbable that events have been transposed 3 . 
This is unfortunate, inasmuch as it increases the difficulty 
of assigning a cause for the failure of the negotiation; 
but it would seem reasonable to imagine that the most 
important questions were discussed at the first meeting. 
Called upon to take office, Pitt was not prepared to desert 
Newcastle and his followers. He assured the king that 
he could only come into his service accompanied by the 
representatives of "the great whig families and persons 
which had been driven from his majesty's council and 
service, which it would be for his interest to restore 4 ." 
Hardwicke was to be lord president 5 , the Duke of Devon- 
shire to be restored to his former post of lord chamberlain 6 , 
Newcastle to receive the privy seal 7 , and Lord Rockingham 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 195, 196. 

2 Pitt asserted that he clearly explained to Bute his opinions, both in 
regard to the distribution of offices and the policy to be pursued ; but the 
latter always denied this (Grenville Papers, ir. 195). 

3 It is true that the king saw Grenville on Sunday, August 28th, and 
gave him a general account of what had happened on the previous day ; 
but Grenville did not learn any particulars until Monday evening 
(Grenville Papers, n. 197, note). 

4 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 378 ; Add. MS. 32950, f. 251, f. 321. 

5 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375. 

6 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101. 

7 Ibid. 32951, f. 301. 



174 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

to be first lord of the admiralty 1 . Either Albemarle or 
Lord Grranby was to be placed at the head of the army 2 , 
and Pitt and Charles Townshend were to be secretaries of 
state 3 . In such an administration, the whig party would 
be well represented, and Pitt might feel that, having 
done his duty towards his allies, he could afford to indulge 
his own inclinations, and consider the prejudices of the 
king. When the latter asked that Oswald and Elliot, 
two of Bute's earliest supporters, should be allowed to 
retain their places in the administration, Pitt gave a low 
bow to signify his assent, and further agreed that Welbore 
Ellis should again have the post of vice-treasurer of 
Ireland 4 . It was, doubtless, equally pleasing to the king 
that Lord Shelburne was to be allowed to retain his place 
at the board of trade 5 . 

The retention of Lord Shelburne, and the admission of 
certain of Bute's supporters into the subordinate offices, 
serve to show that Pitt did not see absolutely eye to eye 
with his whig friends. He had acted consistently with 
his declaration that the great political families should 
be well represented in any ministry, but he was not 
anxious to make himself the hero of a party victory, or 
preclude men from serving the crown because of their 
political connections. But, though friendship with Bute 
was not to be a bar to a place in the administration, and 
a party was not to be proscribed as the tories had been at 
the time of the Hanoverian succession, Pitt was deter- 
mined that all those who had participated in the making 
of the Peace of Paris should be excluded from high 
ministerial office. He bluntly told the king that he 
"never could or would act with any minister who had 
a hand" in the peace 6 . By this declaration, Halifax, 

1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 312. 2 Ibid. 32951, f. 192. ? Ibid. i. 301. 
4 Ibid. f. 101, f. 192. 5 Ibid. f. 301. 6 Ibid. f. 192. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 1 75 

Bute, Bedford, and G-renville were excluded from the 
effective cabinet 1 . Against the Duke of Bedford, Pitt 
displayed a special animus, for when the king asked that 
the duke might be given some office, though not a 
ministerial one, the request was refused without hesitation 2 . 
He also declined to serve with Lord Mansfield, and re- 
quired that Pratt should be created a peer, and given 
a seat in the cabinet council 3 . 

In regard to the measures which Pitt proposed to 
support, should he again take office, our information is 
more scanty. He was not in favour of the destruction 
but rather of the amendment and preservation of the 
recent treaty with France; and was anxious to curb 
the predominance of the Bourbon powers in Europe by 
an alliance between England and Prussia 4 . He did not, 
as far as we know, touch upon domestic politics in his 
conversation with the king, an omission which obviated 
the danger of a disagreement over the question of Wilkes. 
Amidst much that is doubtful, it is at least certain that, 
when Pitt left the king on August 27th, he felt confident 
of success. He visited Newcastle on the following day, 
and letters were despatched, summoning the whig leaders 
to town 5 . The hopes of Newcastle and his followers ran 
high : it seemed that, once more, they were to enjoy the 
delights of office, and prevail over those who had striven 
to banish them from political life. Disillusionment and 
disappointment were speedily to follow. When Pitt 
visited the king on Monday, August 29th, he encountered 

1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. Pitt was apparently willing to allow either 
Grenville or Halifax to have the office of paymaster of the forces, but 
this post did not confer the right of sitting in the inner cabinet (Add. 
MS. 32951, f. 301 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375—382). 

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. ; Add. MS. 32952, f. 1. 

4 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375 — 382 ; Grenville Papers, n. 197 — 201. 

5 Add. MS. 32950, f. 251 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 171. 



176 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

a reception very different from that which he had 
expected 1 . The interview was brief and far less satis- 
factory 2 . The king had changed his mind since Saturday: 
what he had then been ready to yield, he was now un- 
willing to grant. He did not so much state particular 
objections as display a spirit of general opposition; and 
brought the interview to an end by abruptly remarking 
"Well Mr Pitt, I see this won't do. My honour is 
concerned, and I must support it 3 ." 

Thus, when everything seemed to promise success, the 
negotiation was broken off, and men have wondered till 
the present time as to the cause of failure. The cloud 
of mystery, which invests the transactions of these few 
days, will never, probably, be absolutely dispelled. It is 
certain that both the king and Pitt were anxious to come 
to an understanding. The former had every inducement 
to yield, as far as possible, to Pitt's demands. He was 
on bad terms with his ministers, and had taken in hand 
the transformation of the administration against their 
will. Should failure attend his efforts, he would be more 
helpless than he had ever been before, and G-renville 
would be in a position from which he could dictate to his 
sovereign. That Pitt was willing and anxious to take 
office cannot be doubted. Inspired by no selfish lust 
of power, he was desirous of coming to the rescue of the 
country which he thought to be falling from that proud 
preeminence, to which he had raised her. He was willing 
to forget the many slights and insults he had suffered, 
and serve once more the king who had driven him from 

1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 298. 

2 Pitt described the meeting as lasting about an hour ; Hardwicke 
gave the time as nearly two hours (Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375 — 382 ; 
Add. MS. 32950, f. 298). 

3 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 380. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 177 

his council. This eagerness in both Pitt and the king, 
to arrive at a common understanding, adds to the difficulty 
of accounting for their failure to do so. Different and 
conflicting causes have been assigned for what seems so 
inexplicable, but, in the various accounts of the negotiation 
which have survived, it is easier to be certain of what 
is false than of what is true. It has been said that the 
negotiation failed because, at his second interview with 
the king, Pitt materially increased his demands, and the 
former found himself unable to grant what was asked. 
This statement, though it rests upon the unsupported 
word of George III 1 , is sufficiently plausible to deserve 
discussion. On the day between his two meetings with 
the king, Pitt had been with the Duke of Newcastle, and 
it could easily be believed that the latter had induced 
him to make demands, on behalf of the whig party, which 
the king could not possibly fulfil. But there is no 
evidence that Newcastle was guilty of this blunder, and 
it is extremely unlikely thafc Pitt would have allowed 
himself to be influenced by a man whom he may 
occasionally have tolerated, but never could have liked. 
Moreover, on the same day that Pitt was with Newcastle, 
the king told Grrenville that he had decided to break off the 
negotiation 2 , and therefore, if Pitt showed himself more 
exacting on the following day, it could only have served 
to confirm the king in a decision which he had already 
taken. 

It has also been said that the king was offended by 
the demand that the new administration must be pre- 
dominantly whig 3 . It was rumoured that when he learnt 
that those, whom he had treated so badly, were to be his 
ministers once again, he shrank from entrusting power to 



1 Grenville Papers, n. 201. 2 Ibid. 197—201. 

3 Ibid. 197—201. 



12 



178 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

men who had so much to forgive, and so little reason 
to be forgiving. It has been plausibly argued that the 
formation of a whig ministry would undo all that 
George III and Bute had so laboriously achieved. The 
crown would once more be divested of all authority which 
would be transferred to the hands of the whig oligarchy. 
Once again, the principles of party government would 
be enforced; and the king obliged to choose as his 
servants only those whom Newcastle and his followers 
approved. No one would deny that G-eorge III was 
unwilling to put himself in the situation in which his 
grandfather had been at the close of his reign; but it 
may fairly be argued that the administration, as Pitt had 
sketched it, though predominantly, was not to be ex- 
clusively whig. Though all who had assisted to make 
the Peace of Paris were denied ministerial office, no 
proscription was placed upon the tories as a party. There 
was to be no rout of Bute's friends, no counterblast to 
the attack upon the opposition in the autumn of 1762 H 
Neither Charles Townshend nor Pitt can be described 
as representative of the whig oligarchy, but they were 
to be the secretaries of state in the new administration; 
and, though Newcastle, Hardwicke and Devonshire were 
to be given office, the king had not objected to receiving 
them again in his service 2 . It would be to the interest of 
Pitt to represent that his loyalty to his whig allies had 
been the cause of his undoing, but that he never did. 
" He never insinuated/' wrote Newcastle, "that his 
negotiation miscarried, or that the difficulty arose, from 
any objection made to any of the persons who were named 
to his majesty 3 ." 

1 Pitt ' ' insisted only upon ten in the house of commons who had 
been turned out." (Add. MS. 32951, f. 192.) 

2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. » Ibid. 






THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 179 

According to another theory, the rock of offence was 
the nomination of Lord Temple as first lord of the 
treasury. This was a story busily circulated by the 
followers of Grrenville 1 , and was likely enough to be 
readily believed. The king had no cause to love Temple 
who had caused great offence by his patronage of Wilkes, 
but, however credible the story may superficially appear, 
it does not stand the test of investigation. Pitt declared 
that it was the king who suggested Lord Temple for the 
treasury 2 ; and there is no reason to doubt his word. He 
had no interest to serve in misrepresenting the king 
in this particular; and greater importance must be 
attached to his statement than to what was at best but 
a rumour. 

In the face of so much confusion and so many contra- 
dictions, it is impossible to do more than advance a theory 
to account for the failure of the negotiation. A few days 
after his interviews with the king, Pitt informed Hardwicke 
that he could not understand the mishap 3 , but, some time 
later, he expressed the opinion that the responsibility 
rested with Bute 4 . From another source, Newcastle 
learnt that the king had refused to come to terms with 
Pitt because the latter declined to defend the peace and 
Bute 5 ; and, according to Grrenville, the favourite became 
frightened at the consequences of Pitt's return to power, 
and had brought pressure to bear upon the king to break 
off the negotiation 6 . Thus both Pitt and Grrenville agreed 
in believing that Bute had played an influential and 

1 Add. MS. 32952, f. 1. 

2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 301 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 1 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 
375—382. 

3 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375—382. 

i Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. 5 Ibid. f. 94. 

6 Grenville Papers, u. 197—201. 

12—2 



180 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

decisive part, and there is some reason to think that they 
were correct in their surmise. Bute had genuine cause 
for alarm. Pitt had displayed a very strong animus 
against the peace, and had refused to admit into the 
inner cabinet any man who had helped to make what 
he regarded as a shameful treaty. It may be said that 
Bute, inasmuch as he had retired from the ministry, and 
was not prepared to take office again, would be unaffected 
by this proscription; but this is not exactly true. If 
Pitt's demands were fulfilled, a ministry would be formed, 
the effective portion of which consisted of those who had 
no share in making the peace with France. There was 
a real danger that the accession of Pitt to power might 
encourage a popular and parliamentary attack upon the 
men who were commonly supposed to have sacrificed the 
country ; and he certainly would not lift a hand to save 
them from destruction. The days, when Bolingbroke and 
Oxford had trembled for their heads, were not so very 
distant, and Bute was not prepared to place himself in 
a similar predicament. He had no illusions as to the 
hatred he had incurred, or the mercy he might expect, 
and he was not guilty of exaggerated alarm if he felt 
that, with Pitt in power, he could no longer count upon 
safety in England. To save his favourite from the danger 
which threatened him, George III threw away the oppor- 
tunity of giving the country a settled government by 
restoring to office the greatest statesman of his age. The 
greatness of England was weighed in the balance against 
the security of a Scotch nobleman, and was found 
wanting. 

It may be urged against the truth of this theory that 
the king had known for many months past what Pitt 
thought of the peace; and that the latter, in the course 
of his conversations with the king, displayed no greater 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 181 

antagonism to that measure than he had shown on 
previous occasions. This is doubtless true, but the ground 
of Bute's alarm was not Pitt's hostility to the peace, but 
his refusal to give any of those, who had taken part in 
making it, a ministerial office. An inner cabinet would be 
constructed, of which no member could be accused of 
having sacrificed the welfare of England : and, therefore, 
the ministers would be able to allow a parliamentary 
inquiry with perfect safety. It is difficult to understand 
why the king pressed the claims of the Duke of Bedford, 
who had so recently displayed animosity against the 
favourite, except it was done to insure that one member 
of the administration, if not of the cabinet, should be 
a partner with Bute in guilt. 

It may also be objected that to reject Pitt, and to turn 
again to George Grrenville, would by no means better 
Bute's position. The Scotch earl had sinned too deeply to 
be forgiven by Grrenville, amongst whose virtues cannot be 
numbered generosity. It was certain that the triumph of 
Grrenville would mean a sensible diminution of Bute's 
political influence; but it would also be a safeguard 
against a parliamentary inquiry into the Peace of Paris. 
In the eyes of the law, Grrenville was partly responsible for 
the treaty with France; and, as long as he remained in 
power, Bute could count upon security. The tide of 
popular indignation against the treaty would certainly 
subside as time went on, and the attention of men was 
directed elsewhere ; and the king would not be obliged 
always to endure Greorge Grrenville for fear of greater 
evils. When the memories of the peace had faded in 
men's minds, the king's day of emancipation would have 
come 1 . 

1 In a document, dated " about 1766," an account is given of the 
negotiation which supports the theory advanced in the text. " Mr Gr. G. 



182 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

If this theory be correct, and it cannot be stated as 
more than a theory, George III and Bute arrived at a 
momentous decision on Sunday, August 28th. If Pitt was 
allowed to form an administration, Bute might be called 
upon to meet a parliamentary inquiry into his conduct, 
and if Grenville was continued in power, the favourite's 
political influence would be destroyed. A statesman, 
willing to put his fate to the touch, would have chosen the 
first alternative : Bute ingloriously adopted the second. 
He allowed the man, against whom he had schemed and 
intrigued, to triumph j and the doom, he might have 
counted upon, was quick to come 1 . One of the first 

was made first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, 
April 16th, 1763, by the Earl of Bute's influence. In less than one month 
after his appointment to these offices, he gave umbrage to the Earl of 
Bute who had placed him in this high station. The Earl's jealousy was 
increased by an indiscreet letter which he received from Sir John Phillips, 
who delivered it as his opinion that Mr G. would abridge his influence. 
Lord Bute complained to one of his particular friends that Mr G. had 
proscribed him, and his conduct proved that he wished to remove him. 
In the month of August, 1763, Lord Bute advised the king to change his 
ministers, and recommended to his M — y to send for Mr Pitt who was 
very violent against all those who were concerned in making the peace, 
and insisted upon excluding them from H.M.'s service. The conference 
between the king and Mr Pitt was reported to Lord B., who was at a loss 
to form an administration, and upon advising with Sir Gilbert Elliot and 
Mr Jenkinson, he wrote a line to the king, wherein he said that, upon 
consulting two of his best friends, he thought it would be for his service 
to continue Mr G. in his employment. Whereupon the k. sent for 
Mr G. and gave him the strongest assurances of his protection ; but 
Lord B. certainly intended his dismission whenever a favourable occasion 
should offer. Mr G. would in all probability have been dismissed from 
his employment upon the close of the session in the spring of the year 
1764, had it not been necessary for him to continue in office till the 
affairs relative to the North Britain and Wilkes were determined, and, as 
this was an unpopular business, Lord B. had no objection to its falling 
upon Mr G." (Add. MS. 34713, f. 277.) 

1 There is a piece of evidence, which, as it does not fit in with the 
theory stated above, ought to be mentioned. About the middle of 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 183 

demands that Grenville made, when he learnt that he was 
to be continued in office, was that the secret influence, as 
he termed it, should cease; and the king, understanding 
the allusion, assured him that Bute had " desired to retire 
absolutely from all business whatsoever, that he would 
absent himself from the king for a time, ' till an adminis- 
tration, firmly established, should leave no room for 
jealousy against him 1 .'" 

Thus the main result of the tangled negotiations, which 
had occupied the month of August, was to establish 
Grenville in office more firmly than ever. For the sake of 
the man he liked, the king had agreed to tolerate the man 
he detested ; and Grenville had the ball at his feet. Lord 
.Shelburne, who had been a thorn in the side of his 
v colleagues, and had represented Bute in the cabinet, 
determined to retire from office. Involved as he had been 
m the recent negotiations, no other course lay open to 
lim; and, if the king resented his resignation, it could 
only have been because he was unwilling to see another 
office placed at the disposal of the ministers 2 . Shelburne's 
example wa s followed by Lord Mansfield who asked to be 
excused from further attendance at the cabinet council 3 . 
New members had to be chosen to fill the gaps caused by 
death and resignation ; and it was not likely that the 
king would be able to influence the selection. The field of 

October, 1763, Elliot told Grenville that, on the morning of Monday, 
August 29th, Bute sent a message to Pitt, saying that if the latter would 
abandon the idea of giving the treasury to Temple, the negotiation 
might yet succeed (Grenville Papers, n. 201, 202). This story is not 
supported from any other source, and, before it can be accepted, some 
means must be found for discrediting Pitt's emphatic declaration that it 
was the king who proposed Lord Temple. 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 201. 

2 Grenville Papers, u. 203 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 296—298. 

3 Grenville Papers, n. 205. 



184 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

choice had been narrowed by recent events. Pitt, the 
whig opposition, and the followers of Bute were now out 
of the question ; and the Bedford faction saw its political 
value enhanced by the lack of eligible candidates. The 
banishment of Bute removed an obstacle from Bedford' £ 
path. There was no longer any reason for him to remain 
in retirement, and he consented to take the office of lord 
president of the council. His follower, Lord Sandwich, 
was promoted from the office of first lord of the admiralty 
to be secretary of state; and the post he vacated was 
given to Lord Egmont. Lord Shelburne was replaced at 
the board of trade by Lord Hillsborough who was destine 
to play a prominent and unenviable part in the unhap^ 
quarrel with the American colonies 1 . 

It is open to question whether the ministry had gai 
any access of strength by the reorganisation. By . 
nation it was no more respected than before ; and i' 
funds, which had begun to rise on the rumour that I l\ 
was going to take office, continued to fall 2 . Nor were the 
new members of the administration likely to add to its 
popularity or dignity. The Peace of Paris hung like a 
mill-stone round Bedford's neck; and the character of 
Sandwich has been depicted in savage colours by Gray in 
an immortal lampoon. Lack of harmony and union pre- 
vailed among the ministers as of old. Power was in the 
hands of Grrenville, Halifax, Sandwich and Bedford, the 
last two being members of that political faction which 
earned and deserved an unenviable notoriety as " The 
Bloomsbury gang." No sooner had Bedford taken office 
than he raised the question of the distribution of the 

i Grenville Papers, n. 108—112, 115—117, 206; Bedford Corre- 
spondence, in. 238. 

2 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, 30th September, 1763; 
Grenville Papers, n. 132 — 134. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 185 

government patronage. Though willing that the disposal 
of the offices belonging to the house of commons should 
be left entirely to G-renville, he urged that " to others, the 
rest of the king's ministers should also recommend," a 
suggestion to which Grrenville was not willing to agree. 
An appeal was made to the king who privately informed 
Grrenville that he would only act upon his recommenda- 
tions, an understanding which was, naturally, not revealed 
to the other ministers 1 . In the hope, perhaps, of maintain- 
ing the divisions in the cabinet, the king gave Grrenville 
every assurance of support against the intrigues of his 
colleagues 2 ; and he needed all the assistance he could get. 
Early in November, Lord Halifax frankly admitted the 
perilous position of the administration, divided as it was, 
and surrounded by so many dangers 3 . Indeed, the king 
could afford to indulge a contemptuous toleration of the 
man he disliked. Grrenville was not in a position from 
which he could threaten the crown, and it was well to 
keep him in office, for there was work for him to do. 
Wilkes must be destroyed, and the opposition humbled ; 
and fate had chosen Grrenville to attempt the accomplish- 
ment of these tasks. 

While an administration, discredited at home, dis- 
regarded abroad, and weakened by intrigue and dissension, 
maintained itself in power because the king had failed to 
form a ministry which would suit his purpose better, the 
opposition was preparing for the struggle which would 
begin when parliament met. The whig leaders still 
adhered to their conviction that success was unobtainable 
unless Pitt joined in the attack upon the government 4 : he 
was the indispensable man, without whom nothing could 

1 Grrenville Papers, n. 206, 207. 2 Grenville Papers, n. 209. 

3 Grenville Papers, n. 219. 

4 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101, f. 331. 



186 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

be done. Yet, valuable as his assistance would be, the 
whigs could not afford to abandon opposition in order to 
obtain it. The stimulus, that comes from fighting, was 
necessary in order to hold the party together. An 
opposition, which did nothing, which remained silent in 
the face of a triumphant administration, would not be 
likely to win supporters, or keep those it had already 
gained. Pitt must be persuaded to declare a policy, and 
raise a standard round which men might rally. His allies 
were prepared to excuse him from frequent attendance at 
parliament, and ready to make allowances for his ill- 
health; but there must be no misconception of his true 
position, and all men must know that he was the leader of 
the party opposed to the court 1 . 

Strenuous efforts were made to induce Pitt to play such 
a part. Newcastle, Cumberland, and Devonshire en- 
deavoured in turn to convince him, bnt in vain. He 
could not bring himself to approve an organised opposition 
to the government of the day: such a policy seemed to 
him to partake of the nature of faction. He did not 
believe that an opposition party was an essential part of 
the machinery of constitutional government; and shrank 
from opposing the ministers in and out of season. He was 
ready to attack the government upon certain points of 
great importance, such as the questions of parliamentary 
privilege and foreign policy; but to minor matters he 
professed himself indifferent ; and, were the opposition to 
make these subjects of debate, it must be done without 
his assistance 2 . He was ready to fight a series of. duels, 
but was not prepared to carry on a campaign ; and it was 
in vain that his allies attempted to shake him in his 

1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 1 ; Ibid. 35428, f. 64. 

2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101, f. 192, f. 311, f. 395, f. 403 ; Ibid. 32952, 
f. 147. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 187 

determination. He refused to attend the meetings or the 
dinners of the opposition party 1 ; and, as the time for the 
meeting of parliament came near, he seemed to draw 
further apart from the whig leaders. A last attempt to 
induce him to place himself at the head of the opposition 
was made by the Duke of Devonshire 2 , but it met with no 
greater success than those which had preceded it ; and 
the whigs were left bemoaning the loss of one who could 
have given them victory, and upon whom they had built 
all their hopes. Charles Townshend was not the only 
member of the party who was angry with the man who 
had deserted them in their hour of need. 

When Pitt declared against opposition, the whigs 
thought that they detected the cause of his reluctance. 
His conversations with the king in August had left their 
mark upon him. He had failed to form an administration, 
and was probably chagrined at his failure 3 ; but he con- 
soled himself by believing that he had made an agreeable 
impression upon the king. It was in vain that his allies 
assured him that he was the most unpopular man at 
court 4 . He refused to be shaken in his conviction, and 
though, but a few weeks before, he had thought of him- 
self as a political outcast, he was now confident that he 
had secured the goodwill of the crown. The whigs believed 
that he feared to embark upon a career of opposition lest 
he should forfeit the royal favour so recently acquired. 
This view of his conduct has found support from a 
distinguished writer 5 , but it would appear to be based 
upon a misunderstanding of Pitt's real objections to an 
organised assault upon the government. It has already 

1 Add. MS. 32952, f. 166. 2 Add. MS. 32952, f. 272, f. 340. 

3 Add. MS. 32951, f. 8, f. 14. 

4 Add. MS. 32951, f. 14, f. 101 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 166, f. 184. 

5 Dr A. von Ruville, William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 150 ff . 



188 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

been seen that he was prepared to attack the administra- 
tion on those questions which he considered of sufficient 
importance to justify opposition, and he was found to be 
true to his word. His defence of parliamentary privilege, 
and his attack upon general warrants, were not likely 
to prejudice the king in his favour; and it cannot be 
shown that he was prepared to sacrifice a single conviction 
for the sake of securing the approval of the crown. More- 
over, before he had seen the king in August, and while he 
still regarded himself as disliked at court, he had displayed 
an aversion to a formal opposition 1 ; and, therefore, the 
impression made upon him by his interviews with the 
king, though it possibly served to induce him to continue 
a line of policy upon which he was already determined, 
cannot be said to have done more. It was no petty desire 
for promotion that drew Pitt apart from his allies, but a 
fundamental difference of constitutional opinion. The 
whigs held the modern view of the functions of an 
opposition. They believed it to be their duty to obtain 
admission into the service of the crown as soon as possible ; 
and, to attain this end, they must succeed in gaining the 
confidence of parliament and discrediting the administra- 
tion. For this reason, all the actions of the ministers in 
power must be subjected to hostile criticism, their virtues 
minimised, and their defects exaggerated ; nor might any 
slackness be shown in the attack until the enemy was 
overthrown 2 . They valued the strength which comes of 
cohesion, and realised that they would not succeed unless 
they stood before the world as an united party, pledged to 
the maintenance of the same principles. To such a policy 
Pitt could not agree. He appreciated the need of strong 

1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. 

2 Bolingbroke shared this conception of the duties of an opposition. 
Sichel's Bolingbroke and his Times : The Sequel, p. 259. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 189 

government, and could not consent to be for ever thwart- 
ing an administration, thus hampering it in the execution 
of the task which it had to perform. This seemed to him 
to be factious. He was always ready to condemn the 
ministers when he thought they acted wrongly; but he 
could not consent to be for ever harassing and hindering 
them. He refused to associate himself with the whigs 
because they desired him to render it impossible for the 
ministers to govern. To such a scheme, the success of 
which would imperil the safety of the state, he declined 
to be a party. An impassable gulf separated him from 
those who wished to be his followers ; and the whigs were 
compelled to meet parliament and the ministers without 
the leader they had chosen. 

Their hopes, which had risen so high, seemed dashed to 
the ground, and worse was to follow. If Pitt would not 
be a leader, he might still remain an ally ; but even this 
was by no means certain. Charles Yorke was to provide 
a cause for embarrassment and division. In response to 
pressure from Newcastle, he had resigned his office in the 
administration, and joined the opposition. He took this 
step reluctantly, and after much hesitation. In his fare- 
well interview with the king, he burst into tears; and 
seldom has an opposition received a more unwilling 
recruit 1 . It may also be said that seldom has an op- 
position received a more dangerous ally. Yorke had set 
his heart upon becoming lord chancellor, and he had not 
abandoned his ambition in deserting the court. But he 
knew that Pitt had determined to place Pratt upon the 
woolsack, and, therefore, regarded the former as his enemy 2 . 
Moreover, he had committed himself on the question of 

1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 249; Ibid. 32952, f. 51; Grenville Papers, n. 
218, 219. 

2 Add. MS. 35430, f. 212 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 147. 



190 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

parliamentary privilege, and, though he had abandoned the 
ministry, still adhered to the views he had expressed when 
attorney general. It is difficult to exaggerate the serious- 
ness of this difference of opinion. Pitt had already made up 
his mind to attack the ministers for their conduct to Wilkes, 
and the whigs found themselves obliged to determine 
whether they would support him or Charles Yorke. Be- 
sides Hardwicke, who might naturally be expected to be in 
sympathy with his son, both the Duke of Devonshire and 
Charles Townshend agreed with Yorke 1 . Newcastle, 
fearful of offending Pitt, and yet influenced by his friends, 
could not make up his mind, and while the Duke of 
Cumberland thought that a question, on which there was 
so much divergence, ought to be avoided, Lord Rocking- 
ham believed that the duty of the opposition was to 
support its most recent ally 2 . There is something to be 
said for Pitt's opinion that it would have been better for 
the opposition if Charles Yorke had never joined it 3 . 

Thus, if the administration was weak and divided, the 
opposition found itself in an equally distressed condition. 
Parliament was to meet on November 15th, and the 
ministers had strained every nerve to secure an impressive 
majority. It was reported that bribes had been lavishly 
distributed, and that one member of the lower house had 
been summoned back from Patisbon in order to swell the 
government majority 4 . The ministers contemplated a 
triumphant session, and expected to reduce the opposition 
to silence before the end of the year 5 . But hope was not 

» Add. MS. 32952, f. 97, f. 195. 

2 Add. MS. 32952, f. 119, f. 166, f. 195. 

s Add. MS. 32952, f. 147, f. 166. 

4 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, October 28th and 
November 22nd, 1763. 

6 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, October 21st, 1763 ; 
Add. MS. 32952, f. 51. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 191 

dead in the hearts of all the whigs. Newcastle believed 
that he could count upon one hundred and forty votes 
in the house of commons, and that the number would 
increase as the session continued 1 . The ministers were 
certain to possess a majority at the opening of parliament, 
but they were known to be unpopular with the nation, 
and an opposition, which presented a bold front to the 
enemy, might easily gain recruits. But, with Pitt refusing 
to lead, and differences of opinion destroying the harmony 
of the whig camp, the outlook was far from promising; 
and it was in no spirit of triumph that the whigs prepared 
to meet the administration. 

When parliament assembled on November 15th, the 
campaign against Wilkes was immediately begun in both 
houses. When he had been arrested, his papers had been 
seized, and amongst them had been discovered an obscene 
parody of Pope's Essay on Man, and a blasphemous para- 
phrase of the Veni Creator. Extracts from these works 
were read to an astonished house of lords by Lord 
Sandwich, whose motion, that they should be declared 
blasphemous and indecent, was unanimously carried. To 
the Essay on Woman had been appended notes, in imitation 
of those by Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, to Pope's 
poem; and the upper house agreed that this was a 
violation of its privileges. It is impossible to doubt 
that the ministerial attack upon these shameless pro- 
ductions was inspired, not by a desire to safeguard the 
interests of public morality, but by an intention to dis- 
credit a political opponent. Offensive as the Essay on 
Woman may have been, only a few copies had been 
printed, and it had never been intended to circulate 
beyond the small circle of Wilkes' friends. The means, 

1 P.E.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, November 4th, Novem- 
ber 11th, 1763. 



192 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

by which the ministers had obtained a copy, were very 
questionable ; and the spectacle of Sandwich, as the 
scourger of vice and the champion of virtue, was more likely 
to cause amusement than edification. Yet the ministers 
had succeeded in discrediting Wilkes to a certain degree. 
He, who had been hailed as a martyr for liberty, was 
shown to be but of ordinary clay, and capable of amusing 
his leisure moments by the production of indecent litera- 
ture. It was not an age of squeamish virtue or restrictive 
prejudices; but there must have been many who, though 
they would have supported the man who attacked and 
libelled the government, might hesitate to countenance 
the author of an indecent poem. The opposition in the 
upper house, unaware of the discovery made by the 
ministers, was taken by surprise, and found themselves in 
a position which they could not defend ; and, though they 
rallied slightly when the address to the crown was voted, 
there was no doubt that the government had been 
victorious in the first encounter 1 . 

A more fiercely contested but equally disastrous battle 
for the opposition was fought in the house of commons. 
The debate continued until the early hours of the morning. 
Much time had been wasted, and many speeches made, 
before George Grenville was able to read the king's 
message requesting the commons to consider the case of 
Wilkes. In former days, the lower house had often defied 
the crown in defence of its own members, but now, in 
obedience to the royal will, it voted No. 45 North 
Briton a scandalous and seditious libel, tending to foment 
traitorous insurrections. An amendment, to omit the con- 
cluding words of the motion, was lost by a large majority. 

1 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, November 15th, 
November 18th, 1763 ; Walpole's Memoirs, 1 — 245 seq. ; Walpole's 
Letters, v. 384 — 391 ; Pari. History, xv. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 193 

The big battalions were on the side of the ministers, but 
the opposition, though weak, had fought stubbornly, and 
had gained an important recruit in General Conway, the 
brother of Lord Hertford. The defeat was of little conse- 
quence for it had been foreseen and discounted: it was 
of far greater moment that, at the very opening of the 
parliamentary campaign, the opposition had failed to act 
as an united body. All the members of Lord Hardwicke's 
family supported the administration, and Pitt openly 
attacked Charles Yorke for his interpretation of the law 
of parliamentary privilege 1 . The great commoner adopted 
the same detached attitude on the day following, when the 
address was voted, going out of his way to denounce the 
party system as the ruin of the country, and describing 
himself as standing single and alone. A contemporary 
reckoned that this speech was worth fifty thousand pounds 
to the ministers ; and this estimate was, perhaps, not un- 
duly large 2 . Those, who had wavered as to which party 
to serve, would not be inclined to throw in their lot with 
the whigs, seeing that Pitt had so publicly dissociated 
himself from them; and it must be admitted that the 
ministers had every encouragement to continue their 
attack upon Wilkes. 

That unfortunate victim of the royal hatred was now 
confined to his room by a wound received in a duel with 
Martin, one of the many whom he had insulted in the 
pages of the North Briton. In consequence of this, the 
further discussion of his case was postponed to November 

1 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscellaneous, Nov. 18th, 1763 ; 
Grenville Papers, n. 162, 223 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS., pp. 247, 
248 ; Walpole's Letters, v. 384—391 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 249 seq. ; 
Pari. History, zv. 

2 Grenville Papers, n. 164, 165, 223—225; Hist. MSS. Comm. 
Lothian MSS., pp. 247, 248. 

w. 13 



194 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

23rd ; but, when the house of commons assembled on that 
day, it was discovered that Wilkes was still unable to 
attend. It, therefore, became necessary to decide whether 
there should be a further postponement. The opposition 
pressed for delay, and presented an united front to the 
enemy. When the house divided, the ministers had a 
majority, but the three sons of Lord Hardwicke were in 
the minority with Pitt, and, according to an eye-witness, 
the latter' s "look and gesture of joy was the most re- 
markable thing in the world 1 ." The opposition had been 
outvoted, but it had succeeded in reducing the usual 
ministerial majority by fifty, and Charles Yorke had 
spoken and voted with Pitt 2 . Great were the rejoicings 
amongst the whigs ; but the time for union had not yet 
come. When, on the day following, the house voted that 
parliamentary privilege did not cover seditious libel, and 
thus left Wilkes to the mercy of the courts of law, the 
cleavage of opinion in the opposition appeared in a more 
aggravated form than ever. Charles Yorke made a 
violent speech in support of the motion, and was answered 
by Pitt who, leaning upon crutches, and swathed in 
flannel, spoke for nearly two hours. Conway voted 
against the government, but the ministers secured a 
substantial triumph; and it was agreed to communicate 
the resolution to the upper house at a conference 3 . No 
opposition was to be expected from the peers who agreed 
to the resolution of the commons on November 29th 4 . 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 228 ; Add. MS. 32953, f. 16. 

2 Walpole's Letters, v. 397—401 ; Grenville Papers, n. 228 ; Walpole's 
Memoirs, i. 258, 259. 

3 Add. MS. 32953, f. 35; P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscellaneous, 
Nov. 25th, 1763 ; Grenville Papers, ii. 229; Walpole's Letters, v. 397 — 401, 
411 — 415 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 259 seq. ; Pari. History, xv. 

4 Grenville Papers, n. 230 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 261 seq. ; Walpole's 
Letters, v. 401 — 404 ; Pari. History, xv. 






THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 195 

Thus, before the end of November, the administration 
had accomplished the most important part of its work, 
and the expulsion of Wilkes from the house of commons, 
which took place on January 19th, 1764, was only the 
logical outcome of all that had gone before. The whigs 
had been routed and discredited ; and their disgrace was 
not that they had failed to save a popular hero, but that 
they had omitted to settle their differences before entering 
upon the fray. Torn asunder by internal dissensions, they 
had been rendered impotent for decisive action. Charles 
Yorke and Pitt had openly opposed one another ; and 
Newcastle had refused to sign the protest of the peers 
against the limitation of parliamentary privilege because 
of his friendship with Hardwicke 1 . The Duke of Devon- 
shire, disgusted by Pitt's conduct, threatened to retire 
from political life unless the latter mended his behaviour 2 ; 
Charles Townshend and Lord Temple were not on friendly 
terms, and Charles Yorke, supported by his family, still 
cherished designs upon the chancellorship 3 . Thus some- 
thing very much like the confusion after the rout pre- 
vailed in the camp of the opposition. The Wilkes case 
had proved a very apple of discord, and the ministers 
acted wisely in prolonging the discussion of that question 4 . 
The whigs would not recover the ground they had lost 
until they had discovered a point of attack upon which 

1 "There was a meeting yesterday at the Duke of Devonshire's to 
consider about protesting. The Duke of Devonshire and I found that 
they were all for it. My Lord Temple produced a draught, which, to do 
him justice, was originally less liable to objection than I imagined it 

would be After that, I stated my own present and former situation : 

the valuable connections which I had, and wish and desire that, on that 
account, their lordships would feel so much for me, that they would 
approve of my declining to sign any protest upon this occasion." New- 
castle to Charles Yorke, December 1st, 1763 (Add. MS. 32953, f. 145). 

2 Add. MS. 32954, f. 15. 3 Add. MS. 32954, f. 62, f. 233. 
4 Add. MS. 32954, f. 123. 

13—2 



196 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

they all were agreed, and which Pitt approved 1 . At 
one time Newcastle contemplated elevating the private 
character of Lord Sandwich to the dignity of a party 
question ; and those, curious in the manners and morals of 
the eighteenth century, may regret that this scheme was 
never executed 2 . Bearing in affectionate remembrance 
the successful attack upon the cyder tax, the opposition 
attempted to renew the onslaught on that obnoxious 
imposition ; but its efforts had no other consequence than 
the appointment of a committee to suggest means for im- 
proving that measure 3 . Salvation was to come, however, 
and a triumph to be enjoyed, all the greater because of 
the previous humiliation. 

On the first day of the session, Wilkes had been 
prepared to complain of the breach of parliamentary 
privilege he had suffered in his person, but an opportunity 
had not been given him ; and, now that he was expelled 
from the house, and obliged to flee the country, there 
were members of the opposition ready to undertake the 
task for him. The ministry, unable to refuse the request, 
agreed to allow the complaint to be heard on February 
13th, and the opposition determined to seize the op- 
portunity to raise the question of general warrants. This 
was, undoubtedly, a master stroke of policy. General 
warrants, though their use could be supported by recent 
precedents, had always been regarded as dubious ex- 
pedients, and Pratt had lately declared them to be illegal. 
In face of this judicial decision, the ministers could hardly 
justify the means they had taken to arrest Wilkes ; but, 
on the other hand, they could hardly be expected to 
confess publicly that they had broken the law. Thus, 
placed between the horns of a dilemma, they were called 

1 Add. MS. 32954, f. 76. 2 Add. MS. 32954, f. 62. 

3 Walpole's Letters, v. 437—446, 449—454. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 197 

upon to meet the attack of an united opposition. For the 
great discovery had been made and an article of faith 
revealed to which Pitt and the whigs could equally 
subscribe. The former was known to be enthusiastic in 
his opposition to general warrants, and Charles Yorke 
was of the same mind. The schism, which had been pro- 
ductive of so much harm, seemed about to be healed ; and, 
though it remained uncertain how Charles Townshend 
would act, this was of little consequence, inasmuch as 
his frivolity and waywardness had deprived him of all 
weight 1 . 

The opposition was rallied -for the fight, and steps 
were taken to secure a large attendance 2 . The principal 
men of the whig party met to decide upon a course of 
action, and a motion was framed and agreed upon 3 . The 
debate on February 13th proved, however, uneventful. 
More than four hours were occupied in taking evidence 
of the use of general warrants since the revolution; 
but, in spite of the tediousness of the subject, the house 
remained full until a comparatively late hour. When, 
at half past ten o'clock, Lord Frederick Campbell moved 
the adjournment, his motion was rejected by nearly three 
hundred and fifty votes. But no sooner had it been 
decided to continue the debate than the members began 
to troop out in search of refreshment; and, as it was use- 
less to harangue half-empty benches, the house adjourned 
shortly before midnight 4 . The debate was resumed on 
the following day, and continued without interruption 
until seven o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, Feb- 
ruary 15th. Evidence continued to be taken until past 

1 Add. MS. 32955, f. 434, f. 448. 2 Add. MS. 32955, f. 434. 

3 Add. MS. 32955, f. 448. 

4 Add. MS. 32955, f. 456, f. 458, f. 460, f. 462; Walpole's Memoirs, I. 
286, 287. 



198 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

midnight; and a new day had already begun when 
Sir William Meredith rose to introduce the resolution 
upon which the opposition had agreed. He moved that 
general warrants were illegal, and that their use against 
members of parliament constituted a breach of privilege. 
Round these two points the battle raged until seven 
o'clock in the morning. As the hours passed by, weari- 
ness began to tell upon the members, and Charles Yorke 
moved that the house should adjourn. To this the 
ministers were willing enough to agree, provided that a 
motion discharging the complaint against those impli- 
cated in the arrest of Wilkes should be put immediately 
after the adjournment had been voted. The opposition, 
however, desired that both questions should be adjourned, 
and a motion to that effect was only lost by ten votes. 
A supporter of the administration then moved to dis- 
charge the complaint of breach of privilege, and was 
answered by Pitt who broke into a panegyric on liberty. 
A second motion for adjournment was then made by 
the opposition, and was lost by twenty-four votes. This 
ended the contest: the question for discharging the 
complaint was immediately put, and carried without a 
division 1 . 

As the jaded members streamed out into the cold grey 
light of a winter's morning, they must have pondered 
over the scene through which they had just passed. 
Never before had the ministry been pressed so hard, or 
the opposition come so near to victory. Men, who had 
consistently supported the administration, had voted with 
the whigs, and Newcastle believed that the ministers 
would have had a narrower majority still, if some of his 
supporters had not been prevented from attending the 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 261 — 264, 490, 491 ; Walpole's Letters, vi. 
1—12 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 287 seq. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 199 

debate 1 . But the joy, which prevailed in the whig 
camp, was not due only to the temporary increase in 
their numerical strength: it was a source of far deeper 
satisfaction that Pitt, Charles Yorke, and Charles Towns- 
hend had fought side by side in the battle. The divi- 
sions, which had crippled the action of the opposition, 
seemed healed; and a victory might still be won 2 . The 
motion condemning general warrants had been ad- 
journed till Friday, February 17th; and the winning of 
a few more supporters might mean a whig triumph. 
Men's hopes and fears ran high; and in the city, which 
was enthusiastic for Wilkes and liberty, elaborate pre- 
parations were made for a bonfire and illuminations, 
should the ministry be defeated 3 . 

The debate, which began on Friday, February 17th, 
lasted until close upon six o'clock on the following morn- 
ing. Much time was spent in proposing amendments to 
Meredith's resolution; and two or three hours had been 
occupied in this fashion before the contest really opened 
by Norton, the attorney general, moving to adjourn the 
question for four months. With needless offensiveness 
and uncommon brutality, he declared that, were he 
a judge, he would treat a resolution of the house of 
commons upon a point of law with as much respect as 
he would treat the opinion of a drunken porter. He 
was answered by Yorke who explained in self-defence 
that he had never seen the warrant issued against 
Wilkes, until after it had been executed. Both Charles 
Townshend and Pitt joined in the debate, though the 
latter was ill and suffering; and, when the house divided, 
the opposition numbered two hundred and eighteen, and 

1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 7. 

2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 7, f. 83. 

3 Walpole's Letters, vi. 1—12. 



200 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the ministerialists two hundred and thirty-two 1 . This 
was a triumphant close to a week of triumphs and lengthy- 
sittings. The ministers, accustomed to majorities in three 
figures, found themselves carrying divisions by thirties and 
twenties and sometimes less. Those, upon whom they had 
been accustomed to rely, had deserted them at the critical 
moment; and, discredited in reputation and diminished in 
strength, they were threatened by an united opposition, 
full of hope and vigour. Pitt, pining for further battle, 
was emphatic in his approval of Charles Yorke, and 
declared that no proposal must be made "which could 
either renew former points in which we might have dif- 
fered amongst ourselves, or bring on any point in which 
we could possibly differ now 2 ." 

When everything promised so well, it is not a little 
surprising that nothing was done. Pitt was anxious for 
the struggle to continue, and there could be no doubt 
that now was the time for the opposition to press the 
onslaught home. Yet the days passed by, and the 
ministry continued to enjoy immunity from attack; and, 
when parliament rose on April 19th, Grenville and his 
colleagues were left in possession of the field. The tide 
had not been taken at the flood, and by their inaction 
the whigs had strengthened Grrenville's position, and 
enabled him to recover the ground that he had lost. 
As chancellor of the exchequer he introduced the budget 
on March 9th, and won the hearts of the country gentle- 
men who loudly applauded the man who was able to pay 
off debts without imposing new taxes 3 . Politicians have 

1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 19, f. 21, f. 37; Grenville Papers, n. 266, 267; 
Walpole's Letters, vi. 1 — 12. 

2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 83, f. 103. 

3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 230. "However absurd this nattering incense 
is," wrote Newcastle to Legge, "Mr Grenville has certainly, for this 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 201 

proverbially fickle memories, and, when nothing was done 
to thwart or hinder the administration, when the leaders 
of the opposition were conspicuous by their absence, and 
appeared to have withdrawn from the contest in the hour 
of victory, men tended to minimise the importance of 
the encounter over general warrants, and to rally to those 
who, even if they had been hard pressed, had not been 
defeated. 

Few would deny that it was a tactical blunder on the 
part of the opposition to remain inactive; but any other 
course of action presented serious difficulties. There were 
some who were adverse to making any fresh attack upon 
the ministry so late in the session 1 , and those, who thought 
differently, found it extremely difficult to discover a 
suitable point of assault 2 . Nor were these the only 
obstacles in the path of united action. Pitt had en- 
dured that week of lengthy sittings at the cost of much 
bodily suffering; and, when the struggle was over, he 
took to his bed 3 . For some days Charles Yorke was 
secluded by the death of his father, Lord Hardwicke. 
This event had been long expected, and, as Hardwicke lay 
dying, preparations were made for the election of a new 
high steward of the university of Cambridge. The court 
candidate was Lord Sandwich, the secretary of state, 
but there was a large party in the university in favour 
of Hardwicke's son and successor, Lord Royston. Hard- 
wicke died on March 6th, and the contest at Cambridge 
began in earnest. It was carried on with all that vigour 
and resource so often displayed in university politics. 

time, gained some credit by his performance, owing entirely to the 
absence of those who could and would have exposed the falseness or 
futility of every part of his propositions or assertions." Ibid. 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 230. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 239. 

3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 74; Walpole's Letters, vi. 20—23, 28—31. 



202 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

The members of a learned society are commonly supposed 
to be detached from the world, and ignorant of the ways 
of men; but, on this occasion at least, they showed them- 
selves a match for politicians, and, though their learning 
may have been small, their artifice was great. New- 
castle, as chancellor of the university, threw himself into 
the fight, believing that, in helping to defeat Sandwich, 
he was assisting to destroy the administration. The 
battle, which should have been fought in parliament, was 
transferred to Cambridge, and when Charles Townshend 
ought to have been attacking Grenville's budget, he was 
winning the votes of members of the senate 1 . 

Thus various circumstances combined to render the 
opposition inactive ; and the ministers were able to finish 
the session free from serious molestation. Nor did they 
model their conduct upon their enemies and remain idle. 
"Without delay they set to work to break up the ranks of 
their opponents. It was rumoured that overtures had 
been made to Lord George Sackville who had played 
a prominent part in the opposition to general warrants 2 ; 
and the Duke of Bedford approached the new Lord 
Hardwicke and his brother, Charles Yorke. Hardwicke 
showed himself inclined to come to terms with the court, 
and Charles Townshend, realising that he was a younger 
brother, and how little there was to be gained in oppo- 
sition, was not unwilling to be reconciled to George 
Grenville 3 . Thus it may be said that the session closed 
upon a drawn battle. The administration had escaped 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 5, f. 87. See Appendix n. 

2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 168. 

3 Add. MS. 35361, f. 95. With commendable frankness, Townshend 
informed the Duke of Devonshire "that he was a younger brother, and 
if nothing was to be made out of opposition, or no active measures 
pursued, he would lie by this summer, and consider himself at liberty 
to take what part would be most convenient to him." Ibid. 



THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 203 

defeat, but the whigs had shown how formidable they 
could be, when united amongst themselves and led by 
Pitt. If the latter remained firm in his intention to 
play a leading part in politics, and nothing happened to 
alienate him from the whigs, the next session might see 
the efforts of the opposition crowned with success. 

But, for the time being, punishment and disgrace 
constituted the lot of those who had dared to oppose the 
court. Because Shelburne had voted against the limita- 
tion of parliamentary privilege, he was dismissed from 
his post of aide-de-camp to the king, and a similar fate 
befell Barre and Calcraft. But the greatest offender of 
all was Conway. A lord of the bedchamber and an 
officer in the army, he had acted with the opposition 
throughout the session, and was consequently deprived 
of both his posts. He was spared until parliament had 
risen, but this clemency, if so it can be called, was due,, 
not to the king who fretted at the delay, but to Grenville 
who feared to offend Conway's friends and relations 1 . To* 
deprive men of office in the army, because of their actions, 
in parliament, was a violation of the privilege of freedom 
of speech, though not without precedent in the previous 
reign; and, when such were the penalties inflicted upon 
those who refused to take their orders from the court,, 
it is not surprising that the opposition found it difficult 
both to gain and keep adherents. 

1 Grenville Papers, 11. 162, 230, 231. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE. 

PARLIAMENT did not meet again until the following 
January: and, therefore, the hostilities between the 
ministry and the opposition ceased for a while. But in 
politics, as in war, an armistice may be as decisive as a 
campaign; and it was imperative for both parties in the 
contest to employ the time, thus given, in preparing for 
the struggle which seemed certain to be renewed when 
parliament re-assembled. 

At the close of the last session the ministers had lived 
with the fear of disaster before their eyes; and, though 
they had managed to survive, the glory of the battle lay 
with those who had suffered defeat. The whigs had failed 
to carry the day, but they had come far nearer to victory 
than had ever been expected, and had fought in the cause 
dear to the heart of Pitt. Never, since the opposition had 
first beenformed,had it seemed so united and so formidable. 
The old causes of dissensions appeared to have been de- 
stroyed or forgotten; and the administration might well 
be called upon to endure the assaults of a party, burning 
to revenge the indignities it had suffered, elated by the 
hope of victory, and led by the most popular politician of 
the day. There must have been many who expected the 
next parliamentary session to be decisive of the fate of 
the ministry. It was to be so, but not in the way which 
had been anticipated. G-renville and his colleagues were 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 205 

to be driven from office by the king and not by the 
whigs. An administration was to be formed in which 
Pitt had no place, and to which he refused his confidence, 
though composed of those who had acted with him in 
opposition. The downfall of Grenville and the formation 
of the Rockingham administration was a royal and not 
a whig triumph ; and the history of England might have 
been different if Grenville's place had been taken by Pitt 
supported by the whig party. To understand how it was 
that this did not happen, it is necessary to know the inner 
history of the opposition after the month of April, 1764. 

To keep the party together, and to establish intimate 
and confidential relations with Pitt, were the tasks to 
which Newcastle and his friends addressed themselves. 
The strength of the opposition must be maintained, and, 
if possible, increased. In the interval of peace, the excite- 
ment, born of the contest, must be preserved. Neither the 
ministers nor the public must be allowed to forget that 
the opposition still existed, ready to renew the struggle 
with the administration at a fitting opportunity. But, in 
addition to all this, it was necessary for the whigs to 
decide upon a programme of attack; and this was by far 
the most difficult part of their work. They had come near 
to triumph in the last session because they had chosen to 
harass the ministry upon the question of general warrants : 
and better ground could hardly have been selected. But 
their success had been due far less to their own strength 
than to the popularity of the cause which they had 
espoused, and to the active part played by Pitt. It would 
not be easy to discover another question presenting the 
same facilities for attack; and, yet without one, the oppo- 
sition might only too easily slip back into that slough of 
despond from which it had but lately emerged. Though 
Charles Townshend had many faults he did not lack 



206 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

political insight; and he saw, perhaps more clearly than 
his contemporaries, how perilous was the position of the 
whigs. He tried to convince Newcastle that, when the 
parliament met again, the opposition would be found to 
have lost in strength, inasmuch as there would be "no 
general warrants to arraign, no extraordinary measures, 
and no grounds of debate but the army, the navy, and 
the several disputable speculations which may occur 
about the state of the debt and the condition of public 
credit 1 ." 

The warning was timely, nor was it passed by un- 
heeded. When the whig leaders met at Olaremont, early 
in May, 1764, a programme of opposition was drawn up 
and unanimously approved. It was arranged that, when 
parliament reassembled, the opposition, in addition to 
reviving the question of general warrants, should attack 
the administration for dismissing military officers for 
votes given in parliament; and criticise the foreign and 
financial policy of the government 2 . 

Doubtless it was wise of the whigs to constitute them- 
selves the champions of the parliamentary privilege of 
freedom of speech, seeing that Pitt was known to be 
angry at Conway's dismissal 3 ; but it is more open to 
•doubt whether they were well advised to revive the 
subject of general warrants. Popular as that question 
had been when first introduced by the opposition, a 
revival could hardly be attended with equal success. It 
might be said that the whigs were more anxious to over- 
throw the government than to safeguard the constitution; 
and those, who had deserted the administration when the 
question was first mooted, might be found supporting the 
government when it was revived. Nor did an attack 

1 Phillimore's Life of Lord Lyttelton, n. 654 ; Add. MS. 32958, f. 248. 

2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 307. 3 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 653. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 207 

upon the financial and foreign policy of the ministry 
give much hope of success. Finance is peculiarly the 
province of the specialist, and men will always tend to 
vote with the party, they usually support, on questions 
which they cannot understand. Moreover, the foreign 
policy of the government, save to those who, like Pitt, 
saw in France the never ceasing enemy of England, and 
in Prussia our natural ally, was not so glaringly incom- 
petent as to be profoundly unpopular. England might 
have declined from the proud position she occupied during 
the seven years' war, and her relations with Prussia might 
he lacking in harmony: but she was at least not involved 
in a continental struggle, and was given time to recover 
from the exhaustion produced by her recent exertions. 
The country was by no means prepared to enter upon 
another contest with France; and it was felt that, if the 
glory of England was due to the enterprise and energy 
of Pitt, her salvation was owing to the restraint and 
economy of Grrenville 1 . 

The opposition programme had thus several obvious 
defects, and was not likely to inspire those, who had 
undertaken to carry it out, with the hope of success. 
Men, who had lately been so full of joy, now began 
to talk in a tone of despair. It was not only Charles 
Townshend who began to weary of dwelling in a politi- 
cal wilderness ; even the Dukes of Newcastle and Devon- 
shire thought of an union with the Duke of Bedford and 
his party 2 . It was of little use that the whigs should 
meet at the club, which they had founded, and drink 
toasts to the success of the party; for not by such means 
would the ministers be driven from office: "a huzza at 
Wildman's once a week," as Newcastle truly remarked, 

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, Appendix, ix. p. 340. 
4 Add. MS. 32960, f. 235. 



208 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

"will not do alone, though a very good thing 1 ." But 
the real evil was not an imperfect programme but the 
lack of union. In September, 1764, Lord Barrington 
described the minority as having "neither abilities nor 
union 2 ," and, though ability may not have been lacking, 
union certainly was. The old evil had reappeared again; 
and the root of the evil was Pitt. Upon him the whigs 
had built their hopes. They had confessed that they 
could do nothing without him. They had failed in their 
opposition to the Peace of Paris largely because Pitt 
had refused to cooperate with them: and, for the same 
reason, they had not succeeded in protecting Wilkes 
against the animosity of the ministers, or in safeguarding 
the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest. Then 
had come the happy moment when Pitt threw in his lot 
with them in the attack on general warrants, and had 
seemingly become reconciled to Charles Yorke. He had 
gone still further, and had declared with emphasis that 
the differences of opinion, which had so weakened the 
opposition in the past, must not be allowed to render it 
impotent in the future 3 . He pressed for the attack to 
continue, and seemed anxious to welcome as colleagues 
those whom he had formerly repulsed. Yet, in a few 
months, almost in a few weeks, he had completely changed. 
He now talked in a despairing and desponding fashion, 
declared against opposition, and announced his intention 
of rarely attending parliament during the next session. 
He stated that he would never force himself upon the 
king, but, if his services were desired, he would be ready 
to take office. He displayed a violent dislike of Charles 
Yorke and Charles Townshend, though, apparently,. 

1 Add. MS. 32960, f. 332. 

2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS. p. 252. 

3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 83, f. 103. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 209 

amicably disposed towards the other whig leaders, and, 
as he expressly said, would only come into employment 
"supported by all the great families which have ever 
distinguished themselves in the cause of liberty and the 
Revolution 1 ." 

Pitt had not, therefore, yet broken with the whigs, 
and Newcastle still believed that he would never take 
office without them 2 . But he was no longer willing to 
unite with them in opposition; and, as so often before, 
they were to be left to fight their battles alone, while the 
one man, with whose assistance they could not dispense, 
either absented himself from parliament or followed an 
independent and often opposite line of policy. It soon 
became known that Pitt was not likely to oppose the 
government 3 ; and the news must have been welcome to 
the king and his ministers. Pitt withdrew from the con- 
test at the time when he was most needed, and by his 
action deprived the opposition of that element of strength 
which might have enabled it to prevail against the grow- 
ing power of the crown. For the subsequent misfortunes, 
which befell the country, he cannot escape his share of 
responsibility; and the triumph of the king was due in a 
measure to the course he adopted. 

It is by no means easy to discuss the motives which 
inspired his conduct. He had certain grievances, but they 
were hardly of sufficient importance to justify his with- 
drawal from the opposition at the critical moment of its 
career. He apparently objected to the cessation of hostili- 
ties which had marked the close of the last session, and 

1 Add. MS. 32961, f. 186; see also Add. MS. 32959, f. 42, f. 306; 
Add. MS. 32960, f. 17; Add. MS. 32961, f. 186, f. 308; Add. MS. 32962, 
f. 48. 

2 Add. MS. 32961, f. 291. 

3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS. p. 252. 

W. 14 



210 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

which was partly due to the Cambridge contest *; but he 
laid greater stress upon the fact that, when Grenville had 
introduced his budget, adverse comments had been made 
upon the English military operations in Germany during 
the seven years' war, and not a member of the opposition 
had taken up the challenge 2 . He was to repeat this 
complaint at a later date; and the reiteration may be 
taken as evidence that the grievance was deep-seated 
and not a mere trivial excuse thrown off to justify an 
action inspired by other motives. There can be no doubt 
that he was unduly suspicious of the good faith of the 
whigs, especially in regard to questions in any way con- 
nected with foreign policy; and the omission on the part 
of the opposition to defend the German war from the 
aspersions cast upon it by Grenville, would be sufficient to 
arouse his latent distrust of Newcastle and his followers, 
and revive his dislike of the party system. Again and 
again he had declared that he would not take the closet 
by storm, and that he wished to concern himself with 
measures not with men. In moments of excitement, 
such as during the attack upon general warrants, he 
seemed willing to belie his words, and to embark upon 
a regular course of opposition to the administration; but, 
when the crisis had passed, he reverted to his original 
opinions, and shunned what he thought to be the factious 
scheming of Newcastle and his associates. Though he 
was ready to choose his colleagues from amongst the 
whig party, if called upon by the king to form an ad- 
ministration, he was not prepared to place himself at the 
head of a faction pledged to thwart and hinder the 
ministry. 

The irreparable breach had not yet come, and all that 
was known was that Pitt no longer took part in the 
1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 226. 2 Add. MS. 32960, f. 17. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 211 

counsels of the opposition, and was unlikely to oppose the 
government when parliament met again. Nor was this 
the only disappointment which befell the whig party. 
It soon became known that both Charles Yorke and 
Charles Townshend were uncertain in their allegiance. 
The former was in a far from enviable position. His 
brief reconciliation with Pitt had come to an abrupt end 1 , 
for he had given the latter new cause for offence by his 
patronage of Dr Hay who had unfortunately distinguished 
himself, during the last parliamentary session, by making 
a violent attack upon the common council of the city of 
London : " a nest of hornets," as Walpole sagaciously 
remarked, " that I do not see the prudence of attacking 2 ." 
As it was in the city that Pitt numbered his warmest 
supporters, he was bitterly offended with Hay for assault- 
ing the stronghold of his influence, but he was probably 
angrier with Yorke for espousing the cause of such a 
man 3 . Newcastle was also chagrined by the behaviour 
of the son of his old friend; and Yorke found that he had 
little to expect from those for whom he had sacrificed his 
place in the administration. He had already refused 
to pledge himself to take an active part in opposing the 
government 4 ; and it seemed likely that he would seize the 
first opportunity, that offered itself, to establish friendly 
relations with Grrenville, and enter once more into the 
service of the king. Nor was Charles Townshend more 
certain in his adherence. Before parliament had risen, 
he had made overtures to G-renville 5 , and a contempo- 
rary described him, aptly enough, as playing the part of 
harlequin 6 . Ambitious in his own fashion, volatile, un- 

1 Add. MS. 32961, f. 291, f. 308. 

2 Walpole's Letters, vi. 31—34. 3 Add. MS. 32962, f. 48. 
4 Add. MS. 32958, f. 307. 5 Grenville Papers, n. 501. 

6 Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, Appendix, ix. p. 340. 

14—2 



212 PERSONAL AND PAETY GOVERNMENT 

certain, and scantily provided with political convictions 
he was the least likely of all men to continue a member 
of a decaying minority. He needed the stimulus of suc- 
cess to spur him to laborious endeavour; and, in the days 
of their misfortune, the whigs were not likely to number 
him in their ranks 1 . 

The outlook was black enough, but it was to grow 
darker still. The Duke of Cumberland, the constant 
adviser of the opposition, was in favour of disregarding 
Pitt altogether. It was known that the Duke of Bedford 
was on bad terms with his fellow ministers, and had 
ceased to be a regular attendant at cabinet councils : 
and Cumberland suggested that the whigs should throw 
over the man who had proved himself so intractable, and 
conclude an alliance with the Duke of Bedford and his 
party. Such a step was too bold for the prudent states- 
manship of Newcastle who feared that Pitt might take 
his revenge for such treatment by forming an alliance 
with Bute 2 . Perilous as was the situation of the oppo- 
sition, and valuable as the assistance would be that 
Bedford could give, Newcastle still clung to the belief 
that, when the battle was begun again, Pitt would be 
found fighting foremost in the field. He refused to be 
persuaded by Cumberland, and in September, 1764, de- 
clared himself to "be as eager, as ever I was, to get 
Mr Pitt to take an active part at the head of us 3 /' He 
was to be undeceived, and by Pitt himself, who in 
October, 1764, definitely broke with the whig party. New- 
castle had learnt that the parliamentary representatives 
in the counties of Cornwall and Devonshire were willing 

1 Townshend was also offended because his pamphlet "A Defence of 
the Minority," was but coldly received by the party whom it was written 
to justify. Add. MS. 32962, f. 129. 

2 Add. MS. 32960, f. 349, f. 361. 3 Add. MS. 32962, f. 48. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 213 

to support the opposition party if it would undertake to 
press for the removal of the cyder tax 1 ; and though this 
scheme was but coldly received by the whig leaders 2 , it 
was submitted to Pitt for his opinion. The latter seized 
the opportunity to declare his independence of the oppo- 
sition. He refused to give his views upon the plan sub- 
mitted to him by Newcastle, and described himself as 
standing single, attached to no party, and determined to 
act "under the obligation of principles, not by the force 
of any particular bargains." He again referred to the 
action of the opposition in allowing the attacks upon 
the German war to pass unchallenged, and pointedly 
remarked that, after such treatment, he had little mind to 
begin "the world again upon a new centre of union 3 ." 
It was the letter of an angry and a disappointed man, 
determined to associate no longer with those whom he 
thought had treated him badly; and his description of 
himself as " a man standing single, and daring to appeal 
to his country at large upon the soundness of his prin- 
ciples and the rectitude of his conduct 4 " was hardly 
needed to inform the whigs that they could no longer 
look to him as a leader or even as an ally. The break 
was complete, and Pitt had definitely repudiated the 
opposition. It was clear that his advice could no longer 
be taken, nor his assistance expected. The indispensable 
man had once more declared himself a free lance; and 
the whigs were obliged to pursue their way without him, 
trusting that their policy would be such as he would 
approve, and occasionally support 5 . But at the best it 

1 Add. MS. 32962, f. 329. 2 Add. MS. 32963, f. 19, f. 50. 

3 Chatham Correspondence, n. 296. 4 Ibid. 

5 Add. MS. 32962, f. 30, f. 366; Add. MS. 32963, f. 50, f. 122, f. 243, 
f. 364, f. 375; Add. MS. 32964, f. 109. The Duke of Cumberland was 
in favour of the opposition definitely repudiating Pitt, and, that this was 
not done, was partly due to Newcastle's influence. 



214 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

was but a sorry prospect, for the loss of Pitt was not the 
only blow which the opposition had suffered. Charles 
Townshend was treating with Grrenville for the succession 
to the remunerative office of paymaster general 1 , and 
Charles Yorke had once more enlisted under the king, 
taking no office, but being gratified by a patent of pre- 
cedency which gave him rank between the attorney and 
solicitor general 2 . It is not surprising that, confronted 
with these defections, Cumberland began to despair o£ 
continuing the contest, and that even Newcastle lost all 
hope of success. The whig cause seemed doomed, and 
if the ministers were called upon to face an opposition 
when parliament met, this was due, not to the leaders of 
the party, but to a few energetic spirits who refused to 
abandon hope, and determined to fight the battle to the 
end. Both Cumberland and Newcastle were inclined to 
abandon the struggle against overwhelming odds 3 ; and 
the ministers had little cause to fear the attacks of the 
remnant who refused either to surrender or retreat. 

Thus the parliamentary session, which began on 
January 10th, 1765, promised to be tame and uneventful. 
As a matter of fact, the unexpected was to happen, and 
Grrenville was to fall from power at the time when he 
seemed to have least to fear from his enemies. Too great 
a stress should not be laid upon the lack of union and 
cordiality in the cabinet, for that was no new feature; 
and, though often divided in opinion 4 , the ministers were 
always ready to unite against a common enemy. Their 
weakness was that they were only maintained in power 

1 Grenville Papers, n. 465, 466. 

2 Add. MS. 35428, f. 1; Add. MS. 32963, f. 405; Add. MS. 32964, 
f. 5, f. 287; Grenville Papers, n. 467—473, 523—532. 

3 Add. MS. 32963, f. 364, f. 391; Add. MS. 32964, f. 93, f. 109. 

4 Grenville Papers, n. 502, 504, 510—515; Hist. MSS. Comm. 
Stopford Sackville MSS. i. 61, 97. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 215 

by the will of the king. He had supported them against 
the attacks of the opposition, and in spite of their un- 
popularity with the country; and they had served his 
purpose, for through them he had avenged himself upon 
Wilkes. It would seem that they had now fulfilled their 
mission. The king had endured and made use of G-ren- 
ville, but he had never liked him, and would not hesitate 
to overthrow him if a suitable successor could be found. 
Before Grrenville had been in office many weeks, the king 
had attempted to replace him by Pitt. The attempt had 
failed; and for eighteen months Grrenville had continued 
in power because the king feared to surrender himself to 
the mercy of the whig party and the great commoner. 
The political situation, however, had now changed. The 
king had nothing to dread from a weakened and dis- 
credited opposition; and was, therefore, willing to take 
into his service those who had learnt the folly of strug- 
gling against the power of the crown. Grrenville, now 
that he no longer stood between the court and disaster, 
discovered that the royal support was not given so freely 
as in the past, and that, whereas the king had formerly 
been friendly and cordial, he was now cold and embar- 
rassed. Moreover, many of those, who passed by the name 
of Lord Bute's friends, often abstained from speaking or 
voting when the ministry was attacked. Sometimes, active 
opposition took the place of indifference, and, early in the 
session, the prime minister complained to the king of the 
difficulties under which he was obliged to carry on the 
government 1 . Walpole, an acute though prejudiced poli- 
tician, prophesied that the session would see the close of 
Grenville's reign 2 . 

Thus the ministry was endangered by the court and 

1 Grenville Papers, in. 112, 114—116; Walpole's Letters, vi. 172—176. 

2 Walpole's Letters, vi. 176—181. 



216 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

not by the opposition which had reached the lowest ebb of 
its fortunes. It is probable that the Duke of Cumberland 
abandoned, for the time being, his role of confidential 
adviser to the whig party, and Newcastle, in despair at 
the course events were taking, attended the house of 
lords as little as possible \ Those, that were left to con- 
tinue the battle, fought valiantly, but their efforts only 
served to display their weakness. In accordance with 
the programme, which had been agreed upon many 
months before, Sir William Meredith moved in the house 
of commons that the use of general warrants in cases of 
libel was illegal; but the debate, though protracted, 
was of no service to the opposition. Pitt was not present, 
though the motion had been postponed in order that he 
might be able to attend; and Charles Yorke, departing 
from his bold attitude of the previous year, spoke with so 
much caution and reserve that his speech was of little 
value except to the government. Desertion and disaster 
had thinned the ranks of the party which had once come 
so near to victory on this very question; and an amend- 
ment, which destroyed the original motion, was carried by 
a majority of thirty-nine votes. "To be beaten on such 
a question," wrote George Onslow who had been present 
at the debate, "is too serious — I am sick and tired and 
shocked 2 /' 

If the opposition had failed to gain credit by attack- 
ing general warrants, it was not likely that it would be 
more successful in any other venture. Those, who had 
led and directed the attacks upon the ministry in former 

1 Add. MS. 32966, f. 82. 

2 Add. MS. 32965, f. 318. See also Add. MS. 32965, f. 311, f. 313, 
f. 314, f. 316, f. 320; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 37 seq.; Walpole's Letters, vi. 
185—187; Grenville Papers, in. 4—6; Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston 
Underwood MSS. p. 382; Parliamentary History, xvi. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 217 

sessions, had either joined the enemy or withdrawn from 
the contest; and, like sheep without a shepherd, the rem- 
nant of a once respectable party was left undirected and 
unadvised 1 . Opportunities were missed because they were 
not seen; and Grenville, trusting in his predominance in 
parliament, was able to sow the seed which produced the 
revolt of the American colonies. He had already given 
notice in the previous year that he intended to raise a 
revenue in America ; and when on February 6th he 
introduced the stamp bill in the house of commons, it 
was in accordance with a carefully thought out policy 2 . 
He knew that several of the American assemblies had 
passed resolutions against the right of the English parlia- 
ment to levy an internal tax upon the colonies, and it was 
with the deliberate purpose of establishing that right 
that Grenville brought forward his measure 3 . Ignorance 
of American feeling cannot, therefore, be pleaded in his 

1 "I find it is thought... that the bill which Mr Townshend opposed, 
might have been thrown out if it had been better managed. But there 
is no care taken in either house to apprize our friends of what is to come 
on, or what is desired of them.. . .1 am sorry to tell you that your opposition 
is in very low esteem here at Bath," Newcastle to Onslow. Add. MS. 
32966, f. 79. 

2 It is important to note, however, that Grenville cannot claim the 
honour or dishonour of having originated the idea of imposing stamp 
duties upon the American colonists. In a pamphlet, written by Henry 
M'Culloh, an experienced colonial official, and submitted to Lord Bute 
in 1761, great stress was laid upon the necessity of establishing "proper 
funds in America, by a stamp duty on vellum and paper." There is ample 
evidence to show that M'Culloh's suggestion was very carefully considered 
by the ministers. Among the Hardwicke papers is a document, dated 
October 10th, 1763, containing a list of the articles to be included in 
a stamp act, and endorsed "10th October, 1763, was presented to 
Mr Greenvill (sic), who approved it." See Our Concerns in America 
by Henry M'Culloh; with an introduction by William A. Shaw. See 
also Grenville Papers, n. 373, n. 1. 

3 Hist. MSS. Coram. Weston Underwood MSS. p. 382. 



218 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

favour, nor would he have been inclined to shelter him- 
self behind that excuse. He stood his stand upon what 
he thought to be sound law, and in the name of a prin- 
ciple defied the resistance of a nation. But he does not 
stand alone in his guilt, for in the debate on February 6th 
he found himself supported by Charles Townshend and 
many of the opposition. Barre was almost the only one 
who raised his voice in protest, and the ministry had a 
triumphant majority of nigh upon two hundred 1 . Pitt, 
alone, could have stayed Grenville's triumphant course, 
and constructed a formidable party out of what was now 
but the wreck of an opposition. But he refused to come 
out of the retirement to which he had condemned himself. 
In earlier days he had often attended the house, wrapped 
in flannel and supported on crutches; but the energy and 
spirit on behalf of liberty, which had formerly raised him 
from the bed of sickness, no longer animated him. He 
despaired of the opposition, and disapproved its tactics. 
Though no one had been more violent in denouncing 
general warrants, he now objected to the revival of that 
question 2 ; and though no .one had excelled him as a 
champion of parliamentary privilege when it had been 
violated in the person of Wilkes, he now appeared un- 
willing to take an active part in attacking the ministry 
for dismissing Conway from his military command 3 . To 
G-renville's proposal to tax America he took objection, and 
was aggrieved because that measure had met with such 
scanty resistance 4 . Lord Rockingham, who visited him 

1 Add. MS. 32965, f. 346; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 56; Walpole's 
Letters, vi. 187 — 191 ; Parliamentary History, xvi. 

2 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 48. 

3 Add. MS. 32966, f. 39; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 48. 

4 "I saw my Lord Rockingham this morning, whose account of 
Mr Pitt I think so disagreeable a one that... I shall not be much displeased 
if he stays away on the military question...! find he still harps upon the 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 219 

about this time, came to the conclusion that Pitt would 
never more unite with the whig party in opposition 1 . 
He preferred to live in seclusion, waiting until he was 
summoned by the king to take office 2 . There was nothing 
mean or ignoble in such an attitude ; but it was fraught 
with disastrous consequences for the whig party and, 
indeed, for England. 

While Pitt had been living in retirement, and Gren- 
ville had been pursuing his triumphant and disastrous 
course in parliament, the king had suffered the first 
attack of that insanity which was to recur in a more 
aggravated form in later years. On his recovery, he 
instructed his ministers to prepare a regency bill which 
should provide for the event of a minor succeeding to the 
throne. The regency act of the previous reign was to 
be taken as a model, except that no restriction was to 
be placed on the king's right of nominating the regent.. 
This important reservation of power to the crown was 
open to serious objections, and was not approved by the 
ministers; but they agreed at a cabinet meeting that 
the bill should give the king the right of nominating as 
regent "the queen or any other person of the royal family 
usually residing in Great Britain " ; and George III 
acquiesced in this immaterial limitation of his original 
proposal 3 . Grenville and his colleagues had thus com- 
plied with the royal wishes, but it was against their own 
convictions ; and the prime minister had warned the king 
of the difficulties that might ensue 4 . The latter remained 

nonsense and falsehood of his being given up on the subject of the German 
war last year, and is not without his complaints of the American tax 
being not sufficiently objected to this year." Onslow to Newcastle, March 
19th, 1765. Add. MS. 32966, f. 69. 
i Add. MS. 32966, f. 69. 

2 Ibid, and Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 323, 324. 

3 Grenville Papers, m. 15, 16, 125. 4 Grenville Papers, in. 127, 128. 



220 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

unshaken in his determination. It was not likely that he 
would be touched by the remonstrances of his servants, 
for he had already decided to cut short their tenure of 
power. He intended to rid himself of advisers whom 
he had already endured too long for his happiness and 
peace of mind; and this resolution existed before the 
ministers had given the king legitimate cause of offence 
by their conduct over the regency bill. During the second 
week of April, the Earl of Northumberland, acting as the 
representative of the crown, informed the Duke of Cumber- 
land that the king was weary of his ministers, and desired 
to change them directly the regency bill had been passed 
by parliament. Cumberland wisely refused to begin a 
negotiation while the fate of an important measure was 
still in suspense, nor would he be encouraged to under- 
take the arduous task of forming an administration by 
learning that Bute must be given a cabinet office 1 . 
Northumberland's mission was productive of no result, 
but it has an interest inasmuch as it shows that the king 
was anxious to rid himself of Grenville, and was willing 
to extend a friendly hand to the whig party in the hour 
of its defeat. 

But he was prepared to wait a little longer, and had 
resolved that, before the Grenville ministry was dismissed, 
the regency bill should have been converted into a 
statute. The story of the passage of that bill through 
the two houses of parliament has often been told. When 
the measure was introduced into the house of lords, 
debate centred round the clause under which the king 
was to have the right of nominating as regent any member 
of the royal family, and attention called to the fact that 

1 Add. MS. 32966, f. 275. See also Rockingham Memoirs, 1. 185—190. 
Newcastle's Narrative of the changes in the ministry 1765 — 1767 (edited 
by Miss Mary Bateson), pp. 1 — 7. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 221 

the royal family had never been subjected to legal defi- 
nition, which, though a point of little importance in itself, 
was invested with considerable interest for the politicians 
of the period. If the Princess of Wales was to be 
regarded as a member of the royal family, she might 
become regent on the death of her son, and serve as a 
cloak for the power of Bute. The doubt once raised, it 
was necessary to settle it; and it was with the royal 
permission that Lord Halifax proposed and carried an 
amendment by which the regency was limited to the 
queen and those descendants of the late king, usually 
resident in England. Thus the bill, as passed by the 
upper house, excluded the Princess of Wales from the 
regency. 

Men were naturally astonished that the king should 
have allowed a slight to be put on his mother, with whom 
he had always lived on friendly and affectionate terms. 
His conduct has been variously explained: and while 
some, attributing to him a machiavellian cunning, think 
that he was ready to allow the princess to be insulted in 
order that he might have a legitimate grievance against 
his ministers, others incline to believe that he gave his 
consent to Halifax's amendment without fully understand- 
ing its meaning. It is by no means improbable that he 
acted under the influence of fear. He had good cause 
to know how unpopular his mother and Lord Bute were; 
and might with justice dread to furnish an excuse for 
a further outcry against them. He naturally shrank 
from making the princess a subject of parliamentary 
debate; and, intimidated perhaps by the gloomy fore- 
bodings of his ministers, decided to impose an indignity 
upon her, rather than allow an insult to be inflicted by 
others. But he had no sooner taken the step than he 
repented of it. He had branded his mother as unfit for 



222 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the discharge of a responsible duty, and proclaimed 
himself to the world as lacking in filial respect; but, 
fortunately, the mistake was not irretrievable. What 
had been settled by the house of lords, could be altered 
by the house of commons, and the king appealed to 
Grenville to arrange for the insertion of the princess' 
name in the bill during its passage through the lower 
house. Grrenville was not inclined to obey. He had no 
wish to help in the establishment of Bute's power, nor 
was he prepared to inform the world that Lord Halifax 
had either misunderstood or deceived his master. Re- 
buffed by his prime minister, the king turned for help to 
Lord Northington who, willing to act against his col- 
leagues with whom he was in disagreement, arranged 
that a member of the house of commons, known to be in 
the confidence of the Princess of Wales, should propose 
the insertion of her name in the bill. The motion was 
carried without a division, and, on the final reading of 
the bill in the lower house, only thirty-seven members 
voted against the princess being qualified to become 
regent. 

The task, for which Grrenville had been retained in 
power, was thus accomplished, and no sooner had the 
regency bill been passed by the house of commons, than 
the king set to work to bring about a change of ministry. 
~No one could be surprised that he was anxious to rid 
himself of those who had induced him to inflict an insult 
upon his mother; and, as any opposition worthy of the 
name had ceased to exist, it was impossible to contend 
that he had been driven to dismiss his ministers at the 
command of parliament or the nation. G-renville and his 
colleagues fell in the hey-day of their parliamentary 
power, and their destruction was due to the king. No 
better time could have been chosen. The whigs were 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 223 

disheartened, divided, and ineffective. Without a defi- 
nite political programme, living politically from hand to 
mouth, they would, if called upon to take office, owe their 
return to power to their failure and not to their success. 
Pitt's position was but little better. Drawing himself 
apart from those who had been, and were still, willing to 
accept him as a leader, he had absented himself for many 
weeks from parliament, and lived in gloomy retirement 
at Hayes. He had definitely abandoned opposition; and 
it was as true of him, as it was of the whigs, that only by 
the king could he be restored to office. 

Thus George III had little cause to be afraid of those 
who at one time threatened to take the cabinet by storm. 
Probably aware that Pitt was no longer on intimate 
terms with Newcastle and his followers, he was prepared to 
form an administration in which Pitt and the whig party 
were both represented. Acting again on behalf of the 
crown, Lord Northumberland visited Cumberland on 
May 13th, and informed him that the king desired to 
form a ministry to include Pitt, Lord Temple, and the 
great whig families. Only a few persons were named 
for office, among whom, however, was Northumberland 
himself, who was to be at the head of the treasury. 
Cumberland was willing enough, now that the fate of the 
regency bill had been settled, to undertake the task thus 
imposed upon him. He would be naturally anxious that 
his whig friends should be once more restored to power; 
and, though having little sympathy with Pitt, he probably 
perceived the necessity of including him in the ministry. 
For a week he was endeavouring to carry the king's 
wishes to a successful conclusion. No difficulty was ex- 
perienced with the whigs, and, if it had rested with them 
alone, an administration would have been quickly formed. 
But they feared to act without Pitt; and, unless the 



224 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

latter could be won, Cumberland was doomed to labour 
in vain. It was here that the difficulty came. Pitt and 
his brother-in-law, Temple, remained deaf to all arguments 
and persuasion. They refused to come into the service 
of the crown, and Cumberland was obliged to confess to 
failure: the king was once more frustrated in the attempt 
to rid himself of the ministers of whom he had long been 
weary. 

Thus another opportunity of giving the country a. 
stable government was lost, and the culprit on this occa- 
sion was Pitt. His conduct is not easy of explanation. 
Both he and Temple stipulated as conditions of their 
taking office that those officers in the army, who had 
been dismissed from their posts because of the way they 
had voted in parliament, should be restored, that steps, 
should be taken to declare the illegality of general 
warrants, and that alliances should be made with Russia 
and Prussia in order to check the power of France and 
Spain on the continent. Comprehensive as these demands 
were, they were not refused by Cumberland. The first two 
were fully accepted, and, if the king did not bind himself 
to a change in foreign policy, he agreed to it if Pitt, after 
taking office, continued to think it desirable 1 . Newcastle 
believed that these demands were not responsible for the 
failure of the negotiation, and it is not likely that Cum- 
berland would have journeyed to Hayes unless he had 
gained the royal consent to conditions, the fulfilment of 
which Pitt had already declared to be essential to his 
acceptance of office. It has also been suggested that 
both Pitt and Temple were influenced by fear of Bute. 
The negotiations with Cumberland had been first opened 
by Northumberland whose son had married a daughter of 

1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 45; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 14. 
For an opposite view, see Grenville Papers, in. 226. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 225 

the great Scotch earl; and Northumberland had origi- 
nally been named for the office of first lord of the treasury. 
No administration, which included Northumberland in an 
important office, could be counted as safe from Bute's 
influence, and if Pitt and Temple feared this danger, they 
had ample excuse. Yet everything was done to allay the 
alarm which had thus been aroused. The idea of giving 
the treasury to Northumberland was at once abandoned 
when it was found to encounter opposition; and Cumber- 
land undertook that neither Bute nor his brother Mackenzie 
should be allowed to interfere in the affairs of Scotland. 
He also promised, as a pledge of the sincerity of the king's 
intentions, that a certain number of those, who were 
known to be attached to Bute and to regard him as their 
leader, should be removed from their posts. More could 
hardly have been done to reassure Pitt and Temple on 
this delicate point, and if they still continued to feel alarm, 
this must be ascribed to prejudice rather than to reason. 
It is probable that Temple was the more violent of the 
two. Pitt had always objected to the furious attack to 
which Bute had been subjected, but Temple was a poli- 
tician only too likely to be swayed by blind passion and 
personal animosity. His influence over Pitt may have 
possibly induced the latter to disbelieve Cumberland's 
assurances, and it is clear that from the outset Temple 
was opposed to giving serious consideration to the royal 
proposals, and was surprised to find his brother-in-law 
so willing to take office 1 . Yet, however much weight one 
may attach to the influence that Temple was able to 
exercise, it is impossible to believe that Pitt blindly fol- 
lowed him against his own convictions. It is also equally 



1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 194, 195; Grafton's Autobiography, p. 45: 
Add. MS. 32966, f. 420. 

w. 15 



226 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

difficult to believe that Pitt was obsessed by a fear of 
Bute; and it is necessary to account for his refusal by 
some more sufficient reason. 

The key to the puzzle may possibly be found to lie in 
the relations between Pitt and the whig party. He had 
definitely repudiated the party system which had become 
an essential feature of the whig creed, and had with- 
drawn into retirement rather than continue to fight as an 
ally of those who practised and advocated a principle 
of which he heartily disapproved. Refusing absolutely to 
advise them or share in their counsels, he stood apart, 
solitary and independent. In these circumstances he 
might well feel disinclined to take office in an administra- 
tion which was to be formed in accordance with Cumber- 
land's advice 1 . It is clear that the negotiation had been 
conducted in a manner of which he could not approve. 
Instead of appealing directly to him, the king had turned 
to Cumberland who naturally consulted with his whig 
friends. Newcastle, Rockingham, and their followers had 
been actively engaged in discussing arrangements before 
Pitt had ever been approached, and the latter could not but 
feel that, though included in the negotiation, he had not 
been called upon to play the leading part. A negotiation 
conducted in such a manner would be likely to result in 
the construction of a whig administration; and in such 
Pitt did not desire either to lead or to serve. It mattered 
little to him that the proposal to place Northumberland 
at the head of the treasury should be dropped, if that 
office was to be given to Rockingham or some other 
member of Newcastle's following. Pitt would not be 
satisfied unless that post was held by Lord Temple, an 
ally of his own, and not a follower of Newcastle 2 . When 

1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 10. 

2 Apparently Cumberland intended to make Pitt understand that 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 227 

all was over, and Cumberland had abandoned his task, 
Pitt informed a friend that he had never been offered 
carte blanche, and that it had never been intended that 
it should be his administration 1 . He meant probably that 
it was to be a whig ministry, and not one of his making; 
and, what is more significant still, he hinted to his friend, 
James Grenville, "an impossibility of ever being with 
the Duke of Newcastle and his immediate friends 2 ." It 
would seem, therefore, reasonable to believe that Pitt did 
not object to any particular details, but to the principle 
upon which the negotiation was conducted. He had 
definitely broken with the whigs when in opposition, and 
was not willing to unite with them in an administration 3 . 
The bitter personal animosity, which he afterwards felt 
against Newcastle, does not appear to have been in exist- 
ence; and he was willing enough to enlist individual 
whigs under his banner 4 , provided that they foreswore 
allegiance to the party to which they belonged. It was 
of the nature of a tragedy that this fundamental differ- 
ence of opinion separated Pitt from those who could not 
stand without him. He may have been right in thinking 
that he could save the country, but he was wrong in 
believing that he could dispense with the support of the 
whig party. An opportunity was to be given him to put 
his principles into practice ; and he encountered disaster 
and failure. Limited in outlook as Newcastle often was, 
his political insight, clearer than that of Pitt, enabled 
him to see that a ministry, lacking any common bond of 

Lord Temple was to have the treasury, but did not succeed in doing so. 
Newcastle's Narrative, p. 19. 

1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 51. 

2 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 79, 80. 

3 Von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 160 ff . 

4 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 51, 52. 

15—2 



228 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

union, lay at the mercy of the king, and was certain to 
meet with an untimely fate whenever it presumed to 
thwart the wishes of the crown 1 . 

The negotiation having failed, the king was left in an 
unenviable position. He had not been able to gain the 
assistance either of Pitt or the whigs; and it was not 
likely that help could be obtained from any other quarter. 
Lord Lyttelton was asked to step into the breach, but he 
wisely refused to undertake a task which would have 
almost certainly proved beyond his capacity 2 . Cumberland 
made a final attempt to win Pitt, and Lord Temple was 
sent with a message to Hayes; but, like another famous 
ruler, the king did not wait for an answer 3 , and, abandon- 
ing all hope, threw himself upon the mercy of Grenville. 
It was the second time that he had failed to rid himself 
of that minister, and again Grrenville enjoyed his hour of 
triumph. It was for him and his colleagues to state the 
conditions upon which they would consent to remain in 
the service of the crown. They knew that they no longer 
possessed the confidence of the king who had vainly 
endeavoured to find others to take their place; and, 
smarting under the affront which had been put upon 
them, they determined to make the fullest use of their 
victory. They abused the advantage they possessed. They 
scouted the idea of magnanimity, and, by the conditions 
which they imposed, rendered themselves more hateful to 
the crown than ever. If they could not be blamed for 
demanding that Bute's influence should cease, they cer- 
tainly committed a grave blunder in forcing the king to 

1 For a general account of this negotiation, see Grafton's Auto- 
biography, pp. 40—52; Grenville Papers, in. 37—40, 170—173, 225, 226; 
Rockingham Memoirs, i. 191 — 203 ; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 3 — 15. 

2 Grenville Papers, in. 227 ; Grafton's Autobiography, p. 47. 

3 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 19, 20 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, 
Appendix, ix. p. 255 ; Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 229 

dismiss Mackenzie from the office of privy seal of Scot- 
land. The latter had been promised security of tenure, 
and the king was compelled to break his word at the 
dictation of his ministers. He complied with the de- 
mand, but the breach between him and his servants was 
widened in consequence; for he was not the man to 
forgive anyone for compelling him to act in a manner 
unworthy of his honour. Another victim of the mini- 
sterial hatred was Henry Fox, now Lord Holland, who 
was deprived of his office of paymaster general. Few 
outside his own domestic circle could have regretted his 
fall. Men had not yet forgiven him for his conduct during 
the time that he had managed the house of commons; 
and he found few supporters in the hour of his adversity. 
He had sacrificed his ambition and his principles for 
the sake of money; and was deservedly distrusted and 
despised, even by those who had made use of him. He 
had clung to the office of paymaster for the sake of 
the wealth that it brought; and it is not likely that the 
king was unwilling to deprive him of it. His place was 
taken by Charles Townshend who had long been angling 
for the remunerative pos^\ and, by accepting it, finally 
broke with the opposition . 

It is hardly conceivab -■ that the king regarded this 
settlement as permanent. He had become the slave of 
his own servants, and had been forced to consent to 
conditions which would have been rightly considered as 
humiliating by the meanest of his subjects. His grand- 
father, whom he had been taught to regard as far too 
subservient to his ministers, had never been subjected to 
such tyranny ; and if he felt compelled to give way for a 
season, it was only that he might gain time to prepare to 

1 Grenville Papers, in. 38, 40, 41, 176 — 190; Bedford Correspondence, 
in. 278—281 ; Add. MS. 34713, f. 239. 



230 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

strike another blow. Grrenville and his colleagues had 
been guilty of a fatal mistake. Instead of propitiating 
the king, and trying to win his confidence by kindness,, 
they had so wantonly insulted and humiliated him that 
no possible evil in the future could be worse than the 
degradation which he had already endured. He had,, 
therefore, every excuse for attempting to undo what had 
been done : and if the ministers believed that he was 
willing to submit to the defeat which he had suffered and 
cease to intrigue against them, they showed themselves, 
strangely ignorant of the limits of human and royal 
endurance. The outlook for the king was dark, but it 
was certainly not hopeless. He had gained some advantage 
by his recent negotiation, for he was now on friendly 
terms with his uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, and the 
whig party 1 . The past, if not forgotten, had at least been 
forgiven ; and the king knew that the whigs were willing 
to take office if the assistance of Pitt could be secured- 
Thus everything depended upon the latter. If he would 
consent to form a ministry, Grrenville could be dismissed, 
and the king rescued from a state bordering on subjec- 
tion. " The Duke's place, I think," wrote Newcastle, " is 
to behave so to Mr Pitt that before the next session he 
may come in cordially, and accept that what he has now 
refused V 

Barely more than a fortnight after these words were 
written, another negotiation with Pitt had been begun- 
The king had not scrupled to show his dislike of his 

1 Cumberland informed Newcastle that he "had received a very kind 
message from the king; and I believe it is intended on both sides to keep 
up the present intimacy and confidence between them; if so, and that 
our friends are thoroughly and cordially united amongst themselves, all 
will do well." Newcastle to Rockingham, June 1st, 1765. Add. MS. 
32967, f. 3. 

2 Add. MS. 32967, f. 3. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 231 

ministers, and had been lectured by the Duke of Bedford 
" for not giving his confidence to those in whom he had 
vested his authority." The president of the council had 
spoken with emphasis, and had assured the king that if 
he found himself unable to confide in his servants, it 
became him to find others to succeed them 1 . Knowing 
that he certainly could not confide in his ministers, and 
ready to interpret Bedford's words in their widest sense, 
the king was not slow to act upon the hint which had 
thus been inadvertently given 2 ; and a few days after 
this conversation, he was planning with the Duke of 
Cumberland a negotiation with Pitt 3 . This was to under- 
take an enterprise of no little daring; and whichever 
way events turned, retreat would be impossible. If Pitt 
continued obstinate, or if for any other cause the negotia- 
tion failed, the king could not fall back upon the assistance 
of Grenville. Twice he had publicly attempted to rid 
himself of that minister, and he could not afford to confess 
to failure a third time. If Pitt refused to come into office, 
the king would be compelled to construct a cabinet without 
him. The fall of the Grenville ministry was certain : all 
that remained in doubt was the character of the adminis- 
tration which would succeed it. 

The negotiation, which had been carried on in the 
previous May, had been opened by an offer to the whigs 
who had been treated with independently of Pitt. This 
time a different method was adopted. Instead of appealing 
to the whigs, whom he knew to be ready to come to his 
assistance, the king agreed to ask Pitt to come and see 
him. Newcastle and his friends were thus excluded from 
the negotiation, and their chance of obtaining office would 

1 Grenville Papers, in. 194; Bedford Correspondence, in. 286 — 288. 

2 Grenville Papers, in. 211—216. 

3 Add. MS. 32967, f. 48; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 22. 



232 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

depend upon the goodwill of Pitt. The latter could no 
longer complain that he was asked to preside in a cabinet 
which was not of his own making; and, therefore, the 
grievance, which may have prevented him from accepting 
the previous offer, no longer existed. It is difficult to say 
whether this innovation was due to the king or the Duke 
of Cumberland 1 ; but whoever was responsible could claim 
the credit of a successful move. Pitt visited the king 
twice, and on both occasions George III showed himself 
compliant and anxious to come to terms 2 . He agreed 
that general warrants should be condemned, that Pratt 
should be made lord chancellor, that officers in the army, 
who had been dismissed for votes given in parliament, 
should be restored ancLthat an alliance should be formed 
with Russia and Prussia if it were found to be practicable 3 . 
After the second meeting, which took place on Saturday, 
June 22nd, it was generally understood that Pitt had 
consented to take office 4 . 

Up to this point the king had met with a success 
greater, perhaps, than he had anticipated. Pitt had 
shown himself willing to accept office, and had only 
asked for what the king had found himself able to grant. 
But Newcastle was by no means so happy at the course 
of the negotiation. He had not been consulted by Pitt, 
and depended for this information upon the Duke of 
Cumberland and Lord Albemarle who was in Cumberland's 
confidence. It must have been clear to the meanest in- 
telligence that, though individual whigs might be given 

1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 22; Add. MS. 32967, f. 48; Grenville 
Papers, in. 52 — 54, 202; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 445 ff. 

2 The king was apparently more ready to comply with Pitt's demands 
at the second meeting than at the first. Grenville Papers, in. 60, 61. 

3 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 53, 83 — 86 ; Grenville Papers, in. 
60, 61; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 23. 

4 Add. MS. 32967, f. 103. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 233 

office, the administration was not to be representative of 
the whig party. Newcastle knew that if he chose he 
could be lord president of the council ' ; but it would be 
little comfort to him, much as he might wish for power, to 
sit in a cabinet which he had not assisted to construct. 
He did not disguise his chagrin from his friends, and 
informed Lord Ashburnham that, if Pitt formed an ad- 
ministration, it would be in a way " not agreeable to us, 
or to the public, or I should think to himself V He was 
probably correct in his surmise as far as it affected him- 
self and his party. Pitt, being given a free hand, was 
evidently determined to choose his colleagues, not because 
of their political connections, but on account of their 
fitness for the work which he intended them to perform ; 
and it may be because he had this freedom of selection 
that he was willing to take office. Otherwise, it is difficult 
to understand why he showed himself so obstinate in May, 
and so compliant in June. On both occasions the king 
had given his consent to the demands which Pitt made, 
though in June he probably received fuller assurances of 
the royal intention to follow the policy which he approved. 
The difference in this particular can hardly be held to 
account for the change in his attitude; and it would 
appear far more probable that it was due to the exclusion 
of Newcastle from the negotiation. If in May Pitt had 
been summoned to visit the king, and allowed to nominate 
his colleagues, Grrenville might have fallen from office 
a month earlier than he actually did. 

Yet, when all seemed settled, a change was to come 
over the scene, which set the king once more adrift with- 
out a ministry in which he could confide. Pitt had deter- 
mined that Temple should be first lord of the treasury; 
but, greatly to his surprise, the latter refused to take that 

1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 23. 2 Add. MS. 32967 June 21st, 1765. 



234 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

office or indeed any other. Argument and persuasion 
were tried but with no effect. Though Temple knew that 
Pitt would not take office without him, he remained firm 
in his resolution, and Pitt was obliged to inform the king 
that he must decline the task of forming a ministry. 
The unexpected had happened, and what had been so 
nearly achieved had to be begun all over again. 

Two problems present themselves in connection with 
this incident. It is not at all clear why Temple refused 
to come into the service of the crown, and why Pitt 
declined to form an administration without him. Temple's 
conduct has been variously explained, and, probably, 
no completely satisfactory solution will ever be offered. 
It is likely that he was influenced by more than one 
motive, and would perhaps have found it difficult him- 
self to state the various causes of his refusal. Of a 
jealous and intriguing disposition, he was possibly pro- 
voked at the predominant part which Pitt had played 
in the negotiations; and considered himself to be of 
sufficient importance to have been consulted before every- 
thing had been arranged. He was certainly angry at 
the consideration shown to the followers of Lord Bute 1 ; 
and it is not out of the question that he believed the 
ministry, as Pitt had formed it, to be doomed to failure. 
He certainly told the king that he was induced to refuse 
the offer, which had been made, because of the difficulty 
of forming a proper plan in regard to the house of 
commons 2 . Pitt did not propose to attend parliament 
regularly, pleading his health as an excuse 3 ; and Temple 
might justly feel that, in his leader's absence, the ministry 
might easily be overcome by a joint attack of the 

1 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676; Grenville Papers, in. 64. 

2 Grenville Papers, in. 200, 201 ; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 

3 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 235 

members of the whig opposition, who had not been 
given office, and the supporters of the previous ministry. 
But Temple did not act from this motive alone : and he 
was loud in proclaiming that he was influenced by reasons 
of too delicate a nature to be revealed. He was commonly 
understood to refer to his recent reconciliation with his 
brother, Greorge Grenville; but he always denied this 
interpretation of his words, and asserted that the recon- 
ciliation was of a purely private character, and destitute 
of any political significance 1 . Thus the matter stands: the 
knowledge, which Temple denied to his contemporaries,, 
has not been revealed to posterity; and his action still 
awaits an explanation. 

Interesting as it may be to speculate upon the cause 
of Temple's refusal, it is of far greater importance to 
understand its effect upon Pitt. It is not a little surpris- 
ing to find him definitely abandoning the task of forming 
a ministry on learning that Temple was determined not. 
to take office. The latter, though an active politician, 
had not risen to great eminence in the political world and,, 
if it had not been for his wealth, his rank, and his kinship 
with Pitt, would have been comparatively unknown. In 
the administration, as it had existed at the beginning of 
the reign, he had only occupied the unimportant post of 
lord privy seal; and would have been held in little 
consideration by his colleagues if he had not been known 
to be a satellite of his brother-in-law. Thus he was of 
little weight, and if Pitt deemed his services essential in 
1765, it was not on account of his political influence. Nor 
is it probable that Pitt was moved by considerations of a 
more sentimental character. Temple had been his friend 
for many years, and had rendered him financial assistance ; 
but he could hardly be accused of ingratitude if, after 
1 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676. 



236 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

Temple had declined to come into office, he consented to 
form an administration without him. Nor was Pitt likely 
to sacrifice everything for a friend however dear. He 
realised more clearly than many of his contemporaries his 
duty to his country and his king. He saw, and perhaps 
exaggerated, the evils of his time, and regarded the rule 
of Grrenville as pregnant with disaster for the state ; and 
if, holding such opinions, he refused to remedy the evils 
which he saw, and to guard against the dangers which he 
feared, lest he might be suspected of ingratitude to a 
relation, he would have been guilty of misplaced chivalry 
little short of criminal. His action must have been 
dictated by worthier motives, and if he refused to take 
office without Temple, it was because he considered his 
aid to be essential to the success of his schemes. In- 
considerable as he was, Temple was, for the time being, 
indispensable. He must be given the treasury because 
there was no one else who could be placed there with 
safety 1 . If that office was filled by Newcastle, the whig 
party would be given a position of authority in the 
administration. The Marquis of Rockingham was equally 

1 ' ' My Lord Temple, in his audience of the king, absolutely declined 
coming into his majesty's service, for private reasons which he could not 
disclose to anybody; but the publick one he gave was that, in the bad 
state of Mr Pitt's health, as he (Lord Temple) was not in the house of 
commons himself, it might frequently happen that Mr Pitt could not be 
there ; that he could not be sure of Mr Pitt's assistance in the house of 
commons, when perhaps he should be most in need of it ; and that he 
had no other person in the house of commons upon whom he could 
entirely depend.... 

"Mr Pitt has been with the king since, and, as I hear, extremely 
laments and blames my Lord Temple's refusal;... as his ill state of health 
would frequently prevent him from attending his majesty, he should, 
if my Lord Temple was not in his majesty's service, not have one person 
whom he could trust to convey to his majesty his thoughts upon any 
occasion wherein he might think his majesty's service is concerned." 
Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 237 

ineligible, for lie was closely allied with Newcastle : and 
the Duke of Grraf ton, though attached to Pitt who thought 
highly of his capacity, was an ardent member of the 
opposition party, and too much in sympathy with the 
whigs to be suitable. Chance had raised Temple to a 
position from which he could afford to dictate terms. 
Pitt was aware that his declining health would no longer 
allow him to take an active part in business ; and if power 
in the cabinet was not to fall into the hands of the whigs, 
who would use it to strengthen their position as a party, 
there must at least be one member of the administration, 
holding high office, whom he could entirely trust, and 
who was connected with no political faction but with 
himself alone. Temple was the only man who could 
satisfy these conditions; and when he refused to take 
office, Pitt was obliged to abandon the hope of coming 
into power. This was the price he was called upon to pay 
for his determination not to preside over a cabinet re- 
presentative of the whig party ; and he paid it. Willing 
and even anxious as he was to take office, he preferred to 
remain in retirement rather than form an administration 
of which he did not approve. He had staked everything 
upon the support of Temple, and that had failed him ; he 
had been felled by a blow which he had not expected, 
and against which he had not guarded. 

Once more the king found himself in a dangerous 
situation, and had good cause to reflect upon the difficulties 
which beset a constitutional monarch who plays an active 
part in politics. He had failed to attain the success which 
had been so nearly in his grasp, and once more found 
himself embarked upon a stormy sea, uncertain of any 
harbour of refuge. When he intrigued against G-renville, 
he had entered upon the conflict unprepared for emer- 
gencies, and discovered to his cost that it is easier to 



238 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

destroy than to create. But lie had gone too far to be 
able to retreat. It was impossible for him, unless he was 
willing to surrender all power, to ask his present ministers 
to continue in office; and he had no alternative but to 
seek assistance from Newcastle and the whigs. He would 
be saved from suffering further indignities if they 
consented to serve him, and thus, when all other help had 
failed, he turned to those whom he had formerly punished 
and proscribed. It was by no means certain that they 
would be prepared to come to the rescue of the king. 
They might be, and apparently were, willing to forget old 
grievances, for they were anxious to return to power ; but 
they had only recently ref used to form a ministry without 
the assistance of Pitt, and might still adhere to the opinion 
they had then expressed. Moreover, they still feared 
the influence which Lord Bute was supposed to exercise 
over the king ; and it was likely that they would demand 
some material assurances upon this point. 

The negotiation with the whigs was conducted by the 
Duke of Cumberland, and, though carried to a successful 
conclusion, came once or twice near to failure. A certain 
number of Newcastle's supporters were strongly opposed 
to the idea of forming an administration without Pitt, and 
the Duke of Cumberland, who was inclined to share this 
view, was only persuaded to persevere in the task, which 
he had undertaken, by the exhortations of Newcastle 1 . 
It had also been agreed at a meeting of the whig party 
on June 30th to request the king to remove the more 
important of Lord Bute's friends from the offices they 
held, and, also, not to restore Mackenzie to the post of 
which Grrenville had deprived him 2 ; but these demands 

1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 186; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 218—220; New- 
castle's Narrative, p. 26. 

2 Pitt had been willing to allow several of Lord Bute's friends to retain 



THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 239 

were only partially complied with, and the Duke of 
Newcastle was aggrieved by the imperfect fulfilment of 
the conditions which he and his friends had all agreed 
must be assented to before they could take office 1 . But 
both parties to the negotiations were too anxious to come 
to an understanding to permit of failure, and Newcastle 
and his followers once more found themselves in office. 
Driven into a corner, fearing to offend the king by 
refusing to come to his assistance, and disheartened by 
their fruitless efforts in opposition, they took their fate 
into their hands, and came into power without Pitt. 

their offices, and had been anxious that Mackenzie should again be given 
the post of privy seal of Scotland, only stipulating that this office should 
be treated as a sinecure and divested of all authority. Rockingham 
Memoirs, i. 213, 214. 

1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 186, f. 220; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 218—220; 
Lord Despenser was removed, and Mackenzie was not restored, but Lord 
Litchfield was left in the enjoyment of his office. 






CHAPTER VI. 

THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY. 

THE ministerial revolution, which took place in July, 
1765, constitutes a landmark in the reign of George III. 
Five years had passed since the king had come to the 
throne and set to work to regain for the crown the 
authority it had lost. He had achieved much. He had 
been able to dispense with the services of Pitt, and had 
succeeded in driving Newcastle from office. In alliance 
with Bute, he had freed the country from a lengthy 
and exhausting contest ; and had compelled Wilkes, the 
popular hero of the hour, to eat the bread of exile. No 
man could now afford to despise or to neglect the royal 
power. While yet a young man, and within a few years 
of his accession George III had materially increased and 
extended the influence of the crown. But, though his 
efforts had been attended with a considerable measure of 
success, his career had not been unchequered by failure 
and disappointment. He had failed to gain the approval 
of the nation, and could not claim to play the part which 
Bolingbroke had designed for a truly constitutional 
monarch. Nor had he found his ministers always willing 
to submit to his will. As long as Bute remained in office, 
the relation between the king and the first minister had 
been friendly and harmonious; but, when the favourite 
was succeeded by G-renville, G-eorge III was not slow to 
discover how much he had profited by the friendship of 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 241 

Bute. The most violent whig could not have been more 
objectionable to the king than George Grenville and his 
colleagues. They had forced him to break his word, and 
had not scrupled to lecture him upon his conduct. He 
found himself subjected to humiliations such as his grand- 
father had never endured, and on three separate occasions 
he appealed to Pitt for deliverance from a tyranny which 
threatened to become intolerable. When all hope had 
vanished, and it seemed likely that he would be obliged 
to surrender himself once more to the tender mercies of 
Grenville, he was rescued by those whom he had driven 
from his service, and overwhelmed with indignities and 
insults. Newcastle and his friends once more found 
themselves in the service of the crown. Their work lay 
ready to their hand. A powerful whig administration at 
this particular juncture could not have failed to exercise 
a decisive influence upon the course of events. Chastened 
by recent adversity, and bearing in hourly remembrance 
what he had suffered, the king might have refrained from 
intriguing against a ministry strong enough to defend 
itself. The strained relations between England and the 
American provinces called for instant measures to be 
taken, if worse disasters were to be averted; and if the 
new ministers succeeded in pacifying the provoked 
colonists without sacrificing the dignity and prestige of 
the mother country, they would acquire a popularity 
at home which would go far towards rendering them free 
from intrigues at court or attacks in parliament. 

Unfortunately, however, the administration was not 
capable of accomplishing the work it had undertaken. 
Disregarded by the nation, which still centred its affection 
on Pitt, the whigs had conquered by their weakness and 
not by their strength. They had not fought their way 
into the cabinet, and their fortunes had never stood at so 
w. 16 



242 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

low an ebb as when they were called upon by the king 
to take office. Death and desertion had thinned their 
ranks and depressed their spirits. Repudiated by Pitt, 
it was only after much hesitation that they decided 
to obey the king and form an administration. Conscious 
that they possessed but a scanty following in parlia- 
ment, they knew that they would depend upon the 
support of those who voted with any government as long 
as it was approved by the king: a sorry position for 
men who believed in the principles of party government 
and in restricting the authority of the crown. A modern 
ministry in similar circumstances would appeal to the 
country; but recourse to a general election did not com- 
mend itself to the whigs, knowing, as they did, that it 
would do little to improve their position unless they were 
allowed to make use of the influence of the crown 1 . It 
was unlikely that the king would permit his ministers to 
wield in their own interests such a valuable weapon of 
corruption; and it was probably wiser for them to continue 
the parliament, as it was, than to appeal to the country on 
their own merits. The greater safety lay in a policy of 
inaction, but it was clear that the king would have no 
cause to fear those whom he could always thwart by 
rallying the placemen in defence of the throne. 

1 Add. MS. 32969, f. 390. "I admit," wrote Newcastle to Lord 
Albemarle, "that the administration may have a considerable majority 
in both houses : but that majority must be made up of their enemies, 
creatures of the two last administrations, and such as are influenced 
only by their employments and their interest. Such a majority will last 
no longer than they find the administration carries everything clearly 
and roundly. The moment there is the least check, they return to their 
vomit; and vote according to their conveniences (if they have any) or 
at least consistently with their manner of voting during this reign." 
Newcastle, however, was strongly of the opinion that it would be unwise 
to have a general election if the ministers were not allowed to make use 
Of the influence of the crown in all places. Add. MS. 32969, f. 392. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 243 

Thus it seems that the ministers were embarked upon 
a forlorn hope ; and they were but ill qualified for success 
in such a hazardous enterprise. By taking the office of 
first lord of the treasury, the Marquis of Rockingham 
placed himself at the head of the administration 1 . Young, 
wealthy, and neither a time-server nor desirous of political 
distinction, he was generally liked and respected for his 
many good qualities. But even his most fervent admirers 
have never contended that he was adapted by nature to 
be a leader of men or a champion of a lost cause. Nor 
can the charm of his private character be held to com- 
pensate for his lack of political ability. Shy and retiring 
by disposition, a poor speaker, and rarely taking part in 
debate, he was the pilot who shunned rather than weathered 
the storm. He was not in any sense a great man ; and if 
his colleagues had been men of commanding ability, it is 
not likely that he would have been more than the figure 
liead of the administration 2 . Unfortunately for him and 
for the country, his companions in the cabinet were, for 
the most part, youthful and inexperienced politicians. 
The two secretaries of state were General Conway and 

1 "The putting my Lord Rockingham at the head of the treasury, 
and thereby the making him first minister, was done without my 
immediate knowledge, but very much with my approbation, for I profess 
to you, now, he is the person in all England I wish there." (Newcastle's 
Narrative, p. 36.) 

2 Lord Rockingham's secretary was Edmund Burke; and it is not 
easy to estimate the latter's political influence. In June, 1766, Lord 
Buckinghamshire wrote to Grenville, "Lord Albemarle and Mr Bourk 
(I think that is the name not of Lord Rockingham's right hand but of 
both his hands) evidently direct the wires which move our political 
puppets there... Mr Bourk, descended from a garret to the head of our 
administration, is a metaphysician, a man of learning and imagination, 
a garret is a very proper situation for those who mean to read the stars, 
but the springs, which decide upon the fate of nations, lay nearer the 
earth." Add. MS. 22358, f. 35. 

16—2 



244 PEKSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the Duke of Grafton. The former had suffered for his 
political opinions, and was to prove himself the ablest 
member of the cabinet ; but he was seriously deficient in 
personal charm, and, though capable of inspiring con- 
fidence, was not likely to gain popularity 1 . The Duke 
of Grafton had been an active and enthusiastic member 
of the whig opposition but he was not of the stuff of 
which great statesmen are made, and was lacking in 
political experience. Like Rockingham, he was happier 
on Newmarket heath than in the house of lords ; and his 
private life was not free from scandal. Earlier in his 
political career, he had attached himself to Pitt who 
formed a high opinion of his ability; and he had only 
consented to take office under Rockingham on the condition 
that directly Pitt should express a wish to join the ad- 
ministration he should be allowed to do so. Thus from 
the outset an important member of the government was 
divided in his allegiance, and acknowledged as his leader 
one who had no place in the ministry. 

The most experienced member of the cabinet was, 
undoubtedly, the Duke of Newcastle. True to the pledge 
he had given, the old whig leader contented himself with 
the office of privy seal, to which, however, the ecclesiastical 
patronage of the crown was annexed 2 . Newcastle was 
now an old man, and incurred the fate of those who 
outlive their age. Times had changed, and those who 
had known him in the heyday of his power were either 
dead or pursuing an opposite path. The administration, 
of which he now found himself a member, was largely 
composed of men who had been boys at school when he 

1 Walpole's Memoirs, 11. 148 ff. 

2 It has been said that this was done at Newcastle's own request, but 
the arrangement appears to have been suggested by the king. Add. MS. 
32968, f. 264; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 33. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 245 

was already a leading politician. He was a relic of an old 
world ; and, though capable of the self-denial involved in 
the acceptance of a subordinate office, was not enough of 
a stoic to bear with equanimity the neglect which would 
be certain to follow the loss of his influence. But New- 
castle was certainly not the only element of weakness in 
the administration. William Dowdeswell, the chancellor 
of the exchequer, was a dull though painstaking politician, 
and little is known of Lord Winchelsea, the lord president 
of the council. Lord Northington continued as lord 
chancellor, and would be as likely to be as disloyal to 
Buckingham as he had been to Grenville ; Lord Egmont 
remained at the admiralty, and Lord Barrington was 
appointed secretary at war. 

The inclusion of Northington, Egmont, and Barrington 
in an administration, supposed to be representative of 
whig principles, has been commonly attributed to the 
influence of the king. Lord Northington certainly had 
no love for the whig party, and frankly avowed his 
intention of thwarting and hindering his new colleagues 1 ; 
but it is open to doubt whether he owed his inclusion in 
the cabinet solely to the royal favour. It is by no means 
unlikely, strange as it may seem, that the whigs were 
willing, and even anxious, to continue Northington in the 
office which he had occupied under Grenville. If a new 
lord chancellor was appointed, the choice would lie be- 
tween Pratt and Charles Yorke ; and it would not be easy 
to decide between their rival claims. Weighty political 
interests would be involved in the selection. If Yorke 
was chosen, Pitt would be deeply offended; and if, in 
order to please the latter, Pratt was promoted to the 
woolsack, Charles Yorke and his family would probably 
vent their disappointment by going into opposition. A 
1 Grenville Papers, in. 210. 



246 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

middle course was consequently adopted. Northington 
was continued as chancellor, Pratt was created a peer, 
and Charles Yorke, gratified by the royal promise that 
he should be created lord chancellor within a year ', was 
persuaded to accept his former office of attorney-general. 
This arrangement was attended by all the dangers of a 
compromise. The ministers might congratulate themselves 
upon avoiding an immediate evil, and averting the danger 
of offending Pitt ; but they could hardly be blind to the 
fact that Northington would always be their enemy. If 
their hands had been free, if they had not been a in the 
fell clutch of circumstance," they might have hesitated, 
even at the risk of offending the king, before allowing 
such a veteran intriguer to continue in office. 

If Egmont and Barrington were less dangerous than 
Northington, they believed as little as he did in the 
theories of Newcastle and his friends. Lord Egmont had 
been a leading member of the Leicester House party, 
and Barrington, as has been already remarked, adhered 
to the principle that the first duty of a minister was 
obedience to the crown. The king was doubtless well 
pleased that they should be given office, but it is open 
to question whether the royal wishes would have been 
considered if more suitable candidates could have been 
discovered. It is certain that many of the leading 
politicians of the day were unwilling to risk their reputa- 
tion by joining a ministry which appeared doomed to 
disaster. Charles Townshend, who was happy enough as 
paymaster general, refused to become either chancellor of 

1 Add. MS. 35428, f. 1. Amongst the Hardwicke Papers is a document, 
dated July 4th, 1765, containing an account by Charles Yorke of a con- 
versation with the king. According to Yorke, "the king declared that 
he was resolved to give him the great seal in less than a twelvemonth 
(everything on this subject said with earnestness)." Add. MS. 35428, 
f. 94. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 247 

the exchequer or secretary of state ; and Hardwicke, 
Lyttelton and Shelburne were equally reluctant to throw 
in their lot with what seemed a lost cause 1 . Repeating 
the lesson that Pitt had taught him, Shelburne declared 
that "measures and not men" would be the rule of his 
conduct; and Rockingham quickly learned how difficult 
it is to persuade men to incur the risk of failure. 

It cannot be denied that those, who believed the 
ministers incapable of fulfilling the task they had 
undertaken, were substantially correct in their opinion. 
Rockingham and Grafton had still to prove their capacity 
as statesmen, and nothing that Newcastle could do would 
destroy the reputation for incapacity which his enemies 
had fastened upon him. It seemed as if inexperience had 
linked hands with inefficiency, and the union did not 
promise success. The ministers, themselves, were conscious 
of their own weakness. They knew that they had been 
chosen neither by parliament nor by the people but by 
the king; and that they depended upon him for the 
extent and duration of their power. This was but little 
removed from a state of subservience. If they continued 
as they had begun, they would either have to violate the 
principles they professed, or face the prospect of being 
driven from office the first time they dared to thwart the 
royal will. It needed no great insight to perceive that 
if they were to accomplish the work for which they 
had taken office, and repair the evil which their pre- 
decessors had wrought, they must find some other basis 
for their power than the approval of the court. In 
office, as in opposition, they found that they needed the 
assistance of Pitt. Though he had withdrawn into retire- 
ment, he remained the national hero, and was still regarded 

1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 193; Grenville Papers, in. 67—72; Rockingham 
Memoirs, i. 234—236. 



248 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

as the one man capable of bringing peace to a distracted 
country. The new ministers were confronted by the fact 
that the confidence of the people would be withheld from 
any administration of which Pitt was not a member, or 
to which at least he did not give his approval 1 . 

No one has ever doubted that the whig leaders were 
genuinely anxious for his assistance. They had hesitated 
to act without him, and would probably have refused to 
come into office unless they had felt confident that he 
would soon throw in his lot with them. From the outset 
they sought to please him, and no one was more zealous 
in this cause than Newcastle, For this reason Pratt was 
promoted to the peerage as Lord Camden, and negotiations 
begun for an alliance with Prussia 2 ; but it was all in 
vain. At one time Rockingham believed that Pitt was 
favourably inclined towards the ministry 3 , but rumours 
to an opposite effect soon began to circulate, and were 
eagerly credited 4 . When the Duke of Grafton appealed 
to Pitt to declare his opinions, the latter returned an 
answer characteristically vague. He blew neither hot 
nor cold. He neither approved nor condemned the 
ministry, and disclaimed all responsibility for a cabinet 
which he had not assisted to construct. He hinted at 
an objection to the Duke of Newcastle, declaring that 
he could hardly be expected to give his confidence to an 

1 "Here," wrote Lord Chesterfield to his son in July 1765, "is a new 
political arch almost built, but of materials of so different a nature, and 
without a keystone, that it does not, in my opinion, indicate either strength 
or duration. It will certainly require repairs, and a keystone, next winter ; 
and that keystone will and must necessarily be Mr Pitt." (Chesterfield's 
Letters, edited by John Bradshaw, in. 1322.) 

2 Add. MS. 32967, f. 354 ; Add. MS. 32968, f. 166, f. 212. 

3 Add. MS. 32967, f. 234. 

4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MS. i. 100—102; Grenville 
Papers, in. 78, 79, 85; Bedford Correspondence, in. 315 — 317. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 249 

administration in which that statesman had a seat 1 . 
Short of actual denunciation, nothing could have been 
less hopeful than this utterance. The objection to the 
party system, which had prevented Pitt from uniting 
cordially with the whigs against Bute and Grrenville, still 
dictated his policy. The cabinet had been formed on a 
plan of which he could not approve because the selection 
of members had been influenced largely by their political 
connections. He credited Newcastle, whom he distrusted 
as the greatest exponent of the party system, with more 
influence than he actually possessed, and saw in him the 
guiding spirit of the administration. It was no personal 
objections, no petty feelings of jealousy, but a difference 
of principle that divided Pitt from those who were so 
anxious for his assistance. 

Fortunately for their peace of mind, the ministers still 
remained in happy ignorance of the ground of Pitt's 
reluctance to extend to them his approval. They lived in 
hope that one day he would consent to cover them with 
the lustre of his name. And indeed they had need of all 
the encouragement they could gain. The future was 
dark and uncertain, and from the beginning things began 
to go awry. Newcastle discovered to his vexation that 
a subordinate position has its drawbacks as well as its ad- 
vantages, and that youth is often wanting in the respect 
which age always claims as its due. He found himself 
neglected by his colleagues who omitted to inform him 
of what he thought he ought to know; and complained 
bitterly of the treatment he suffered at the hands of men 
young enough to be his children 2 . Nor was Newcastle 
the only discontented member of the administration. 
Lord Egmont was known not to approve of an alliance 

1 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 58 — 59. 

2 Add. MS. 32969, f. 201, f. 246; Add. MS. 32971, f. 177. 



250 PERSONAL AND PAETY GOVERNMENT 

with Prussia, and no reliance could be placed on a political 
adventurer like Northington. The pillar of strength, to 
which the ministers clung, was the Duke of Cumberland. 
Unfortunately, he was now waning in health and crippled 
by disease. Fate had not dealt kindly with him. In 
the course of a long life he had suffered much sadness 
and many disappointments. Successful in his campaign 
against the Jacobites, he had acquired a reputation as a 
general which he speedily lost by his failure in the seven 
years' war. By his treatment of the Scotch rebels, he had 
earned a name for cruelty which was remembered long 
after men had forgotten that he had saved England from 
a great disaster. After the death of his elder brother, it 
was commonly thought that he was scheming to supplant 
his nephew on the throne ; and during the early years of 
his reign, George III was not on friendly terms with his 
uncle whom he distrusted as a supporter of the opposition. 
When, however, Cumberland rescued the king from the 
tyranny of Grenville, he was once more taken into favour 
at court; and was, therefore, in a position to play the 
part of mediator between the crown and the Rockingham 
administration, should occasion arise. Nor was it by any 
means unlikely that the ministers would have need of his 
services. There was work to be done, especially in regard 
to the American colonies, which might easily provoke a mis- 
understanding between the king and his servants ; and at 
such a crisis, Cumberland could have rendered invaluable 
assistance. He frequently attended cabinet councils 1 , 
and might have succeeded in guiding the administration 
through many dangerous channels; but death took him 
when he was most needed. He died suddenly on the last 
day of October, 1765, and the whigs lost a friend whom 
they could ill afford to spare. 

1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 55. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 251 

The immediate effect of Cumberland's death was to 
weaken the administration, and to render Pitt's assistance 
all the more necessary. As the ministers were now less 
certain of the support of the court, it was incumbent upon 
them to endeavour to win the approval of the nation. 
Newcastle has often been accused of gross selfishness and 
base treachery ; but, on this occasion at least, his conduct 
must satisfy the most captious of his critics. He saw the 
opportunity, and was anxious to take it, even to his own 
undoing. Though fully aware that Pitt bore him no good 
will, he was ready to sacrifice himself for the cause he 
had at heart. He understood that the assistance of Pitt 
was more indispensable than ever, and urged that a 
message should be sent to him, believing that all would 
go well if the world could be convinced that Pitt approved 
of the administration. It would be enough if he consented 
to accept a peerage at the hands of the ministers 1 . The 
king and Rockingham agreed to the proposal, and it was 
arranged that Grafton, who would be likely to receive a 
favourable hearing, should open the negotiation. It is 
possible that the young duke might have found his task 
unexpectedly easy. A few days after Cumberland's death, 
Pitt, writing to Thomas Walpole, mentioned that " those 
who with me have stood by the cause of liberty and the 
national honour upon true revolution principles, will 
never find me against them till they fall off and do not 
act up to those principles 2 ." Walpole, understanding this 
message to mean that Pitt was prepared to join the 
administration, communicated the important passages in 

1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 289. "Your grace," wrote Newcastle to Grafton, 
"knows Mr Pitt's disposition towards me too well to imagine that I can 
have any view in this with regard to myself. I mean only the king's 
service, the quiet and satisfaction of the nation, and the ease and success 
of his majesty's present ministers." Ibid. 

2 Chatham Correspondence, n. 328 — 330. 



252 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

the letter to Rockingham, and informed Pitt of what he 
had done. If Walpole was correct in his interpretation, 
the ministry could not have chosen a better time at which 
to make an overture ; and Newcastle was greatly disgusted 
to learn that his scheme had been abandoned. He at 
least was not to blame for any ill effects that followed. 

It is impossible to dogmatise on Pitt's inclinations at 
this moment, and Rockingham may have been right in 
thinking that an exaggerated importance had been 
attached to a stray remark ; but, when all deductions are 
made, it must be admitted that the ministers failed to 
avail themselves of what might have proved to be a 
favourable opportunity. It is not improbable that Pitt 
was offended by the independent attitude adopted by 
them ; and, if this was the case, it would account for the 
increased hostility he displayed towards Newcastle. The 
old duke was made the scapegoat for an offence of which 
he was entirely guiltless 1 . 

It is in vain to speculate upon the cause of Rocking- 
ham's reluctance to approach Pitt. Youthful, and of a 
sanguine temperament, he may easily have underrated 
the difficulties which confronted him, and imagined that 
an appeal to the great commoner would be construed as 
a sign of weakness. Nor was it only in this particular 
that the ministers, or at least some of them, appeared 
prepared to run the risk of alienating the man whom they 
wished to have as an ally. The idea of a treaty with 
Prussia was abandoned 2 , and the office of vice-treasurer 
of Ireland was conferred upon Lord G-eorge Sackville. 
Pitt had neither forgotten nor forgiven Sackville's be- 

1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 289, f. 341; Add. MS. 32972, f. 21, f. 60, f. 95; 
Add. MS. 32973, f. 230, f. 244 ; Chatham Correspondence, n. 333, 342, 343, 
345, 346. 

2 Add. MS. 32972, f. 126. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 253 

haviour at the battle of Minden ; and his promotion to a 
place in the administration would be counted as a new- 
offence committed by the ministers. Not Newcastle, but 
Rockingham, Grafton, and Conway were responsible for 
this unfortunate exercise of ministerial patronage ; and it 
is to their discredit that they refused to listen to the advice 
of one who was older and, on this occasion at least, wiser 
than they were 1 . Thus Rockingham and his colleagues 
stand convicted of pursuing a policy only too likely to 
arouse the anger of the man whom they should have 
sought to please. Little more than four months had 
elapsed since they had taken office ; but during that time 
they had lost a valuable ally at court, and had succeeded 
in widening the breach between themselves and Pitt. 
In the eyes of the public the administration appeared no 
more stable than it did at the beginning of its career ; and 
it is not surprising that both North and Barre refused 
places in a ministry which seemed doomed to a speedy 
destruction 2 . 

The outlook was all the more serious inasmuch as bad 
news was coming from America. The glove, which 
G-renville had thrown down, had been quickly taken up 
by the colonists ; and the stamp act had been met with a 
storm of opposition. The first step had been taken along 
the road which was to lead to the most disastrous war 
waged by England during: the 18th century. In spite of 
the restrictions imposed iii the interests of the mother- 
country, trade and industry had generally flourished 

1 Add. MS. 32972, f. 93, f. 100, f. 126. "I own," writes Newcastle to 
Rockingham on December 1st, ' f I am very doubtful what effect Lord 
George's accession will have; with our own friends certainly a bad one. 
But what I lament the most, I am afraid it will quite alienate Mr Pitt ; 
and I know our good friend Jemmy Grenville...I dread this of Lord George 
Sackville, I am sure you do the same." Add. MS. 32972, f. 95. 

3 Add. MS. 32972, f. 95. 



254 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

throughout the plantations; and the conditions of life 
were such as to foster a spirit of independence and a 
resentment of interference. The colonists were in no 
mood to suffer what they considered a new and un- 
justifiable imposition; and Grrenville, who, at the worst 
was guilty of legal pedantry and lack of statesmanship, 
presented himself to their imaginations as a dark and 
brooding tyrant intent upon destroying liberty wherever 
he found it. The Virginian house of burgesses declared 
against the stamp act on the ground that it violated the 
principle of no taxation without representation. In Boston 
and other towns serious riots broke out. The new stamps 
were seized and destroyed, and those commissioned to put 
the act into execution, discharged their duties at the peril 
of their lives. An assembly, which styled itself a congress 
of the committee of the several houses of representatives 
of the British colonies, met at New York, and passed a 
resolution that the stamp act tended to subvert the rights 
and liberties of the colonists 1 , and from Massachusetts 
Bay and Rhode Island came petitions to the king and 
parliament asking for the repeal of the obnoxious tax 2 . 

It was impossible for any statesman to avoid recog- 
nising the serious character of the opposition which had 
thus been aroused by Grenville's ill-judged measure. 
The discontent, which had been evoked, was not confined 
to a single province; and the mother country found 
itself threatened by what might prove to be a national 
resistance. By his assertion of the rights of parliament 
over the colonists, Grrenville had sown the seeds of revo- 
lution in a soil prepared for their reception; and those, 
who succeeded him in office, had to solve a difficulty 
which was not of their own making. It was a task 

1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 113. 2 Add. MS. 32971, f. 116, f. 120. • 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 255 

which might have taxed the strength and discretion of 
the most efficient administration. 

The problem was by no means easy of solntion. The 
right of parliament to levy an internal tax in America 
had been definitely asserted and as definitely repudiated ; 
and the ministers had to discover the proper course to 
pursue towards those who refused to acknowledge the 
supremacy of the mother country. It was a question 
not for lawyers but for statesmen to decide. If the 
English government, disregarding the complaints of the 
colonists, insisted upon the enforcement of the act, it 
might be necessary to have recourse to the sword. 
England might prevail in the struggle, but it would 
be at the cost of a legacy of hatred and bitterness which 
would take many years to eradicate. But an opposite 
line of policy was not without serious disadvantages. It 
is always easy to mistake conciliation for weakness. If 
the stamp act was repealed in answer to the complaints 
of the colonists, further concessions might be demanded 
from the mother country. Encouraged by their success, 
the Americans might seek to free their trade from the 
restrictions imposed by England; and, by gradual en- 
croachment, presume on the conciliatory spirit of the 
government until their demand for independence became 
irresistible. Thus the problem, winch confronted the 
ministers, was one of no small difficulty. Whatever solu- 
tion was adopted, it would be certain to meet with hostile 
criticism. G-renville, who had the legal cast of mind, and 
could not understand that it is not always expedient to 
enforce a right, could be counted upon to oppose the 
repeal or modification of his measure ; and he would have 
the support of his brother, Lord Temple, who in this 
particular was in agreement with him. It was also 
likely that many would oppose any modification of the 



256 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

stamp act, regarding such a policy as a concession to 
rebellion and the establishment of a dangerous precedent. 
On the other hand, Pitt had already declared his dis- *\ 
approval of the act, and if the ministers determined to 
uphold it, they must forswear all hope of ever persuading 
him to throw in his lot with them. Thus many factors 
had to be taken into consideration before it was possible 
to arrive at a decision. It might be wise to restore peace 
in America and to purchase the support of Pitt ; but it J 
would be at the risk of arousing the opposition of a 
powerful party in parliament and, perhaps, of offending 
the king. The arguments in favour of opposite policies 
were too evenly balanced for a decision to be easy. 

Parliament was summoned to meet early in January, 
1766 ', and it was foreseen that the American question 
would be the most important subject of debate. The 
ministers were not united on a policy; the crisis, which 
had thus suddenly arisen, found them unprepared. Some 
were in favour of a total repeal of the act; others pre- 
ferred modification. When the cabinet met on December 
27th, there was a clear divergence of opinion. There 
was a general agreement to assert the legislative rights 
of parliament over the colonies by means of a declaratory 
act; but they could not determine whether the stamp 
act should be repealed or only modified 2 . The question 
was far too important to be left thus undecided; and 
the ministers turned to Pitt for advice and assistance. 
Thomas Townshend was sent to Bath to learn Pitt's 
views on the American question, and to invite him to 

1 Parliament had met on Dec. 17th, 1765, but only to be prorogued 
to the following January. 

2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 3, f. 11 ; Adolphus' History of England, i. 197, 
198. It is interesting to note that Newcastle, who was not present at this 
cabinet meeting, was opposed to the idea of a declaratory act. Add. MS. 
32973, f. 25. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 257 

join the administration 1 . It was unfortunate that this 
appeal for assistance had not been made earlier; for 
when it came it found Pitt in no compliant humour. 
Chagrined perhaps because he had not been approached 
before, he refused to express an opinion on the American 
question, save to the king or parliament; and, though 
professing willingness to take office under the crown and 
to serve with Rockingham, Conway, and Grafton, he 
demanded, as a condition of his acceptance, that Newcastle 
should be excluded from the ministry, and that the 
treasury should be offered to Lord Temple. If, however, 
Temple still declined to take that office, Pitt was willing 
that Rockingham should retain it 2 . 

These were hard terms for the ministers to digest, 
and both Newcastle and Rockingham had cause for 
offence. The latter could not but be vexed at being 
called upon to make way for Temple, and upon New- 
castle fell the whole weight of Pitt's anger and distrust. 
It was not a conciliatory answer to a friendly overture, 
and it is difficult to censure Rockingham for refusing 
to submit to conditions so imperiously dictated. Yet in 
so doing he was guilty of a blunder. It was worth 
making a great sacrifice in order to gain the assistance 
which Pitt alone could give; and the loss of Newcastle 
would have been but a trifling price to pay. Nor was 
the latter unwilling to play the role of victim to political 
necessity. Rising above himself, he proved, by his con- 
duct at this crisis, that a long course of corrupting others 
had not destroyed the nobler elements in his composition. 

1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 11, f. 55 ; Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 62, 63. 
Grafton asserts that Pitt was asked to place himself at the head of the 
administration ; but this statement is not supported by either Newcastle 
or Rockingham. 

2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 

w. 17 



258 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

He was ready and even anxious to retire from the 
administration, rather than stand in the way of Pitt's 
return to power 1 , and it was Rockingham who refused 
to submit to the will of the great commoner. Grafton 
and Conway desired that the king should invite Pitt to 
confer with him; but the prime minister firmly and 
successfully opposed the idea of making any further con- 
cessions to the man who had so grossly insulted those 
who bore him only good- will. His influence prevailed : 
no message was sent to Pitt, but it remained undetermined 
whether, should he attend parliament, the king would 
grant him an audience after a levee 2 . 

Grafton was aggrieved at this decision. He had only 
taken office on the understanding that Pitt should be 
allowed to join the ministry when he liked; and he felt 
that the pledge had not been fulfilled. An opportunity 
had been lost, and Grafton began to think of severing 
his connection with men who had failed to keep their 
word. Conway, though less prejudiced in favour of Pitt, 
was also of the opinion that a serious blunder had been 
made. Rockingham, however, refused to listen to the 
advice of his secretaries of state; but his determination 
to persevere in an undertaking, which to others seemed 
hopeless, must not be attributed to a mean desire to 
retain office at all cost. Though often lacking in under- 

1 "I immediately sent my good friend, Mr White, yesterday to my 
Lord Rockingham, to acquaint his Lordship, as I intend to do to-morrow 
the king, that I have ever been so much of opinion that it was for the 
service of his majesty and the nation that Mr Pitt should be employed, 
tbat I could not suffer myself to be the avowed obstacle to it; and that 
I therefore desired to resign my employment to remove that obstacle." 
Newcastle to Page, January 7th, 1766. Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 

2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55, f. 100, f. 104, f. 117; Rockingham Memoirs, 
i. 262 — 268 ; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 43 — 47 ; Grafton's Autobiography, 
pp. 62, 63. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 259 

standing, he was not of that order of politicians who 
think solely of their own advantage. He was only too 
likely to minimise the dangers which threatened him, 
and rashly to believe himself secure of the support of 
the court 1 . Moreover, his pride may justly have been 
wounded by Pitt's demands. He had not striven for 
high office, and was not consumed by political ambition ; 
but he might well feel hurt at being asked to make way 
for a statesman of such little eminence as Temple. He 
might find it difficult to remain a member of an adminis- 
tration which had suffered a fundamental change, and 
assumed a different complexion 2 ; yet, though acting in 
no ungenerous spirit, he stands convicted of a serious 
error of judgment. He misread the signs of the times 
which really left him no alternative but to accept Pitt 
on his own terms. By appealing to Caesar, and then 
refusing to take the Caesarian answer, the administration 
had struck a blow at its own power ; it had confessed its 
weakness and displayed its obstinacy. 

It was, therefore, in no spirit of triumph that the 
ministers met parliament when it assembled on January 
14th. In his speech from the throne, the king specially 
commended the troubles in the colonies to the attention 
of the two houses. Pitt was present, and took a prominent 
part in the debate which followed the king's speech. As 
he rose to address the house, all eyes were turned on the 
man who, though without office, was more powerful than 
any minister. When he seemed about to conclude, loud 
cries encouraged him to continue. He did not condescend 
to tell his hearers what they would have liked to hear. 
He espoused an unpopular cause, and proclaimed himself 
the champion of American freedom. He denounced the 
stamp act as inexpedient and illegal. He denied that 
1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 21. 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 

17—2 



260 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

parliament had the right of levying an internal tax on 
America; and not only excused but congratulated the 
colonists upon their resistance. " I rejoice," he exclaimed 
in a phrase which was to become famous, " that America 
has resisted." Turning to the ministers, he expressed his 
approval of them, but refused to give them his confidence : 
" confidence," he remarked with bitter emphasis, " is a 
plant of slow growth in an aged bosom." He was careful 
to describe himself as unconnected and unconsulted ; and 
if his words gladdened the hearts of the Americans, they 
must have depressed the spirits of members of the 
administration. He had gone out of his way to strike 
a blow at the ministers; and by publicly withholding 
his confidence had confirmed what before had only been 
a rumour. Men now knew that Pitt was in no way con- 
nected with the administration, and drew their conclusions 
accordingly. 

Rockingham was wise enough to understand that an 
effort must be made to counteract the baneful influence 
of a few words spoken in debate. Pitt must be persuaded 
to undo the evil he had wrought, by consenting to join 
the administration. Another attempt must be made to 
gain his assistance; and, in one respect, there was a greater 
prospect of success than before. In the debate in the 
upper house on January 14th, Temple had roundly 
declared in favour of the stamp act ; and it was possible 
that this might prejudice Pitt against him 1 . Grafton 
visited Pitt on January 16th, and two days later the 
same nobleman and Rockingham conveyed a message to 
him from the king. He was requested to say whether 
he would consent to take office, and whether he still 
desired that Lord Temple should be given an opportunity 
of joining the administration. The answer could have 
1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 270, 271. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 261 

been little pleasing to Rockingham, differing as it did 
but slightly from that returned on the previous occa- 
sion. Pitt declared himself ready to serve the king in 
a ministerial capacity, and to act with Rockingham, 
Conway, and Grafton; but he again demanded that New- 
castle should be excluded from the administration, and 
Temple allowed to take office if he wished to do so. 
Moreover, the ministry was to be subjected to changes 
and alterations which, however much the fact was dis- 
guised, would probably amount to a dissolution of the 
existing cabinet 1 . 

Such a reply, unwelcome as it was, might have been 
expected. Prepared to come to the assistance of his king 
and his country, Pitt did not intend either to lead or 
serve in an administration which was not of his own 
making. His influence must predominate in the govern- 
ment, and Newcastle must be banished because it was 
wrongly imagined that, whatever place he occupied in 
the cabinet, he would always tend to lead rather than 
to follow 2 . It may be true that Pitt was justified in 
formulating such terms, but it is not surprising that 
Rockingham was loath to accept them. Few men are 
willing to make a public confession of failure ; and 
Rockingham had also to think of those who had acted 
with him in opposition, and were now his colleagues in' 
the cabinet. If he sacrificed them in order to fulfil Pitt's 
demands, he would run the risk of being accused of 

i Add. MS. 32973, f. 148, f. 158, f. 180, f. 194; Grafton's Auto- 
biography, p. 64 ff. ; Chatham Correspondence, n. 371. Grafton's 
account differs in certain particulars from that given by Rockingham 
(Add. MS. 32973, f. 194). The former states that Pitt was willing that 
no offer should be made to Lord Temple ; but it is difficult to believe this 
statement, seeing that Pitt, when called upon to come into office six 
months later, was quite prepared to have Temple as a colleague. 

2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 237. 



262 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

treachery towards those who, whatever their short- 
comings, had at least always loyally supported him. 
Yet, whatever blame attaches to the refusal of Pitt's 
terms, must rest not on Rockingham but on George III. 
The king, had he chosen to do so, could have sent for 
Pitt, and instructed him to form an administration in 
accordance with the conditions he had formulated. This 
he was not willing to do; and, having heard Pitt's 
answer, decided to discontinue the negotiation 1 . Such 
conduct is difficult to explain if it be believed that the 
king was fretting under the rule of the whigs. But of 
such discontent there is no trace. The ministers had not 
yet come into conflict with the royal will ; and their very 
weakness and lack of popular support commended them 
to the king. He might fare far worse with Pitt in power, 
and had little need to anticipate danger from those who 
would be unlikely to find either defenders or sympathisers 
if attacked by the court. 

Thus the second attempt to gain the support of Pitt 
had failed ; but the ministers, enlightened by his speech 
in parliament, were aware of his views on the American 
question. Now that he had spoken, they were prepared 
to act. At a meeting at Lord Rockingham's house on 
January 17th, it was decided to repeal the stamp act, and 
to introduce a declaratory bill, asserting the rights of par- 
liament over the colonies 2 . This was an attempt to solve 
the difficulty by a compromise, and had all the defects 

1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 194, f. 224, f. 237; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 
271, 272. 

2 "Charles Townshend and General Conway, Dowdeswell, and the 
Duke of Grafton were here this evening. The ideas we join in are nearly 
what I talked of to you this morning, that is — a declaratory act in general 
terms, — afterwards to proceed to considerations of trade, etc., and finally 
determination on the stamp act, i.e. a repeal." Rockingham to Charles 
Yorke (endorsed 17th January, 1766). Add. MS. 35430, f. 31. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 263 

of timid statesmanship. In deciding upon a policy of 
repeal, the ministers must have been greatly influenced 
by Pitt's opinion. It was the only course open to them, 
unless they were prepared to drive him into violent 
opposition. If, stopping half-way, they had advocated 
the modification rather than the repeal of the act, they 
would find both Grrenville and Pitt against them; and 
it was therefore wiser to proceed further. Yet there 
would be many who would regard the policy of repeal 
as an unworthy concession to rebellion; and the king, 
though prepared to see the stamp act removed from the 
statute book, was anxious that the rights of the mother 
country over the colonies should be definitely asserted 1 . 
Thus the declaratory act was an attempt to propitiate 
those who would only grudgingly consent to a policy 
of which they did not approve. Pitt might well be 
offended, for he had denounced the stamp act not only 
as unjust but illegal; and it was to spare his suscepti- 
bilities that, though the declaratory act asserted the 
authority of the king and parliament over the colonies 
in all matters, no mention was made of the power of 
taxation 2 . It was not a strong position for men to take 
up who were responsible for the destinies of the nation. 
Rockingham was alarmed at the prospect of the parlia- 
mentary opposition which might be evoked by concessions 
to America 3 ; and sought to avert the danger by a measure 
which was to prove a rock of offence to Pitt 4 . Much 

1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 271, 272. 

2 Charles Yorke was opposed to this omission. Add. MS. 35430, f. 37. 

3 Add. MS. 35430, f. 37. 

4 In defence of Rockingham it should be stated that from a con- 
versation with Pitt on Tuesday, January 21st, he gained the impression 
that the latter was not violently opposed to a declaratory act. " As 
to the affair," wrote Rockingham, " Mr Pitt declared strongly for the 
repeal of the stamp act ; but as to the other parts of the question, the 



264 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

would depend upon the attitude adopted by the king. 
He had unwillingly consented to the repeal of the stamp 
act, regarding the concession as a necessary evil. Were 
he to find that his ministers had exaggerated the neces- 
sity, he might easily come to believe that he had been 
tricked by them. Thus on all sides danger threatened 
the administration. Ominous signs of parliamentary 
opposition soon began to appear. On the last day of 
January the government was run close in the house of 
commons on the trifling question of a Scotch petition. 
The tories and the friends of Lord Bute voted against 
the ministry which only prevailed by a scanty majority 1 . 
A few days later the opposition carried a question against 
the government in the house of lords. Bute and his 
followers openly attacked the king's servants, and the 
favourite made no secret of his intention to oppose the 
repeal of the stamp act 2 . 

The danger, which thus threatened the ministers, was 
far too serious to be neglected with safety. Grafton, 
weary of existence in a cabinet without Pitt, advocated 
that the administration should be dissolved ; but he failed 
to persuade his colleagues to take so final a step 3 . They 
endeavoured to protect themselves under the shield of 
the court, trumpeting abroad that the king approved 
of the repeal of the stamp act. They could not have 
pursued a more disastrous course. The king had assented 
to the policy of his ministers, but he had not approved 
it. He would have preferred the stamp act to be 

asserting the right of the parliament, Mr Pitt did not seem so strong as 
he was the other day in his speech." Add. MS. 32973, f. 237. 

1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 321 ; Walpole's Memoirs, u. 196. 

2 Grenville Papers, in. 357 — 359; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 47 ff . ; 
Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MSS., i. 106—108; Chesterfield's 
Letters (edited by Bradshaw), in. 1334, 1335. 

3 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 47. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 265 

modified, and had only consented to its repeal when he 
was informed that there was no alternative between that 
and enforcement. He had concealed his preference for 
modification as he had promised to support his ministers 1 ; 
but when he learnt that his name was being used to 
influence men's political opinions, he threw off the 
restraint which he had imposed upon himself. He in- 
formed Lord Strange that he would prefer modification 
to repeal, and Strange published the news abroad 2 . 
When charged by Rockingham with going back upon 
his word, he justified himself by asserting that he had 
only consented to the repeal of the act, because he was 
given to understand that it was impossible to modify it 3 . 

The confusion had been caused more by misunder- 
standing than duplicity. The ministers had failed to 
grasp that the royal consent was only conditional, and 
the king had not troubled to make his meaning sufficiently 
clear. The incident is important, inasmuch as it is the 
first serious breach between the king and the administra- 
tion. The ministers had staked everything upon the 
support of the court; and that appeared about to fail 
them. They found themselves compelled "to carry on 
a great public measure against the king's declared 
sentiments, and with a great number of his servants 
acting against them 4 ." Estranged from Pitt, and held in 
little account by the nation, they found themselves more 
isolated and helpless than ever. They had built their 
house upon the sands, and discovered the insecurity of 
the foundations when the first storm arose. 

If for a time they prevailed in parliament, it was only 

1 Grenville Papers, in. 353. 2 Grenville Papers, in. 362. 

3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 300, 301. 

* Conway to Lord Hertford, February 12th, 1766 ; quoted in Hunt's 
Political History of England, 1760—1801, p. 71. 



266 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

by dint of hard fighting; and their success was not 
unchequered by failure. It was necessary for them to 
be prepared to meet the criticism of Pitt, as well as 
encounter the opposition of their habitual opponents. On 
January 27th a petition from a body, styling itself the 
American congress, was presented to the house of commons 
which refused to accept it. This was in conformity with 
the wishes of the ministers, but Pitt seized the occasion to 
declare once more that the Americans were justified in 
their resistance to a tyrannical act which violated the 
original contract between the sovereign power and the 
colonists 1 . When on February 3rd Conway introduced 
the resolution " that Great Britain had, hath, and ought 
to have full right and power to bind the Americans in all 
cases whatsoever," he found himself opposed by Pitt who 
bitterly reflected, the day after the battle, that the 
commons had assented to "England's right to do what 
the treasury pleases with three millions of freemen 2 ." 
Nor was it only Pitt's opposition that the ministers were 
called upon to face. In the course of one week they 
suffered two defeats in the upper house; and though in 
the house of commons they succeeded in holding their 
own against their enemies, the outlook was sufficiently 
serious 3 . As far at least as the house of lords was 
concerned, there was every sign that the repeal of the 
stamp act would encounter a fierce opposition, and only 
those, who have never known what it is to flinch before 
danger, can censure Rockingham for thinking of resigna- 

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MSS., i. 105, 106 ; Rocking- 
ham Memoirs, i. 290, 291. 

2 Grenville Papers, m. 357 ; Chatham Correspondence, in. 363 — 370 : 
the letter in the Chatham correspondence is misdated. 

3 Add. MS. 35374, f. 284; Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville 
MSS., i. 106, 108 ; Grenville Papers, in. 357 — 359 ; Newcastle's Narrative, 
pp. 47, 51; Chatham Correspondence, n. 375 — 377. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 267 

tion 1 . He now knew that he would have to encounter the 
attack of the solid phalanx of placemen who thought to 
please the king by opposing his servants ; and in his hour 
of need he again turned to Pitt for assistance. 

No greater success was to attend these new overtures 
than those which had preceded them. Lord Shelburne 
was selected to act as intermediary, and Rockingham 
frankly confessed to him how necessary it was for the 
administration to establish friendly relations with Pitt. 
The latter, however, proved himself as intractable as 
before. He refused to take office at the hand of Rocking- 
ham, preferring to wait until he received the king's 
command to form an administration. To a message 
through Nuthall, asking him to frame a plan of a 
ministry, and then discuss it with Rockingham and the 
two secretaries of state, a similar answer was returned; 
only at the king's request would Pitt consent to express 
his sentiments : and Rockingham refused to carry a 
message from the court 2 . That would be equivalent to 
his own resignation and the dissolution of the cabinet 
over which he presided. Between him and Pitt lay a 
difference of principle which could neither be neglected 
nor reconciled. It was not the policy but the composition 
of the cabinet that was at stake. Rockingham was the 
champion, and Pitt the opponent, of the party system, 
and neither would give way in the struggle. The youthful 
prime minister was confronted by a choice between two 
grim alternatives. He must either abandon his post and 
confess to failure before he had suffered defeat, or 
continue to strive against apparently overwhelmingly 
odds. It is to his credit that he chose the nobler if the 

1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 303. 

2 Add. MS. 32974, f. 417 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 379—382 ; 
Chatham Correspondence, n. 397 — 402; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 311 — 313. 



268 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

more hazardous course. As Pitt refused his assistance, 
except on terms too humiliating to be accepted, Rocking- 
ham took his fate into his hands, and continued the battle 
unaided. 

On Friday, February 21st, Conway moved for leave to 
bring in a bill to repeal the stamp act 1 . He enlarged 
upon the damage inflicted by that measure upon English 
merchants trading with America ; and the excited crowd, 
largely composed of men interested in American trade, 
which thronged the passages and gathered in the lobbies 
of the house, proved that Conway was speaking the truth 
and not having resort to a rhetorical device. The debate 
continued for many hours, and it was not until a new day 
had dawned that the motion was carried by a majority of 
one hundred and eight. It is unnecessary to follow in 
detail the passage of either the repeal bill or the declaratory 
act through the two houses. In spite of the opposition of 
a host of placemen 2 , both measures were carried; and the 
ministers enjoyed a triumph, the greater because it was 
unexpected. Their success is somewhat surprising, con- 
sidering the difficulties they encountered; and it is open 
to doubt whether the king was so actively antagonistic 
to the repeal of the stamp act as has been often assumed. 
Save for his remark to Lord Strange, there is no proof 
that he intrigued against his ministers ; and it may have 
been due to the moderation of the crown that the govern- 
ment was not pushed harder than it actually was 3 . 

1 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 210, 211. 

2 For a list of the placemen who voted against repeal in hoth houses, 
see Appendix in. 

3 "The repeal was carried in both houses by the ministers against 
the king's declared inclinations, which is a case that has seldom 
happened, and I believe seldom will happen. Lord Bute's conduct has 
been, through all this affair, extremely irresolute and undecided." 
Chesterfield's Letters (edited by Bradshaw), in. 1336. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 269 

The king was wise in his generation. By thwarting 
the repeal bill, he might have added to his unpopularity 
with the nation; and he did not have to fear, as a result 
of his inactivity, an increase in the popularity of the 
administration. The gratitude of the people was given 
not to the ministers but to Pitt. It was he who received 
the laurels of victory. He had never wavered in his 
opposition to the stamp act, and had declared for repeal 
when the cabinet was too divided in opinion to be able to 
formulate a policy. He reaped the reward of his con- 
sistency. The whigs had borne the brunt of the battle, 
but he acquired the glory 1 . The great measure had been 
carried, but the administration had gained neither in 
strength nor reputation. 

The ministers could not conceal from themselves that 
they had failed in office as they had failed in opposition. 
They had not succeeded in gaining the approval of the 
nation, or in retaining the support of the court ; and shat- 
tered were the hopes which they had cherished of Pitt's 
assistance. The king refused to punish the placemen who 
had voted against the repeal bill ; and thus all, who were 
anxious to oppose the government, knew that they could 
do so with impunity. Perhaps because they realised how 
short was the time at their disposal, Rockingham and 
his colleagues were not sparing of their energy. The 
remainder of the parliamentary session was not wasted. 
General warrants were declared illegal, and the obnoxious 
cyder tax repealed ; but, beneficial as these measures may 
have been, they failed to add to the prestige of the 
government. In the panegyric which he pronounced 
upon the ministers after their fall from power, Burke 
laid stress upon their legislative activity, and proudly 

1 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 75, 76 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Round 
MS8. 14th Report, Appendix, ix, p. 298. 



270 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

asserted that they had left " their king and their country 
in a much better condition than they found them 1 ." This 
is undoubtedly true, but it was not correct to say, as 
Burke did, that the Rockingham administration was 
<( supported by the confidence of the nation." It was 
because they were lacking in this, that they found them- 
selves unable to overcome the various forces opposed to 
them. 

The end did not, however, come suddenly: it was 
heralded by a long drawn-out agony. The Duke of 
Grafton, who had so long talked of resignation, executed 
his threat at the end of April. For many months he had 
continued in office under protest. He had only consented 
to join the administration on the understanding that Pitt 
should be allowed to take his place in it directly he 
desired to do so ; and he was aggrieved that this condition 
had not been fulfilled. In order to induce him to remain, 
a final, but equally unsuccessful, attempt was made to 
win Pitt. The ministers could have had little hope of 
.success attending these overtures, but the negotiation 
has an interest, since it afforded Pitt an opportunity to 
speak out more clearly than he had ever done before. 
He revealed the reason of his antipathy to the Rocking- 
ham administration which, he declared, must be remodelled 
on non-party lines. The best and ablest members of all 
parties must be summoned to serve the king, and the 
value of men estimated, not by their political connections, 
but by their ability to promote the glory and prosperity 
of England 2 . 

The resignation of Grafton was the beginning of the 
end, and when, from his place in the house of lords, the 
former secretary of state declared that he had left the 

1 Short Account of a late Short Administration. 

2 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 57, 58. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 271 

administration because, in his opinion, it lacked "authority, 
dignity and extension 1 ," he revealed to the public gaze 
the skeleton in the ministerial cupboard. The ministers 
might have prolonged their tenure of official life by an 
alliance with Lord Bute and his party ; but they shrank 
from so ignoble a surrender of the principles which they 
had maintained in opposition 2 . Newcastle advised that 
the parliamentary session should be concluded as soon as 
possible, and measures taken to placate the placemen 3 ; but 
such a makeshift policy was powerless to avert the doom 
which threatened them. Nor were their chances of 
survival increased by the appointment of the Duke of 
Richmond as Grafton's successor. The vacant post had 
been offered to Lord Hardwicke and his brother, Charles 
Yorke ; but the former, though he agreed to take a seat 
in the cabinet without office, was unwilling to become 
secretary of state, and Charles Yorke was not to be 
diverted from the goal of his ambition 4 . The appointment 
of Richmond was not pleasing to the king who declared 
that he had been forced by Rockingham to approve it 5 ; nor 
was the new secretary of state likely to be of much assistance 
to his colleagues. He had had little political experience, 
and it is worthy of remark that Horace Walpole favoured 
the appointment on the strange ground that Richmond 
was likely to give way to his native indolence if not given 
employment 6 . Yet, if the selection of Richmond was a 

1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 421; Grenville Papers, in. 242. 

2 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 60; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 228, 229. 
s Add. MS. 32975, f. 72. 

4 Add. MS. 35428, f. 22 ; Add. MS. 32975, f. 254 ; Rockingham 
Memoirs, i. 330, 331, 333 ; Grenville Papers, in. 240. 

5 Add. MS. 32975, f. 254. 

6 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 229. Lord Buckinghamshire remarked in a 
letter to Grenville: "Apropos to the Duke of Richmond, as the whig 
administration, thinking it necessary always to have a secretary of 



272 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

mistake, it was one of little account, seeing that the 
ministers were rapidly passing beyond all hope of re- 
demption. If they continued to survive for a few weeks 
longer, it was only because they were sufficiently weak to 
be tolerated with safety. The king remained in command 
of the situation, and was able to refuse the requests of his 
servants with impunity. He declined to create new peers 
at their bidding, or to remove those who attacked them 
in parliament 1 . It was clear to all men that the end 
could not be far off. Buckingham may have blundered 
when he omitted to secure the consent of parliament to 
a provision for the king's younger brothers 2 , but it is not 
to this mistake that he owed his downfall. Though the 
administration had only been in existence for a year, it 
displayed all the symptoms of old age and decay. Even 
its admirers did not wish it to survive. When a false 
rumour was spread that the king had sent for Pitt, Lord 
Albemarle, a staunch supporter of the whig party, rejoiced 
that his friends had been relieved from an impossible 
situation 3 . The death blow came early in July. At a 
cabinet meeting at the end of June, the lord chancellor 
quarrelled with the ministers, and declared his intention 
of ceasing to attend the cabinet 4 . He informed the king 
that he desired to resign his office. In an interview with 
Rockingham, George III laid stress upon the gravity of 
the situation, and remarked that he must seriously consider 
the proper course to be taken 5 . By the following day he 
had decided upon a line of action, and summoned Pitt 

state of the race of Charles II (for what other motives could determine 
them) have appointed His Grace to succeed the Duke of Grafton, the 
Duke of St Albans is next heir to the seals, and we may yet live to see 
them in the hands of the Duke of Cleveland." Add. MS. 22358, f. 35. 

1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 347 ; Grenville Papers, in. 253. 

2 Add. MS. 35428, f. 22. « Add. MS. 32975, f. 414. 
* Rockingham Memoirs, i. 350. 5 Add. MS. 32976, f. 19. 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 273 

to visit him. The decisive step had been taken, and the 
Rockingham administration had ceased to exist. 

The element of tragedy in the history of this whig 
ministry is that, with the best intentions in the world, it 
failed because it deserved to fail. Since it had first come 
into being, it had waned rather than waxed in strength. 
It had sought salvation by works, and discovered, to its 
dismay, that nothing it could do would gain for it the 
faith which alone could justify it in the eyes of the nation. 
It is true that it had not been favoured by circumstances. 
The death of Cumberland had been a heavy blow, and 
the ministers had not foreseen the attitude which Pitt 
would adopt. They had, moreover, alienated the sympathy 
of the king, and thus deprived of the very prop of their 
power, the essential weakness of the ministry could no 
longer be concealed. It suffered the fate which is marked 
out for all who depend for their strength upon external 
assistance. Rockingham and his companions had em- 
barked upon a noble and difficult undertaking, and they 
had failed to achieve success. It is true that they had 
initiated and passed measures likely to benefit the country 
and restore harmonious relations between England and 
her American colonies ; but they had not fulfilled their first 
and greatest duty, that of keeping themselves in power. 
The country needed a powerful and stable administration, 
and Rockingham was unable to give it what it needed. He 
could do nothing without Pitt, and the latter persistently 
refused his assistance or protection. 

The fall of the whigs, and the accession of Pitt to 
power, closes and begins an epoch in the reign of George III. 
Six years had passed since the king had ascended the 
throne, an untried and inexperienced boy, and within 
that short time he had succeeded in making the authority 
of the crown more of a reality than it had been since the 
w. 18 



274 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

death of Queen Anne. With marked courage he had 
entered upon a contest with the most popular statesman 
and the most successful party manager of the day, and 
had emerged victorious ; but his triumph had only been 
obtained after a sharp struggle, the issue of which some- 
times seemed uncertain. Driven from office, Newcastle 
and his friends had upheld in opposition those principles 
of party government to which they owed their success in 
the past; and although the battle had been fierce and 
intense, the king possessed the inestimable advantage of 
being able to turn against his opponents the very weapons 
they had used in the days of their predominance. It says 
much for Newcastle's political insight that he understood, 
more clearly than any of his associates, that, unable to 
bribe and corrupt as had been their wont, the whigs must 
attack the government in the name of the nation, and 
prevail against the crown by becoming the popular party. 
In order to attain this end, it was necessary that Pitt 
should become a member of the opposition, or at least 
extend to it his approval; and by July, 1766, it was 
evident to all men that the great commoner had 
definitely abandoned all belief in the party system. 
Henceforward it was vain for the whigs to look to him 
for any assistance. He had decided against the principles 
which they professed, and proved his faith by forming an 
administration which Burke aptly compared to a piece of 
uncemented tessellated pavement. The national hero of 
the day had declared himself on the side of the crown; 
and if Newcastle mourned the loss of an indispensable 
ally, the king could congratulate himself upon the ac- 
quisition of a most valuable recruit. 

Thus the period ends in a royal triumph and a whig 
defeat. The principles of party government, repudiated 
by Pitt, and discredited by the downfall of the Rockingham 



THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 275 

administration, seemed about to fall into the oblivion 
which engulfs effete political ideas. George II had been 
avenged by his grandson, and the power, granted by the 
revolution settlement, restored to the monarchy. From 
1766 until the fall of Lord North in 1782, it was the 
king who governed in the name of his servants. Largely 
responsible for the policy which resulted in the outbreak 
of the war of American independence, playing an active 
and predominant part in the unconstitutional crusade 
against Wilkes, George III, though successful, gave an 
instructive lesson in the evils of personal government. 

The royal industry, disastrous as it was in many 
respects, was not wholly unproductive of good results, 
inasmuch as it enabled men to understand that the party 
system was not a mere mechanical contrivance, by means 
of which a few men ruled the country, but an essential 
part of the political machinery for restraining the authority 
of the crown. Many years after his death Newcastle was 
justified by the son of the man who had refused him 
assistance in the hour of need. In his relations with the 
duke, Pitt was guilty of a grave political blunder. During 
the early years of the reign it had been within his power 
to render the whig party an effective force, and he had 
refused to do so; and it is in accordance with the usual 
irony of history that the man, who had assisted to win 
Canada, contributed towards losing the American colonies. 
He united with his sovereign to destroy the party 
system; and the disastrous events of the years, which 
elapsed between the fall of Rockingham and the fall of 
North, were to show that Newcastle was right and Pitt 
was wrong. 



18—2 



APPENDIX I. 

WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER. 

All students of the eighteenth century owe a deep debt 
of gratitude to Dr von Ruville for his masterly biography 
of one of the greatest figures of that period ; but we feel 
sure that the learned author would be the last to ask 
that we should accept his conclusions without examination 
or criticism. It is impossible to dispute Dr von Ruville' s 
impartiality or freedom from prejudice; but it is open 
to question whether some of the theories he propounds 
do not rest on too slender a basis of fact. His judgment 
of Pitt's character does not err on the side of generosity, 
and it is somewhat startling to English readers to find 
that statesman depicted as a vulgar fortune-hunter. 
Few great men have had mc T, i glaring defects and more 
obvious failings; but, until ne appearance of Dr von 
Ruville's work, it was always elieved that Pitt, whatever 
his faults, was never influent d by sordid motives or the 
desire for money. As is v> 11 known, he received at 
different times valuable leg cies from the Duchess of 
Marlborough and Sir Willia Pynsent; but it has been 
reserved for his most recer . biographer to discover a 
sinister interest attaching t( these bequests. Divesting 
these gifts of their apparent innocence, he reveals them 
as the price paid to Pitt for acting against his convictions j 
and with the ruthlessness of the scientific historian, 
sacrifices the honour of his hero in order to establish his 



WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 277 

wisdom. The charge cannot be passed by without exami- 
nation. If the accusation can be proved, Pitt's reputation 
for integrity is destroyed. He stands no higher than his 
contemporaries, and indeed lower, for they at least did 
not conceal their vices under the cloak of disinterested 
ambition. 

By the will of the Duchess of Marlborough, who died 
in October, 1744, Pitt inherited ten thousand pounds, and, 
in addition received reversionary rights of great value. 
The generosity of the duchess probably had its spring 
in her hatred of Walpole. That minister had wronged 
her in the days of his power, and she was glad to reward 
the man who had dared to oppose him, and had suffered 
for his temerity. As she had made no secret of her 
intentions, the legacy did not come as a surprise either 
to Pitt or to the world 1 . The fact that the duchess had 
allowed her benevolent designs to be known before her 
death is not unimportant, inasmuch as it rendered it 
possible for Pitt's policy to ;be influenced by the prospect 
of a substantial legacy. $uch an influence, however, 
must be carefully discriminated from the effect produced 
upon Pitt by his accession of wealth after the duchess' 
death. In the one case h* would be dependent upon the 
whim of a tyrannical and ( aged woman : in the other he 
would be more completer his own master than ever 
before in his career. 

It will be convenient i^o consider first the attitude 
adopted by Pitt after thaadeath of the duchess. Until 
this time a comparatively ; poor man, he had inherited, 
if not a fortune, at least a substantial sum of money, and 
might be expected to adopt a more independent line of 
action than hitherto. If at this period he is found to 
have changed his opinion in any important particular, 
1 Grenville Papers, i. 32. 



278 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

an obvious case for inquiry exists; but the investigator 
would do well to bear in mind the deceitfulness of the 
maxim — post hoc, ergo propter hoc. It seems that a few 
weeks before the death of his benefactress, Pitt had taken 
part in negotiations with the Pelhams whom he had 
consented to join without making any conditions as to 
measures. After the death of the duchess, however, he 
changed his opinion, and refused to contemplate the 
possibility of an union with the Pelhams whom, he 
denounced as worthless and useless. It would be easy, 
as Bolingbroke did 1 , to conclude at once that with his 
increase in wealth Pitt had lost all desire to take office, 
but such a conclusion would certainly not be beyond 
all dispute. It is well to remember that Pitt was the 
least consistent of politicians, and the most prone to take 
offence; and if we attribute his unwillingness to take 
office solely to the legacy, we may be assigning a single 
cause to an event which, as a matter of fact, had several. 
Yet, even if we allow that Bolingbroke was right in 
his surmise, Pitt's admirers have no need to blush for 
him. Enriched by the benevolence of the Duchess of 
Marlborough, he could now afford to take a more inde- 
pendent line, and stand oat for better terms; but this 
cannot be taken to prove that, when Pitt consented to 
a union with the Pelhams, he was acting against his 
convictions. Politicians, like other men, are often not 
free agents, and have to put up with what they can get, 
rather than continue a struggle for the unobtainable; 
and the greatest infamy that can be urged against Pitt 
is that he took full advantage of the independence con- 
ferred upon him by an admirer's kindness. If this be 
counted a disgrace, the honour of many statesmen will 
be in peril. 

1 Marchmont Papers, i. 70 — 75. 



WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 279 

Whether Pitt was influenced or not by his increased 
financial independence may remain a point in dispute, 
but it is far more serious when he is accused by Dr von 
Ruville of having deliberately framed his policy so as 
to ensure receiving the legacy. This is to reduce the 
greatest statesman of his age to the rank of those needy 
adventurers who are willing, for the sake of gain, to 
sacrifice everything except their own advantage, and 
everybody except themselves. If the accusation can 
be proved, then Horace Walpole was right when he 
cynically remarked that countries were usually saved 
by the worst men in them. There is, however, ground 
for believing the cruel charge to be baseless; and the 
particular actions of Pitt, which appear so suspicious to 
his biographer, are capable of a more innocent inter- 
pretation. 

Dr von Ruville has great difficulty in understanding 
the animus with which Pitt pursued Walpole after the 
latter' s .fall from power; and suggests that when he 
called for the punishment of the man who had betrayed 
and corrupted England, he was thinking more of the 
Duchess of Marlborough than of the welfare and honour 
of the country. It may be questioned, however, whether 
the difficulty involved in Pitt's conduct in this crisis exists 
anywhere but in his biographer's imagination. Fierce 
and bitter as was the attack on Walpole, personal in 
its tone and vindictive in its arguments, it must be 
admitted that it was eminently characteristic. The man 
who could insult his brother-in-law in the house of 
commons, and wield all the thunder of his eloquence 
against the Duke of Newcastle, was not likely to spare 
the minister who appeared to him to have betrayed the 
country. Few statesmen have been more the victim of 
unreasoning prejudice, and to Pitt, Walpole was the 



280 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

enemy not only to be overthrown but to be destroyed. 
If Pitt had been moderate and restrained, if he had 
practised a machiavellian cunning, and concealed his 
hostility under the cloak of friendship, some explanation 
might have been necessary, but that he should be unfair, 
vindictive, personal, and violent, presents no difficulty. 
It did not need the stimulus of a promised inheritance 
to induce him to pour out the vials of his wrath upon 
a man whom he thought had acted wrongly. 

The attack on Walpole is, however, the minor count 
in Dr von Ruville's charge against Pitt; and the more 
important instance of the latter's supposed duplicity 
must now be examined. In the summer of 1744, the 
Pelhams, desirous of compelling the king to dismiss 
Carteret, negotiated with the opposition. They found 
their enemies divided in opinion. Lord Cobham refused 
to lend his assistance to the ministers, except on specific 
conditions, whereas Pitt and Chesterfield were in favour 
of an unconditional union with the administration. In 
this incident Dr von Ruville again detects the mark of 
the cloven hoof. In opposition Pitt had been foremost 
in calling for that measure of reform which would put 
an end to the prevailing system of corruption ; and yet, 
at the critical moment, we find him abandoning his pro- 
fessions, and willing to unite with the Pelhams without 
even stipulating for a place bill. If we follow Dr von 
Ruville, we must at once attribute this inconsistency to 
the legacy which was being dangled before him. But 
difficult as it may be to account for the change of front, 
it is more difficult to attribute it to a desire to please the 
Duchess of Marlborough. Henry Pelham and his brother 
were under the protection of the Earl of Orford, and were 
therefore not likely to be pleasing to the latter's deadly 
enemy. Dr von Ruville perceives this obstacle in his 



WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 281 

path, and attempts to overcome it by explaining that 
inasmuch as Chesterfield, who had much influence with 
the duchess, had consented to unite with the Pelhams, 
Pitt was obliged to follow suit. This argument, ingenious 
as it is, does not carry conviction. Because Chesterfield 
had committed himself to a policy which might reason- 
ably be a cause of offence to the duchess, it is not 
apparent why Pitt should have done the same, and 
though one may deplore his readiness to sanction a 
system of government which he had so justifiably 
attacked, it is unnecessary to attribute his conduct to 
the meanest motive. 

If there is little evidence to prove that the Duchess 
of Marlborough had in any way bought Pitt, there is 
less to show that his policy, at a later stage of his career, 
was at all influenced by the prospect of the Pynsent 
inheritance. Sir William Pynsent, a west-country baronet 
of eccentric tastes, was a stout whig and an eager oppo- 
nent of the Peace of Paris. On his death in January, 
1765, it was discovered that he had left the bulk of his 
fortune to Pitt. With an ingenuity, which dispenses with 
any proof, Dr von Ruville argues that the animosity 
displayed by Pitt against the Peace of Paris, and those 
who assisted to make it, can only be explained by a desire 
to please Sir William Pynsent, and acquire the valuable 
inheritance. One serious objection at least must be over- 
come before this theory can be accepted. There is abso- 
lutely nothing to show that Pitt was aware of Pynsent's 
design. He was not acquainted with him, and it is 
difficult to treat with becoming seriousness the argument 
that Pitt must have known of the legacy, because " Sir 
William scheint aus seinem herzen durchaus keine Mor- 
dergrube gemacht zu haben. Sein offenbar cholerisches 
Temperament liess das kaum zu." In reply to this 



282 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

contention it might be urged with some force that, 
if Pynsent was likely to reveal his intentions to Pitt, 
he was equally likely to reveal it to others; and yet, 
when the news of the legacy was published, the world, 
as well as the legatee, was surprised. 

This, however, is not the only line of argument 
employed by Dr von E-uville. He endeavours to drive 
us between the horns of a cruel dilemma. He argues 
that unless we are willing to accept his suggestion that 
Pitt's opposition to the Peace of Paris was influenced by 
sordid and unworthy motives, we are left without any 
adequate explanation of his conduct. This is only 
another way of saying that we must convict Pitt of 
either baseness or madness. The dilemma, however, is 
of Dr von Kuville's own creation. Doubtless it would be 
very difficult to explain or justify Pitt's opposition to 
the Peace of Paris, if that treaty was, as Dr von Puville 
describes it, the most glorious ever concluded by England. 
Such an estimate may well be considered extravagant, 
even by those who consider the peace to have been 
unfairly censured. Grlorious, inasmuch as it ended a most 
successful war, and added wide dominions to the British 
Empire, the attack upon the treaty was not due simply 
to the spirit of party and factious opposition. Pitt may 
have gone further than many of his contemporaries, but 
he was not alone in thinking that a great opportunity 
had been lost by faulty diplomacy and undue precipita- 
tion. This, surely, would be enough to account for his 
hostility. Statesman enough to see that the peace, having 
been made, must be maintained, he could not forgive 
those who had helped to bring it about; and until 
Dr von Puville produces further evidence, he must excuse 
us from believing that Pitt was the hired bully of Sir 
William Pynsent. 



WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 283 

It is always easier to make charges against character 
than to refute them; but there is a sound principle in 
English law which attributes innocence until guilt is 
proved. And Pitt has every right to claim the protection 
afforded by this canon of justice. The verdict of history 
is in substantial agreement with the opinion of contempo- 
raries. Pitt had many enemies who were willing to 
accuse him of much, but they never charged him with 
being base; and, if permitted to hear the judgment 
passed upon him by Dr von Ruville, he might appeal 
to his career as a whole in refutation of the charge. 



APPENDIX II. 

THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD OF THE UNI- 
VERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE IN THE YEAR 1764. 

The internal affairs of an university, though always 
of immediate and absorbing interest to those intimately 
concerned with them, do not often attract the attention 
of statesmen and men of the world. The academic poli- 
tician is generally condemned to play his part upon a 
narrow stage and before a scanty audience. Preoccupied 
with issues, the importance of which escapes the per- 
ception of the ordinary man, he is unable to win a name 
amongst those who move in a different environment to 
himself; and both his skill in securing victory, and his 
fortitude in enduring defeat, are rarely appreciated be- 
yond the confines of his university. This is not, however, 
always the case. It sometimes happens that an academic 
contest arouses enthusiasm in the non-academic mind; 
and those who have conquered and been vanquished in 
obscurity, are for once allowed to display their prowess 
to the world at large. Such an opportunity came in the 
year, 1764, when the office of high steward of the uni- 
versity of Cambridge fell vacant through the death of 
the first Earl of Hardwicke. For the space of a few 
weeks, Cambridge became a centre of attraction to many 
who, though not enamoured of learning or its devotees, 
were anxious to strike a blow at their political opponents. 

The two candidates for the vacant post were the 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 285 

new Lord Hardwicke and the Earl of Sandwich. The 
former might justly aspire to high office in a learned 
society. Possessed of studious tastes, and unblown upon 
by the breath of scandal, he formed a striking contrast 
to his rival, the Earl of Sandwich, who was justly 
considered one of the most abandoned and profligate 
characters of the period. It is difficult to imagine a vice 
which would not have attracted him, or an infamy which 
he would not have perpetrated. As licentious as Wilkes, 
he lacked the latter' s many redeeming qualities; and 
when that sordid champion of freedom was denounced 
by Sandwich in the house of lords, the world was more 
amused than astonished. Fearing neither God nor man, 
he pursued with undiminished vigour his vicious pleasures, 
until death put an end to his debauchery. He lived 
in an age which was by no means squeamish, but few 
men have been more mercilessly pilloried by their con- 
temporaries for the excesses of their private life. Gray 
in The Cambridge Courtship, and Churchill in The 
Candidate, drew pictures which, even if only partly true, 
would suffice to stamp Sandwich as a monstrous libertine ; 
and their testimony, though doubtless inspired by political 
hostility, is too well supported from other sources to be 
lightly disregarded. 

If Lord Hardwicke, however, could assert a superiority 
in morality to his rival, the latter was far more ex- 
perienced in public life. During part of the reign of 
George II, Sandwich had been first lord of the admiralty, 
and had assisted in settling the preliminaries of peace at 
Aix-la-Chapelle. In September, 1763, he had become 
secretary of state in Grenville's ministry; and it was, 
therefore, as no unknown man that he appeared before 
the university of Cambridge. He was able to match 
his political experience against the secluded life and 



286 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

studious habits of the second Lord Hardwicke; and if 
the latter could claim to be more in sympathy with the 
academic mind, Sandwich could point to his reputation 
as an industrious and not inefficient administrator. 

It is not likely, however, that the competition between 
these two men for the office of high steward would have 
awakened much enthusiasm, save in the university itself, 
if it had not been that one was secretary of state, and 
the other the son of one of the leaders of the whig 
opposition. It was the candidates, rather than the office 
which they sought, that aroused men's interest. If 
Sandwich succeeded in being elected high steward, the 
king and his ministers would gain a notable triumph in 
a university which, with Newcastle as chancellor, had 
always been regarded as a stronghold of the opposition. 
It was this consideration which induced the whigs to 
neglect the parliamentary warfare, and concentrate their 
attention upon the contest at Cambridge. They believed 
it to be their duty to repel the ministerial intruder, and 
to strike a resounding blow at the prestige of the king's 
administration. It was inevitable that Newcastle should 
play an active part in such a struggle. He was prepared 
to strain every nerve to achieve victory for the son of 
his old friend, and for the party whose destinies he 
guided; and, doubtless, conscientiously thought that, in 
so doing, he was serving the country as faithfully as if 
he had been engaged in supervising the parliamentary 
combat. He knew that he was fighting the same enemy 
at Cambridge as he had fought at Westminster; and 
could salve his conscience with the reflection that it was 
his opponents who had chosen the new ground for the 
encounter. 

It was of vital importance that no time should be lost. 
The old Lord Hardwicke died on March 6th, but his life 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 287 

had been despaired of many days before the end came, 
and canvassing had begun before his death. Lord 
K-oyston 1 might well feel reluctant to appear too eager 
to succeed his father in his various dignities, but his 
rival had less reason for delicacy, and was not likely to 
refrain from action for fear of committing a breach of 
good taste. The secretary of state was the first in the 
field 2 . No sooner was Lord Hardwicke dead than 
Sandwich's supporters began to arrive in Cambridge 3 ; 
and, by wasting no time, he was apparently more success- 
ful than his antagonist in enlisting the sympathy of the 
non-resident members of the university. Speedy action 
on the part of the whigs was necessary if the battle was 
not to be lost at the outset; and in response to a hint 
from Newcastle, Charles Townshend left London for 
Cambridge on March 8th 4 . It is true that he could be 
ill spared from the house of commons, where he might 
have rendered invaluable service in contesting Grenville's 
budget; but, always ready for a new excitement, it is 
likely that he was by no means unwilling to embark 
upon an enterprise which possessed the attraction of 
novelty. 

In fairness to Townshend, however, it should be said 
that he faithfully discharged the duties imposed upon 
him, throwing himself with ardour into the new field 
of operations, and labouring assiduously to win votes 
for Hardwicke. He was soon able to report satisfactory 
progress 5 , and Newcastle had good reason to be satisfied 



1 The title borne by the eldest son of Lord Hardwicke. 

2 In a pamphlet entitled "An Address to the Members of the Senate " 
(1764) reference is made to " the indecent use made of a lingering illness 
previous to the death of our late most worthy high steward." 

3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 123. 4 Add. MS. 32956, f. 248, f. 254. 
5 Add. MS. 32956, f. 310. 



288 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

with the exertion of his nephew. About the middle of 
March, his place was taken by Thomas Townshend, and 
Charles departed from the university, to return again 
before the end of the month 1 . "The coming of the two 
Mr Townshends," wrote the master of St John's, "has. 
had a good effect, and done great service to your cause 2 ." 
Successful they may have been, but the methods 
employed, though typical of the men and the period, 
would not commend themselves to university politicians, 
at the present day. To a certain Mr Hill of St John's,, 
Newcastle wrote, " Though I have not the honour to be 
personally known to you, as I had the pleasure to con- 
tribute to your obtaining the degree of master of arts in 
our university, I take the liberty to ask the favor (sic) of 
you to give that vote to the present Earl of Hardwicke 3 ." 
It was arranged that Mr Mease, fellow of St John's, and 
curate at Halesworth in Suffolk, should be approached 
by Sir Joshua Vanneck from whom he had hopes of 
advancement in the church 4 . Mr Fogarve, of the same 
college, undertook to give his vote for Lord Sandwich 
in return for a Whitehall preachership ; but he was wise 
in his generation, and discreetly refused to be content 
with civil promises 5 . Mr Carr, a member of the caput, 
had obtained a valuable living through the influence of 
Lord Rockingham and the Archbishop of York; and his 
indebtedness to these two magnates was not forgotten by 
those working in Hardwicke's interests 6 . Mr Barton was 
to be compelled to vote for Hardwicke because his mother 
was pensioned by Lady Gainsborough 7 ; and Mr Bennet 
was " much embarrassed " when a certain name was 

1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 414 ; Add. MS. 32957, f. 310. 

2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 34. 3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 316. 
4 Add. MS. 32956, f. 393. 5 Add. MS. 32957, f. 123. 
6 Add. MS. 32957, f. 153. ? Add. MS. 32957, f. 165. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 289 

mentioned to him 1 . Thus any weapon of intimidation 
or persuasion which came to hand was used ; and Thomas 
Townshend waxed indignant at the idea that the Bishop 
of Exeter might not be able to prevent his chaplain from 
voting at the election 2 . 

In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Charles Towns- 
hend gave an interesting account of his labours. "Our 
friend, the Bishop of Lincoln," he wrote, " arrived in the 
afternoon, and we instantly canvassed his college, and 
called together upon one or two gentlemen of St John's, 
Lincolnshire gentlemen whom I thought open to explicit 
solicitation, and likely to be influenced by the visit, 
civility, and kind assurances of their own bishop, in 
opposition to the loose though positive promises of our 
liberal adversary. Fogarve of St John's was one whom 
I have good hopes we shall get, but Gunning is more 
reserved, and I wish the Bishop of Ely may not have 
wrote too slightly to him. He should both repeat and 
enforce the application, for Gunning is not engaged. 
Dr Powell will try him again this day. Mr Browne, 
minor canon of Rochester, waits Lord Ravensworth's 
directions, and will be with us upon that application. 
I think I have made an impression upon Dr Collignon 
who stands, even in the present list, marked against us. . . . 
Pemberton of Peterhouse declared to me yesterday after 
long expostulation. He is a pretty young man. I have 
this morning gained ground with Ewin, and I will venture 
to say he will go with us....Longmire of Peterhouse is 
shy, but the master thinks him sure. He is the more 
material as he is a proctor, his colleague against us, and 
the manner of taking the votes exceptionable, and too 
open to all sorts of inaccuracy 3 ." 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 149. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 149. 

3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 357. 

w. 19 



290 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

Thus the game was played ; and men, accustomed to 
lead quiet secluded lives, suddenly found themselves 
cajoled and threatened by eager politicians and great 
nobles. Much had undoubtedly been done to improve 
Hardwicke's prospects; but Sandwich still retained an 
advantage in respect of the non-resident voters, and 
might succeed in carrying the day by their aid. The 
whigs were ready enough to bring up their supporters 
from London and elsewhere, but time was fighting against 
them. The election had been fixed for March 22nd, and 
the day was close at hand. It was in vain that Newcastle 
petitioned for a delay of a week : the vice-chancellor, 
though in sympathy with Hardwicke, refused to comply 
with the demand 1 . It is probable that no alteration 
would have been made, had it not been for the indiscreet 
action of certain of Sandwich's followers. In their 
anxiety to thwart their opponents as much as possible, 
they over-reached themselves, and contrived to furnish 
the vice-chancellor with an excuse for postponing the 
day of the election. 

As at present, masters of arts, who removed their 
names from the register of the university, lost the right 
of voting in the senate, but it was possible for them, 
by replacing their names, to recover the privilege. To 
obviate abuses, which might possibly arise in connection 
with this practice, it was expressly provided that an 
interval of three months must elapse, after the date of 
re-admission, before the right of voting could be exer- 
cised 2 . It had, apparently, never been definitely decided 
whether these three months were to be reckoned by the 
moon or by the calendar ; and, taking advantage of this 
ambiguity, Dr Smith, master of Trinity, and an ardent 

1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 314, f. 369. 

2 A longer interval, namely 180 days, is now demanded. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 291 

supporter of Sandwich, presented a memorial to the vice- 
chancellor, in which he contended that " no person re- 
admitted after December 22nd had the right of voting 
in the senate on March 22nd," inasmuch as "the space 
of time from December 22nd to March 22nd, being equal 
to the months of December, January, and February 
added together, or of January, February, and March 
added together, contains three calendar months 1 ." 

If Dr Smith was right in his contention, Lord 
Hardwicke's followers had been guilty of a miscalcula- 
tion which might have serious consequences. Reckoning 
the three months, required by statute, according to the 
moon, they had counted upon using the votes of all their 
friends re-admitted before December 30th. Between the 
latter date and December 22nd there had been twenty- 
two re-admissions, thirteen of whom were supporters of 
Hardwicke, and nine followers of Sandwich 2 . Thus the 
point raised by the master of Trinity was of something 
more than academic interest. If his interpretation of 
the statute was upheld, Hardwicke would be the loser; 
and if the question was left unsettled, the validity of 
twenty-two votes would be open to dispute. It was of 
material advantage to the whigs, at this crisis of their 
fortunes, that they numbered the vice-chancellor amongst 
their friends. Throwing his scruples to the winds, he 
frankly acted as a partisan; and, on the advice of 
Hardwicke's party, postponed the election to March 30th 3 . 
By this he did more than cut the ground from under the 
feet of the master of Trinity; he gave Newcastle and 
his friends time to win votes amongst the non-resident 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 61. 

2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 260. No mark is attached to the name of 
George Onslow, but it seems fair to include him amongst the supporters 
of Hardwicke. 3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 57, f. 95. 

19—2 



292 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

members of the senate. It is not surprising that Sandwich 
was deeply chagrined by such conduct. He had every- 
thing to lose, and nothing to gain, by delay ; and displayed 
his vexation by threatening the vice-chancellor with legal 
proceedings 1 . 

It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the im- 
portance of this incident. Sandwich had suffered a 
rebuff, but he still remained a very formidable antagonist. 
Neither party could look forward to a triumphant issue 
with any degree of certainty. University opinion was 
closely divided on the merits of the rival candidates; 
and it was clear that, whoever carried the day, would 
only do so by a narrow majority 2 . Moreover the existing 
constitution of the university increased the difficulty of 
a reliable forecast. The high steward was appointed by 
a grace which had first to be passed by the caput, a small 
body consisting of the vice-chancellor and five other 
members. The powers of this assembly were by no means 
inconsiderable, inasmuch as any individual member of 
it had the right of absolute veto 3 . If passed by the 
caput, the grace would be submitted to the senate which 
was divided into two houses, known as the regents and 
non-regents. All masters of arts for the first five years 
after taking their degree were regents, after which time 
they became non-regents. The consent of each house 
was necessary to the passing of a grace; and this pro- 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 137. 

' 2 The majority of heads of houses were supporters of Hardwicke ; 
and of the colleges, while Trinity, King's, Pembroke, Caius, and St 
Catharine's were strongholds of the Sandwich party, Queens', Corpus, 
Clare, and Peterhouse were mainly in Hardwicke's interest. Add. MS. 
32957, f . 5, f. 53, f. 205 ; Add. MS. 32958, f. 60, f. 68, f. 70, f. 72, f. 74, 
f. 76, f. 80, f. 82. 

3 Wordsworth's Social Life at the English Universities in the Eighteenth 
Century, pp. 38, 39. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 293 

vision enabled the junior members of the university often 
to offer effective opposition to their seniors. A doctor 
enjoyed the privilege of voting in either house, except for 
the first two years after taking his doctor's degree, during 
which period he was a member of the regents' house 1 . 

Those working in Lord Hardwicke's interests were 
prolific in producing statements purporting to show the 
numerical strength of the two parties 2 ; but the value 
of these accounts is very much open to question. All 
prophecies, as to the probable result, were vitiated by the 
element of uncertainty which it was impossible to elimi- 
nate. A certain proportion of the voters preserved a 
discreet silence, refusing to commit themselves definitely 
to either party; and these were the men who, by de- 
claring themselves at the last moment, might turn the 
balance in one direction or the other. It was, moreover, 
extremely difficult to foretell the number of non-residents 
who would vote on the day of the election; and the 
unexpected arrival of Castley from the Isle of Man 
caused the master of Jesus to have the most gloomy 
forebodings 3 . Nothing was beyond doubt, save that it 
would be a close encounter and a fight to the finish. 

If a certain number of the senior members of the 
university were reticent in expressing their opinions, 
their example was not followed by the undergraduates 
who displayed a lively interest in the struggle which was 
going on in their midst. Without a vote in the senate, 
they were unable to influence the course of events, but 

1 "You know," wrote Lord Sandwich in 1764, "there are many 
doctors who are only regents" (Add. MS. 32957, f. 184). Dr Warren 
described himself as a member of the regents' house " as two years are 
not quite elapsed since I was admitted doctor " (Add. MS. 32957, f. 31). 

2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 271, f. 321, f. 442 ; Add. MS. 32957, f. 1, f. 83, 
f. Ill, f. 165, f. 276. 

3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 165. 



294 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

were willing enough to seize an opportunity for riot and 
disorder. They were, for the most part, warmly in 
favour of Lord Hardwicke, and showed little mercy to 
the most eminent supporters of his rival. On the night 
of March 15th there was a riot in King's, the under- 
graduates gathering round the provost's lodge, and 
raising the cry "Bring out your daughters, Jemmy 
Twitcher is come 1 ." The scholars and pensioners of 
Trinity were bitterly opposed to their master for his 
support of Lord Sandwich; and there was a reasonable 
fear that a serious riot might break out on the day of 
the election. Constables were planted in the streets 
leading to the senate house, and every precaution taken ; 
for, as an observer informed Newcastle, "the spirit of 
the young men on this occasion... was very remarkable, 
so that there was just reason to fear that they might 
proceed to extremities against some particular persons 2 ." 
Whatever disturbance there was, however, occurred 
inside and not outside the senate house. The grace for 
the appointment of Lord Hardwicke as high steward 
having been safely steered through the caput, was sub- 
mitted to the senate on March 30th. It passed the non- 
regents' house by a narrow majority of two; but when 
the votes of the regents were added up, it was discovered 
that the two proctors disagreed. Longmire, the senior 
proctor, counted 108 placets for the grace and 107 non- 
placets, but this order was exactly reversed by Foster, 
the junior proctor, according to whose reckoning the 
grace was non-placeted by one vote. The confusion 
appears to have arisen through a blunder by Foster. 
When everyone had voted except Longmire, an equal 
number of placets and non-placets, namely 107, stood 
recorded on each proctor's list. Longmire then voted 
1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 193. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 396. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 295 

placet and recorded his vote on his list; but, either by 
accident or design, he was marked by Foster as having 
non-placeted the grace. 

The conflicting lists were presented by the esquire 
bedell to the vice-chancellor who at once commanded 
the two proctors to appear before him. In the meantime 
Longmire and Foster had altered their lists, so as to make 
it appear that an equal number of placets and non-placets 
had been given 1 . Addressing them from the chair, the 
vice-chancellor inquired whether they could declare the 
grace approved or rejected, instructing them, if they 
found themselves unable to give a definite answer, to 
hold a second scrutiny. At once three doctors, supporters 
of Sandwich, arose, and loudly called upon the junior 
proctor to answer no questions, to refuse a second scrutiny, 
and to adhere to his declaration that the number of votes 
was equal. A scene of general confusion followed, in 
the midst of which was heard a hammering on the door 
of the senate house. The provost of King's called the 
attention of the vice-chancellor to the noise, and declared 
it to come from the master of Trinity seeking admission. 
Fearing perhaps that he might be insulted and misused 
by the undergraduates of his college 2 , Dr Smith had 
refrained from appearing in the senate house, much to 
the annoyance of his allies who, when they heard the' 
knocking, concluded that he had repented at the eleventh 
hour. If their surmise was correct, he had chosen his 
time well : his vote in a second scrutiny might decide the 
question in favour of Sandwich. 

This point was quickly seen by the members of the 

1 This was an arithmetical impossibility, inasmuch as it was never 
denied that the number of placets and non-placets given by the regents 
amounted in all to 215. 

2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 396. 



296 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

senate. The provost of King's demanded that the master 
of Trinity should be admitted, and was opposed by the 
master of Magdalene who argued, with some force, that 
" the mistake, which was made amongst the numbers 
then present, was not to be rectified by the admittance 
of a new vote 1 ." Either convinced by this argument, 
or influenced by his sympathy with Hardwicke, the vice- 
chancellor ordered that the doors should not be opened; 
but no sooner had the decree gone forth, than the futility 
of the discussion was revealed. It was discovered that 
the knocking proceeded from a messenger who had come 
to say that the master of Trinity would do anything for 
Lord Sandwich, except imperil his life for him. 

This incident was but an interlude in a day of con- 
fusion and anarchy. When it was understood that 
Dr Smith did not seek admission, the discussion reverted 
to the question of the second scrutiny. The master of 
Trinity Hall argued that constitutional practice demanded 
a second scrutiny, and the vice-chancellor was of the 
same opinion. What followed may be best described 
in the words of a contemporary. " Silence was ordered. 
Mr Bennet, notary public, was summoned to attend that 
he might take notice what questions were asked, and 
of the replys (sic). The question put to the senior proctor 
was, ' Will you declare placet or non-placet ? ' ' No, I 
cannot.' ' Will you proceed to a second scrutiny ? ' 
' Yes, with all my heart.' The like questions were put 
to the junior proctor who answered to the first as the 
senior proctor had done; to the other, that he would 
go to no second scrutiny. Then the vice-chancellor gave 
him a monition so to do ; which he refusing to obey, the 
vice-chancellor dissolved the congregation 2 ." 

1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 394. 

2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 394, see also f. 310, f. 312. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 297 

This was but a barren result for the hard work which 
had preceded the election. Both parties had cause for 
dissatisfaction, for it still remained open to question 
which of the two candidates, if either, had been elected. 
When first approached for his opinion, Charles Yorke 
argued that the dissolution of the congregation, before 
any declaration had been made, annulled all the pro- 
ceedings, and that nothing remained but to hold a second 
election 1 . Newcastle, however, was bitterly opposed to 
such a course of action, and it is not likely that Sandwich 
was prepared to begin the struggle all over again. But, 
if a second election was out of the question, no alternative 
remained but an appeal to the courts of law. This might 
appear to be an equally hazardous enterprise, but Lord 
Hardwicke and his followers were encouraged to hope 
for a successful issue by a lucky discovery made by the 
Bishop of Norwich. Apparently a certain Mr Pitt, who 
had given his vote in the regents' house against Lord 
Hardwicke, had done so illegally, being a non-regent. He 
had taken his degree as master of arts on July 18th, 1758, 
"from which day," wrote the Bishop of Norwich, "his 
regency takes its reckoning, not from the subsequent 
commencement 1759. Persons who go out by mandate, 
as he did, are created immediately, and their creation 
makes their commencement as the Bishop of Lincoln can 
inform your grace 2 ." 

The case was brought before the court of king's bench 
in the spring of 1765, and decided in Hardwicke's favour, 
Pitt's vote being disallowed. Thus ended the contest 
which had continued for more than a year, and which 
may be said to have profited neither party. The triumph 
of Hardwicke was too belated to be of substantial ad- 
vantage to the whig opposition, and Sandwich had gained 
1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 466. 2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 23. 



298 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

nothing by his incursion into unfamiliar territory. By 
the time that the matter was submitted to the court of 
king's bench, a good deal of the interest had evaporated ; 
but when the contest was at its height, feeling had run 
high in the university. The calm of academic life was 
rudely broken, men's passions were aroused by the mimic 
warfare; and one of the greatest of the Cambridge 
colleges was the scene of a struggle which, being the 
outcome of the greater contest, may not unfittingly be 
related here. 

On April 5th, 1764, Lord Sandwich arrived in Cam- 
bridge from Hinchingbrooke, and was invited to dine in 
the hall of Trinity on the following day. The passions, 
aroused by the events of the previous weeks, had by no 
means yet subsided ; and it is significant that the master 
of Trinity took the precaution of inquiring of the fellows 
of the college whether they intended "to entertain his 
lordship genteelly 1 ." It may be surmised that he was 
satisfied with the answer they gave; but he would have 
been wiser to secure the good behaviour of the junior 
members of the college. The scholars and pensioners, 
ardent partisans of Hardwicke to a man, determined to 
signify their disapproval of the action of their elders, 
and on the day that Lord Sandwich was a guest at the 
high table, only one undergraduate condescended to dine 
in hall 2 . No more effective demonstration of hostility 
could have been devised. The long empty benches told 
their own tale; and the presence of a single under- 
graduate served to point the absence of the rest. 

It would doubtless have been wiser to pass by such 
conduct in silence, but the master considered, and with 
some justice, that a gross insult had been inflicted upon 
his guest and himself. He determined upon the punish- 

1 Add. MS. 32958, f, 7. 2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 15, f. 21. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 299 

ment of the offenders, and the course he pursued can 
be best gathered from a letter written by the Rev. James 
Backhouse 1 , a fellow of the college, to the Duke of New- 
castle. "The kind concern," wrote Backhouse, "your 
lordship was pleased to express for the difficulties we 
have now to struggle with in Trinity college, induces me 
to trouble you with a sketch of our proceedings since 
my last. On Friday last, when Davis, Meredith, and 
Newbon (our friends in the present cause) were out of 
college, the master, having previously converted Powell 
and Place, summoned the seniors to confirm the sentence 
he had drawn up for the undergraduates, which, at last, 
after a sort he effected. But when the sentence came 
to be put into execution, only four of the whole number 
of lads could be prevailed upon to sign the admonition. 
What the consequences of this will be I know not ; but 
the great man declares that no vacant scholarship shall 
be filled up this year, and the young men, fearing the 
worst, are many of them looking out for a refuge else- 
where. Mr Brockett was of the seniority, and, I need 
scarce tell your lordship, most violent in his counsels. 
The next day he declared in a public coffee house that 
now the sword was drawn in Trinity college, it should 
never be sheathed whilst there was one left standing in 
the field. To give your lordship a specimen of the 
master's behaviour at the meeting, I mention the follow- 
ing circumstance, viz. — when he was pressed to a non 
plus about the true sense and meaning of a clause in the 
statute, de pona (sic) majorum criminum 2 , he commanded 

1 For an account of Backhouse, see Gunning's Reminiscences of 
Cambridge, u. 113, 114. 

2 The statute ran as follows: "Nihil est quod magis homines ad 
delinquendum incitet, quam impunitas ; et propterea statuimus et 
ordinamus, ut si quis Sociorum aut Discipulorum, aliorumve intra 



300 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 






me in a magisterial strain to be silent, alledging (sic) this 
reason for it, tliat the interpretation of the statutes 
belonged to the master alone, and the seniors had 
nothing to do with it 1 ." 

Thus one of the consequences of the contest for the 
office of high steward was open war in Trinity. The 
master was in opposition to a certain section of the 
fellows, and to nearly all the undergraduates. By dint 
of something like chicanery 2 , he had obtained the consent 
of the seniority to a high-handed measure of authority. 
The document, which the undergraduates were called 
upon to sign, ran as follows : " It being notorious that 
not one of the scholars of the house, and but one of the 

collegium vitam degentium, haereseos, autprobabilissuspicionishaereseos 
aut simoniae, aut impiae et perversae, alieujus opinionis aut dogmatis, 
aut laesae majestatis, aut pertinaciae, aut perjurii, furti notabilis, 
homicidii voluntarii, stupri, adulterii, incestus, raptionis injuriosae, ac 
violentae percussionis Socii cujusquam, aut Discipuli, aut Pensionarii, 
aut Sisatoris, aut Subsisatoris, couvictus fit, aut vulnus grave cuipiam ex 
praedictis inflexerit, aut si magistrum ejusve vicarium aut officiarium, 
octove Seniorum quempiam, vel leviter percusserit ; quinetiam si portas 
collegii furtim reseraverit, aut conjurationes vel insidias contra Collegium 
comparaverit, vel seditiones in collegio aliquando excitaverit, aut damnum 
grave ei intulerit, aut per alios haec fieri aliquando procuraverit, aut 
dedecus infamiamve Collegio inusserit, aut coram Magistro, ejusve 
Vicario, et octo Senioribus se vel haec omnia praedicta crimina, vel 
singula eorum admississe eonfessus fuerit, aut eorumdem idoneis testibus 
convictus, Magistri et majoris partis octo Seniorum consensu, sine ulla 
monitione collegio omnino privetur. 

Minorum autem criminum poena, de qua in Statutis nulla fit mentio, 
judicio Magistri, aut ejus Vicarii et octo Seniorum, semper relinquatur. " 

1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 382. 

2 "The four seniors who concurred with the master (whose con- 
currence made a majority) were Dr Walker, Mr Powell, Mr Place, 
Mr Brockett. The master availed himself of the absence of Dr Davis 
and Mr Newbon : for, by their going out of college, Place and Brockett 
came into the number of the eight resident seniors." Add. MS. 32958, 
f. 429. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 301 

pensioners, did appear in the college hall on Friday, the 
6th April last, when by invitation from the master and 
seniors, the Earl of Sandwich, Lord Townshend, and 
Lord Carysf ort were entertained there : We, whose 
names are underwritten, do confess, that being then in 
commons we did knowingly and wilfully conspire to be 
absent from the hall, as above mentioned, in open 
contempt and defiance of all decency, discipline, and 
government : and having thus debased ourselves, and 
dishonoured the college by branding it with disgrace 
and infamy, we confess we have incurred the penalty 
of expulsion by the 38th statute, De poena majorum 
criminum et minorum; and do receive from our governours 
(sic) this admonition in order to expulsion, instead of 
expulsion itself, which we have justly deserved 1 ." 

Only four undergraduates, all of them pensioners, 
were at first found willing to admit their fault, and sign 
the confession imposed upon them. The remainder, 
encouraged by their number, and by the support they 
received 2 , raised the flag of rebellion, and preferred to 
run the risk of expulsion rather than allow that they 
had acted wrongly. Yet, resolute as they were, they 
found an equal determination in the master and those 
of the seniors who were in sympathy with him. An end 
would be put to discipline if authority could be flouted 
with impunity ; and the time was not suitable for 
half-measures. The prophecy, which Mr Brockett had 

1 See Admission Book, Trinity College, Cambridge. A copy of the 
admonition is to be found amongst the Newcastle Papers, Add. MS. 
32958, f. 383. 

2 "I wish you would consider," wrote Newcastle to Charles Yorke, 
"whether those meritorious young men of Trinity can have any relief 
from these acts of oppression in the master. I hear the other colleges 
are determined to take them in the handsomest manner, if they are 
expelled their own college" (Add. MS. 32958, f. 476). 



302 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

delivered in a public coffee house, seemed in the course 
of fulfilment. The seniority met on the morning of 
May 14th, and further measures of reprisal were carried. 
It was decreed that "none of the pensioners, who will 
not subscribe the admonition to-morrow evening after 
chapel, shall be permitted to offer himself a candidate 
for scholarships " ; but, as this would only affect a certain 
section of the undergraduates, it was agreed to leave the 
punishment of the scholars and other pensioners for future 
consideration 1 . 

The penalty thus imposed was undoubtedly very 
severe. A Trinity scholarship was, and still remains, 
a much coveted honour; and, by the decision of the 
seniority, many were precluded from the satisfaction of 
their legitimate ambition, unless prepared to confess to 
a fault of which they did not feel themselves guilty. In 
defence of the action of the master and seniors, it might 
be argued that the college was justified in refusing to 
allow those, who had resisted its authority, to compete 
for its emoluments ; but this argument would apply with 
far less force to the undergraduates who, on the strength 
of being elected to a Westminster scholarship in the 
previous year, had already come into residence, but now 
found themselves denied admission into their scholarships 
unless they signed the admonition 2 . The legality of such 
a proceeding was very questionable, and the father of 
one of the boys concerned threatened to take legal pro- 
ceedings against the master 3 . 

It is to the credit of the college that an overwhelming 

1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 386. 

2 "The consequence of this I believe will be," wrote Backhouse, 
' ' that the last year's Westminsters will be excluded from their scholar- 
ships" (Add. MS. 32958, f. 386). 

3 Add. MS. 32959, f. 118. 



THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 303 

proportion of the undergraduates refused to be intimidated 
"by the tyrannical threats of the master and seniority. 
Originally only four signatures had been appended to 
the admonition, and it was not until a little later that 
James Carrington, thinking perhaps that, if Paris was 
worth a mass, a Trinity scholarship was some com- 
pensation for humiliation, submitted and signed the 
document 1 . His example was not followed by any of 
the other rebels ; and thus only five, out of the whole 
number of undergraduates then in residence, were found 
willing to confess that they had done wrong in refusing 
to dine in hall on the day that Lord Sandwich honoured 
the high table by his presence. Confronted with such 
strenuous resistance, the authorities pursued the wisest 
course under the circumstances, and abandoned the 
struggle which ought never to have been begun 2 . In 
the Admission Book of the college, there is an entry, 
dated June 23rd, 1764, which states that " in order to 
restore tranquillity and time for study, the master and 
seniors have pardoned all the offenders in the case above 
mentioned, or any way relating to it, even those who 
refused to sign the admonition"; but it is not without 
interest, or altogether devoid of significance, that amongst 
the ten candidates who were awarded scholarships in 
that year, are to be found the five who had signed the 
admonition. 

Some apology is perhaps needed for dwelling at 
length upon a topic of very limited interest; and it 
was by way of an apology that the story was relegated 

1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 386 ; Admission Book, p. 446. 

2 On May 26th Newcastle was informed that "it is thought at 
Cambridge that he (i.e. the master) will not do anything more" (Add. 
MS. 32959, f. 118); James Backhouse was also of the opinion "that the 
master is sick of his persecutions" (Add. MS. 32959, f. 150). 



304 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 

to the obscurity of an appendix. No one would contend 
that the internal affairs of Cambridge or Trinity are of 
great importance, but it is possible that they may prove 
of interest to those who, versed in the university politics 
of the present day, will find in the struggle between 
Hardwicke and Sandwich both a parallel and a contrast. 



APPENDIX III. 

Amongst the Newcastle papers in the British museum 
is an interesting list of the placemen in both houses who 
voted against the repeal of the stamp act. To the name 
of each man is appended the office that he held; and 
the document gives a vivid illustration of the strength 
of the party of "king's friends/' and the power which 
George III possessed to control the decisions of the house 
of commons. 



ADDITIONAL MSS. 33001, April 26, 1766 
Placemen who voted against the Repeal 



Lord Barrington 
Lord Bateman 
Lord R. Bertie 
William Blakiston 
Hon. Robert Brudenell 
Hon. John Burgoyne 

Hon. Charles Cadogan 
James Campbell 
Sir James Douglas 
Archibald Douglas 
Jeremiah Dyson 
John Eames 
Sir G. Elliot 
Simon Fanshaw 
Lord Adam Gordon 
Marquis of Granby 



Secretary at War 

Master of the Buckhounds 

Lord of the Bedchamber 

Solicitor General to the Queen 

Vice Chamberlain to the Queen 

Colonel of the 16th Regiment of 

Dragoons 
Surveyor of the Gardens 
Governor of Stirling Castle 
Admiral of the White 
Colonel of Dragoons 
Commissioner of Trade 
Master in Chancery 
Treasurer of the Chambers 
Comptroller of the Green Cloth 
Colonel of Foot 
Master of the Ordnance 

20 



306 



PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 



Thomas Gilbert 
David Graeme 
John Hamilton 

William Gerard Hamilton 
Eliab Harvey 
Edward Harvey 
Frank Holbouin 
Marquis of Lome 
John Ross Mackye 
Alexander Mackay 
Lord Robert Manners 
John Manners 
R. H. Thomas Millar 
Thomas Moore Molineux 

H. Arch Montgomery 
John Morton 
John Mostyn 
Edmund Nugent 
R. H. James Oswald 
Earl of Panmure 
Sir George Pococke 
George Rice 
John Lockhart Ross 
Lord George Sackville 
Sir John Sebright 
Henry Seymour 
Lord Charles Spencer 
Hans Stanley 
Sir Simeon Stuart 
Lord Strange 
Thomas Thoroton 
Edward Thurlowe 
Henry Wauchope 
Lord Warkworth 
Alexander Wedderburn 
Thomas Worsley 



Comptroller of the Household 

Secretary to the Queen 

Master of the King's works in 

Scotland 
Chancellor of Exchequer in Ireland 
King's Counsel 
Colonel of Light Horse 
Admiral of the Red 
Colonel of Foot 
Paymaster of the Ordnance 
Colonel of Foot 
Colonel of Dragoons 
Housekeeper at Whitehall 
Lord Advocate 
Captain in the 3rd Regiment of Foot 

Guards 
Ranger of S. James and Hyde Park 
Chief Justice of Chester 
Colonel of Dragoons 
Groom of Bedchamber 
Vice Treasurer of Ireland 
Colonel of Foot 
Admiral of the Blue 
Lord of Trade 
Captain in the Navy 
Vice Treasurer of Ireland 
Colonel of Foot 
Groom of the Bedchamber 
Verdurer of Whichwood Forest 
Governor of Isle of Wight 
Chamberlain of the Exchequer 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancashire 
Secretary to the Master of the Ordnance 
King's Counsel 
Deputy Privy Purse 
Aide-de-camp to the King 
King's Counsel 
Surveyor of Board of Works 



PLACEMEN AND REPEAL OF THE STAMP ACT 



307 



April 17, 1766 
Lords having places who voted against the Repeal 



Earl of Pembroke 

Earl of Denbigh 

Earl of Litchfield 

Earl of Coventry 

Earl Ferrers 

Earl Waldegrave 

Earl Orford 

Earl of Buckinghamshire 

Earl of Oxford 

Earl Harcourt 

Earl of Darlington 

Earl Talbot 

Viscount Townshend 

Earl of Sutherland 

Earl of Eothes 

Earl of Eglintoun 
Earl of Loudon 
Earl of March 
Lord Cathcart 



Colonel of Dragoons 

Master of Fox Hounds 

Captain of the Band of Pensioners 

Lord of Bedchamber 

Captain in the Navy 

Colonel of Dragoons 

Banger of S. James and Hyde Park 

Lord of the Bedchamber 

Lord of the Bedchamber 

Lord Chamberlain to the Queen 

Master of the Jewel Office 

Lord Steward 

General of the Ordnance 

Aide-de-camp to the King 

Colonel of 3rd Regiment of Foot 

Guards 
Lord of the Bedchamber 
Colonel of Foot 
Lord of the Bedchamber 
First Commissioner of Police in 

Scotland 



20—2 



INDEX. 



Act, cyder, 147, 149, 150, 149 n. 3, 
196, 212, 213; repeal of, 269; 
declaratory, 256 and n. 2, 262 
and n. 2, 263, 268; declaring 
the rights and liberties of the 
subject, 3 ; excise, 27 ; Jew 
naturalization, 27 ; militia, 24 ; 
mutiny, 3 ; regency, 219-222 ; 
stamp, 217, 218 ; resistance to, 
in America, 253-255 ; considera- 
tion of, by the Rockingham 
ministry, 255, 256; parliament- 
ary debate upon, 259, 260; 
decision to repeal, 262 and 
n. 2, 263; repeal of, 268, 305- 
307 

Advice in writing, 73; refused by 
the king, 75 

Aix - la - chapelle, treaty of, 68, 
285 

Albemarle, Earl of, see George 
Keppel 

America, annihilation of English 
force in, 15 ; and the stamp act, 
217, 241, 253-255, 266; war 
with, 275; see also 250 

Andover, parliamentary election at, 
in 1761, 38 

Anne, Queen, 3, 6, 7, 9, 274 

Anson, George, first Lord Anson, 
first Lord of the admiralty, 37 ; 
opposed to war with Spain in 
1761, 72, 76; death, 112 

Ashburnham, John, second Earl of 
Ashburnham, 233 

Augsburg, proposed congress at, 
49 and n. 2, 50, 54 

Austria, relations with France in 
1761, 47-49, 60, 61 

Backhouse, James, fellow of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 299 and n. 1, 
302 n. 2, 303 n. 2 



Barre\ Isaac, attacks German war 
and Pitt, 98 ; dismissed from his 
military post in 1763, 203; op- 
poses stamp act, 218; refuses a 
place in Rockingham ministry, 
253 

Barrington, William Wildman, 
second Viscount Barrington, 
chancellor of the exchequer in 
1761, 32; his political opinions, 
32, 246 ; relations with New- 
castle, 32, 109 ; resigns chancel- 
lorship of the exchequer, 112, 
113 ; secretary at war under 
Rockingham, 245; reasons for 
selecting him, 246 ; see also 208 

Barton, Mr, of the university of 
Cambridge, 288 

Bath, 256 

Beauclerk, George, third Duke of 
St Albans, 271 n. 6 

Bedford, Duke of, see John Russell 

Belleisle, meditated attack upon, 
24, 51 ; fall of, 53 ; restoration 
of, to France, 140 

Bennet, John, of Clare college, 
Cambridge, 288 

Bessborough, Earl of, see William 
Ponsonby 

Bloomsbury gang, nickname of the 
Duke of Bedford's party, 13, 153, 
184 

Bolingbroke, Viscount, see Henry 
St John 

Boroughs, rotten, and treasury, 4 

Boscawen, Hugh, second Viscount 
Falmouth, electioneering in- 
fluence in Cornwall, 4 n. 1 

Boston, riots in, against the stamp 
act, 254 

Brielle, Solar de, 114 

Bristol, Earl of, see George William 
Hervey 



INDEX 



309 



Briton, the North, 159, 160 ; voted 
a libel, 192, 193 

Brockett, Laurence, fellow of 
Trinity college, Cambridge, and 
regius professor of modern his- 
tory, 299, 300 n. 2, 301 

Browne, Mr, minor canon of 
Eochester, 289 

Burke, Edmund, influence over 
Bockingham administration, 243 
n. 2; panegyric upon Bocking- 
ham ministry, 269, 270 ; opinion 
of Pitt's administration of 1766, 
274 

Bussy, Comte de, instructions of, 
48 n. 2 ; arrives in England, 51; 
relations with English ministers, 
52, 53, 64, 65 ; meeting with Pitt, 
65 and n. 4 

Bute, Earl of, see John Stuart 

Bute's friends, nickname of a poli- 
tical party, 215, 238 and n. 2 ; 
oppose the Bockingham ministry, 
264 ; possibility of alliance with 
Bockingham ministry, 271 

Cabinet, outer and inner, 31, 33, 
34, 85; independence of crown, 
8, 9; dispensation of patronage 
by, 7, 8 

Calcraft, John, 203 

Candidate, The, 285 

Cambridge Courtship, The, 285 

Cambridge, university of, election 
of high steward of, in 1764, 201, 
202, 210, 284-298 

Cambridge university, vice-chan- 
cellor of, see William Elliston 

Camden, Earl of, see Charles Pratt 

Canada, conquest of, 19 ; and peace 
negotiations in 1761, 54, 55, 58 ; 
governorship of, offered to Pitt, 
87; see also 139 

Cape Breton, and peace negotia- 
tions in 1761, 54, 55, 58, 60, 62 

Caput, the, 288, 292, 294 

Carr, Mr, of the university of 
Cambridge, 288 

Carrington, James, 303 

Carteret, John, Lord, Earl Gran- 
ville, and the Pelhams, 280 ; 



dismissed by George II, 4 ; de- 
nounced by Pitt, 16 ; opposes 
Pitt in peace negotiations of 
1761, 56; advises Lord Egre- 
mont to accept the office of 
secretary of state, 83 n. 1; and 
peace negotiations in 1762, 122 ; 
his death, 153 

Caryl, Lynford, master of Jesus 
college, Cambridge, 293 

Carysfort, Lord, see John Proby 

Castley, Mr, 293 

Cavendish, Lord John, 135 

Cavendish, William, fourth Duke 
of Devonshire, his character and 
political opinions, 13 ; first lord 
of the treasury, 16, 18 ; consents 
to Bute becoming secretary of 
state in 1761, 36; attitude to- 
wards peace negotiations in 1761, 
44, 61, 62 ; threatens to dis- 
continue attendance at cabinet 
council in 1761, 66 ; reconciles 
Newcastle and Bute in 1761, 67 ; 
and Pitt's pension, 87 ; and 
Prussian subsidy, 107; and peace 
negotiations in 1762, 118; in- 
vited to return to the adminis- 
tration, 132, 133; dismissed by 
the king, 133-135, 138; his 
opinion of Pitt, 146, 195 ; and 
negotiations between Pitt and 
the king in August, 1763, 173, 
178 ; see also 74, 186, 187, 190, 
207 

Charles II, 161 

Chesterfield, Earl of, see Philip 
Dormer Stanhope 

Choiseul, Due de, and peace nego- 
tiations in 1761, 47, 48, 53-55, 
58, 64 ; his policy of duplicity, 
63, 64 ; pledged to support 
Spanish interests, 68, 69; and 
peace negotiations, 1761-63, 114- 
126 

Churchill, Charles, 285 

Churchill, John, first Duke of 
Marlborough, 18 

Churchill, Sarah, and legacy to 
Pitt, 276-281; her hatred of 
Walpole, 277, 281 



310 



INDEX 



Clare hall, Cambridge, 292 n. 2 

Cobham, Viscount, see Eichard 
Temple 

Collignon, Dr Charles, of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 289 

Commons, house of, see Parlia- 
ment 

Compact, family, 61, 70, 71, 94, 
122, 123 

Conway, Francis Seymour, first 
Marquis of Hertford, 193 

Conway, Henry, unites with oppo- 
sition, 193, 194, 203 ; deprived 
of military post, 203, 206, 218 ; 
secretary of state in Kockingham 
administration, 243, 244 ; and 
promotion of Lord George Sack- 
ville, 253 ; and appeal to Pitt in 
December, 1765, 256-259; and 
the appeal to Pitt in January, 
1766, 261 ; and the decision to 
repeal tbe stamp act, and intro- 
duce declaratory bill, 262 n. 2 ; 
his parliamentary resolution on 
February 3rd, 1766,266; and the 
repeal of the stamp act, 268 

Cornwall, electioneering influence 
of the crown in, 4 and n. 1 ; 
opposition to cyder tax in, 212, 
213 

Corpus Christi college, Cambridge, 
292 n. 2 

Crown, influence of Revolution and 
Hanoverian succession upon, 2, 
3-6, 7-9 ; patronage of, 3, 5, 6 

Cumberland, Duke of, negotiations 
with Pitt, 137, 138, 186 ; opinion 
on opposition to cyder tax in 
house of lords, 149, 150; in 
favour of disregarding Pitt and 
concluding an alliance with the 
Duke of Bedford, 212, 213 n. 5; 
despairs of opposition, 214, 216 ; 
and negotiations for change of 
ministry in April, 1765, 220 ; in 
May, 1765, 223-228; in June, 
1765, 231-233; and formation 
of Rockingham administration, 
238, 239; dependence of Rock- 
ingham administration upon, 
250 ; his death, ibid. ; effect upon 



the ministry, 251, 273; see also 
116, 132, 166, 167 n. 1, 230 n. 1 
Cyder tax, see under Act 

Dashwood, Sir Francis, succeeds 
Lord Barrington as chancellor of 
the exchequer, 112, 113; and 
John Wilkes, 159; see also 939 
n. 1 

Davis, Henry, fellow of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
n. 2 

Declaratory act, see under Act 

Delaval, Sir Francis Blake, opposes 
German war, 97 

Despenser, Lord, see Sir Francis 
Dashwood 

Devonshire, Duke of, see William 
Cavendish 

Devonshire, opposition to cyder 
tax in, 212, 213 

Dispensing power, 3 

Dodington, George Bubb, first Lord 
Melcombe, and the Weymouth 
election, 39 ; summoned to at- 
tend a cabinet council, 119 

Dominica, capture of, 61 ; and pre- 
liminaries of peace, 139 

Dowdeswell, William, chancellor 
of the exchequer in Rocking- 
ham administration, 245 ; and 
decision to repeal stamp act and 
introduce declaratory bill, 262 
n. 2 

Drummond, Robert Hay, arch- 
bishop of York, 288 

Dunk, George Montagu, second 
Earl of Halifax, opposes Pitt in 
peace negotiations in 1761, 56 ; 
first lord of the admiralty, 1762, 
112 ; secretary of state, 1762, 
128 ; offers place in cabinet to 
Newcastle, 1762, 133 ; issues 
general warrant, 160 ; proscribed 
by Pitt, 174 ; and regency act, 
221, 222 ; see also 154 n. 7, 184, 
185 

Dunkirk, 56, 58, 62, 68 

Egmont, Earl of, see John Per- 
ceval 



INDEX 



311 



Egremont, Earl of, see Charles 
Wyudham 

Election, general, of 1761, 37-41 ; 
possibility of a general election 
in 1765, 242 n. 1 

Elizabeth, Czarina of Russia, death 
of, 102-104 

Elliot, Sir Gilbert, 174, 181 n. 1, 
182 n. 1 

Ellis, Welbore, 174 

Elliston, William, vice-chancellor 
of the university of Cambridge, 
and master of Sidney Sussex 
college, 290-292, 295, 296 

Ely, bishop of, see Matthias Maw- 
son 

Ewin, Mr, 289 

Excise bill, see under Act 

Exeter, bishop of, see Frederick 
Keppel 

Falmouth, Viscount, see Hugh 
Boscawen 

Family compact, 61, 70, 71, 94, 
122, 123 

Finch, Edward, 41 n. 3 

Finch, Daniel, eighth Earl of Win- 
chelsea, appointed lord president 
of the council in Rockingham's 
ministry, 245 

Fitzmaurice, William, second Earl 
of Shelburne, opposed to German 
war, 98; named for secretary- 
ship of state in 1763, 153; ap- 
pointed first commissioner of 
trade in 1763, 154; relations 
with his colleagues in Grenville's 
ministry, 170 ; resignation of, 
183; dismissed from post of 
aide-de-camp to the king, 203 ; 
refuses to take office in Rocking- 
ham ministry, 247 ; influence of 
Pitt over, 247 ; and negotiations 
between Rockingham and Pitt 
in Feb. 1766, 267; see also 
174 

Fitzroy, Augustus Henry, third 
Duke of Grafton, opposes pre- 
liminaries of peace, 141, 142 ; 
dismissed from his lord-lieu- 
tenancy in 1762, 143 ; and cyder 



tax, 150 ; and John Wilkes, 161 ; 
Pitt's high opinion of, 237, 244 ; 
secretary of state in Rockingham 
administration, 244, 247 ; con- 
ditions upon which he took office, 
ibid. ; appeals to Pitt to declare 
his opinion of Rockingham 
ministry, 248 ; arranged that he 
should visit Pitt after Cumber- 
land's death, 251 ; and promotion 
of Lord George SackviUe, 253 ; 
and appeal to Pitt in December, 

1765, 256-259, and 257 n. 1; and 
the appeal to Pitt in January, 

1766, 260, 261; and decision to 
repeal stamp act, and introduce 
declaratory bill, 262 n. 2; favours 
dissolution of ministry, 264 ; 
resignation of, 270 ; speech after 
resignation, 270, 271 ; his suc- 
cessor, 271 

Florida, ceded to England by Spain, 
139, 140 

Fogarve, Mr, of St John's college, 
Cambridge, 288, 289 

Foster, Mr, junior proctor of the 
university of Cambridge, 294-296 

Fox, Henry, first Lord Holland, 
secretary of state in 1755, 15 ; 
abandons Newcastle, 16; views 
on George Ill's popularity, 28 ; 
testifies to Bute's influence, 34; 
suggested as Pitt's successor in 
secretaryship of state, 80, 81 ; 
his evil political reputation, 81, 
130 ; alliance with Bute in 1761, 
90, 91 ; undertakes management 
of house of commons in 1762, 
128 ; his use of bribery and cor- 
ruption, 133, 136 ; his attack 
upon the whig party in 1762, 
143; reported that Bute was 
jealous of him, 145; and Bute's 
resignation iu 1763, 151-153 ; 
offered first lordship of the 
treasury, 152, 153 ; dismissed 
from office of paymaster-general, 
229 ; see also 132 

France, outbreak of war with, 15 ; 
negotiations for peace with, in 
1761, 43-69 ; negotiations for 



312 



INDEX 



peace with, in 1761-63, 114-130, 
139, 140, 145 

Frederick the Great , King of Prussia, 
and peace negotiations in 1761, 
52, 62, 68; and English subsidy, 
101-108 ; and preliminaries of 
peace, 139, 140 and n. 1 ; see also 
under Prussia 

Fuentes, Comte de, Spanish am- 
bassador in England, 60 n. 1, 



Gainsborough, Lady, see Diana 
Noel 

Galitzin, Prince, Russian ambas- 
sador in England, 49 

George I, 7, 9 

George II, restricted powers of, 9 ; 
his German tastes, 28; opposed 
to militia bill, 24 

George III, character of, 1, 2 ; 
political education and views, 2, 
19-23, 26 n. 1 ; attitude towards 
peace negotiations in 1761, 29, 
30, 45-47; his design for con- 
trolling parliament, 25, 26 ; his 
success at general election of 
1761, 37-41 ; relations with Pitt 
and Newcastle at beginning of 
reign, 24 and n. 2, 41, 42; exer- 
cise of patronage, 41, 42; his 
popularity, 27-29 ; his speech at 
first privy council, 41; and at 
opening of parliament, 41 ; his 
hostility to Legge, 31, 32, 38; 
refuses to accept the "advice in 
writing," 75; his situation after 
Bute's resignation, 154, 155 ; 
relations with the Grenville 
ministry, 156-158, 214-216, 228- 
230 ; his hostility to Wilkes, 158 ; 
negotiations with Pitt and the 
whigs in 1763, 167-183 ; and the 
regency bill, 219-222 ; negotia- 
tions with Pitt and the whigs in 
May, 1765,222-228; negotiations 
with Pitt in June, 1765, 230-237 ; 
and formation of Rockingham 
administration, 237-239 ; his 
situation in July, 1765, 240, 
241; power over Rockingham 



ministry, 247, 248; and the 
appeal to Pitt in January, 1766, 
262 ; attitude towards Rocking- 
ham ministry, 262; and the 
repeal of the stamp act, 264, 
265, 268 and n. 3, 269 ; refuses 
to punish those who voted against 
the Rockingham ministry, 269, 
272 ; disapproves of Richmond's 
appointment as secretary of state, 
271 ; refuses to create new peers, 
272 ; summons Pitt to form a 
ministry, 272; his position in 
1766, 273-275 

German war, opposition to, 92, 93, 
96-99 

Gibbon, Edward, and Wilkes, 159 

Gloucester, bishop of, see William 
Warburton 

Gonville and Caius college, Cam- 
bridge, 292 n. 2 

Goree, and peace negotiations in 
1761, 54, 58, 64 ; in 1762, 116 

Gower, Earl, see Granville Leveson- 
Gower 

Grafton, Duke of, see Augustus 
Henry Fitzroy 

Granby, Marquis of, see John 
Manners 

Granville, Earl, see John, Lord 
Carteret 

Gray, Thomas, 87, 184, 285 

Green, John, bishop of Lincoln, 
289, 297 

Grenada, and peace negotiations 
in 1762, 117 

Gunning, Francis, of St John's 
college, Cambridge, 289 

Grenville, George, 90 ; not in 
sympathy with Pitt, 31, 82; 
promoted to rank of cabinet 
councillor, 31 ; refuses secre- 
taryship of state, but undertakes 
management of bouse of com- 
mons, 82, 83 ; limitation of his 
powers, 84 ; his oratory, 89 ; 
offended with Bute on account 
of Fox, 90, 91 ; and negotiations 
with Spain after Pitt's fall, 92, 
93, 95 ; opposed to German war, 
97 ; and Prussian subsidy, 107 ; 



INDEX 



313 



secretary of state in May, 1762, 
112 ; opposes Bute in the peace 
negotiations, 112, 118-123, 126, 
127, 145, 152; deprived of 
secretaryship of state, 126-128 ; 
continues in cabinet, 128, 129 ; 
rumour that he intends to resign, 
145 ; insulted by Pitt, 147 ; 
succeeds Bute as first lord of 
the treasury, 153, 154 ; his 
restricted authority, 153, 154, 
156, 157 ; weakness of his 
ministry, 157, 158 ; and negotia- 
tions between the king and the 
whigs in August, 1763, 170, 
173 n. 2, 175 and n. 1, 177, 179, 
181-183, 181 n. 1; reconstruc- 
tion of his administration, 183, 
184 ; divisions in his minis- 
try, 184, 185 ; his situation at 
close of the parliamentary 
session, 1763-1764, 200 and 
n. 3, 201, 202, 203, 207; his 
budget of 1764, 200, 210, 287 ; 
situation at beginning of parlia- 
mentary session, 1764-1765, 
214-216; and stamp act, 217 
and n. 2, 218 ; and regency 
bill, 219-222; his treatment of 
the king in May and June, 1765, 
228-230 ; reconciliation with 
Lord Temple, 235; fall of his 
ministry, 237-239; and the 
repeal of the stamp act, 263 
Grenville, James, 227, 253 n. 1 
Grenville-Temple, Kichard, Earl 
Temple, related to Pitt, 17 ; and 
peace negotiations in 1761, 56 ; 
favours war with Spain, 69, 72, 
73, 76 ; resignation of, 85 ; and 
cyder tax, 150 n. 4 ; and John 
Wilkes, 161, 179; dismissed 
from lord lieutenancy, 163 ; and 
negotiations for change of minis- 
try in August, 1763, 179, 182 
n. 1 ; and negotiations for 
change of ministry in May and 
June, 1765, 223-228, 226 n. 2, 
233-237, 236 n. 1; reconcilia- 
tion with George Grenville, 235 ; 
approves of stamp act, 255 ; 



suggested as first lord of the 
treasury by Pitt in Dec. 1765, 
257-259 ; defends the stamp act 
in house of lords, 260 ; and the 
negotiations between Pitt and 
the ministers in January 1766, 
260, 261 and n. 1 ; see also 147, 
148, 167 

Grimaldi, Marquis, Spanish am- 
bassador in France, 60 n. 1, 
70, 75 

Guadeloupe, and peace negotiations 
in, 1761, 54, 58; in 1762, 117, 
119, 140 

Hales worth, 288 

Halifax, Earl of, see George 
Montagu Dunk 

Hanoverian succession, effect of, 
upon royal power, 7-9 

Hardwicke, first Earl of, see Philip 
Yorke 

Hardwicke, second Earl of, see 
Philip Yorke 

Harley, Bobert, first Earl of Oxford, 
180 

Havannah, proposed attack upon, 
100 ; and peace negotiations of 
1762, 126-128, 130; surrender 
of, by preliminaries of peace, 
139, 140 

Havrineour, French ambassador 
in Sweden, 63 

Hay, Dr George, 211 

Hayes, 223, 224, 228 

Henley, Bobert, first Earl of North- 
ington, his characterand political 
opinions, 31 and n. 2; appointed 
lord chancellor, 30 ; opposes 
Prussian subsidy, 107 ; and 
regency bill, 222 ; continued as 
lord chancellor under Bocking- 
ham, 245 ; reasons for his con- 
tinuance, 245, 246 ; opposed to 
his colleagues, 245, 250 ; quarrels 
with them, 272 

Hertford, Marquis of, see Francis 
Seymour Conway 

Hervey, George William, second 
Earl of Bristol, 73, 76, 93, 
99 

20—5 



314 



INDEX 



Hesse, Landgrave of, ally of Eng- 
land during the seven years' 
war, 50 

Hinchingbrooke, 298 

Hill, Samuel, of St John's college, 
Cambridge, 288 

Hill, Wills, first Earl of Hills- 
borough, 184 

Hillsborough, Earl of, see Wills 
Hill 

Holland, Lord, see Henry Fox 

India, overthrow of French power 
in, 19 

Jacobites, Bolingbroke's relations 

with, 20 
Jesus college, Cambridge, master 

of, see Lynford Caryl 
Jenkinson, Charles, 31, 181 n. 1 
Jew naturalization act, see under 

Act 
Johnson, Dr, dislike of Scotch, 

29 ; and Wilkes, 159 
Judges, independence of tenure, 3 

Keppel, George, third Earl of 
Albemarle, 174, 232, 242 n. 1 ; 
influence over Buckingham 
administration, 243 ; welcomes 
the news of the fall of the 
Bockingham ministry, 272 

Keppel, Frederick, bishop of 
Exeter, 289 

King's college, Cambridge, 291 n. 
2, 294; provost of, see John 
Sumner 

Legge, Henry Bilson, dismissed 
from chancellorship of the ex- 
chequer, 31, 32, 113 ; king's 
hostility to, 32, 38 ; see also 147 

Leicester House, 31, 32, 246 

Lennox, Charles, third Duke of 
Bichmond and Lennox, succeeds 
the Duke of Grafton as secre- 
tary of state in 1766, 271 and 
n. 6 

Leveson-Gower, Granville, second 
Earl Gower, member of Bedford 
party, 13, 14, 153 ; sug 



for the admiralty, 154 ; pro- 
scribed by Pitt in 1763, 171 

Liddell, Henry, first Lord Bavens- 
worth, 289 

Ligonier, Viscount, 107 

Longmire, Daniel, of Peterhouse, 
Cambridge, 289, 294, 295, 296 

Louis XIV, 18 

Louisiana, and peace negotiations 
in 1762, 117 

Lyttelton, George, first Lord 
Lyttelton, 132, 228; refuses to 
take office in Bockingham minis- 
try, 247 

Mackenzie, James Stuart, dis- 
missed from office of privy seal 

of Scotland, 228, 229 ; see also 

238 and n. 2 
Magdalene college, Cambridge, 

master of, see George Sandby 
Manners, John, Marquis of Granby, 

174 
Mansfield, Earl of, see William 

Murray 
Mariegalante, and peace negotia- 
tions in 1761, 58 ; in 1762, 119 
Marlborough, Duke of, see John 

Churchill 
Marlborough, Duchess of, see 

Sarah Churchill 
Martin, Samuel, secretary of the 

treasury, his duel with Wilkes, 

193 
Martinique, and peace negotiations 

in 1762, 117, 119 
Massachusetts Bay, petitions 

against stamp act, 254 
Mawson, Matthias, bishop of Ely, 

289 
M'Culloh, Henry, and the stamp 

act, 217, n. 2 
Mease, Michael Oliver, fellow of 

St John's college, Cambridge, 

288 
Medenham Abbey, 159 
Melcombe, Lord, see George Bubb 

Dodington 
Meredith Moore, fellow of Trinity 

college, Cambridge, 299, 300 

n. 2 



INDEX 



315 



Meredith, Sir William, 198, 216 

Militia bill, disliked by George II 
and Newcastle, 24 

Minden, Lord George Sackville 
and battle of, 253 

Minorca, capture of, by French, 
15 ; and peace negotiations in 
1761, 54, 55 ; and preliminaries 
of peace, 139 

Miquelon, 115, 125, 140 

Mitchell, Sir Andrew, English 
ambassador in Prussia, 104 

Montagu, John, fourth Earl of 
Sandwich, member of Bedford 
party, his character, 13, 14, 196, 
285 ; first lord of the admiralty, 
154 ; relations with Wilkes, 159 ; 
attacks Wilkes in house of lords, 
191, 192 ; proscribed by Pitt in 
1763, 171 ; appointed secretary 
of state in 1763, 184 ; candidate 
for office of high steward of 
university of Cambridge, 201, 
285-298; and Trinity college, 
298, 301 

Murray, William, first Earl of 
Mansfield, 74, 107, 109, 162 ; 
and peace negotiations in 1762, 
116, 119 ; retires from cabinet, 
183 

Mutiny act, see under Act 

Newbon, Kichard, fellow of Trinity 

college, Cambridge, 299, 300 

n. 2 
Newcastle, Duke of, see under 

Thomas Pelham-Holles 
Neweome, John, master of St 

John's college, Cambridge, 288 
Newfoundland, fisheries of, and 

peace negotiations in 1761, 54- 

62, 68; in 1762, 115, 125, 139, 

140 
New York, congress at, 254 
Nivernois, Due de, 124 
Noel, Diana, Lady Gainsborough, 

288 
Non-regents, house of, 292, 294 
North, Lord, 26 n. 1 ; refuses a 

place in Rockingham ministry, 

253 ; his fall, 275 



Northington, Earl of, see Robert 
Henley 

Northumberland, Earl of, see Hugh 
Smithson Percy 

Norton, Sir Fletcher, . attorney- 
general, 199 

Norwich, bishop of, see Philip 
Young 

Nova Scotia, and peace negotia- 
tions in 1761, 54 

Nuthall, Thomas, 138, 267 

Onslow, George, 216, 291 n. 2 
Orford, Earl of, see Sir Robert 

Walpole 
Oswald, James, 174 
Oxford, Earl of, see Robert Harley 

Paris, peace of, see Peace 

Parliament, effect of Revolution 
upon, 3-7 ; influence of public 
opinion upon, 15, 16, 18, 22, 27; 
royal and ministerial influence 
upon, 4-6, 7, 18, 25, 26, 190; 
and general election of 1761, 30, 
37, 40, 41 ; privilege of freedom 
from arrest, 160-164, 189-195, 
208 ; privilege of freedom of 
speech, 203, 206 

Patriot king, Bolingbroke's, 20-22, 
240 

Peace, negotiations for, in 1761, 
43-77 ; prospect of success, 43- 
48 ; in 1762-1763, 114-127, 129, 
130, 139, 140 ; preliminaries of, 
signed, 130; of Paris signed, 
145, 148 ; debated in parliament, 
40, 141, 142; attacked by Wilkes, 
159, 160 ; see also 151, 170, 174, 
175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 
208, 281, 282 

Pelham, Henry, 10, 12; effect of 
his death, 15 ; see also 280 

Pelham-Holles, Thomas, first Duke 
of Newcastle, his character and 
political opinions, 9-12 ; his 
parliamentary power, 15, 18 ; 
interference in elections, 25 and 
n. 1 ; his rise to supremacy after 
fall of Walpole, 14, 15 ; resigns 
in 1756, 16 ; relations with Pitt 



316 



INDEX 



in coalition ministry of 1757, 18, 
23, 24, 36, 42 ; and Bute's ap- 
pointment as secretary of state, 
36, 37 ; adverse to Legge's dis- 
missal, 31, 32 ; and general 
election of 1761, 37-40, 39 
n. 1 ; against war with Spain, 
69-77 ; and peace negotiations 
in 1761, 24, 44, 50, 55-69; 
alliance with Bute in 1761, 45- 
47, 66-68 ; threatens to retire 
in 1761, 66 ; situation after fall 
of Pitt, 77 ; and the appointment 
of Pitt's successor, 78-83 ; and 
negotiations with Spain after 
Pitt's fall, 91-95, 100 ; and the 
German war, 92, 93, 96-99, 101, 
108, 109 ; and Prussian subsidy, 
106, 107 ; and peace negotiations 
in 1762, 114-118; resignation of, 
in 1762, 109-111; his efforts to 
win Pitt at the beginning of 
1763, 145-149; his opinion of 
Pitt's refusal to attack Bute's 
administration, 146; and cyder 
tax, 149, 150 ; his relations with 
Pitt during 1763, 164-167, 186- 
190 ; his views on Grenville's 
ministry, 153 n. 3, 157 ; and 
the negotiations with the king 
in August, 1763, 168, 169, 170, 
173, 175, 178, 179 ; his estimate 
of his political strength in the 
autumn of 1763, 190, 191; re- 
fuses to sign protest against 
limitation of parliamentary 
privilege, 195 and n. 1 ; and 
the debate on general warrants, 
198 ; and the opposition 1764- 
1765, 205-209, 212, 214, 216, 
217 n. 1 ; and the negotiation 
with the king in May, 1765, 
222-228 ; and negotiation be- 
tween Pitt and the king in June, 
1765, 231-233 ; and the forma- 
tion of Bockingham ministry, 
238, 239, 243 n. 1 ; his views 
on the parliamentary strength 
of Bockingham ministry, 242 
n. 1 ; and on advisability of a 
general election in 1765, ibid. ; 



accepts office of lord privy seal, 
244 and n. 2 ; anxiety to gain 
the support of Pitt for Bocking- 
ham ministry, 248, 249 ; dis- 
contented with his position in 
Bockingham cabinet, 249; presses 
for overtures to be made to Pitt 
after Cumberland's death, 251 
and n. 1, 252 ; not responsible 
for promotion of Lord George 
Sackville, 253 and n. 1; opposed 
to declaratory act, 256 n. 2 ; 
and appeal to Pitt in December, 

1765, 256-259, 257 n. 1; 
his willingness to resign, 257, 
258 and n. 1 ; and the nego- 
tiation with Pitt in January, 

1766, 261; advises that the 
parliamentary session should be 
brought to an end, 271 ; his 
political principles justified by 
the younger Pitt, 275 ; and 
the election of high steward of 
the university of Cambridge, 
202, 286-298 ' 

Pemberton, Andrew, of Peter house, 
Cambridge, 289 

Pembroke college, Cambridge, 292 
n. 2 

Perceval, John, second Earl of 
Egmont, joint postmaster, 145 ; 
first lord of the admiralty, 184 ; 
continued under Bockingham, 
245 ; reasons for his continu- 
ance, 246 ; disapproves of the 
projected alliance with Prussia, 
249, 250 

Percy, Hugh Smithson, second 
Earl of Northumberland, carries 
on negotiation with Cumberland 
in April, 1765, 220; in May, 
1765, 223-226; named as first 
lord of the treasury, 225 

Peter III, Czar of Bussia, accession 
of, 102 ; his importance, 102, 
103 

Peterhouse college, Cambridge, 
289, 292 n. 2 

Phillips, Sir John, 181 n. 1 

Pitt, William, his character and 
political opinions, 16, 17, 276- 



INDEX 



317 



283 ; paymaster of the forces, 
17 ; his negotiations with the 
Pelhams in 1744, 277-281 ; his 
animus against Walpole, 279, 
280; secretary of state in ad- 
ministration of 1756, 16, 18 ; 
dismissed, 18; his popularity, 
17-19, 25-27, 29 and n. 1, 30, 
157, 241, 247, 248; and victories 
of the seven years' war, 19 ; 
relations with Newcastle in 
coalition ministry of 1757, 18, 
23, 24, 36, 42 ; opposed to Bute 
becoming secretary of state, 35, 
36 ; and peace negotiations in 
1761, 24, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 
55-62, 59 n. 1, 65-69 ; favours 
war with Spain, 69-77 ; his fall 
in October, 1761, 77-79 ; popular 
feeling about his resignation, 

86, 87 ; accepts royal bounty, 

87, 88 ; his attitude towards the 
administration in autumn of 
1761, 89 and n. 1; and Prussian 
subsidy, 108 ; and German war, 
108, 210, 213, 218 n. 4; his 
relations with the whig opposi- 
tion to preliminaries of peace, 
132,136-138,140-142; relations 
with the whig opposition from 
the end of 1762 to October, 1764, 
144-149, 164-167, 185-190, 200, 
204-206, 208-210 ; opposes pre- 
liminaries of peace in parlia- 
ment, 141, 142 ; and opposition 
to cyder tax in house of lords, 
150 ; and Bute's resignation, 
152 and n. 3 ; relations with 
Charles Yorke, 165-167, 199, 
200, 208, 211 ; and negotiations 
with the king in August, 1763, 
167, 169-183, 187, 188; his 
views on party government, 186, 
189, 226-228 ; and John Wilkes, 
165, 190, 193-195, 218; and 
parliamentary debates on general 
warrants, 197-200, 216, 218, 
224 ; his breach with the whig 
party in October, 1764, 212, 
213, 218, 219, 223 ; and the 
stamp act, 218 ; and negotiation 



with king in May, 1765, 222- 
228; in June, 1765, 230-237; 
his views on the value of an 
alliance with Prussia and 
Kussia, 167 n. 1, 175, 224, 
232 ; his attitude towards the 
Rockingham ministry in the 
summer of 1765, 242, 248, 249 ; 
his high opinion of Grafton, 
237, 244; efforts of Rocking- 
ham ministry to placate him, 
245, 246, 248 ; attitude towards 
Newcastle during Rockingham 
ministry, 248, 249, 251 n. 1, 
257, 258, 261 ; expresses his 
views on the situation after 
Cumberland's death, 251, 252 ; 
dislike of Lord George Sackville, 
252, 253; appealed to for his 
opinion on the stamp act and 
asked to join the administration, 
December, 1765, 256-259, 257 
n. 1 ; attacks the stamp act in 
parliament, 259, 260 ; asked to 
join the administration in 
January, 1766, 260-262 ; and 
the declaratory bill, 263, and 
n. 4, 266 ; and overtures from 
Rockingham in February, 1766, 
267, 268; acquires popularity by 
repeal of the stamp act, 269 ; 
last overtures to him, 270, 271 ; 
summoned by the king to form 
an administration, 272, 273 ; his 
failure as a politician, 275 

Place, Marwood, fellow of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
n. 2 

Placemen, opposition of, to Rock- 
ingham ministry, 265, 267, 268, 
269, 305-307 

Pondicherry, capture of, 61 

Ponsonby, William, second Earl 
of Bessborough, 135 

Pope Alexander, 21 n. 1 ; his Essay 
on Man, 191 

Powell, John, fellow of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 289, 299, 
300 n. 2 

Pratt, Charles, first Earl Camden, 
and John Wilkes, 161-163 ; and 



318 



INDEX 



Pitt, 165 and n. 3, 189 ; named 
for lord chancellor in June, 
1765, 232 ; created a peer on 
formation of Rockingham minis- 
try, 246, 248 
Princess of Wales, see Wales 
Proby, John, Lord Carysfort, 301 
Proctor, the junior, of the univer- 
sity of Cambridge, see Foster; 
the senior, see Daniel Longmire 
Prussia, 167 n. 1, 175, 207, 224, 
232; projected alliance with, by 
Rockingham ministry, 248 ; 
abandoned, 252 ; see also under 
Frederick the Great 
Pynsent, Sir William, and legacy 
to Pitt, 276, 281, 282 

Queens' college, Cambridge, 292 n. 2 

Ratisbon, 190 

Ravensworth, Lord, see Henry 
Liddell 

Regency act, see under Act 

Regents, house of, 292, 293, 294 

Revolution of 1688, effect on royal 
power, 2, 3 ; families, 9 

Rhode Island, petitions against 
stamp act, 254 

Richmond, Duke of, see Charles 
Lennox 

Rigby, Richard, member of Bedford 
party, his character, 13, 14 ; 
opposes German war, 97 ; see 
also 127, 130, 148 

Rights, Bill of, see under Act 

Rockingham, Marquis of, see 
Charles Watson-Wentworth 

Russia, death of Czarina of, 102- 
104 ; Pitt's views on alliance 
with, 224, 232 

Russell, Francis, Marquis of Tavi- 
stock, 39 n. 2 

Russell, John, fourth Duke of Bed- 
ford, character and political 
opinions, 13 ; relations with 
Newcastle during reign of 
George II, 10, 13, 14 ; and peace 
negotiations in 1761, 44, 56, 59, 
61, 62 ; threatens to cease 
attendance at cabinet council 



in 1761, 66, 67 ; discussed as 
possible successor of Pitt, 81, 
82 ; given the office of lord privy 
seal, 85; opposed to German 
war, 101 ; and peace negotiations 
in 1762-1763, 116, 118, 119, 
123-126, 129, 130 ; Hardwicke's 
estimate of, 124 ; declines lord 
presidency of the council, 154; 
and negotiations for change of 
ministry in August, 1763, 170, 
171, 181 ; proscribed by Pitt, 
170, 175 ; accepts presidency of 
the council, 184; relations with 
his colleagues in the cabinet, 
184, 185, 212; and the king 
in June, 1765, 231 ; see also 
202, 207, 212 

Sackville,Lord George, and general 
warrants, 202 ; created vice- 
treasurer of Ireland, 252 ; Pitt's 
dislike of, 252, 253 

St Albans, Duke of, see George 
Beauclerk 

St Catharine's college, Cambridge, 
292 n. 2 

St John, Henry, first Viscount 
Bolingbroke, opposition to Wal- 
pole, 20 ; political philosophy 
of, 20-22, 188 n. 2; opinion 
of Pitt, 278 ; see also, 180, 240 

St John's college, 289 ; master of, 
see John Newcome 

St Lawrence, fishing rights in 
gulf of, 55-57, 67, 68, 115, 125 

St Lucia, and peace negotiations 
in 1762, 119-124 ; restored to 
France, 140 

St Pierre, and peace negotiations 
in 1762, 115, 125, 140 

St Vincent, and peace negotiations 
of 1762, 139 

Sandby, George, master of Magda- 
lene college, Cambridge, 296 

Sandwich, Earl of, see John 
Montagu 

Sandys, Samuel, chancellor of the 
exchequer in 1742, 84 

Saunders, admiral, 76 

Scotch, unpopularity of, 28, 29 



INDEX 



319 



Senegal, and peace negotiations in 
1761, 58 ; and preliminaries of 
peace, 139 
Shelburne, Earl of, see William 
Fitzmaurice 

Sidney Sussex college, Cambridge, 
master of, see William Elliston 

Simpson, Sir Edward, master of 
Trinity hall, 296 

Smith, Kobert, master of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 290, 291, 
295, 296, 298-303 

South Sea Company, 27 

Spain, at war with England in 
1739, 27 ; relations with France 
in 1761, 48, 49, 58-60, 63, 64; 
points in dispute with England, 
48 ; relations with England be- 
fore the fall of Pitt, 69-76; 
after fall of Pitt, 93-96, 99, 100 ; 
declaration of war with, 100 ; 
influence upon negotiations be- 
tween England and France in 
1761, 68, 69 ; and negotiations 
for peace, 1762, 115, 117, 120-126 

Spencer, Charles, third Earl of 
Sunderland, 9 

Stamp act, see under Act 

Stanhope, James, first Earl of 
Stanhope, 9 

Stanhope, Philip Dormer, fourth 
Earl of Chesterfield, 280, 281 

Stanley, Hans, appointed to conduct 
the peace negotiations in France, 
1761, 51 ; his instructions, 51, 
52 ; relations with, and opinion 
of Choiseul, 53, 58 ; summoned 
to return, 69, 114 ; arrives in 
England, 75 ; see also 70 

Stanley, James Smith, Lord 
Strange, and the repeal of the 
stamp act, 265, 268 

Steward, High, of the university 
of Cambridge, see under Cam- 
bridge 

Strange, Lord, see James Smith 
Stanley 

Stuart, John, third Earl of Bute, 
his character, 33-35 ; and 
George Ill's education, 19 ; 
unpopularity of, 28, 29, 114, 



130, 221 ; introduction into 
the cabinet, 32, 33-35; com- 
poses king's speech to first meet- 
ing of the privy council, 41 ; 
adds to the king's speech to 
parliament, 41 ; and Lord Henley, 
30, 31 ; and peace negotiations 
in 1761, 45-47, 55-60, 61-64, 
65-69 ; becomes secretary of 
state, 34-37 ; alliance with New- 
castle in 1761, 45-47, 66-68; 
opinion of Newcastle, 80 and 
n. 1 ; alliance with Pitt in 
1761, 62 and n. 4 ; resignation 
of Pitt, 74-79 ; negotiations with 
Spain after Pitt's fall, 91-96, 
100, 101 ; endeavours to under- 
mine Pitt's popularity, 86-88 ; 
fear of provoking Pitt's hostility, 
91, 99 ; attitude towards German 
war, 92, 93, 96-99, 101, 102, 
108, 109 ; and Prussian subsidy, 
101-108; his jealousy of Fox, 
145 ; and Newcastle's resigna- 
tion, 111 ; first lord of the 
treasury, 112 ; and negotiations 
for peace with France in 1762— 
1763, 114-127; endeavours to 
conciliate Newcastle and his fol- 
lowers, 132, 133; his resignation, 
151-155, 151 n. 2, 152 n. 1, 167 ; 
and formation of Grenville's 
ministry, 152-154 ; results of his 
administration, 154, 155 ; atti- 
tude towards Grenville's min- 
istry, 156 and n. 1, 157, 168; 
and negotiation between king 
and opposition in August, 1763,. 
169, 171, 173 and n. 2, 175, 179- 
183 ; his retirement from court, 
183 ; and negotiations for change 
of ministry in 1765, 220, 224; 
opposed to repeal of stamp act* 
264 

Sudbury, borough of, and general 
election of, 1761, 38 

Sumner, John, provost of King's 
college, Cambridge, 295, 296 

Sunderland, Earl of, see Charles. 
Spencer 

Suspending power, 3 



320 



INDEX 



Tavistock, Marquis of, see Francis 
Russell 

Temple, Richard, Viscount Cob- 
ham, 280 

Tobago, and peace negotiations of 
1762, 139 

Townshend, Charles, second Vis- 
count Townshend, 9 

Townshend, Charles, secretary at 
war, 32 ; relations with New- 
castle, 32 and n. 4 ; offered 
secretaryship of plantations, 131 ; 
opinion of peace of Paris, 139 
n. 1 ; and the formation of 
Grenville's ministry, 154 ; and 
negotiations for a change of 
ministry in August, 1763, 174 ; 
disgusted with Pitt, 187; despairs 
of opposition, 202 and n. 3 ; 
and parliamentary debates on 
general warrants, 197, 199 ; and 
contested election of high steward 
of Cambridge university, 102, 
287-289 ; supports stamp act, 
218 ; paymaster general, 229 ; 
refuses to become chancellor of 
the exchequer or secretary of 
state in Rockingham ministry, 
246, 247 ; and decision to repeal 
the stamp act and introduce 
declaratory bill, 262 n. 2 ; see 
also 178, 190, 202 and n. 3, 
205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212 
n. 1, 214, 217 n 1 

Townshend, George, first Marquis 
Townshend, 301 

Townshend, Thomas, sent with 
overtures to Pitt, 256 ; and con- 
tested election of high steward of 
the university of Cambridge, 288 

Trinity college, Cambridge, 292 
n. 2, 294, 298-304 

Trinity college, Cambridge, master 
of, see Robert Smith 

Trinity hall, master of, see Sir 
Edward Simpson 

Twitcher, Jemmy, nickname of 
Lord Sandwich, 294 

University of Cambridge, see under 
Cambridge 



Uti possidetis, principle of, in 
peace negotiations of 1761, 51 ; 
abandonment of, 54 

Utrecht, treaty of, 44, 54, 56, 58, 69 

Vanneck, Sir Joshua, 288 

Veni Creator, Wilkes' paraphrase 
of, 191 

Virginia, house of burgesses of, 
protests against stamp act, 254 

Viry, Comte de, Sardinian ambas- 
sador in England, 35, 36, 115, 
132 

Waldegrave, James, second Earl 
Waldegrave, opinion of George 
III, 1 ; and of Lord Bute and 
the Princess of Wales, 28 n. 3 ; 
invited to join the administration 
in 1762, 132 

Wales, Princess of, influence of, 19 ; 
unpopularity of, 28, 221 ; and 
regency bill, 221, 222 

Walker, Dr, fellow of Trinity 
college, Cambridge, 300 n. 2 

Wall, Richard, General, Spanish 
minister, 93, 99 

Walmoden, Amalie, first Countess 
of Yarmouth, 41 n. 3 

Walpole, Horace, views on patent 
places, 5 ; prophesies the fall 
of the Grenville ministry, 215 ; 
favours the appointment of Duke 
of Richmond as secretary of 
state, 271 ; see also 211, 279 

Walpole, Sir Robert, first Earl of 
Orford, position in cabinet, 9 ; 
and excise bill, 27; Pitt's animus 
against, 279, 280 ; see also 16, 
86, 280 

Walpole, Thomas, 138 ; in com- 
munication with Pitt in Novem- 
ber, 1765, 251, 252 

Warburton, William, bishop of 
Gloucester, 191 

Warrant, general, issued against 
Wilkes, 160 ; declared illegal by 
Pratt, 163, 196 ; parliamentary 
debates upon, 196-200, 216*; 
declared illegal by parliament, 
269 ; see also 206, 232 



INDEX 



321 



Warren, Dr, 293 

Watson- Wentworth, Charles,second 
Marquis of Bockingham, his 
character and political ability, 
243 ; Newcastle's letter to, 110 ; 
dismissed from lord lieutenancy, 
143 ; resigns his place in the 
bedchamber, 135 ; and negotia- 
tions for a change of ministry 
in August, 1763, 173, 174 ; and 
negotiations in May and June, 
1765, 226, 236 ; takes the office 
of first lord of the treasury, 243 
and n. 1 ; weakness of his 
ministry, 241, 242, 247, 248, 264, 
266, 269, 270 ; efforts to placate 
Pitt, 245, 246, 248 ; dependence 
upon Pitt, 247, 248 and n. 1; 
and proposed overtures to Pitt 
after Cumberland's death, 251, 
252 ; and promotion of Lord 
George Sackville, 253 ; division 
of opinion in his ministry over 
the stamp act, 255, 256 ; appeal 
to Pitt in December, 1765, 256- 
259, 257 n. 1 ; reasons for re- 
fusing to accept Pitt's terms, 
258, 259 ; his further appeal to 
Pitt in January, 1766, 260-262 ; 
decision to repeal stamp act 
and introduce declaratory bill, 
262 and n. 2, 263 ; meditates 
resignation, 267 ; fresh overtures 
to Pitt in February, 1766, 267, 
268 ; effect of the repeal of stamp 
act upon his ministry, 269; 
failure to secure parliamentary 
approval of provision for king's 
younger brothers, 272 ; fall of his 
administration, 273; and election 
of high steward of university of 
Cambridge, 288 ; see also 147, 
156, 190, 218 n. 4 

Weymouth, election at, in 1761, 39 

Wildman's club, 207 

Wilkes, John, character of, 159 ; 
dislike of the Scotch, 29, 159; 
attack on king's speech, 158-160 ; 
legal proceedings against, 160- 
163 ; and the whig opposition, 
163-166 ; parliamentary pro- 



ceedings against, 191, 192-195 : 
his Essay on Woman, 191, 192 ; 
see also 175, 179, 185, 190, 199, 
215, 218, 240, 275, 285 

William III, 3 

Winchelsea, Earl of, see Daniel 
Finch 

Wyndham, Charles, second Earl of 
Egremont, succeeds Pitt as secre- 
tary of state in October, 1761, 
83 ; and negotiations with Spain 
in 1761, 93, 94 ; opposes Prussian 
subsidy, 107; opposes Bute in 
peace negotiations, 118-127 ; 
attempts to induce him to resign 
in 1762, 112 ; rumoured resigna- 
tion of, 145 ; proposal to remove 
him from secretaryship of state 
on Bute's resignation, 153, 154 ; 
negotiates with Lord Hard- 
wicke in 1763, 168, 169; his 
death, 172; see also 134, 154 
n. 7, 156 

Yarmouth, Countess of, see Amalie 
Walmoden 

York, Archbishop of, see Bobert 
Hay Drummond 

Yorke, Charles, refuses to vote 
against the preliminaries of peace, 
142 ; and John Wilkes, 161, 162 ; 
relations with Pitt, 165, 166, 
167, 199, 200, 208, 211 ; resigns 
the post of attorney-general and 
joins the opposition, 189, 190 ; 
and Wilkes' case in parliament, 
193-195; and parliamentary de- 
bates on general warrants, 197- 
200, 216 ; approached by the 
court, 202 ; breach with the 
opposition, 211, 214 ; appointed 
attorney-general in Bockingham 
ministry, 245, 246 ; promised 
the lord chancellorship by the 
king, 246 and n. ] ; and the 
declaratory act, 263 n. 2 ; re- 
fuses the secretaryship of state 
in 1766, 271; and election of 
high steward of the university 
of Cambridge, 297, 301 n. 2 

Yorke, John, 161 



322 



INDEX 



Yorke, Philip, first Earl of Hard- 
wicke, character and political 
opinions of, 12 ; offered presi- 
dency of the council by Lord 
Bute, 34 n. 1 ; consents to Bute 
becoming secretary of state, 36 ; 
and peace negotiations in 1761, 
44, 56 ; and in 1762, 118, 124 ; 
offered the privy seal, 85; attends 
cabinet council without office, 
85 ; ceases to attend cabinet 
council, 113, n. 2 ; and negotia- 
tions with Spain after Pitt's fall, 
94, 100 ; invited to return to 
the cabinet in 1762, 132 ; opposes 
preliminaries of peace, 136, 137, 
140-142 ; opinion on parlia- 
mentary privilege of freedom 
from arrest, 161 and n. 1, 168 ; 
opinion on legality of general 



warrants, 163 and n. 2 ; and 
negotiations with the king in 
1763, 168, 169, 173, 178, 179; 
his death, 201, 284, 286, 287 ; see 
also 41, 147, 167 

Yorke, Philip, second Earl of Hard- 
wicke, supports preliminaries of 
peace, 142 ; and Wilkes' case in 
parliament, 193,194; acandidate 
for the post of high steward of 
the university of Cambridge, 201, 
285-298 ; approached by the 
court in 1764, 202 ; refuses to 
take office in Rockingham min- 
istry, 247 ; refuses secretaryship 
of state, 271 ; takes a seat in 
the cabinet without office, 271 

Young Philip, bishop of Norwich, 
297 



3^77-2 



CAMBRIDGE \ PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 



